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Volume 2
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PREFACE

Contemporary German Philosophy (CGP) is projected as a yearbook following volumes reviewing the 1960–80 period. CGP is to be devoted principally to making available in English contributions to philosophical comprehension originating in German. The aim is in no sense to displace the German language as a medium for philosophical discourse, but to provide for the reader who is more at home with English some points of access to such of the more pivotal recent and contemporary contributions to philosophy originating in German as can lend themselves to this format.

In keeping with this objective, in the selection of articles to be published which shall have appeared in German, some preference is accorded to authors whose work for the most part has not as yet appeared in English. This preference shall not pertain with respect to Original Articles or to reviews, discussions, etc. Within these parameters, **CGP** is open to the full range of philosophical interests and orientations to which such philosophy in the German language as reflects cognizance of its historical roots importantly contributes. It is open as well to items of content which consider the bearings of insights within such allied fields as mathematics, political science, historiography, and linguistics upon philosophical issues. The term "contemporary" is intended to refer, not to any particular style of doing philosophy, but to philosophical literature of recent origin, occasionally reaching back as far as a decade or so. Approximately equal space is to be devoted to historical studies, theoretical philosophy, and practical philosophy.

CGP principally publishes:

(a) Original Articles (normally two in each issue): An Original Article may be especially prepared by the author of a major work which has appeared in German but not in English translation, this normally having been within four years of the selection, upon invitation of the Editors. The article shall be devoted primarily to the philosophical development or extension of some key idea or theme treated within the work, but it shall in no sense be a review, nor shall it be merely introductory in character. It may also be invited on the basis of a contribution to the philosophical discussion other than through the publication of a book.

(b) Articles which have appeared or are to appear in German.

(c) Reviews, review articles, discussions, and notes relating principally to selected major works which have appeared in German, these being for the most part by English language authors.

(d) Reviews, review articles, discussions, and notes relating principally to selected major English works, these for the most part having appeared in German.

(e) Announcements which may be of interest to English readers, including a listing of works originating in German which have recently appeared or are scheduled to appear in English translation.

Commensurate with its aim of publishing quality translations by persons with the philosophical and linguistic training prerequisite to particular assignments and the patience for direct collaboration with authors, **CGP** seeks by every means to accord suitable recognition to this demanding role. To this end it maintains a listing of philosophers with the requisite interest and skills for translating work by German language authors into English and with information pertaining to specific areas of special philosophical competence. It maintains a listing of information concerning projects for translating German philosophy into English, as well. Contributions to either of these listings are appreciated and information from them may be obtained by writing to the Coordinator, Darrel E. Christensen, Josef-Messner-Str. 28, A-5020 Salzburg, Austria. A request for information to be sent by air mail should be accompanied by a postal money order or U.S. stamps to cover postage costs.

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ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF COMMUNITY*

Eugen Fink †

Translated by Michael R. Heim

I

Any attempt to make a statement about human community must from the outset risk entrance into the high-tension field of "conflicting world-views."[1] We do not approach "sociality" in a calm and unbiased manner,

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* An address delivered in Cologne on July 16, 1953, and in Kiel on July 17, 1953. Previously published only in Spanish translation in *La Torre: Revista General de la Universidad de Puerto Rico,* 4 (1956), pp. 501-524, under the title "El problema del modo de ser de la communidad humana."

Eugen Fink was born in Konstanz on December 11, 1905 and died in Freiburg on July 25, 1975. He studied in Münster, Berlin, and Freiburg and received his doctorate in 1929. His doctoral dissertation, *Vergegenwärtigung und Bild: Beiträge zur Phänomenoligie der Unwirklichkeit,* was written under Edmund Husserl and appeared the following year in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung.* Fink was Husserl's assistant from 1928, and in 1938, he helped Professor Van Breda in saving Husserl's estate and bringing Husserl's library and manuscripts to Louvain where, in 1939, the Husserl Archives were founded. Fink worked at the Archives from 1939 until 1949, when he was appointed Professor Ordinarius for Philosophy and Education in Freiburg. Both Husserl and Heidegger were influential in Fink's work; Fink contributed to German philosophy an unusually concrete richness of detail, and his literary expression often evinces a unity of everyday life with the concerns of theoretical intelligence. His most important publications are: "Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik" (1933); *Zur ontologischen Frühgeschichte von Raum-Zeit-Materia* (1957); *Oase des Glücks. Gedanken zu einer Ontologie des Spiels* (1957); *Sein, Wahrheit, Welt, Vor-Fragen zum Problem des Phänomen-Begriffs* (1958); *Alles und Nichts. Ein Umweg zur Philosophie* (1959); Spiel als Weltsymbol (1960); *Nietzsches Philosophie* (1960); *Studien zur Phänomenologie, 1930-1939* (1966); *Metaphysik und Tod* (1969); *Epilog zur Dichtung* (1971); *Traktat über die Gewalt des Menschen* (1974); *Sein und Mensch. Vom Wesen der ontologischen Erfahrung* (1977); *Hegel, Phänomenologische Interpretationen der "Phänomenologie des Geistes"* (1977). A relatively complete bibliography of Fink's work was edited by F. W. von Hermann in 1970.

as if it were an object *alien* to us. It is not a factual, pre-given natural condition as are ant colonies, beehives, schools of herring, or wolf packs. People do not simply "live socialized"; they also reflect communality in their speaking with one another. And so language, *logos,* is not a neutral zone in which the community grasps itself in a static self-concept. Rather, it is the foremost domain in which community is summoned forth and brought into existence. In this public domain arise possible meanings of love and hate, friendship and enmity, work and domination, law and order. Language constitutes the element of "confrontation" as it prevails throughout each particular community in a different way, forcing a choice among basic orientations in socio-ethical life.

Language does not cover human bonds as if it were a coat of "meanings understood." It is not merely explicit custom; it is also very much the present, passionate debate concerning *how* the community *ought* to be. United through language, men relate themselves argumentatively to this unity. Because community is not a simple dowry of nature but something which must be first summoned, achieved, and realized, human life, as a life together, is disturbed by contentions about the best social order. Society is deafened by the dispute about the "social." This is evident in the *contemporary* situation, in which nations and whole continents are armed to the teeth to protect their own conceptions of social life, and in which "the Individual" and "the Collective" become emphatic war-slogans, and in which the pagan and the Christian once again stand in sharp opposition and the Western tradition is dimmed by the growing shadows of an emerging "nihilism." Political-ideological shouts of particular groups of true believers hardly allow any place in which it is yet possible to draw one's circles undisturbed.[ii] In ancient Athens, the legislators prescribed the death penalty for anyone who refrained from joining a party during the civil war; *apragmosyne* ("non-involvement") is outlawed today as well.

Human social life does not transpire outside of thought. It may indeed

i. Throughout this translation, only double quotation marks are used to indicate actual quotations, special sense, mention, and so on. This being the convention followed in the original German text, it has seemed preferable not to introduce distinctions in usage not found there.

ii. "Do not disturb my circles" was the request of Archimedes, who thus responded to the invading Roman soldiers when they threatened to kill him during the conquest of Syracuse in 212 B.C. Cf. *Valerius Maximus* (VIII, 7, 7).

seem that most people go on living "thoughtlessly" and passively take in the objective meaning-configurations of the social order as though these were "natural." These meaning structures are nonetheless the creations of active thought that has put the work of millenia into them. The socio-ethical world itself exists in the element of thought. To be sure, from the perspective of the natural sciences, the territory of humankind is a small, negligible corner, and man but a tiny realm among life-forms which, like mould, cover a small planet. Religion and philosophy taught us to think greater things of humankind: "In him God loved the world," says Christianity; and also metaphysical thought in the West orbits repeatedly around the preeminence of man over all other natural beings. We may then ask whether, should we wish to inquire "ontologically" into human society, traditional metaphysical thinking from the outset determines the procedure of inquiry. The history of metaphysics conditions our every action, desire, and thought. Each attempt at thinking is, from the start, embedded in the large stream of thoughts that are *realized*, thoughts surrounding us as forms of social order which shape our daily existence. Not in library books do old thoughts prove their power to prevail, but in the structures of the family, of the state, of law and community life, which actually penetrate us. "Society" is no simple, immediate "phenomenon," but is as such already permeated with, and gripped by, thought. Before it any "phenomenological description" falls short. The point is not to effect a thinking relationship to something simply given so as to penetrate it; rather, thoughts that have become incorporated into the recalcitrant material of the prevailing order are to be pulled back again into the fluid element of thinking.

We wish to formulate the problem of community as the question of human association, of human being-together. We are not concerned here with a program for social reform; the question, therefore, is not one of *how* the community *should* be. Our question is a more provisional one: What remarkable mode of "being" does one indicate with the words "*being*-together?" It is precisely this peculiar *mode of being* of human interaction which goes unilluminated whenever particular features of sociality are made thematic; one operates with an opaque and unexamined conceptual framework. There is a fundamental basis for this. It is one of the paradoxes of our existence that we live in constant alienation, that we do not properly recognize ourselves—and this not only when we lose ourselves in things so as to be taken in and preoccupied by them. Even the sharpest opposition of the "I" to the "external world" offers no guarantee that the mode of being of the "I" does not remain obscured by the overarching guidance of the thing-model. Human-being is the kind of being which knows of the basic domains of reality, which keeps apart the "regions" of things, which is expert in multiple thing-like modes of being even while it understands least of all its *own* kind of being: the kind which is itself the understanding of being.

Everyone is well acquainted with "community" as a phenomenon.

Everyone lives in many social forms, as a member of a family, of a nation, of a culture, with friends and enemies. Everyone is involved in the public, institutionalized intercourse of innumerable social roles that, through the gigantic apparatus of the modern state, have grown beyond our control. But human beings and human institutions are not the only components of the social world. Human-related features of things we look upon as being "non-human" also belong here. Trees, for example, are natural beings; they grow out of the soil of the earth into the free wind and light, and become useful in the context of human economic interests. Nature has traced streams and rivers, but man regulates, dams, and renders them navigable. We live in a constructed human settlement which was at one time won from the wilderness by human work. The seas have been sailed, deserts crossed, and the Ice Pole is a strategic outpost of great import. Even nature herself is covered by the traces of mankind; wherever there has been seeding and harvesting, the bones of many generations rot in the rich earth; the plow is pulled over sunken cities, and through our activity we contribute ever new alterations to the disfigured face of the earth.

What is brought about by these cooperative efforts? A place of dwelling, a human habitation, the *polis*, the "city." The wonderful plane-trees on the Ilissos could "teach" the wisest of the Greeks nothing, but surely men in the city could. And what is the city for Socrates? A conglomerate of houses and squares, temples and markets, streets and harbors? Is it a large utility item, used in common by a swarming mass of humanity, an instrument for life-support, where houses offer protection from heat and cold, where the market is the place in which goods and money are exchanged and town meetings and trials held, where porticos are used for sports and for thoughtful discussions, where the harbor serves to increase the wealth of citizens through trade and war-fleets? Is Athens like this for a Socrates, who seeks instruction? Does he understand man to be primarily a creature who employs things and seeks his own advantage? Is the city the sacred soil of the fatherland, the unchangeable borders in the hearts of those who are of native extraction, the bloody battlefield where friend and foe may fight, the resting-place of the dead? Is it what surrounds the consecrated area where the gods are present? Or, is the city an arena of ambition and will-to-power, of partisanship and civil war, the breeding-place of such beautiful and monstrous creatures as Alcibiades, the homeland of great, bigger-than-life men like Solon the Law-giver and Pericles the Statesman, in whose shadows there is also a homeland for many lesser men? Are those men closer to the life of the city who sell wisdom for gold, or those who find wisdom to be a priceless matter of the heart? Socrates wanted to learn from everyone, and he could learn from anyone. He probably received the most instruction from his own city, which unjustly condemned him.

The city shows itself in a multiplicty of images. The city is Socrates' instructor in the totality of its aspects of life; it is a matrix for multifarious

conceptions of life: life is one thing for merchants, another for generals; the life of the slave differs from that of the free man; the life of the native from that of the stranger, the Sophist's from that of the friend of wisdom. The city is the sum total of interpretations of life, these consisting not only in explicit "teachings," but also in lived-out attitudes and bearings, such as those of the carpenter in his workshop, the soldier toward the enemy, the ephebe (youth) on the track-field of competition. The carpenter lives in his world of carpentry and from this perspective understands the whole of life; he is also a husband and father, party-member in the civil war, and sometimes a thoughtful man as well. And he is open toward the life-perspectives of others. As a whole, the city is not an aggregate of different, complementary and sometimes also contradictory conceptions of life developed by the various classes and occupational groups of citizens; it is, rather, more primordially, a certain sense of the openness of life embracing and sustaining everyone; in it, everyone has a part without according the same meaning to the whole. The city is a total interpretation of human existence, a living that understands how to deal with life, in which each individual understands how to orient himself in his own fashion toward the life of the citizenry, toward the connection of classes and individuals and, finally, toward his own advantage and utility. The city subsists primarily as its openness to life; it is not simply a biologically structured system like an ant-hill. Even if ants had a "consciousness," their building structures would still not be a city, civil order. Essentially human is the self-relation that always relates to a *meaning* of life, and so always exists in the element of teaching and instruction in which everything done sets an example, whether good or bad. Humans instruct one another, even unintentionally. The communality of a city most fundamentally consists in a communally shared basic attitude toward human existence in all its central phenomena, and also in a comportment toward all that is. Such communality is essentially a mode of disclosure, a mode of living truth. Disclosure includes not only the occupation and business of the individual in his interaction with other occupations and classes, and with other ways of existence. It is above all an interpretation of what is good and just, of what is bad and ignoble, and of what constitutes honor and praise, victory or disgrace. The *polis* as *polis* is a form of teaching, the basic feature of human association. Each teaches the others how to live. Socrates tried to learn from everyone what *arete* (virtue) is, and whether and to what extent virtue is teachable knowledge. He did not hesitate to start with the skills of the weaver or saddle-maker in his penetrating, relentless inquiry into virtue, and no craft was, in his view, too trifling. He shed light upon, and understanding of, the question concerning the nature of virtue because he began with the good and shoddy as found in the production of craftwork—which he viewed in respect to the good and the bad as such—and then pursued to the highest goods and evils for the city as a whole. He did not thereby "utilize" a subsidiary model; he constantly

indicated that everything, even the *smallest* activities of the citizens of the city, is based upon the *highest* truth of the disclosed meaning of life. Socrates conceived of human community as an "ethical world."

II

Do we clearly understand the peculiar *mode of being* of association—of being together—when, in the social structure, we live together, love one another, fight with each other, care for one another, and strive to win each other.[iii] At first, association or "being-together" is probably more a bland, formal concept than a category which actually helps us understand. Is "the social" a network of formal relations concerning which the only important issue is whether the whole precedes the part, or the part precedes the whole? Communality is not extricated from the empty neutrality of merely structural relations by subordinating the "We" to the "I," the "I" to the "We," or by according them equal rank. Then, what in its deepest sense is human association, human being-together? Are we not usually guided by alien models inappropriate to the understanding of the peculiarly human mode of being? Indeed, only too frequently we are guided by a notion of being merely alongside of one another. The coexistence of objects seems more readily accessible to us; it has, however, difficulties of its own.

Let us try to make a few distinctions. On a mountainside is a debris slope. The mountain is *one* thing—an enormous, gigantic object of stone; on its slope lie many small pieces of stone, blasted out of the mountain, together with several chunks and decomposed rubble. Even at a glance we understand the debris to be fragmented bits of the mountain. What is now separated and scattered was at a previous time a unit. The proximity that the stone slabs have to one another is not accidental; the fragments of rock came from the mountain. They have come out of an earlier bond; and even now they belong to the mountain, constituting its rubble-covered surface. The litter of stones or other lifeless objects is taken as a background against which to contrast *other* kinds of association, other kinds of co-existence belonging to the living. But even scattered stones are not a matter easily grasped if we are inquiring into their mode of being. Are we already in possession of an adequate understanding of the lifeless things on hand, so

iii. *Miteinandersein* is rendered by "association" in apposition with "being-together," and is subsequently rendered sometimes with one, sometimes with the other, and sometimes with both. In order to avoid hyphenated concatenations that are strikingly unidiomatic in English, the present translation renders *das Nebeneinandersein* with "proximity to one another," *das Beieinandersein* sometimes with "co-existence," sometimes with "are together," "being with one another," or "assemblage of things." While the author does make playful variations on some of these expressions, I have avoided such equivalences as would appear ungainly rather than playful.

that it could serve as backdrop for our understanding of living existences? The rock fragments lie on the mountainside; their proximity to one another is exhausted by describing them in terms of extension on a spatial field, as a configuration of contiguous particular pieces. The pieces are taken to be fragmented bits of the mountain. They have the property of having been torn from what nevertheless still bears them as extracted pieces. The slabs are related to the mountain as the mountain itself is related to the earth. The mountains tower up, and in their towering achieve a definite form and particularity; thus becoming nameable, they are nonetheless set down in the ground of earth. As element, the earth still underlies everything that has emerged and broken off from it. Earth constantly exposes itself. Whatever seems to maintain a particularized form tears itself loose from the earth. But tearing itself away is not an escape. Earth supports all that has been broken off from it, offers it a place, provides a location and duration. The sum of all individual things cannot, by addition, render the element of earth, since it is prior to all fragmentation. Just as the stone slabs in the debris slope belong to the mountain, so do all mountains and valleys belong to the earth. Wherever, as in ancient Greece, the elemental character of earth is still appreciated, not only in the realm of the lifeless but in *all* individual things—in the realm of stones as well as plants, of animals as well as men—this element takes on the aspect of the Great Mother and appears as Demeter.

Another way in which particulars are together can be seen by considering the view of a group of trees. Trees in a group do not appear next to each other like stones on a mountain slope. Rather, they are involved with one another in such a way that each senses the life of the other; they group together so as to withstand storms, struggle for light and space for roots, and so on. Their proximity is one of living beings—a symbiotic bond. But tree trunks on a lumber stockpile are tree corpses, indifferent to one another. Or consider another image: a flock of crows winging its way through a gray winter sky. The flock is certainly composed of many individual birds. But their being with one another is more than the being-together of an accumulation of single birds. Animals experience their togetherness; they feel protected in the group, and their being bound to one another is intrinsic to their existence. Yet this kind of animal life-bond is something completely different from the sociality of humans who have an understanding of being. Plant and animal symbiosis is a kind of existing alongside of one another. Coexistence is the mode of being one tends to apply uncritically when trying to conceptualize the familiar phenomenon of human sociality. Not only do particular things of the same kind exist together, such as stones, trees, or animals; also, various kinds of things, such as the crow in the branches of the pine-tree growing out of the debris slope, can exist together. But what kind of being-together is the latter? Reality is not a heap of many diverse things which just happen to have been

blown together. Rather, all particular things appear in one and the same open range of being (*Spielraum des Seins*), in the world that provides a place and has time for them. But how, then, are we to understand the way in which the *world* and *things* are together? This belonging together of world and things, as the ground of the possibility of their being assembled in any particular instance, is prior to their every connection. But do we have models adequate to the clarification of the ontological structure of this relationship? Can *intra*-worldly relationships provide a perspective for determining the relationship between thing and world which is at all adequate? These questions are apparently irrelevant. And yet the entire explanation of human community remains under the sway of unanalyzed concepts, within a "blind" employment of categories belonging to the relation of things. And this is the case not merely where mechanistic or biological notions of the social bond are prevalent.

A new level of consideration seems to be reached where one no longer posits association as a static relationship in itself, where one no longer asks what characterizes the relation of lifeless and living things, and so on. Things are "together," one may assert, but the association of human beings is a *phenomenon of consciousness,* not a relationship that is there in itself. Being-together, as an existing together and being found together, is a form of connection of things, objects, but not the way in which subjects are connected. The human social bond is a "being for one another," a reciprocal activity of representation.[iv] Thus, the nature of man is sought in his subjectivity. And since the subject lives as a representing subject, the living community of men is interpreted to be an act of mutual representation, done by representing subjects. The problem of community becomes an analysis of what it is to experience another person. Behind this analysis lies a peculiar construal. The representing relation to the other person gets clarified through an analogy with the relation that an "I" achieves in representing itself. Just as the representing self, through reflection represents itself as a subject that represents things, so the "I" represents the other self as a representing subject. This "analogy" has considerable shortcomings; it can only be employed argumentatively so long as the analysis of the activity of representation remains rough and inexact. In truth, there is no genuine, sound analogy between reflection and experiencing another person. We usually do not fully articulate what it means: to represent one another. If I

iv. *Ein wechselseitiges Vorstellen* is "a reciprocal activity of representation." *Vorstellen* is rendered throughout by verbal and substantive forms of "to represent." The author is not developing a rigorous, fixed terminology, but is rather characterizing general trends of Idealist "metaphysics"; thus "representation" recalls Kemp Smith's English translation of the Kantian *Vorstellung* while not, however, coinciding with D. Cairns' systematic reservation of "representation" for the Husserlian *Darstellung* and *Gegenwärtigung* (cf. Cairns' *Guide for Translating Husserl,* p. 131).

represent another to myself, this does not mean that I imagine a corporeal object having a peculiar form not unlike that of my own body, which has a similar structure—and which results in the likely conclusion that, just as I control my body from within in movement and exist throughout it, so too under a similarly appearing corporeal object there must be such an "inward mover and experiencer," who, though hidden from my perception, betrays its presence by gestures that can only be understood through their similarity with my own bodily gestures. With means of such complexity, attempts have been made to establish a theory as to how one can experience another person. These were misguided. "I represent another" means primarily: I represent another who represents me, one who represents me "just as" I represent him. At the level of consciousness we are then of the same order, interwoven by the reciprocity of mutual presentation. This reciprocity has an inner infinity, an unending series of reflections of mutual relations in the reciprocity of mutual representation. I represent the other as one who represents me as representing him, and at the same time, I know that I am representing him in a way that he perceives me as an active representing that is represented by him, and so on. However, a represented activity of representing, which for its part represents the "I" that represents it, is a reiterative infinity which is inexhaustible. The ball bounces back and forth between both "I's" and never comes to rest; it is, as it were, the infinite depths of two mirrors placed opposite one another. In this notion of the reciprocal relation of representation as the supposedly genuine relationship of human communality—a notion which has never really been worked out—there is a primacy attributed to the immediately present other who happens to be in my perceptual field. The *absent* other, even the deceased other and one who has vanished from the field of visibility and perception, can preoccupy me infinitely more than my immediate contemporaries in space and time. To be sure, there is a rigorous consistency in the approach employing the representing relationship, a peculiar closure. It is almost a magic circle from which, once one is caught inside, it is difficult to escape.

Since Descartes's methodological recourse to the "*ego cogito,*" modern metaphysics has transformed the problem of being by giving emphatic primacy to knowing, perceiving, and representing. The entity is turned to show its aspect of being an object; categories, considered by the Ancients to be ontological determinations, are taken to be primarily the constitutive characteristics of objectivity. The subject-object relation forms the perspective for questions and explanations. The activity of representing, *cogitare,* becomes the prominent domain for problems, insofar as all problems are formulated mainly as problems in and of consciousness. But the being of *being*-conscious (*Bewusst-seins*) itself becomes less and less questioned and determinate. "Being" as such is suppressed into a mere modality of representation, is taken to mean "being posited"—the *positum* of a conscious *positio.* All theories of "community" which attempt to clarify

human association by using the key of representational "being for one another" are dominated by this modern metaphysic.

If the models we have discussed all prove inadequate, what then is the true, genuine meaning of human association? In a way, we have already suggested one: human association is the ethical world of a *polis* steeped in the element of "teaching." A human being is a citizen of a city, a state, and a culture because, according to his own being, he is a citizen of the *cosmos*—the only being between heaven and earth who relates himself to the whole universe. Human openness to the world must be conceived as the basis of all forms of community, of all social structures. This thesis must now be clarified.

III

Human beings do not gather in communities like non-relating stones, nor like the plants that sense one another, nor like animals perceiving each other. Neither are they gathered as conscious subjects mutually representing each other. Human association *does not primarily* have the character of a relationship between various beings. It is, above all else, an *activity* of sharing a world with others. The determinate forms of cities and nations emerge out of the specific relation of man to the world. Humans do not only live *in* time and float in its stream as all other finite things. Man *relates to time as time,* and he does this not merely through his "theoretical understanding." He feels in the marrow of his bones the pain of transience, the rapidly drifting flight of the seasons as they bring everything forth and then take it away. Stones, trees, and animals are all in time, torn away in its consuming wake. They are born in time, grow, weaken, and vanish; in it, they have their rise and decline, their rush and tranquility. Humans relate to their own passing, know of flourishing and wasting away, know hours and years, know of the past and sense the future as they live in the present, know yesterday and tomorrow in today. Man provides, plans, invents projects, sows, harvests, gathers into his barns, works in the sweat of his brow and anticipates his death. Not only is he acquainted with his own death; he is also aware of the death of his fellow-humans. He even understands the possibility of killing, and knows the gain in power that comes from the taking of another's life. He preserves the memory of his ancestors, lives in pious regard for the deceased, and from the depth of the Underworld brings consecration to his daily life in the Upperworld. Space is not primarily a neutral system of positions, distances, and places. In a more primordial sense it is nearness and farness, homeland and foreign country, the soil of the fatherland and the enticing distance of lands far away, the uninhabitable wilderness or the settlement won from the wilderness by hard work. Space is the blue width of the arching heavens, the immense stillness of broad-breasted earth, or the tossing of distantly shimmering seas. Our

understanding of being is not identical with a mere knowledge of being, but signifies an ambiguous, incessant dealing with all that is. Whatever passes for a "being" is blown by the icy wind of "nothingness," it is questionable, suspect, dubious. We find ourselves in need of searching for being and for something enduring—a dependable being; we feel a need to look for "the highest being most properly so called," to track down "the Absolute" in the restless search of conceptual thought, and also in every practical deed. Such conduct is at the same time human "grandeur" and human "misery." It is shot through with a need, the *need* in which we become *exposed.* No longer protected in the motherly womb of nature as is the animal, man, estranged and exposed, relates himself to the whole of things. He is exposed to the unconcealedness of beings, but is not on this account at home in the light of being as are the gods. Rather, he dwells in twilight, in shadows where light and dark intermingle. He has a premonition of the pure brightness among the heavenly ones, for want of which he suffers pain. He is open to so much of being that he is troubled and distraught by the longing to search for it. He has access to just so much of time that the terrors of transience grip his heart, and yet he does not comprehend what it is that takes him away, and how he has become the prey of a relentless gnawing. He is acquainted with space to the extent that nearness and farness constrain him, but the pure essence of the polarity between homeland and foreign land, between familiarity and uncanniness, remains hidden from him. We are all like the unhappy son of Laius, like Oedipus the parricide and defiler of his mother; our understanding extends far enough to be able to behold our existence as an incomprehensible Sphinx. Even where man is pursued by seemingly "animal" wants, where he eats and drinks and procreates, there reverberates in these "needs" one and the same *basic need of our want of being.*

Relating to being, time, and space is not merely a "matter of ideas," or of theoretical knowledge. In his behavior permeated by need, man constructs an "abode" in the midst of beings; he builds a house and lights a flame on the hearth, fashions a table and bed, casts a plow and sword, and makes cradle and coffin. Perhaps nothing characterizes man's finitude so well as his dependence on these "necessities." Gods need neither house nor lair, neither tools and machines nor weapons. But man is situated between the familiar and the uncanny; he needs the sheltering house; he must eat his bread in the sweat of his brow, and needs the table and the plow. As mortal, he must hand down his life through the embrace of love, and needs bed, cradle, and coffin. He must establish himself in a stable order of life, fighting for the law even more than for the walls of the city, and thus he needs the sword. In such "necessities" are manifest elemental phenomena of our existence: dwelling, love and death, work and domination. Of course this is not a complete ennumerative catalogue of basic phenomena. There are many other essential dimensions of our existence. For example, we

relate to the divine and to those departed, we pour them the libation, and celebrate festivities in commemoration of them. Hence we need the jug and the lyre; we need play and poetry.

The "necessities" are not understood when conceived only as *techne onta,* as works of production, as creations of human hands whereby considerable pride may be inferred for man's demonstration of his creativity in manufacturing things. In so doing, humans do show a pre-eminence over the animal. A swallow's nest is not a house, not a creation of spiritual freedom. True, even man is not entirely free in producing things. He is dependent on plastic material, and to guide the shaping process he is dependent on a fore-glimpse of the *eidos,* that is, of the essentials of whatever is to be produced. In his becoming involved with, and committed to, material and form there is a play of creative freedom. Man, to be sure, produces "the necessities," building houses, making tables. But does he thereby also make the horizons of meaning in which such artificial things are then located? Essential here is not the imitation of the original ideal jug in innummerable earthen jugs, but rather the preceding, understanding openness of human existence toward "need" and "the necessities." In producing such things man is in each case bent on "averting" (*wenden*) a manifest need. Averting is not removing or annihilating. The basic needs of our existence cannot be annihilated. In averting, the need remains, only in a different way. The house does not annihilate uncanniness. In its very protectiveness, it is related to what is uncanny. The question of being is not extinguished by the work of conceptualization. The inscrutability of the *deus absconditus* is not removed in his "revelation," nor is the magic of love and the attraction of death removed by the song of the poet. The human device of averting needs is constantly in decay; whatever he does, man builds on sand, whether he founds states or religions. The futility of human achievement is, if correctly understood, no objection to such activities. They are not therefore "meaningless," but are a continuous aversion of a recurrent need.

Things like house, table, and bed avert (*wenden*) human need (*Not*). They are necessary (*not-wendig*) for us. We need them. They are useful. Sometimes a brilliant flash of meaning comes over these simple, everyday things. Indeed, we usually no longer perceive this flash. A thick dust-film has settled on them, the dust of conventionality (*Selbst-verständlichen*). We then evaluate them as items of utility—as useful, serviceable, disposable. Table and bed then become simply pieces of furniture. But whence comes the usefulness of using such things? There is no disputing the fact that such an aspect of usefulness has its justification; but it is doubtful whether this is the predominant aspect of things. The table *is* the place for meals. The meal is a ritual, perhaps the oldest there is. By eating and drinking, mythic man celebrates his assimilation of the earth; he enjoys in bread and wine the gifts of the soil and of the light. Nature herself is present wherever

two or three persons are gathered together for a meal. The religious, ritual celebration of the meal does not mean a transcendence of an everyday life-process; the table is originally an altar and sacrificial stone—and only when the original meaning becomes attenuated does religion have to put these simple, symbolic things into the realm of "similitudes." Perhaps in the farmer's environment there is still a weak glimmer of the essential depths of meaning contained in simple things. In origin, eating and drinking are always a feast, and feasts are the presence of the divine—not an isolated amusement of man fallen from all relationship with world. Work and feasting, the labor of the field and refreshment with food and drink, visible men and invisible gods, all come together at the table. The table is not a mere utility item to be used for some purpose; it is a thing around which humans assemble so as to experience their assembling in a *world* which assembles. In dividing and passing food and drink, the partakers share in the meal and thus in a common world. The table becomes the place for an explicit relation to world. To be sure, the table is for the most part hidden in its elemental nature, levelled in the neutral context of utility items. But it *can* shine forth in its true nature—as the place of ritual where humans celebrate the sacrament of the earth, and where they absorb the juices of life. In this way they are kept for a moment in the daylight of the Upperworld, but they also commemorate their ancestors and hope for future generations. They know their present to be surrounded with the past of the deceased, who were their fathers and mothers. And a bed is more than a simple piece of furniture, more than an arbitrary part of household equipment. It *can* manifest itself in its meaning as the resting-place for nightly sleep, where nature takes her estranged child once again to her heart; as the nuptial bed where man and wife unite, in which the woman in labor gives birth and the eyes of the dying grow dim. The bed is the place of eternal mysteries of love, birth, and death. It would by myopic to raise the objection that the table and the bed are in themselves indifferent objects which get a "meaning" attached to them afterwards on account of the basic processes of our lives which transpire around them. Those basic processes *need* a "locus"; they cannot occur at all without "a place." They must take place in things. The table belongs to the meal which assembles humans in a relationship to the earth, and to the heavenly ones; the bed belongs to loving, giving birth, and dying. Table and bed are two examples of necessities that can suddenly flash through the usual distortions with an infinite significance, and that can point to dimensions of meaning which do not only reside in what is manifest and contemporary, but which also reach down to the hidden and subterranean. Table and bed are things that stand before us and which are yet not exhausted by their immediate appearance. They are present and simultaneously expose regions of the absent and of the unperceivable. What is perceivable becomes a "sign," a

symbol—not of finite things signifying other finite things, but of things signifying *world.* They then unite humans. Human communication is not grounded in "just happening to be next to one another," nor in a sensing of one another, nor in a reciprocal staring at one another. Communication arises from an assembling relationship to the world. The necessities are only a locus of such a relationship.

We have attempted to bring these necessities into view in order to obtain an *ontological model* for human association which would not be based upon the relations obtaining *between* objects, nor upon the relations between subjects who reciprocally represent one another. Human communities are communities of love, work, and authority—communities of a creature that suffers need, who is dependent on necessary things. Where things suddenly turn into genuine symbols, men recognize themselves as participants in the same world. Where, however, things do not disclose their "world-depth," there human life at best transpires within a tradition which, although darkened, yet maintains itself for a time; but the unifying joints are likely to break and crumble. The table, as we said, assembles human beings for the meal, unites the partakers in what is communal. However, the suiters who caroused in the house of Ulysses were not "united." They were blind and did not recognize the beggar at the threshold of the hall, because they did not even recognize one another as men of a single world. Each lived for himself, only concerned with winning the princess and the wealth of her house. They no longer possessed things with "world-depth." And it was not merely on account of the weakness of their arms that they were unable to draw the bow, but also on account of the weakness of their isolated and indifferent existences. The suspicion of a deeper reality occurred to them only when the bow in the beggar's hand sang "brightly as the chirp of swallows." Ulysses and Telemachus, however, had a true world in their bloody task of slaughter; they formed a genuine community. To them the bow, sword, and lance were more than useful equipment; these weapons were the world-disclosing messengers of death for the atonement of their house, for the re-establishment of home and rulership.

IV

The ontological problem of human community is extremely difficult, particularly because categories derived from objects prove to be just as inapplicable to it as do the categories derived from the activity of persons. In numerous theories of understanding or communication, a schema that contrasts persons with things is operative. Current opinion has it that there are in the last analysis only persons and things, the latter being of two types—those that exist of themselves, and those that are made by persons. By reshaping given objects, persons make artificial things, imbue a given material with meaning. This meaning exists first "inside" the person and is

then "externalized" in the realm of things. Other persons, being likewise capable of "externalizing," can for their part "internalize" the meaning. This oscillating exchange of externalization-internalization is supposed to supply an "intersubjective understanding" which underlies the entire sphere of culture. Such notions did not first arise in the subjectivistic theorems of the nineteenth century, where God was finally reduced to the inwardness of the heart, and where the work of art was construed as an inadequate expression of the artistic soul. The misunderstanding of understanding has deeper roots. In the last analysis it depends on the *metaphysically* conceived distinction between person and thing, a distinction which is only a variant of the opposition of spirit and nature, freedom and necessity, and of idea and sense-object. This metaphysical horizon is still almost entirely definitive for the concept of man, even in cases where, in defiance of metaphysics, a more "realistic" anthropology is attempted. But is man in his essential core a "person," "freedom," "freely self-determining reason?" Does his sensuousness, which is also somehow inherent in him, have the character of being non-essential, a "mere appearance," that which must be overcome, and the like? Are human communities really based on a contract of persons, and does the sensual serve merely as a means for mediation? Let us try to avoid the schema of persons and things. The central phenomena of our existence, and the basic structures of community supported by them, cannot be treated adaequately from the standpoint of a metaphysical opposition between persons and things.

In a brief, little-noticed writing of 1786, Kant offers some reflections on "The Probable Beginnings of Human History." In his own manner he recounts the biblical narrative of the Fall into Sin. It would be naive, however, to want to see in this only a rewriting of a holy revelation in the languge of "Enlightenment"; rather, Kant develops basic features of human-being from it, and designates these: language, care, consciousness of death, shame, work, and authority. These phenomena are for him the major phenomena of ethicality. But in Kant, the *interpretation* of the ethical world occurs under the spell of the metaphysical distinction between persons and things. This becomes most evident in his interpretation of the kind of community from which all life arises. Eros forms the first community. The realm of the erotic is the fundamental problem of any social philosophy. In what Kant says concerning the ethicality of Eros, we have before us a classical case of that moral conception which develops the ethical problem through the opposition of nature and freedom, spirit and sensuous life. He treats the sexual community in the *Metaphysics of Morals.* The love-bond of man and wife can be both a natural and legal relationship. For Kant, the legal relationship of marriage is alone moral, compatible with the dignity of man, with a being that is reasonable—that is, with a person. As a free being oppressed by sensuous drives, as a sensibility mixed with reason, as a spiritual creature disturbed by animal corporeality and animal

needs, man is basically regarded as a bipartite creature. He belongs to two kingdoms, to the kingdom of nature, the *mundus sensibilis,* and the kingdom of freedom, the *mundus intelligibilis.* He is a citizen of the spiritual kingdom of reasonable beings, and he also belongs to the animal kingdom in his sensuously-appearing nature; he is a "person," and also a "thing." In a certain sense, Kant radicalized the traditional metaphysical dualism insofar as he injected into man himself the whole opposition of the sensible and the intelligible realm. Man becomes a centaur—half spirit, half creature of the senses. This viewpoint guides the Kantian interpretation of marriage. It is a legal relationship of a remarkable kind. Kant classifies it as the "personal right of the *ad rem* sort," and it is a right to the possession of an external object as a thing and the use of the same as a person. And he defines sexual communality as the "mutual employment a human makes of another's sexual organs and powers . . . ." This definition has scandalized not only small but also great minds; yet it is only the rigorous consequence of distinctions which still enjoy our highest regard. The natural, lawless sexual union is, for Kant, not a genuine human possibility; it is "animal-like," and it is only an abstract moment which provides natural material to serve as the basis for the ethical structure of marriage. He defines marriage as "the union of two persons of the opposite sex for a life-long, mutual use of their sexual properties." He further describes the conception of children as non-constitutive for the meaning of marriage. This would be only its natural goal, nature having planted in the sexes an attraction toward each other for the sake of reproducing the species; but the intention to further this natural aim is not requisite for the legality of the marriage union. For him, marriage is motivated by the natural drive toward pleasure. Lust drives male toward female and *vice versa;* and this lust, according to Kant, is mutually directed toward the partner's sexual organs.

> It is also under the supposition that lust for the mutual use of sexual properties is the basis of marriage that the marriage contract is not merely arbitrary, but one which is necessary by the law of mankind. This means that if man and woman wish to enjoy each other in their sexual properties, they must necessarily marry each other, and this is necessary according to the laws of right according to pure reason.

Kant tries to show this necessity in a peculiar genealogy in which the reasonable sense of marriage arises when the freedom of the person is violated, and following this violation, freedom is restored. Insofar as a human being gives himself over to another for pleasure, he makes himself a "thing." The passivity of surrender is already an antecedent concession of the free person to his own natural impulse. In the act of erotic surrender, says Kant, "a human being makes himself into a thing, which violates the right of mankind to his own person." Only as marriage can sexual com-

munity be ethical. "This is possible only under the one condition, that while one person is acquired by the other as a thing, the former equally again acquires the latter. In this way they regain themselves and re-establish their personhood." From this brief look at Kant's interpretation of marriage, it is already clear that he explains erotic communality completely from the viewpoint of the dualistic distinction between person and thing, and with unprecedented rigor thinks through the centaur concept of a half-spiritual, half-sensuous human being. Can Kant's view be maintained? Must the surrender of lovers be a self-degradation, a reduction to the status of a thing?

What we find dubious is that the antitheses of traditional metaphysics are sufficient to clarify basic social phenomena. With Kant, the formation of a community in marriage is motivated by the natural inclination of man to be a sexual creature, something which ties him to the animal domain. Driven by his animal nature, he seeks satisfaction in bodily pleasure; the deepest inner bond between humans gets founded in the animal element of sexuality. This bond cannot be purely one of freedom with freedom—something only more blessed spirits could achieve. For us children of the earth, steeped in the muddy element of the sensuous that holds us prisoner as long as we draw breath, it is not possible. It is due to the animal element in us that the basic form of community, marriage, transpires in such a way that two persons mutually reduce each other to objects. Basically, this implies a degradation of the free person. Because the freedom of the partners can be reconstructed through the reciprocity of life-long possession, this does not entirely destroy the person. To reason, it remains an incomprehensible fact—which injures the free dignity of reason—that the continuation of the human species, the very earthly existence of free persons, is at all connected with this peculiar function of copulation. Kant says: "It is impossible to have any idea of how the reproduction of a free being takes place through a physical process . . . . " Sexuality then belongs to what is merely animal in man, it does not touch his essential core. Grasped in his essence, man is a rational person, neither male nor female. Viewed from a Kantian perspective, masculinity and femininity are mere facts of phenomenal nature, not metaphysical determinations of man himself.

V

In the field of speculative thought, Hegel was probably the first to turn against this Kantian notion which expresses the legacy of traditional dualistic metaphysics in the antithesis of person and thing. He understood that freedom is not the only possibility for ethical communality. Those human communities which are fundamentally *unions brought about by will* rest on freedom and on that which is achieved by freedom. Such unions include states, institutions, organizations in general, and even institutions in which the foundational relationships will refer to the more primordial ties

of blood, such as marriage and the family. Such structures of freedom do not represent some shaping of an indifferent raw material, of the animal nature in man, but alterations of a much older ethicality, that of *piety.* An enormous tension permeates both realms of human behavior. There is no peaceful co-existence between them, and they are in constant conflict. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* Hegel designates them the "divine law" and the "human law." The "divine law" is the law of the earth and of the subterranean, the ethicality of blood-ties, piety towards life, wherein the primordial unity of Pan is still felt. "Human law" is the moral realm of deeds, of individuation, of self-assertion. The will explodes the tranquil foundation of life, and the day of history dawns as the realm of freedom. But the pretemporal is not thereby entirely annihilated. It becomes a suppressed basis, the indeterminate ground into which determinations and differences are engraved. The ethical world of blood-ties, of clan and kin, is overpowered by the world of freedom, just as the Titans of deep earth were overcome by the Olympian divinities of light. The Olympians, however, could rule only so long as they closed off the Titans in Tartarus. Thus the copresence of the vanquished belongs to the victory of freedom; human law lives from its opposition to divine law, and freedom lives from its opposition to blood.

There is no reconciling this opposition. For this reason, Hegel illustrates it by Ancient Tragedy. The right of day is counterposed to the right of night. Antigone violates the law of the state which forbids the burial of the enemy of the state. She obeys the voice of blood: with the dust she throws over her dead brother, she protects him in the formless realm of the Underworld. She returns the broken man to a state of wholeness wherein differences no longer matter. But Creon too is in the right when he consigns the transgressor (Antigone) to death. Hegel clarifies the tragic tension between the two ethicalities of divine and human law by way of the opposition of male and female. In so doing he obtains a speculative definition of the duality of human sexuality. Inasmuch as the woman, more than the man, still remains open to the bearing, protecting, and sheltering nature of earth, she corresponds to the cosmic power that is prior to all individuation. Inasmuch as the male is the doer, action-oriented, maker and maintainer of distinctions, he corresponds to the cosmic power which bifurcates, distinguishes, and sets in opposition—he corresponds to the light. And though everything arises as a "mixture" of light and dark, of heaven and earth, of *peras* and *apeiron* (to use Plato's cosmic metaphors), the human being is not, like every other being, a half-breed knowing nothing about his "parents." He is the one and only being that knows about the mixture as such and knows the *rizomata panton,* the roots of all things. For this reason, the primordial bond, on which all bonds among humans are based, is the bond between humans disunited in the discord of the sexes and the discordant world. The problem of community is first and foremost a problem of *world.* Hegel's insight into the world-based dwelling of man, and

into the resulting tension between the so-called "natural" and "historical" forms of community, opens entirely new vistas of social-philosophical thought. It especially provides a more profound conception of the peculiar *dialectic* that is immanent within all structures of the human ethical world as its moment of unrest. And this is not only true of the erotic community of love and marriage. It holds as well for the community of work and domination, and also for the ambiguous nature of death, which tears humans from one another and yet binds them together in another way, separating the living and reuniting them with the departed. And all these various kinds of community permeate one another. The relationships of work and domination are touched on all sides by the more hidden relationships to love and death.

We have not contributed a conclusive answer to the question: What indeed *is* human association, human being-together? On the contrary, by doubting the validity of categories taken from objective things or from representing subjects, and by remaining skeptical about any application of the metaphysical schema of "person" and "thing," we have only been driven farther from any definite direction. Perhaps we have thereby awakened an awareness of the problem. We do not raise questions about community out of some empty obsession with doubting; community is something for which everyone longs. Even those who seemingly "have no needs" need community; no one is so self-sufficient that he does not need his fellow-man. In the clear, terse language of Aristotle:

> For nothing is more characteristic of friends than associating with one another. Material assistance is desired by those who are in need, but spending the day together is something which even the very happy want.[v]

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v. *Nic. Ethics,* Bk. VIII, 1157b20. This is cited by the author in the original Greek: *Ouden gar houtos estin philon hos to syzen. Opheleias men de hoi endeeis oregontai, synhemereuein de kai hoi makarioi . . . .*

THE GROUNDING OF KNOWLEDGE ON EXPERIENCE: A CRITICAL CONSIDERATION OF JOHN LOCKE

Lorenz Krüger

Translated by Kenneth L. Heiges

I

In the recent discussion about the correct philosophical interpretation of science, a great deal has been said for and against empiricism. Since the days of the Vienna Circle (in Germany, to be sure, only since 1945), many have held it to be *the* epistemological position which could finally bring clarity and critical self-restraint to the claims and expectations which are everywhere attached to the sciences. To others, empiricism appears to be a disastrous error, because they regard it as obstructing the way to that interpretation of science and, accordingly, also to that scientific practice, which society needs for its progress towards a better life.

I am convinced that much of the controversy about empiricism derives from a restriction of the underlying concept of experience which is, admittedly, understandable but in no way compelling. Further, I think that precisely this restriction must also be held responsible for most of the internal difficulties and incongruities in the varieties of empiricism which have been prevalent up to now.

"The concept of experience"—as H. G. Gadamer once put it—"is among the least-clarified of the concepts which we possess."[1] Accordingly, I will in this paper be concerned to contribute something to its clarification, particularly with the purpose of showing that at least a part of the current controversy about the empirical character of the non-formal sciences (*Realwissenschaften*) is superfluous, and can only be a source of error, because it proceeds from an unfortunately distorted concept of experience—and, accordingly, also from a distorted concept of empiricism. I

1. H. G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode* (2nd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1965²), p. 327.

would like to work out and illustrate my discussion of this by means of some problems in the philosophy of John Locke, the first to conceive the epistemological position which can be called empiricism in the narrower sense; since his time, the continuity of this philosophical tradition has remained unbroken and—thanks especially to Hume—of continuing interest. While in Locke the difficulties of empiricism do indeed stand out clearly, the foundation upon which their solution can be sought has, however, not yet been abandoned.

II

I should first like to present a short, informal preliminary discussion of the concept of experience, and indicate how the restriction of this concept, which I have mentioned, came about. Then I will turn to the thesis that two defects in the restricted concept have, in essence, brought about the problems in Locke's philosophy, and especially the problems in the philosophies of the empiricists who followed him; these are the characteristics of (*a*) egocentricity and (*b*) passivity, which are attributed to the phenomenon of experience. I will discuss in turn the following five problems arising from them: (*i*) the interpretation of the system of what Locke designates as 'simple' ideas; (*ii*) a paradox in the definition of the basis of the system of ideas, or of the "given"; (*iii*) the problem of the objectivation of experience; (*iv*) the question about the experience of faculties or of dispositions; and finally (*v*) the problem of scepticism about reality. In all five cases, I hope to be able to show that a solution to the problems—both taken as problems of Locke's philosophy and as problems in their own right—becomes possible when one takes as a basis an adequate concept of experience, within which the characteristics of passivity and egocentricity have been overcome.

III

What do we understand by 'experience'? I should like to distinguish four meanings, and to develop them successively out of one another:

(i) In the singular, the word 'experience' is often used in the sense that someone "has experience" of, or "is experienced" with, or in, something—thus that he is familiar with something and is accustomed to dealing with it, because he has already had something to do with it previously. In this sense, most of the activities of life, from profession and sport up through political and private life, generally require experience. The experienced person has learned for the future from the past. Experience in this first sense is being-at-home with something, a capacity to deal with it in a suitable way; ἐμπειρία has already been brought into connection with δύναμις by Aristotle.[2]

2. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A 1. 981a.1.

(*ii*) In a second usage, which is also current in everyday speech, we employ the plural of the word 'experience' and speak of someone as "having experiences" (in the sense of "going through experiences"). Here, we are thinking about good and bad experiences, of success or failure, from which "our experience" in the singular is formed. Experience here denotes the usually surprising *Erlebnis,* significant with regard to purposes and expectations; its memory remains active and can become an element in future orientation. Aristotle uses the term μνήμη that is, 'remembrance.'[3]

(*iii*) These first two meanings of the word 'experience' have in view especially the purpose of that which is so designated, and thus what experiences, or the experience growing out of them, is good for in general. This suggests the question about what distinguishes experience(s) specifically from other kinds of attitude or behavior that are adequate to reality, for example, a correct anticipation or an intention that is appropriate in a given situation. This question directs our attention to the aspect of surprise in every experience, which we have already mentioned. An experience is instructive because in it, something is expressed which only "happens to" him who experiences which he receives, which is free (or at least should be kept free) from his own contribution. Moving in this direction, our philosophical reflection leads to a third meaning of experience, which, in a way, renders precise what is essential: Experience is perception. Only when this has been made clear does it become understandable how we can hope to get unfalsified knowledge of the world from our complex contact with it. Aristotle can once again be cited here as a witness who ascribes experience to memories, and defines these as perceptions which perdure.[4]

(*iv*) It now appears natural to add a further step in order to make the last meaning of 'experience' still more precise: Perception is a cognizing of reality which is often directed, selectively and interpretively, by memories and expectations; and it is thus often overdirected—as anyone who has, for example, sought and overlooked misprints in the proof-sheets for a printed text knows. The element which actually begets experience must then be sought in that impression which is given before all revisionary processing—that is, (and this is the fourth meaning of 'experience'), in the sensation which is registered without falsification, or which is received in complete passivity. <Here, habit, intention (and so on) do not contribute to the contents of the perception.> Aristotle here offers us the "special" sensory qualities, such as color for the eye.[5] But the tendency, in refining the con-

3. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* B 19, *Metaphysics* A 1; W. T. Krug, *'Erlebnis,'* entry in his *Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften,* Vol. 5 (Leipzig: Brockhaus 1838), p. 370.
4. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* B 19. ("Thus sense-perception gives rise to memory, as we hold, and repeated memories of the same thing give rise to experience.")
5. Aristotle, *De Anima* B 6.

cept philosophically, to interpret experience as sensation really becomes clear only with Locke's successors, such as in Condillac or Hume, and finally even in Kant, when he says that sensation is that "which . . . constitutes the distinctive difference between empirical and *a priori* knowledge."[6]

Kant himself, to be sure, combines this sharply-reduced definition of the properly empirical with a comparatively rich concept of experience, to which all the conditions of its possibility also belong. But, as is well known, he regards all the elements entering into these conditions as being *a priori;* in particular, to the extent that they include human activity, they are defined by him as spontaneity of the pure understanding, and not as action. The absence of a more complete account of the phenomenon of experience, conversely, provides the occasion to add something from supposedly other sources, *a priori* human faculties, to the foundation of empirical knowledge—which, defined as sensation, has been defined all too leanly. In this way, the sweeping philosophical consequences of the restrictive defining of the concept of experience become clearly visible. At the same time, his statement cited above reflects what stands behind this restriction: it is the search for the given, for the reality which is unfalsified by human influence. Three sorts of interests play a role here: (*a*) an ontological interest: to cognize that which is *as* it is in itself; *(b)* an epistemological interest: to secure that which is common to, and thus binding in, all evaluative interpretataions by removing or specifying our active contributions, and thereby to secure valid knowledge; and *(c)* a methodological interest: to make clear that order in which the material of cognition of the world is separated from the principles of its assimilation, and accordingly in which the construction of human cognition is laid out in a transparent and verifiable manner. Directed by these sorts of interests, the question about knowledge becomes a question about the basis of knowledge as that which is given; and just here it also overshoots its target in the analysis of the concept of experience.

IV

What has been the result of the philosophical tendency we have depicted here towards determining that which is properly empirical in experience? Experience was understood as the effect of reality upon an individual man—that which confronts him and is only passively registered by him. In this way, the two characteristics of egocentricity and passivity which have

6. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft,* B 208/209; or *Critique of Pure Reason,* trans. Norman Kemp Smith (Toronto: Macmillan, 1929), p. 202; see also the *Prolegomena* §24; or *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics,* trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis/New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1950). Notwithstanding the very different theory of experience and knowledge which Kant develops, the core of his concept of experience is sensory affection, where we are strictly receptive and thus passive.

already been mentioned became attached to the concept of experience. This consequence occurred even in some authors who did not share or shared only in part, the restrictive interpretation of experience as sensation; further, it also appeared in authors who did not at all advocate a pure empiricism (that is to say, an empiricism which rejects synthetic *a priori* principles). Kant's account of the proper distinguishing feature of the empirical has already been cited. While Bertrand Russell, like Kant, believed it necessary to go beyond empiricism in order to explain the incontrovertible fact of our science, he has, on the other hand, still constructed his whole theory of knowledge on the concept of experience as immediate familiarity-with ("knowledge by aquaintance").[7] And, finally, it is characteristic for Locke that, in laying the foundations for his theoretical philosophy, he did not distinguish terminologically between experience, on the one hand, and observation or perception, on the other.

> Whence comes it [the mind] by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge: To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself.

And then he continues without transition:

> Our *observation* employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds *perceived* and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all materials of thinking [my emphasis].[8]

I should, in passing, like to make a comment which seems to me to be important: the concentration of modern epistemology (of whatever school) on immediate perception has two further sources in addition to the development of the notion of experience already depicted. One is the classical tendency, existing since Plato's time, to bring knowledge into close connection with observation and seeing, if not even to interpret it metaphorically as perception;[9] the other is the conviction, deriving from Descartes, that, to begin with, only that which is given in my consciousness, as such, has the necessity or certainty of being true which is traditionally required for the honorific title 'knowledge.' With Locke, anyway, we find this confidence in experience together with the Cartesian certainty-principle, and we can see

7. Cf. especially Bertrand Russell, "On the Nature of Acquaintance," in *Logic and Knowledge,* ed. R. Marsh (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956), pp. 127-174.
8. John Locke, *Essay* II. I. §2.
9. *Ibid.* IV. I. §2.

how this combination could, understandably, bring him and the philosophers following in his tradition to understand experience as being precisely only the immediate conscious having of involuntary ideas (that is, ideas not produced by the perceiver).[10]

Following this short excursus, I should like to take up, in order, the problems indicated above (in Part II) and their relations with the concept of experience.

V

To begin with, I will turn to Locke's taxonomy of what he calls 'simple' ideas. This—gathered together from various passages of Book I of his *Essay*—would look something like this:


simple idea
sensory perception
inner perception (reflection)
of one sense ("special-sense object")
of more than one sense ("common-sense object")
of all sense and reflexion together
of reflection alone

Colours	Extention	Pleasure	Thinking
Sounds	Figure	Pain	Perceiving
Smells	Rest	Power	Willing
Tastes	Motion	Existence	
Solidity		Unity	
Hardness			
Cold			

My question is: What does this taxonomy tell us about the concept of experience which here is, or should have been, taken as fundamental? In seeking an answer to this question, one has to bear in mind that, according to Locke, simple ideas are contents of consciousness which appear involuntarily and immediately, and, as such, they cannot be further analysed or

10. Experience is defined as perception (II. I. §2), and perception as the conscious having of ideas (II. I. §9) which have to be involuntary (II. I. §23 and §25).

altered.[11] Now, if we look at the column on the far left, it becomes apparent that simple ideas from the classes listed there, defined in this way, reach us by means of the individual sense-organs, and that thus the experience which provides them can be defined as perception in the usual sense of the word.

In the column second from the left, the matter is less clear. Aristotle had already distinguished between the perceptual contents "special" (to one sense) and those "common" (to several senses),[12] and he maintained that (a) what is perceptible in the strictest sense[13] is only the first; and further (b) that only in regard to them is perception (almost) free from error. In regard to the latter, however, it is especially prone to error, because they are merely contingent accompanying properties of the things which are themselves only contingently connected with the special perceptual properties.[14] Expressed in an example: we may say that no error is possible in the judgment that one now sees white; this is no longer true for the judgment that the white (thing) is this or that person, and *a fortiori* is not true in regard to the judgment about how large he is or how quickly he is moving. Aristotle is pointing out two things here. First: the appropriate sense decides about the "special" sensory qualities immediately. Locke concurs when he says that we attain the greatest thinkable certainty in regard to colour, and that this is connected with the fact that here it is precisely the eyes which are "the proper and sole judges."[15] On the other hand, manifestly no sense decides "by its own nature" about the "common" sensory qualities [it does so only incidentally].[16] The cooperation of several senses and of the understanding is here required in order to distinguish between error and truth. In accordance with this view, a Locke expert such as John Yolton has taken the position that Locke's simple ideas had to be sorted critically into "sensory ideas" and "explanatory ideas;"[17] the latter, to which ideas such as those in the second column of the above schema belong, had been incorrectly represented as contents of immediate experience, while in truth they were constructs formulated for purposes of explanation.

Why does Aristotle, who is obviously aware of the problem, still represent them, as Locke does, as being contents of perception? The error does not lie where Yolton thinks: the point here is not (or should not be) to determine, under the guidance of an ideal of freedom from error, what perception solely and properly is, and what, in distinction to it, is merely inference or explanatory construction. Rather, it is necessary to acknowledge that we

11. *Essay* II. I. §25.
12. Aristotle, *De Anima* B6.
13. *Ibid.*, *κυρίως*
14. *Ibid.*, C 3. 428b.18ff.
15. Locke, *Essay* IV. XI. §2.
16. Aristotle, *De Anima* B 6, 418a 25, and C 1, 425b 14-15.
17. John Yolton, "The Concept of Experience in Locke and Hume," *Journal of the History of Ideas* I, 1963.

can, with complete legitimacy, also say of things which can *not* be attributed to a single sensory organ that we perceive them immediately—for example, of a number of strokes of a clock, or the size and motion of an object. Of course, one can infer that the collaboration or exchangeability of the performances of perception which are specific to particular organs are, in addition to these performances and above and beyond them, a performance of experience with a unique and new quality. Aristotle, here more profound and subtle than Locke, had already touched on the question of how, for instance, we distinguish white from sweet.[18] Faced with such questions, it is clear that our perceptual faculties, taken as a whole, are more than the sum of the individual perceptual faculties in the narrower sense, which are specific to individual organs. The explication of experience as perception, that is, as passive registration by means of suitable organs, becomes questionable. Now, when Locke takes over the "common" perceptual objects from Aristotle, this inference applies to him as well.

Let us for a moment consider the view stated by Aristotle that special (one-sense) perception is (almost) free from error. Is it really true that we can less easily be deceived about a color of objects in our field of vision than about their number, at least in those cases where the latter is small enough to be immediately apprehended? Normally, just the reverse would be the case. It is, however, more important to ask what being "free from error" and "in error" themselves mean here. Colors as well as numbers are identified through linguistic signs—words or symbols. These are, however, always the common property of a whole language-community. If, then, the identification of a perceived content takes place by means of language—and how is it otherwise to take place?—then the individual's performance of recognition is not the only factor which determines the susceptibility to error in cognition; in addition, there is the *intersubjective* performance of establishing a reliable usage in the language. And there, the common sensory objects—for example, the numbers—often cause fewer difficulties than the special sensory objects such as colors, not to mention smells and tastes.

Now, if one admits the phenomenon of the factual degrees of susceptibility to error, and accepts the reasons for it suggested here, then he has definitively left behind the possibility of explicating experience as a mere effect—a mere registering—as perception or even sensation. Experience proves, rather, to be something which can be called "conceptual perception" or "linguistically-articulated perception."[19] This is, to be sure, always carried out by an individual person, but it is only possible upon the foundation of an intersubjective language, and is part of a communal performance. Neither the characteristic of egocentricity nor the characteristic of passivity can still be straightforwardly

18. Aristotle, *De Anima* C 1.

attributed to it unless one, absurdly, takes language to be a product of nature, completely removed from our volition and action.

Now, we could follow through with these lines of thought and perhaps make them more telling if we were to consider the two right-hand columns in the above schema of simple ideas. I will, however, for reasons of space, neglect the column to the far right almost completely. We will come back to the two middle columns in a somewhat different connection.

VI

Beforehand, I will turn to the second problem indicated above: a paradox in Locke's account of the experiential basis. I can here speak more briefly because I have addressed myself to this in detail elsewhere.[20] The paradox is yielded by the following three theses of Locke: (i) All passive ideas are ideas of the experiential basis, thus are passively-registered perceptual contents;[21] (ii) All abstract ideas are universals, and are thus produced by us;[22] (iii) Some (or, more precisely, all) simple ideas are abstract—for example, the idea 'white.'[23]

These three statements are not all mutually compatible. What then is to be given up here? In addition, it is also necessary to ask what sort of impressions we do then have immediately in experience. Simple ones, such as, say, those of white and sweet? Or are they not usually (if not exclusively) complex impressions—that is, those of objects in which innumerable simple qualities are joined together: shape, color, hardness, taste, and so on? Since the latter is the case, obviously the so-called simple ideas must first be acquired through analysis and abstraction. We thus conclude that proposition (i) is false. What could Locke have intended here? The answer which he gives in the framework of Book III (*Of Words)* appears to me to be that which most adequately presents the phenomenon he has in mind. There, he singles out the simple ideas as unique in that he recognizes them as "indefinable."[24] He gives an example: whoever has never seen anything white or tasted anything sweet cannot, through words, obtain the ideas of them,

19. In a more exhaustive interpretation of empiricism in Locke [Lorenz Krüger, *Der Begriff des Empirismus—Erkenntnistheoretische Studien am Beispiel John Lockes* (Berlin/New York; de Gruyter, 1973)], I started out from the position that the foundations of knowledge in Locke actually do not rest on sensory data, but rather on something like conceptual perception or linguistically-articulated perception (cf. pp. 4, 11-13 there, and the solution of the particular problem in regard to the paradox of the basis of ideas in the present paper, sec. VI with note 20).
20. Cf. note 19, esp. §§4-5.
21. Locke, *Essay* II. I. §25.
22. *Ibid.*, II. XI. §9; III. III. §11.
23. *Ibid.*, II. XXXI. §12; III. IV. §2.
24. *Ibid.*, III. IV. §7.

however many words are used.[25] The meanings of the corresponding words are, in this sense, simple and irreducible experiential contents, although, as particular characteristics, they must first be analysed-out from more complex experiences.

We see again that the experiential basis of simple ideas indicated by Locke already includes an activity which is to be stabilized intersubjectively in language, namely, the activity of abstracting, which provides the simple ideas in the first place.

VII

The third problem we will discuss is that of the objectivation of experience. What is here intended? Empiricism can be interpreted in at least two ways, each very different from the other: (a) phenomenalistically, and (b) realistically. According to the phenomenalistic version, our experience offers us nothing but certain (to be sure, involuntary) contents of consciousness or perceptual or sensory data. What we call "things" are nothing but logical constructions, acquired from such sensory data, which become possible or meaningful through these data appearing in constant combinations which reappear again and again. Carnap, for example, explicitly formulates empiricism in this way in his book *The Logical Structure of the World.*[25a] And Locke's philosophy also has been interpreted or further developed predominately in this direction—recently, for example, by Jonathan Bennett.[26]

According to the realistic version, on the other hand, it is necessary, inside of the system of ideas which are immediately acquired from experience, that is, which belong to the experiential basis, to distinguish two classes of ideas: those which can be interpreted as nothing other than states of consciousness of the experiencer—the so-called "secondary ideas"—and those which can be understood as representative copies of properties of the things perceived, the so-called "primary ideas."[27]

In the following discussion, it is assumed without argument that we are,

25. "The simple ideas we have, are such as experience teaches them us; but if, beyond that, we endeavour by words to make them clearer in the mind, we shall succeed no better than if we went about to clear up the darkness of a blind man's mind by talking; and to discourse into him the ideas of light and colors." (*Essay* II. IV. §4; cf. also IV. XVIII. §3; III. IV. §11; III. XI. §14).

25a. [*Der logische Aufbau der Welt* (Berlin/Schlachtensee; Weltkreis-Verlag, 1928). In English translation by Rolf George, *The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy* (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1967).]

26. Jonathan Bennett, *Locke, Berkeley, Hume—Central Themes* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971).

27. Locke, *Essay,* II. VIII.

for good reasons, not prepared to do without this distinction, and that we insist on attributing certain perceptual data to the objects (say, the shape of the perceived needle, which ends in a point), while other data (such as the pain which the needle causes) are attributed by us to the perceiver. With this distinction, we will also regard as meaningful the scientific program according to which all secondary qualities must be explained as the effect on us of things with their characteristic primary properties.[28]

In the sense of this explanatory program, however, precisely the apparently simplest of all simple ideas, such as that of a homogeneous colored surface, are the objects of a highly-complex causal analysis.[29] The ideas that do not stand in need of such an analysis, but are rather the central notions by means of which it is carried out, are among those simple ideas that are attributed to several sensory organs, or even simultaneously to the senses and to inner experience. The list of these primary ideas (also called "original" ideas) is, according to Locke, the following:[30]

Extension;
Solidity;
modal ideas { *Mobility,* or the power of being moved;
Perceptibility, or the power of perception, or thinking;
Motivity, or the power of moving;
Existence;
Duration;
Number.

One sees that almost all of these ideas must be assigned to the three columns to the right in the schema of simple ideas; with the exception of "solidity" (which belongs on the far left), and perceptivity (which belongs on the far right), they actually all belong to the two middle columns—thus to the sorts of simple ideas which overlap between the various faculties of perception.

What is the significance of this fact? It is precisely what came out in the discussion above (Part V) in connection with Aristotle: that the more integral experiences are closer to reality, and are thus also intersubjectively

28. This sort of program has in no way been rendered obsolete by recent developments in physics. It is generally admitted that such a program is in principle inevitable with a realistic interpretation of empiricism. Cf. on this point, most recently, J. L. Mackie, *Problems from Locke* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1976).
29. For the account of color-perception in Locke's *Essay*, cf. for example, III. IV. §10, and IV. XVI. §12.
30. *Ibid.*, II. XXI. §75.

more stable. A critical counterquestion: Does not this sort of thinking deviate from the basic principle of empiricism—the principle of grounding our knowledge of reality on immediate experience? In other words, is not the phenomenalist the most consistent empiricist after all? I think not. On the contrary, only the realistic version permits empiricism to be pursued consistently: that is, to really interpret experiences as being experiences of something, as effect of a reality on the experiencer; this is where empiricism, as depicted earlier (Part III), is actually aiming. Of course, this experience has to be interpreted anew as a complex unity of *Erlebnisse,* in which perception, intersubjective language and, finally, action converge.

VIII

We have been concerned with activity in experience only insofar as it enters into the *linguistic* or *conceptual* formulation of the experiential basis (the problem of the abstraction necessary for simple ideas). It can now become clear that human action enters into this basis in an even more direct sense, namely, through the ideas labelled "modal" above. I will here limit the discussion to the third, the idea of 'motivity' or, in short, of 'power.' The following line of argument has been used:[31] Because the qualities corresponding to secondary ideas are not actual properties of things, but rather certain faculties, dispositions, or 'powers,' which produce secondary ideas in us, we assume, for purposes of distinction, that all primary ideas correspond to actual properties of objects. Some primary qualities, such as size, shape and number, can in fact be so understood without difficulty. Then, however, it would be impossible to include among the simple primary ideas the idea of power, for example, as Locke undoubtedly did.[32] Locke's view here rests upon two supports: (i) Power, or causality,[33] is an indispensible basic concept of every realist program for the explanation of our experiences; (ii) the exertion of power is an *immediate simple experience* which first provides the meaning underlying that program of explanation.[34] With this interpretation, more closely worked out in what follows, I am opposing the tendency to separate the phenomena from the explanations, as has been attempted by Yolton (note 17) and, recently, by Mackie.[35] The purpose of the empiricist program of explanation which Locke conceived is,

31. For example, by J. L. Mackie. Cf. *Problems,* chap. 1.
32. Locke, *Essay* II. VII. §§1, 8 and II. XXI. §3 for 'simple' and II. XXI. §75 in connection with II. VII. §9 for 'primary.'
33. *Ibid.*, II. XXVI. §1.
34. *Ibid.*, II. XXI. §§4-5, 7; cf. also IV. X. §19.
35. Mackie, *Problems,* chap. 1; see also my critical remarks on this in my review of Mackie's book in the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* (forthcoming). Cf. also the more extended discussion in my book *Der Begriff des Empirismus.*

in my view, not to provide an economy of thought (E. Mach) resting on suitable constructs, but rather to justify a realistic philosophical position which involves, among other things, the division of experiential ideas into two groups—one consisting of ideas capable of contributing to explanation because they are interpretable realistically, the other of ideas which are capable of, or in need of, being explained because they are only subjective and dissimilar to real qualities. We are concerned with a program in which epistemological interests are combined with those of a realistic ontology of scientific knowledge, as well as of everyday knowing.

It would surely be rash to reject out of hand the experience of power to which Locke is here appealing. Many philosophers who do this are more influenced by Hume than by their everyday life and everyday speech. The decision about whether or not we have an immediate experience of a power or a causal connection is obviously made more difficult because of the problem (among others) that it is unclear whether the standard for these sorts of epistemological decisions is to be observation of external processes through our senses or, instead, introspection. This uncertainty is expressed by Locke at the beginning of the discussion of the idea of 'power' in his attempt at first to regard inner and outer appearances in the same way.

> The mind being every day informed, by the senses, of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things without; and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and another begins to exist which was not before; reflecting also on what passes within itself, and observing a constant change of its ideas, sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses, and sometimes by the determination of its own choice; and concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things, by like agents, and by the like ways,—considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed, and in another the possibility of making that change; and so comes by that idea which we call power.[36]

Obviously, here only the (inner and outer) changes are being regarded as straightforward objects of immediate experience; the idea 'power' is then to be developed from them through an inference ("concluding") and an analysis ("consider") of the processes which are repeated ("constantly"). The description of that which is being inferred turns out to be correspondingly abstract. This is the "possibility" of producing or suffering change. Possibilities—as one might suggest—cannot be perceived immediately; they have to be inferred through comparisons, or supposed on the basis of comparisons. Hume could have appealed to this passage in Locke without difficulty to support his theory of causality. From the regular repetition of

36. Locke, *Essay* II. XXI. §1.

processes, something is "inferred" which is never met with in the perception of the actual individual case.

But Locke now carries his analysis of the genesis of the concept of power one step further, in that he examines the possibility of producing change in particular.[37] "Active power" is, according to him, the more proper meaning of the word 'power,' because bodies cannot provide us with as clear an idea of power as can reflection on the operations of our mind. This reflection alone provides us with "the idea of the beginning of motion." " . . . We find *by experience* that, barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies, which were before at rest." This power, which we "find in ourselves," is the Will;[38] the Will is, according to Locke, the impression underlying the power-concept in general, which Hume seeks in vain.

It was, at the latest, when Hume wrote the appendix to his *Treatise of Human Nature* that he noticed that the weak point in his analysis of causality lay here.[39] In his *Enquiry,* he took the trouble to augment his argument, which was developed on the basis of external perceptions, with a discussion of the Will more than five times as long as that on the observation of the changes in the external world.[40] The core of his discussion consists in establishing the thesis that we have no experience or intuition about *how* we bring about an action (motion or thought) through our volition. Hume is here assuming that we could only speak of an impression 'power' when we could forsee the results of volition "*a priori*," that is, from the knowledge of the "mechanism" of the Will. He is seeking an analysis and explanation of the effectivity of the Will, which would also make clear (among other things), as he expresses it, the "energy in the Will,"[41] from which the effect of volition proceeds.

These demands placed on the evidence for the reality and legitimacy of the experience of power are very exacting. Hume does not justify their rigor. Locke, by way of contrast, is already satisfied with the Will itself, instead of the "energy in the Will"; for him, the Will *is* a power.[42] And its

37. *Ibid.*, II. XXI. §4. My emphasis in the quotation which follows.
38. *Ibid.*, II. XXI. §§5 and 7.
39. David Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature,* ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1888), *Appendix* p. 632, as subsequent addition to p. 181.
40. David Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,* ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (2nd Edition; Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1902), Sec. 7, part I. This line of thought is, to be sure, present in germinal form in the first edition of the *Treatise*, for example in II. I. §10 (pp. 312-13) and especially II. III. §§1-2, but these discussions are not utilized there as arguments in the analysis of causality.
41. Hume, *Enquiry* VII. I. pp. 65, 69.
42. Locke, *Essay* II. XXI. §5.

reality—that is, the fact that we will—is also not contested by Hume. Locke emphasizes expressly that lack of knowledge about the way in which a power works provides no argument which can justify denying the existence of this power.

> We cannot conceive how anything but impulse of body can move body; and yet that is not a reason sufficient to make us deny it possible, against the *constant experience* we have of it in ourselves, in all our voluntary motions; which are produced in us only by the free action or thought of our own minds, and are not, nor can be, the effects of the impulse or determination of the motion of blind matter in or upon our own bodies; for then it could not be in our power or choice to alter it. For example: my right hand writes, whilst my left hand is still: What causes rest in one, and motion in the other? Nothing but my will—a thought of my mind; my thought only changing, the right hand rests, and the left moves. This is a matter of fact, which cannot be denied: explain this and make it intelligible, and then the next step will be to understand creation.[43]

The acknowledgment of a simple everyday experience (such as our normal capacity to act) thus requires, according to Locke, no insight into its grounds or causes. On the contrary, he seems to want to say that we are able to ascertain these grounds or causes, if at all, only within the framework of an explanatory program where we already have available a concept of power, and thus of causality, which we have comprehended.

For Hume, the experience of the power of the Will, as Locke depicts it in the above quotation, is suspect probably (among other reasons) because Hume held more strictly than Locke to the restricted explication of experience as passive perception. Such a restriction no longer includes the experiencer as an acting person, and thus leads almost inevitably to a sensualistic atomism, as Hume formulated it in the second principle of his theory of ideas, which states that every simple idea is separable from every other.[44] A "tie" between ideas is then excluded out of hand from the realm of the experienceable.

It is, naturally, not possible in this paper to assess adequately the strengths and weaknesses of the respective accounts of Locke and Hume. We should here merely make clear whether, and to what extent, the appeal to experience, taken in itself as the sole source of our knowledge of the real world, provides an argument for or against the legitimacy of the concept of power. And here, Locke appears to me to be more credible than Hume, because he pursued less consistently the philosophically-idealized program

43. *Ibid.*, IV. X. §19; my emphasis.
44. Hume, *Treatise,* I. I. §3, p. 10.

which brings the restricted concept of experience in its wake. Applied critically against Locke, this means that if power is a concept which is acquired immediately from experience, we need a concept of experience which cannot be taken from that life-situation where perception merely registers; rather, it must include the complex situation where we have the *Erlebnis* of effecting something through action.

IX

In conclusion, I should like to say something about the problem of scepticism respecting reality, the discussion of which can be closely related to what has just been said. Locke defines experience as perception, as we emphasized above (Part IV)—contrary, in a way, to the preceding analysis. Perception, in turn, is defined as the passive reception or the having of ideas.[45] And thus it appears to him, as it did to Descartes (with whom Locke here concurs completely), that everything which is immediately given consists of nothing but our ideas. How can we ever know anything about the reality outside of us—indeed, how could it ever occur to us to assume that there is such a thing? This is the sceptical question, inescapable since the time of Descartes, to which there apparently is no satisfactory answer. But, as one of the most brilliant experts on scepticism, David Hume, has observed, sceptical arguments are distinguished by the circumstance "that they admit of no answer and yet produce no conviction."[46] How, then, can one ever get tangled up in them in the first place? The reason, in my view, is that the situation in which we find ourselves as experiencing subjects has been distorted from the first.

Let us for a moment assume ourselves to be in the position of a man who is condemned to the absolute passivity of mere registering. How is such a person ever to be able to become conscious of more than the progression of his inner ideas? Hume has thought this ficticious case through to the end; our man would never be able to come up with anything like the relational idea of power, effect, or active conjunction of one idea with another. He would, consequently, have no (legitimate) idea of causality, and accordingly would lack a basic concept which is indispensible for him to even be able to conceive of the program, sketched above, of an objectivation of experience as experience of something outside of himself. It is thus also crucial for the refutation of sceptical idealism, which Kant considered a "scandal to philosophy,"[47] to develop a concept of experience which includes action.

There is a not uninteresting parallel between the line of argument which Locke uses to defend the legitimacy of the concept of power, and that with

45. Cf. Note 10.
46. Hume, *Enquiry* XII. I.
47. Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft* B XXXIX; Kemp Smith translation, p. 34.

which he justifies our confidence in simple sensory experiences. As we have seen, Locke does not regard the experience of power as endangered through our not knowing the secret of the mechanism by which it works. He argues, in the same way, that the certainty of our senses is not impaired by our not knowing the ways and means by which sensory ideas are produced.

> . . . It takes not from the certainty of our senses, and the *ideas* we receive by them, that we know not the manner wherein they are produced: *e.g.* whilst I write this, I have, by the paper affecting my eyes, that *idea* produced in my mind, which, whatever object causes, I call *white*; by which I know that that quality or accident (i.e. whose appearance before my eyes always causes that *idea*) doth really exist, and hath a being without me. And of this, the greatest assurance I can possibly have, and to which my faculties can attain, is the testimony of my eyes, which are the proper and sole judges of this thing; whose testimony I have reason to rely on as so certain, that I can no more doubt, whilst I write this, that I see white and black, and that something really exists that causes that sensation in me, than that I write or move my hand; which is a certainty as great as human nature is capable of . . . [48]

I understand Locke as wanting to say here that one must, at first, just take the simple experiences as being what they appear to be, without worrying about what grounds or causes bring them about. With perceptions, as with actions, he wants to distinguish between the ideas of the *that* and of the *how*. In his view, all these ideas have to be acknowledged as an immediately trustworthy basis, because something more certain, on which one could base the analysis or criticism of these experiences, simply is not given to human nature. On the contrary: in the same way that only an analysis of the process of perception with reference to parts or elements which are supposedly more certain can shake our certainty in sensory experience, and thus can bring about scepticism in regard to the reality of what is perceived, so too only the analysis of the elementary experience that we can will and act, which is based on supposedly simpler elements, can deprive the idea of power of its empirical legitimacy. Seen from this angle, it does not appear to be accidental that Hume's more consistent pursuit of the reduced concept of experience made him into a more consistent sceptic.

The defense against scepticism attempted by Locke in this last quotation is, admittedly, very unsatisfactory. But this does not derive so much from any lack of acumen or from any *naïveté* in his arguments; even less does it come from his not being right. What is unsatisfactory is, rather, the half-heartedness, indeed the inconsistency, of his attempts at a solution. On the

48. Locke, *Essay* IV. XI. §2.

one hand he appeals, in his defense against a hypertrophied scepticism, to the irresistible power of conviction inherent in simple experiences of life. On the other hand, he does not at all base the construction of his system of ideas on these experiences, which instead count, if at all, more *against* the systematic program—for example, in the conviction that there are immediate perceptions, thus simple ideas, which belong simultaneously to reflection and sensory perception. Among them are actually ideas such as that of power, which have as their content a union of inner and outer perceptions.

This giving of equal status to experiences through the senses and experiences through action is nevertheless expressed in the last citation. It is programmatically reinforced in those places where Locke is repudiating exaggerated objective-scientific or epistemological demands, in that he emphasizes the significance of all knowledge for the purposes of life as the standard for legitimate epistemological expectations.[49] It is, for this reason, only consistent that Locke meets scepticism (as Hume did too, incidentally) with pragmatic considerations—if not within the theory of knowledge itself, at least in the reflections with which he surrounds it.

> . . . If . . . any one will be so sceptical as to distrust his senses, and to affirm that all we see and hear, feel and taste, think and do, during our whole being, is but the series and deluding appearances of a long dream . . . he may dream that I make him this answer, That *the certainty of* things existing *in rerum natura* when we have *the testimony of our senses* for it is not only *as great* as our frame can attain to, but *as our condition needs.* For, our faculties being suited not to the full extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple; but to the preservation of us, in whom they are; and accomodated to the use of life: they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those things, which are convenient or inconvenient to us. For he that sees a candle burning, and hath experimented the force of its flame by putting his finger in it, will little doubt that this is something existing without him, which does him harm, and puts him to great pain; which is assurance enough, *when no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by than what is as certain as his actions themselves [my emphasis]* . . . . So that this evidence is as great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain, i.e. happiness

49. *Ibid.*, especially the Introduction §§5 and 6, for example: "Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct. If we can find out those measures, whereby a rational creature, put in that state in which man is in this world, may and ought to govern his opinions, and actions depending thereon, we need not to be troubled that some other things escape our knowledge."

> or misery; beyond which we have no concernment, either of knowing or being.[50] (Emphasis mine)

The characteristic thing about this statement is, again, the giving of equal status to the certainty of perception and of action, and the immediate connection between them. The passage shows unmistakably that for Locke, intersubjective and active experience in everyday life is the appropriate standard for certainty of cognition. Perhaps, however, he does not recognize clearly that it is actually the sole possible standard here. Otherwise, he would have had to rewrite his epistemology in a pragmatic spirit. Neither he nor many other modern epistemologists since Descartes have acknowledged a more completely and adequately conceived experience as the ground or basis of knowledge; as we have seen, however, this is precisely what the nature of the phenomenon of experience would demand. Locke's error, which he shares with many of his successors up to the present, naturally does not lie in disdaining the lessons of everyday life, but rather in *not recognizing and not utilizing them in their theoretical significance* for a suitable foundation of knowledge, that is, for the formulation of an adequate concept of experience.

50. *Ibid.*, IV. XI. §8; cf. IV. II. §14 and IV. X. §2.

ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ARISTOTLE*[1]

Joachim Ritter †

Translated by Alfonso Gomez-Lobo

I

Ethics, the philosophy of law, and social philosophy in European thought point historically back to Aristotle. Yet the title of nobility that such venerable origins confer is mere ornamentation. In fact, the tradition in practical philosophy that starts with Aristotle breaks down in the eighteenth century. Its last comprehensive exposition within the broad framework of a scholastic system is contained in Christian Wolff's *Philosophia practica universalis.*[2] According to Wolff, practical philosophy is the discipline that

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* Translated from "Zur Grundlegung der praktischen Philosophie bei Aristoteles" in Manfred Riedel, *Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie, Band II, Argumentation, Diskussion* (Freiburg i. Br.: Verlag Rombach, 1974), pp. 479-500. (The translator is grateful to Professor H-M. Sass of the University of Bochum for the materials from which the biographical note was excerpted).

Joachim Ritter was born near Hamburg in 1903. He studied in Heidelberg, Marburg, Freiburg and Hamburg where he became a privatdozent in 1932. He was first appointed to a chair in philosophy in 1943 at the University of Kiel. In 1946 he accepted an equivalent position in Münster where he taught until his retirement in 1969. He had the honor of being elected rector of the University of Münster for the year 1962-1963. As with most intellectuals of his generation, Ritter's philosophical training was historically oriented. His first book was devoted to Nicholas of Cusa (*Docta Ignorantia.* Die Theorie des Nichtwissens bei Nicolaus Cusanus, Leipzig: Teubner, 1927) and ten years later he published an important work on St. Augustine (*Mundus Intelligibilis.* Eine Untersuchung zur Aufnahme und Umwandlung der neuplatonischen Ontologie bei Augustinus, Frankfurt/M.: Klostermann, 1937). After World War II the bulk of his work was on Aristotle and Hegel and he acquired the reputation of being a sui generis neohegelian (cf. his *Metaphysik und Politik.* Studien zu Aristoteles und Hegel, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1969, 2nd ed. 1977). Professor Ritter was an impressive teacher. In 1971 he undertook the immense task of editing an exhaustive historical dictionary of philosophy based on that of Rudolf Eisler. Upon his death on August 3, 1974 he had only seen the third volume (G–H) through the press.

1. This article appeared for the first time in *Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie.* 46 (1960), pp. 179-199. It is based on two works that form an essential unity, the *Nicomachaen Ethics* and the *Politics.* The following editions of the Greek text were consulted: *Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea* recog. I.

deals with the grounding of human action upon human nature. Moreover, he calls it universal because in providing the foundations for the *Philosophia moralis* (1750-1753), the *Oeconomica* (1754), and the *Philosophia civilis* (1756-1759), its subject-matter is "all the specific differences of human actions," the principles of "all rights and obligations"—in individual acts, in the household and the lower communities, in the economy, in the legal sphere, and in the state. When Hegel "in his official capacity" lectured for the first time in Berlin in 1818-1819 on "Outlines of Natural Law and Political Science," he linked his own doctrines to the Scholastic tradition "that still continued to spin its web." However, metaphysics had already become a worn-out Penelopean work:

Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949); *Aristotelis Politica* recog. W.D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957); *The Politics of Aristotle,* edited with introduction, essays and notes by W.L. Newman, 4 vol. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950, first printed in 1887-1902). The German translations I made use of were the following: Aristoteles, *Die Nikomachische Ethik* Übertragen von Olof Gigon (Zürich: Artemis-Verlag, 1951); Aristoteles, *Nikomachische Ethik* Übers. von Franz Dirlmeier (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1956); Aristoteles, *Politik* Übers. von Eugen Rolfes, 4th ed. (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1948). In addition to the older commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics* [Sir Alexander Grant, *The Ethics of Aristotle,* 2 vols., 4th ed. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1885, first printed in 1857); Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics,* a commentary by H.H. Joachim, ed. D.A. Rees (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951)] one can now consult Dirlmeier's notes to his translation. On the politics cf. Newman, *op. cit.,* vols. i-iv. Cf. further the epoch-making work of Erik Wolf on the history of Greek political philosophy, *Grieschisches Rechtsdenken,* 3 vols. (Frankfurt/M.: Klostermann, 1950-1956). Extensive bibliographies can be found in Dirlmeier, *op. cit.* pp. 255-264, and in *Staats-Lexikon* hrsg. von der Görres-Gesellschaft, Vol. I (Freiburg: Herder, 1957), s.v. Aristoteles, p. 579 f.

2. The complete title is: *Philosophia practica universalis methodo scientifica pertractata Theoriam complectens, qua omnium Actionum humanarum differentia omnisque Juris ac Obligationum omnium Principia a priori demonstrantur* (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1738).

i. I have consulted the same editions of the Greek text that Professor Ritter mentions in footnote 1, above. I have made use of the Oxford Translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (by W.D. Ross), and of the *Politics* (by B. Jowett) as printed in Richard McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941). Occasionally I have also made use of H. Rackham's translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics,* Loeb Classical Library (London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1934). In some cases, however, I have deviated from these translations in order to provide an English version which corresponds as closely as possible to what Professor Ritter has printed in German.

Translations from Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* are my own. In the notes, I have referred to Knox's translation for the benefit of readers wishing to examine an alternative rendering.

academic philosophical reasoning was already a decadent and powerless mode of thought. An "open break" had taken place.[3] As a result of it, universal practical philosophy has lost its foundation and its footing; it has disintegrated. The moral principle breaks its connections with law, society, and the state and emigrates inwards, into subjectivity. As ethics, practical philosophy is restricted to postulates and imperatives of the pure "ought" that determine action within the realm of inner thoughts and convictions. As a theory of "morality," it is separated from the theory of "legality," a step that has the result that for practical philosophy, "all concrete determinations of law, duty and existence" "evaporate."[4] Accordingly, legal theory emancipates itself from philosophy. In its dealings with contemporary, historically determined social reality, practical philosophy has been left in the lurch by philosophical reason, and is forced to look for something to replace the speculative foundation of which it has been deprived. During the same period in which philosophy established the separation of morality and legality, the German school of historical jurisprudence (*historische Rechtsschule*) began to transform "philosophical contemplation" into "knowledge based on the proximate and remote historical causes." The "nature of the case" (*die Natur der Sache*) as a rational concept in law was "replaced" by the "historical explanation" on the basis of "circumstances." Furthermore, this type of explanation was expanded so as to acquire the "importance of a valid justification in and for itself (*an und für sich*),"[5] thereby anticipating the general development of these concepts in the eighteenth century. "Philosophy of law" no longer stood within the context of philosophy; it had become a scientific theory of law.

In this manner the unity of practical philosophy embracing morality, law and state was sundered. The philosophical marriage of ethics and philosophy of law came to an end. Today they live apart. Due to their present bifurcation, the context of Aristotle's practical philosophy recedes into the distant past. Present-day theory is linked to it only insofar as its own conceptions establish some connection with it. Hence, it is time to attempt to discover and disclose those features of Aristotelian practical philosophy that have become unfamiliar to contemporary theory.

II

Ethics is the study of human action and, in particular, of good action. It determines the essence of virtue and describes it systematically. It indicates

3. G.W.F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Hoffmeister Edition (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1955), Vorrede p. 4 (IV), p. 13 (XVIII); or T.M. Knox, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942), pp. 1, 9.
4. Hegel, *Grundlinien,* SS 138; Knox, p. 92.
5. Hegel, *Grundlinien* SS 3; Knox, pp. 16-17.

the right path and is hence "moral philosophy," that is, an attempt to answer the question: What ought we to do? Even persons brought up in the ethics of subjectivity will find in Aristotle what they anticipate. But there is a problem in this discovery. The solidity of Aristotle's philosophical thought, and its fusion with a 2000 year-old tradition, make it appear like a timeless philosophy. His ethics, too, seems to remain within a realm of unhistorical universality that prevents us from perceiving "the real life that is supposed to be scientifically mastered by ethics."[6] But this universality is only one aspect of the matter. On the one hand, the philosophical discipline called "ethics" is concerned with human action; it is "philosophy of human nature," as the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics* puts it.[7] As such it remains influential in the history of European culture, as part of the broader unity of philosophy which originated in Greece. On the other hand, Aristotle also places an unusual amount of emphasis on its justification as philosophy of man's being, on the grounds that ethics is destined to solve an unmastered problem[ii] of his time, a problem as yet unsolved by philosophy. Ethical inquiry, in his opinion, has great importance because it is something that requires decisions. As in hunting, its task is to surround and get a clear view of the prey, in this case the object of inquiry, in order to hit upon it like archers that clearly sight their target.[8] In general, Aristotle's philosophy, including his practical philosophy or ethics, is a synthesis of what preceded him, but this also means that it takes up explicitly what his "predecessors" have left open[9] in order to resolve it along paths thus far unknown to them. Then, the problem which requires a theory of human action as its solution is specified. It is the "art of politics" which regulates everything in the city, and to which all the other arts—including the most highly esteemed, such as strategy, household management, economics, rhetoric—are subordinated. This art, and with it the constitution and laws, requires the determination of its foundations and goal.[10] The problem to be resolved is a political one, for ethics is a "political inquiry."[11] It enables us to assess "what sorts of influence preserve and destroy states, and what sorts preserve or destroy the

ii. Here and throughout the article, Professor Ritter prints a transliteration of the Greek word "*aporia*" instead of the more current expressions "*Schwierigkeit,*" "*Problem.*" I conjecture that he wanted to stress the idea that the problems and difficulties he mentions are analogous to impassable, pathless, impracticable places, for this is what the etymology of "*aporia*" is commonly taken to imply.

6. Dirlmeier, *op. cit.* p. 249.
7. *N.E.* X.9. (10) 1181 b 15: ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φιλοσοφία.
8. *N.E.* I.1. 1094 a 22-26.
9. *N.E.* X.9. (10) 1181 b 12.
10. *N.E.* I.1. 1094 a 27-b7.
11. *N.E.* I.1. 1094 b 11: μέθοδος . . . πολιτική.

particular kinds of constitutions, and to what causes it is due that some are well and others ill administered."[12] This idea corresponds to the fact that the *Nicomachean Ethics* is followed without interruption by the *Politics.* This indicates that for Aristotle, the former work contains the foundations of a theory whose subject-matter is political leadership, constitutions and legislation. The *Nicomachean Ethics* ends with the words λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι, ("let us make a beginning of our discussion"). Now that a beginning has been made and the foundations have been laid, we can discuss constitutions and laws, which are the original basis and motive of the inquiry.[13]

Ethics, then, as practical philosophy—that is, as an inquiry into man's existence—focuses upon a problem posed at that time. Determined by the concrete situation, it becomes political theory. This is why it does not consider government or the state in general, but rather (as Greek philosophy had done from its origins) the *polis* and the political order developed within. In Greek, this order is called *politeia,* an expression that implies that it cannot be applied directly, independently of the *polis,* to other forms of government.[14] The art of politics is concrete leadership in the city, the *politeia,* not in the state. *Politeia,* in fact, is primarily the participation of citizens in the administration and the legislature, in the courts and the council. It is only derivatively the "order" (τάξις), which, drawn up as a "constitution," legally organizes the aforementioned participation through prescribing the distribution, assignment, and duties of public office.[15] "*Polis*" does not refer to the place built of stone where men simply live together. It is not merely some city, a residence of the monarch, a location of the temple, a military encampment, or a caravan. It is the political community of free citizens endowed with civil rights and participating in civic life. (κοινωνία πολιτική, βίος πολιτικός).

This is extremely important for it implies that, according to Aristotle, the inquiry into human action, as practical philosophy, does not have the task of making human nature the principle of a general theory of the state within the realm of pure thought. It has the concrete duty of inquiring into the foundations of the political order of the city in the midst of unsteady events, endeavouring to understand it on the basis of those foundations. What is at stake is political leadership, the "art of politics" which is based on its constitution. This art is not to be derived from general principles, but rather to be obtained by turning toward their factual and generally recognized doubtfulness. "Moral nobility and justice, which political art investigates, admit of much disagreement and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be

12. *N.E.* X.9. (10) 1181 b 18.
13. *N.E.* X.9. (10) 1181 b 23; F. Dirlmeier, *op. cit.* p. 606.
14. Cf. below, p. 54.
15. *Pol.* IV. 1. 1289 a 15; and *Pol.* III. 6. 1278 b 8.

thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature."[16] The expressions "it seems that (*δοκεῖ*) and "it appears that" (*φαίνεται*), both quite common in Aristotle at the outset of an inquiry, bear witness to the fact that philosophy does not raise a problem on its own, but rather takes it up in the form in which it is already given: in the city, both educated and vulgar people talk about it in such and such a way, and it is also in a particular manner that earlier philosophers have dealt with it.[17] In the statement that justice and moral nobility are determined by custom and convention, and not by nature, Aristotle is offering a typically dense summary of a long quarrel that reached its sharpest formulation in sophistic thought: Justice and moral nobility have forfeited the political importance they used to have because of the "disagreements and fluctuation of opinion" about them. They do not seem to exist "by nature."

This is Aristotle's starting point in the *Nicomachean Ethics.* After some explanatory remarks the text says explicitly: "We are speaking about such things and starting from such things."[18] In this manner, Aristotle introduces his philosophical theory into the concrete, given political situation of the city. He speaks "starting from it." This approach has important methodological consequences: No progress can be made in these matters if one starts from abstract principles with the intention of deriving from them a just political order "such as it would be if it were in accordance with our aspirations." A procedure of this sort cannot even be followed when the subject-matter is "the best constitution."[19] The same reasoning appears unequivocally in *Nicomachean Ethics* when the Platonic grounding of the practical good upon "the Good in itself" is rejected: "Even if there would be one Good that is universally predictable or capable of separate and independent existence," it would be of no help in the task facing the *Nicomachean Ethics.*[20] Furthermore, it is held that the point is not to retreat from the political situation in which moral nobility and justice have become dubious; on the contrary, "the truth" is to be sought in, and elicited from, it: "We must be content if, in talking about such things and starting from them, we succeed in presenting a broad and general outline of the truth."[21] In this manner, Aristotle takes up the political problem arising out of the disagreements on moral nobility and justice. He does not produce deductions from principles nor does he bring in Plato's "Good in itself," nor does he turn into some other bypath. He accepts the given and, in spite of its doubtfulness, he trusts that the truth can be elicited from it.

16. *N.E.* I. 1. 1094 b 14: *τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια . . . ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή.*
17. Cf. *N.E.* I. 2. 1095 a 18.
18. *N.E.* I. 1. 1094 b 19: *περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας.*
19. *N.E.* I. 1. 1094 b 23 ff., I. 2. 1095 b 3, *Pol.* IV. 1. 1288 b 21 ff.
20. *N.E.* I. 4. 1096 b 32.
21. *N.E.* I. 1. 1094 b 19 ff.

When we try to grasp a philosophical theory of the past, our understanding first seizes on its general content, that is, on those aspects which are not bound to its concrete historical situation. The hermeneutical foundations of Aristotelian ethics, however, compel us to seek the universal (*das Allgemeine*) as the truth which ethics, starting from the concrete situation, attempts to produce as the truth of this situation. Aristotle's methodological indications concerning the starting-point of ethics are shown by the way in which he takes up a certain problem, and should not be brushed aside. They imply that the *Nicomachean Ethics* has the task of understanding the truth of a situation in which "moral nobility and justice" exist solely by custom and convention.

For Aristotle, δίκαιον is "what is just" with reference to both the city's enacted laws and to the political and legal equality of the citizens which is constitutive of the city. However, in the passage of the *Nicomachean Ethics* where the aforementioned problem is taken up, the term appears in connection with the καλον (the "beautiful," "noble," "proper,") and therefore denotes "what is just" with respect to those things which, according to the customs of the city, the individual is required to do or not to do. Its sense is not restricted to the sphere of enacted legislation. Something is said or done δικαιως, "in accordance with justice," when it is done according to custom; a man is "just" when he is honest and upright, satisfying in word and deed the requirements of traditional standards. This explains why Aristotle makes justice coextensive with the whole field of the virtues.[22] It appears in the traditional forms of "interchange of words and deeds,"[23] hence in everything that counts in the city as "right behaviour."[24] In addition to the most important virtues, Aristotle also discusses in the *Nicomachean Ethics* what one may say in jest,[25] which public expenditures in the city bring honor to the giver ("those connected with the gods—votive offerings, buildings and sacrifices—as well as equipping a chorus splendidly or a ship of war, or entertaining the city.")[26] In all these relationships, that involve acting in a befitting and proper way, as well as in those that imply obligation in the strict sense, what is proper or just is determined by the given traditional customs, by the habits and lifestyles that have been handed down within the

22. *N.E.* v. 15. 1138 a 5, cf. V. 2. 1130 b 18: ἡ . . . κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη. The "juridical" concept of justice presupposes the general concept of justice. The former, in fact, circumscribes just relations with respect to external matters (honor, money, contractual agreements, and so on). On this topic, cf. M. Salomon, *Der Begriff der Gerechtigkeit bei Aristoteles* (Leiden, 1937); W. Siegfried, *Der Rechtsgedanke bei Aristoteles* (Zurich: Schulthess, 1947); P. Trude, *Der Begriff der Gerechtigkeit in der aristotelischen Rechts-und Staatsphilosophie* (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1955).
23. *N.E.* IV. 12. 1126 b 11, IV. 14. 1127 b 33 ff.
24. *N.E.* IV. 14. 1128 a 17.
25. *N.E.* IV. 14. *passim.*

city. Aristotle applies to it the word *νόμιμον*, "what is customary."[27]

What is customarily done in the household and in the city indicates what is proper and just in the political realm.[28] This explains why the work that deals with justice and moral nobility, with the aim of solving the problem of political order in the city, is titled *Ethics.* It has to do with the *"ethos,"* originally "the place where man or beast customarily lives." For horses, it is the stable and the pasturage; for fish, water; for Greeks, the city.[29] In the language of Aristotle and his contemporaries, "*ethos*" still meant the traditional and habitual order in which life is led, the way one lives within the world that gives one's life its form. This implies not only customs, habits and other things contributing to the proper ordering of one's life, but also the "customary" institutions based on tradition and custom, such as household and tribe, worship of the city's gods, the manifold communities, leagues, fraternities, neighborhood associations, guilds for burials, and celebration of feasts. In sum, it includes the whole realm of civil life as determined by the customs and institutions of the *polis.*

Whether the title *Ethics* originates with Aristotle himself or not is an open question. The Aristotelian conception of ethics, however, is firmly entrenched in this context; it is explicitly associated with custom.[30] "Ethical" is whatever is proper, befitting, becoming, or right, and this, along with all the virtues, is determined by the customs, habits, and traditions of the city to the extent that they are embedded in its institutions. Hence, the behavior of the individual becomes ethical by learning and growing up within the given ethical customs, and by adopting its virtues, which become the forming element of his own disposition. In this manner, the individual makes customary virtues his own and they, in turn, determine his behavior. The citizen becomes just by acting justly, courageous by acting

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26. *N.E.* IV. 5. 1122 b 20, 22. Gigon, *op. cit.* p. 13 (*Einleitung*) mentions that such rules "have for us social rather than genuinely ethical meaning." However, the fact that they are included in the *Ethics* shows that, for Aristotle, whatever pertains to habit and custom is ethical in a primary sense. This distinguishes his view from that which grounds the ethical dimension on inner subjectivity.
27. *N.E.* V. 2. 1129 a 34: *νόμιμον.*
28. *N.E.* X. 9 (10) 1180 b 3: *ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι . . . τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἤθη . . . ἐν οἰκίαις . . . τὰ ἔθη.*
29. Even in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *De Mundo* 6. 398 b 33, the word "ethos" is used in the sense of "place." The same holds for Plato, as in *Tim.* 42 e; *Laws* IX. 965 e. In the sense of "living habits" and "customs," it is used by Aristotle in his biological works. The *ἤθη* belong to the modes of living[iii] of animals, for example *Hist. An.* 588 a 18.
30. *N.E.* 11. 1. 1103 a 17: *ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ (ἀρετὴ) ἐξ ἔθους περιγίγνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους,* "moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name *ethike* is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word *ethos,* 'habit'."

courageously—as by playing the flute one becomes a flutist and, in general, by practicing an art one learns the corresponding skill. "Virtue," in the ethical sense of the word, and "excellence" in the arts not only correspond to the same Greek word, viz. ἀρετή; they are also essentially akin. They share not only their formal aspect of being two types of good performance; they are radically and essentially related insofar as they are obtained by learning and practicing the type of action leading to an 'attitude' prescribed and sanctioned as 'ethical' by the customary institutions of the City. Consequently, the term "ethos" in Aristotle has also always the sense of the 'bearing' and 'character' of the individual.[31] It is clear, at any rate, that at this point we have to cast aside all modern conceptions of ethics, because the foregoing has nothing to do with "subjectivity" nor with morality as having its origins in a good will. The motion of ethical determination in Aristotle proceeds, so to speak, in the opposite direction from the modern theory. Its starting-point is that which for subjectivity is only external and has "evaporated" (Hegel) into what is in itself external. What is just according to custom becomes the virtue of the individual. But thereby custom is set in motion, until it reaches its own actualization, just as the artisan's skill becomes actual in the excellence of the master craftsman, and the medical art heals the patient when "this doctor" cures "this sick man."[32] Aristotle, in his confrontation with Plato, engages in a general and fundamental vindication of the positive and irrevocable rights of particulars; the universal is always actual as "this," a particular. The same holds for the ethical and political order, which is actualized in the particular actions of the citizens. Thus, the general *ethos* and the particular citizen depend on each other for their actualization, and hence they form a necessary unity. For Aristotle, an individual posited in isolation is an abstraction: "A man without tribe, without custom or law, without a hearth" has no existence, and may be compared to an isolated piece of draughts.[33] Practical theory cannot go beyond ethically constituted existence and its mediation of the particular and the universal. Its subject-matter is not "the individualist who leads an egoistic life exempt of obligations," but rather "the individual living in the city, within its ethical order, together with his parents and children, with his wife and friends and fellow citizens."[34]

This is decisive for political theory. Both the constitution and the νόμος, in the sense of legally binding laws, are always understood by Aristotle as

31. *N.E.* II. 1. 1103 a 31-b 2. The "ethically" prescribed virtue becomes an attitude (ἕξις, N.E. II. 5. 1106 a 14, 6. 1106 b 36). Thus, "attitude" and "ethos" are synonyms. To ἠθικὴ ἕξις, "ethical attitude," corresponds τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος, "the ethos of the soul" (for example Pol. VIII. 2. 1137 a 39).
32. *N.E.* 1. 4. 1097 a 8-13 (against Plato).
33. *Pol.* I. 2. 1253 a 2-7. According to the rules of Greek games of draughts, an isolated piece cannot make any move (Cf. Rolfes, *op. cit.* p. 302, note 8).
34. *N.E.* I. 5. 1097 b 8. This paraphrasing translation follows Dirlmeier, *op. cit.* p. 13.

enacted statutes of positive law reached by convention, created rationally like a work of art, and founded upon the will and the insight of the legislator. And yet, for him there are no principles for the enactment of political and legal statutes which are detached from the ethical sphere and given in isolation. Enacted statutes are grounded on the ethical and institutional form of all actions. Hence, positive legislation does not lose the essential connections with custom that the word *νόμος* implies. That moral nobility and justice exist by *nomos* can equally mean that they are "by custom," or "by enactment or convention." There are customs which all men by nature accept in the guise of "unwritten laws," (such as the right of the dead to be buried),[35] which cannot be abolished by any ordinance or "written law." Also, there are laws that regulate various things that require regulations, without any significance attached to them over and above considerations of expediency. And there are also matters about which the law cannot decide at all.[36] Thus, for Aristotle, the limits between custom and law are fluid: custom becomes law, law becomes custom. He states explicitly that even if new laws are better in themselves, it only makes sense to introduce them if there is hope that they will enter into, and form part of, the common customs and habits (*ἔθος*).[37] It makes no difference whether the preservation and protection of what is universal (*das Allgemeine*) is entrusted to written or unwritten *νόμοι*.[38] For Aristotle, there is no separation between custom and law, ethos and justice, nor between enacted political constitution and the ethos of the civic life of the citizens. They point to the same thing, just as the Greek word *νόμος* means "custom" and "law," and *ἦθος* means "habit" and "attitude of the individual." Thus, according to Aristotle, every enacted statute is itself grounded upon the ethical and institutional constitution of life and action. As such it is not only its foundation, but also its single substantial content. Hence there cannot be any separation between internal "morality" and external "legality"; both grow on the common ethical ground. What makes Plato's *Republic* dubious for Aristotle is the fact that it proceeds from principles that are removed from

35. *Rhet.* I. 13. 1373 a 9. On the distinction between written and unwritten law, cf. R. Hirzel, in *Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 20 (1900) p. 65 f.; Salomon, *op. cit.* p. 59 f. In the oldest traditions, the *νόμοι ἄγραφοι* are "unwritten rules of habit and customs" (E. Wolf, op. cit. II, p. 84). A compact summary of this topic is presented by K. Kleinknecht, "Der *νόμος* in Griechentum und Hellenismus," in G. Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1933-42) Vol. IV, pp. 1016-1029. The relationship between law and custom for Aristotle is such that custom is stronger than all written laws. Cf. *Pol.* III, 16, 1287 b 5 and Newman, op. cit. III, p. 288.

36. *Pol.* III. 16. 1287 b 19.

37. *Pol.* II. 8. 1269 a 20 ff.

38. *N.E.* X. 9. (10) 1180 a 35.

that ground, and therefore have no connections with the habits of the city. They are not obtained from the city as dwelling in it.[39] This includes some positive elements. When the foundations of the political order fixed by the city's constitution and legislation have become dubious due to "disagreements and fluctuation of opinion," questions about those foundations can only be settled by an ethical theory which, using hermeneutical means, discloses in turn the foundations of the ethical customs of the city. The idea that ethics was expanded into political theory by Aristotle is not justified. The movement flows in the opposite direction—political and legal theory require an ethical foundation. But at the same time, ethics as a political inquiry becomes practical philosophy due to the universal scope of a theory of human action. In this universal form, detached from its place in history, it exerts a continuous influence on the Western mind. For Aristotle, the theory of law, ethics and practical philosophy—as a theory of man which starts from the art of politics, then turns to its ethical substance and finally returns from there to human action—constitutes an indissoluble unity, as already implied in the hermeneutical method employed by Aristotle, which actually leads to a turning point. By founding the political order upon human praxis, Aristotle overcomes the approach adopted by the "early thinkers" and is thus able to solve the unresolved problems of constitution and legislation. "Since our predecessors have left the subject of legislation to us unsolved and open, it is best, therefore, that we should ourselves study it, and in general study the question of the constitution, in order to complete to the best of our ability our philosophy of human nature."[40]

Linking his work to the sophistical thesis that moral nobility and justice exist only by custom and convention, and not by nature, Aristotle faces a difficulty that previous philosophers had already tried to solve. The problem arises out of the fact that as a result of a long historical process of upheaval and political change, the city had dissociated itself from the binding force of the "original customs of the fathers."[41] An inevitable result of these developments was that tradition and heritage ceased to legitimize the ethico-political order, which persists only as custom and as convention. Once the longevity of the laws and their traditional origin no longer insure legality, it looks as if the political order were not by nature. The "disagreements and fluctuation of opinion" raise doubts about the foundations, and the truth of traditional standards, of justice and moral nobility. This is the problem with which philosophy, from its origins, is confronted

39. Cf. *Pol.* II. 3. 1262 a 1 ff. on the elimination of the term "mine."
40. *N.E.* X. 9. (10) 1181 b 12.
41. On the history of the dissociation from the *πάτριος νόμος*, "the law of the fathers," cf. E. Wolf, *op. cit., passim.* On the change of meaning of the term *νόμος* which went along with it, cf. Kleinknecht, *op. cit., passim,* and F. Heinimann, *Nomos und Physis,* Herkunft und Bedeutung einer Antithese im griechischen Denken des 5. Jahrhunderts (Basel: F. Reinhardt, 1945).

within the city. In the *Laws,* Plato deems it necessary to provide a philosophical foundation for the laws because the cities no longer live "under the binding force of traditional order."[42] In the *Republic,* at the beginning of the discussion on justice, the aged Kephalos leaves the company to attend to sacrifices performed according to traditional habit.[43] When old traditions no longer hold, philosophy right from its start attempts to provide the city with "the divine nomos that nourishes all human customs and conventions."[44] Socrates turns directly to "matters ethical" seeking to understand their foundations.[45] This is where Aristotle takes up the problem, beginning where the "early thinkers" left off and leaving behind the paths trodden by them. Neither in the *Ethics* nor in the *Politics* do we find the old traditional concepts of justice, (viz. θέμις, θεσμός or δίκη), the divinity that sets the sun its measures.[46] The stories (μῦθοι) that convey them have lost their significance for Aristotle; it is not worthwhile to ask them for guidance.[47] In the *Politics* he rejects all attempts to renew the old traditions and to win acceptance for the authority of the fathers on which they rest. To the question "whether it is beneficial or detrimental for the city to make changes in the customs handed down by the fathers," Aristotle answers: "It is better to make changes."[48] In deep and radical opposition to Plato, who calls "the men of old better than ourselves, dwelling nearer the gods,"[49] he holds that, in spite of tales describing them as "born from the earth" or "saved from death," even the "first men" were men like everybody else. Wherever a residue of archaic customs has survived, one can see how "primitive and barbaric" they were.[50] Hence, it is "senseless to abide by the convictions of men of old,"[51] to look for salva-

42. *Laws* I. 625 a.
43. *Republic,* I. 331 d.
44. Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker,* 6th ed. 3 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1952), I. 22B 114, or Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge: University Press, 1962), p. 213 (text No. 253).
45. *Met.* I. 6. 987 b 1.
46. Cf. Diels-Kranz, *op. cit.* I. 22B 94, Kirk and Raven, *op. cit.* p. 203 (text No. 229). For Aristotle δίκη has materialized as the concept of the order of the political community. Cf. *Pol.* I, 2, 1253 a 37.
47. *Met.* II (III). 4. 1000 a 18.
48. *Pol.* II. 8. 1268 b 27: τὸ κινεῖν τοὺς πατρίους νόμους . . . 33 βέλτιον . . . τὸ κινεῖν.
49. *Philebus* 16 c.
50. *Pol.* II. 8. 1268 b 34-1269 a 8: τοὺς . . . ἀρχαίους νόμους λίαν ἁπλοῦς εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικούς. In Ancient times the Greeks used to bear arms, and purchase wives from one another; cf. Newman, *op. cit.* II, p. 309, note 41. The second instance refers to a legal custom in Kyme and cannot be clarified any further, cf. *ibid.* note 42, 1.
51. *Pol.* 11. 8. 1269 a 7: ὥστε ἄτοπον τὸ μένειν ἐν τοῖς τούτων δόγμασιν.

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tion in a return to the source. It would be senseless to reinstate the tradition stemming from the fathers and to take it as a legal principle upon which enacted legislation can be grounded: "It is better to make changes." Aristotle is here speaking out of the situation which has developed. In it, he tries to discern the truth as the principle that, in the process in which longevity has ceased to be a principle of what is just, has become the foundation of convention and custom in the city. Ethos and convention, no longer legitimized by their origins, demand investigation of their principle. This puts Aristotle on the path leading from political theory as ethics to practical philosophy, the theory of man's being. He understands that in "making changes man as such becomes the subject and the measure of the ethical and political order of the city." What in the traditional teaching of practical philosophy has become obvious and primary—the idea, namely, of taking man as the starting-point and inquiring into his actions—is here a result. It is the consequence of a conceptual approach to reality which consists in trying to understand the foundations of what has come into existence with the city. It represents a turning point, the beginning of history in which the measure for questions of justice and the justification of constitutions and legislation, along with those of custom, habit, heritage and tradition—no matter how old and venerable they might be—is man's being as such. This is the origin of all those ideas that have been influential in European history under the title of natural and human rights, and also of the conception of a truly human society and of a state bound by the rights of man as such.

Aristotle's political philosophy is the beginning of all these developments. As practical philosophy, it defines at the outset the foundations of the political order of the city by taking into account the *praxis* (active actualization of one's life) of human beings. Understood thus, *praxis* is an essential property of all living beings insofar as they actualize by their *praxis* their natural potentialities and capacities; they become what they are naturally capable of being. The Greek term "*praxis* is, hence, a synonym of βίος, "the peculiar way of life," and Aristotelian biology establishes essential natural differences between living organisms on the basis of obvious "differences in their *praxis* and their way of life."[52] Thus, in a very special sense, *praxis* is part of the nature of each living being; it is that nature in the condition it reaches when its potentialities have attained their actualization. *Praxis* is identical with the actualized nature, that is, with "a way of life" that actualizes the potential nature of a living being. Accordingly, as the actualization of a peculiar nature, *praxis* is an end and goal. The generation of all living things is directed towards it. It is the condition in which living beings attain their end and become *actu* what they were capable of being. In order to know the nature of a given living being, we have to observe its actualized nature. Its potential nature does not disclose it. "The nature of a

52. *De Part. An.* II. 1. 646 b 15; *De Hist. An.* I, 1. 487 a 14.

thing is its end, its goal. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family."[53] Hence, it is insufficient to understand practical philosophy vaguely as a theory of action and its various forms, such as management, care, creation, production, and so on. Rather, it inquires into human *praxis* in the precise sense this term has in biology, namely, the actualized nature of a living being. This in turn fixes the subject-matter of the philosophical discipline dealing with man's being as such. *Praxis* is considered by it not as mere action, but rather as actualized human nature, as the condition of a human organism in which man has become *actu* what, according to his potential nature, he had the possibility of becoming.

And yet, by the same token, this implies that in his practical philosophy Aristotle abandons the path he had followed in biological research. His investigation of nature becomes political theory. While other living beings become "by nature" what they can be, the condition in which man is fully actual is linked to the city. The general procedure of investigating the nature of living beings in their actualized forms is also followed by Aristotle in the *Politics.* The *polis* is the end and goal of human nature, just as the actualized nature is for natural beings an end and a goal: "It is evident that the city is a creation of nature and that man is by nature a living being dependent on the city."[54] The second half of the sentence, which is usually translated as "man is a political animal," has found a place in all texts of legal and social philosophy; in them, however, it has been severed from its peculiar context and taken to imply that Aristotle discovered, among the other faculties of human nature, the capacity of building a state and forming a society. Aristotle, however, is not improving here on the old definition of man as a rational animal, by adding to it the property of sociability. He states explicitly that to be a "social living being" is not peculiar to man; bees, ants, wasps, cranes and all animals that live in flocks or swarms are also social beings. The differentiating characteristic of man is still reason: "Only man is endowed with reason and speech."[55] This defines his nature. Hence, it is man, the rational being, that is called by Aristotle ζῷον πολιτικόν. This in turn means that the potential nature peculiar to all men, and hence man as such, can only become actualized if there is a *polis.* Man depends on it for the actualization of his nature. Accordingly, Aristotle also says that the polis is a "natural" thing. Among all other forms of power and among different kinds of state, it is the only one that actualizes human nature by providing the conditions for a truly human life; it is the only one that brings man into a condition of actualized human existence. In this manner, Aristo-

53. *Pol.* I. 2. 1252 b 32-34.

54. *Pol.* I. 2. 1253 a 2: φανερὸν ὅτι ιῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί καὶ ὁτμ . . . φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον.

55. *Pol.* 1. 2. 1253 a 9-10.

tle conceives the *polis* as actualized human nature, an insight of infinite importance. Wherever there is no *polis,* wherever man is apolis, "deprived of a *polis*"[56] [in the original state of nature (*Naturzustand*), as well as under forms of government not grounded on man], human nature strives after its actualization without success. The common-place of conceiving man vaguely and in general terms as a ζῷον πολιτικόν has obscured the epoch-making importance of Aristotle's conception of the *polis.* According to it, for the first time in history, there is a state that is both essentially founded upon human nature and designed to actualize it in a truly human life. By the same token, it provides for the first time the possibility of understanding human nature as such.

In connection with the question of what became the foundation and the substance of the ethical and political order of the city upon its emancipation from the *nomos* of the fathers, the theory of human *praxis* explains why the destruction of the "old" is "better." And yet it is clear that the positing of man's being as a principle of legal justification is due to the *polis* and its constitution; it is the result of an interpretation of its foundations and not a conclusion drawn from deductions and postulates. The *polis* and its constitution are always of primary importance for practical philosophy. They are both its starting-point and the subject-matter it is supposed to understand in and of itself. Its method is grounded upon this. So, too, for the *Politics:* the essence of a political order can only be understood if the theory observes "how things grow from their foundations."[57] "Just as in general we analyse compounds into simple elements, in the case of the city we must observe the elements of which it is composed, in order that we may see in what different kinds of rule differ from one another."[58] The distinguishing mark of its political constitution in the numerous forms developed in the cities lies in their being grounded in freedom. Freedom, in the political sense of the term, implies that the citizens have a right to participate in the government, the admnistration, the courts, the assembly, and the council. As a constitutional principle, it is thus also defined by Aristotle as the equality of the rulers and the ruled found in the city.[59] But insofar as practical philosophy understands the foundations of the constitution and its principle, and hence observes "how things grow from their foundations," it breaks through the political forms. It is able to determine what it is in the political forms that leads to a constitution adequate to these foundations. For Aristotle, who was the first to claim it as the underlying element of the constitution, it is political freedom, the free existence of the citizens living

56. *Pol.* I. 2. 1253 a 2.
57. *Pol.* I. 1. 1252 a 24.
58. *Pol.* I. 1. 1252 a 23.
59. *Pol.* VII. 14. 1332 b 12 f. This is based on the fact that the *polis* is "a political community of citizens."

it. "Free is the man who exists for his own sake and not for another's."[60] The slave does not belong to himself but to his master, therefore his existence and his decisions rest with his master and not with himself. Hence, according to Aristotle, freedom is also defined by the fact that the free man has his own will. He is free insofar as he is capable of leading his own life and becoming what he himself is. But this means that man is able to lead his own life as man only in a city based on freedom, in a city that aims to have its citizens attain the actualization of their human existence in a condition consisting in an autonomous life. This condition, that everyone wishes for himself, is called "happiness" by Aristotle; he adds that happiness is one and the same thing, for a city founded upon freedom and for the individual.[61] Freedom implies the idea that the free man as man reaches happiness in the condition of actualization of human existence. All of the responsibilities that the political leadership assumes—namely protection, furthering of trade, securing internal and external peace—are ordered to that end: "It is clear that the *polis* is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of trade. These are conditions without which the *polis* cannot exist; but all of them together do not constitute a *polis*, which is a community of households and families, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life."[62]

Thus, freedom as substance implies that the *polis* has the vocation of bringing man to the condition of human existence. It is actualization, *actualitas,* of his nature. This distinguishes it from all other forms of government, and from all other kinds of state. Some hold the view that every type of government implies exercise of power and hence that the regime of the *polis* is "the same thing" as kingship or despotism.[63] But this is not said "in the right way." Such views remain at the level of the formal likeness of rulership, they do not perceive the substance of life in this rulership which determines its nature. Aristotle thus asserts that these opinions are not true because they do not understand that "there is as great a difference between the rule over free men and the rule over slaves as there is between slavery by nature and freedom by nature."[64] With the rise of the *polis*, a type of state

60. *Met.* I. 2. 982 b 25-26.
61. *N.E.* I. 1. 1094 b 7. On the importance of happiness in Aristotle's political philosophy cf. J. Ritter, "Das bürgerliche Leben," *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenchaftliche Pädagogik* 32 (1956) pp. 60-94, reprinted in J. Ritter, *Metaphysik und Politik,* Studien zu Aristoteles und Hegel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1959) pp. 57-105.
62. *Pol.* III. 9. 1280 b 30-35. Happiness, that is, the perfect and self-sufficing life, is also called by Aristotle the "human good" (*summum bonum humanum*), cf. N.E. I, 1, 1094 b 6-7. Aristotle is simply taking up the idea that the *polis* is human nature actualized in *praxis.*
63. *Pol.* I. 1. 1252 a 7-9.
64. *Pol.* VII. 3. 1325 a 28-30.

came into being whose freedom makes man free to actualize his own nature. This actualization, in turn, is necessarily denied by any form of government based on bondage. All of the political concepts furnished by the polis can subsequently be applied to other forms of government, to other types of state, for all of the concepts pertaining to the political realm in the European tradition were originally *polis*-concepts. That they have attained universal validity is due to philosophical theory, because such validity flows from the universal principle that philosophy discovered at the very basis of the city and brought to light conceptually. Once human nature has become the substance of the state in the *polis,* the forms of government and legal systems that are not founded upon man's freedom can only be called "a state" and "the law," in a homonymous sense of these terms. For this reason Aristotle calls the *polis* "a community in which everything is brought to perfection."[65] He says that it "embraces"[66] all the other kinds of community, and that "in all men there is by nature an impulse toward such a community."[67]

By the time of composition of the *Nicomachean Ethics,*[68] the *polis* was already doomed, its end approaching. The philosophy of Aristotle makes its appearance at a late stage of Greek civilization. In the manner of Epimetheus, it looks back to what has already taken place, free from the turmoil and struggles that characterize the periods in which things are coming into being. This review of the past is Aristotle's practical philosophy, that is, his theory of man. It preserves the substantial principle born in the *polis* during the politically unresolved crisis provoked by the breakdown of tradition. It understands the rational necessity according to which traditions and customs are bound to lose their status as principles of legal justification. Once human existence has become the foundation of the ethical, political, and legal order, everything else follows suit. It becomes the only standard in terms of which both the new and the old, positive law as well as traditional and venerable customs, have to prove and establish their rights. In this manner Aristotle settles philosophically the problem of what is just being a mere matter of "custom and convention." Politically the *polis* was unable to solve it. Within its limited particularity, it was unable to produce a stable and adequate political form that would match the universal principle it had introduced. Unlike Plato, Aristotle no longer thinks about a renewal of the *polis.* He has already been confronted with its future. In the calm and serene realm of concepts, his practical philosophy retains the universal principle that the state should be grounded upon human nature at the time when the *polis,* the first embodiment of the principle in world history, is already fading out of existence.

65. *Pol.* I. 2. 1252 b 28.
66. *Pol.* I. 1, 1252 a 5.
67. *Pol.* I. 2. 1253 a 29.
68. It was probably written between 347 and 330, cf. Dirlmeier, *op. cit.* p. 249.

With this *Aufheben,* practical philosophy becomes a universal theory of the actualization of human rational nature in the condition which consists of leading a human life. While all other living beings attain the actualization of their potentialities "by nature," man is the sole being that does not. His coming into being and his existence presuppose a rational human society, its institutions and a moral order; these *are* his actualization. Man comes into his existence by living in a state grounded upon his nature, by becoming accustomed to its ethical order: "From this it is plain that none of the virtues that comes through habit arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather, we are endowed by nature with the potentiality to receive them, but they are actualized by ethical habits."[69] This is the fundamental principle: Man's nature as potentiality is not actualized by nature. Its actualization consists in the ethico-political order within which it reaches the condition of leading a human life. Aristotle thinks that this is the truth that earlier philosophy was unable to discover in the city and left undecided. It had dealt with its *nomos* and *ethos.* It had done this by taking man and human reason as its starting-point and by grounding the political and ethical order of the city upon a conception of what man is within the totality of being. And yet it was unable to understand that all knowledge of man about himself and his own being, and hence philosophy itself as the theoretical discipline that bears this knowledge, is based on the condition that reason, which man possesses by nature as potentiality, must already have reached in practice the actualized condition of a human being. Aristotle was the first philosopher to see this. By understanding the foundation of the *polis* in its truth, he lifts up what is universal in it for theoretical consideration. Man is then *actu* rational only in the world, understanding his own being within the totality of being when he has left behind the state of nature (*Naturzustand*) and has reached the condition of actualized human existence within a state that is based upon, and destined to produce, such a condition.

This doctrine signals the end of Ancient philosophy and at the same time explains why it was something peculiar to the *polis.* Aristotle summarizes everything that precedes him through the insight that the ground and substance of political and legal conventions is man's nature insofar as it is actualized in the institutions and the ethos of the city. This is why the *Nicomachean Ethics* does not start with an undetermined, immediate concept of action. Its starting-points are the "arts and sciences" that provide

69. *N.E.* II. 1. 1103 a 19-26.

and produce the necesssary goods and services in the city.[70] They are the different forms in which man's potentialities are realized. His capacity to think and acquire knowledge is actualized in the sciences, his skills in the arts and crafts. Thus human nature in its institutionalized actualization provides the foundations for the conventions and enactments of the city. It is impossible to separate enacted law from inherited custom. Therefore, practical philosophy as ethics attempts to show that man has become the subject of the law due to the political perfection attained by the city: "Have the carpenter and the shoemaker certain functions, and has man none? Must we not rather assume that just as the eye or the hand, man also has a function of his own?"[71] But although the general concept of human nature continues to be influential in ethics as well as in legal and political philosophy, the decisive Aristotelian doctrine—namely, that the substance of the law and the state is the ethically actualized nature—is forgotten. From this neglect it follows that human nature and positive law, human nature and the state, are referred to each other without any mediation. The ethico-historical richness of the Aristotelian theory is lost. Mediation is lacking between the state and the law on the one hand, and human nature on the other. Deductions and abstract definitions must now replace the concept that Aristotle discovered in man's nature as actualized in the concrete historical, ethical richness of human existence.

III

The modern world, by breaking away in the eighteenth century from the uninterrupted Scholastic tradition in philosophy, severed itself from the Aristotelian heritage. And yet, at the same time, it preserves a certain enigmatic historical relationship to it. For the first time in world history the bourgeois society conceives the *status hominis* in a universal manner, that is, without limiting it to the boundaries of the Greek *polis*. As applied to all men, it becomes the universal principle of law and state. But along with this conception, bourgeois society, as a system designed to satisfy natural needs, reduces the condition of man to natural relations determined by work and yield. This is the source of the conflict that destroys the unity of Aristotelian practical philosophy, a unity that embraced both the legal and the ethical realm. Subjectivity returns into itself, escaping from a social reality that has become foreign to it, thus trying to preserve in morality the humanity which this social reality no longer contains. Over against subjectivity is a society that aims at establishing the aforementioned natural relations that desire to be all there is to man, and threaten to annihilate what subjectivity preserves, labeling it as "purely subjective." In the non-mediated opposition of socie-

70. *N.E.* I. 1. 1094 a 1-22.
71. *N.E.* I. 6. 1097 b 25-34.

ty and subjectivity the moral world, the *ethos* of Aristotle, starts to lose its footing and its peculiar way of being.

Once this has happened, Aristotle's practical philosophy retains, perhaps, the role of a reminder which rouses in us the recognition that certain things which are hostile and tend to anihilate each other, in themselves and *actu*—because they belong to the condition of being human—can only subsist together.

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iii. I assume that *"Lebewesen"* in the original is a misprint for *"Lebeweisen."* This view is supported by the passage in the *Historia Animalium* to which Professor Ritter refers.

STATE AND FREEDOM*

Hermann Krings

Translated by Helga Schmettau

I

In the period between the eighteenth and the twentieth centuries, "freedom" and "state" were high-sounding themes. The names of great revolutions and great thinkers, as well as great wars, were associated with them.

Numerous peoples freed themselves from foreign domination and created their own states. The nations of the western hemisphere became modern constitutional states. No longer was the state merely the private concern of a monarch; it was the concern of the nation. The enthusiasm of that pioneering era has lent a sort of halo to the nation-state. Flags and hymns were as much the symbols of the national spirit as of the state itself. Hegel went so far as to coin the ominous phrase that the state, in his thinking, was "the real God" (*Philosophy of Right,* §258).

This pioneer era of political freedom, which, though at different times, has appeared as a distinct epoch in all parts of the world, has now come to a close in Europe. By this time, everyone is for freedom. In the West, a large measure of personal and political freedom is guaranteed. Talk of liberty, whether in the West or East, is commonplace, and becomes devalued through inflation.

A decisive reason for this turn in the development of political freedom

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Born in 1917, Hermann Krings holds a chair in philosophy at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich. His orientation is German idealism, more particularly the tradition surrounding the transcendental philosophy of Kant. He is perhaps best known for his *Transzendentale Logik.* Other principal works include *Fragen und Aufgaben der Ontologie, Meditation des Denkens, Philosophisch-historische Grundlegung einer abenländischen Idee, Fragen der Pädagogen und Aufgaben der Bildungspolitiker.*

may be that our state not only guarantees all of the liberties that we fought two hundred years to attain, but that, being a social state, it regards their social fulfillment as its task. However, the more closely complete social realization of the guarantees of freedom and fundamental rights is approached, the more the exercise of that freedom will be *legislated by the state.*[1] To put this more precisely: As the realization of the liberal constitutional and social state progresses, a part of the freedom wrested from the pre-republican state reverts back to the now social state. The modern freedom drama approaches a point of return: Each further step toward social perfection of the liberal state threatens also to become a step towards an institutionalization (*Verstaatlichung*) of our freedom.

The subject of "state and freedom" is no longer the high sounding theme it once was. It is a difficult, dialectical subject. He who promises freedom outright, or strives directly to bring about human liberation, resembles a hiker in the fog, believing himself to be on the right trail but walking, in fact, in a circle. He arrives again at his place of departure, only now he is exhausted and without hope. The program of political freedom in an established liberal constitutional and social state is structured differently from the program of political freedom whose goal it is, first of all, to attain and to establish the liberal constitutional state. It contains the contradiction that greater freedom as realized by the state may mean diminished freedom. Today, undifferentiated liberal slogans from any and all political persuasions are rendered questionable by this contradiction. The same contradiction is well suited, however, to serve as a challenge to politics, to the disciplines of law and of political and social science, as well as to philosophy.

These initial remarks may show the way to a methodology: The topic of "state and freedom" will have to be treated from a dual perspective. This is already being done in practice, as I will show in an example; it will not be easy, however, to obtain convincing results in this manner.

In a small collection of essays titled with the rhetorical question, "Can the state care for everything?,"[2] two authors and politicians of generally similar persuasion, Hans Maier and Axel von Campenhausen, describe the Juvenile Welfare Law of 1922 from directly opposite points of view. Von Campenhausen remarks critically that with this law, the state for the first time takes over an area that had been the domain of free decision-making (138). Hans Maier, on the other hand, remarks with praise that this law "affirms the necessity of Free Juvenile Welfare Laws and with them of Juvenile Labor and its promotion as a public issue" (93). Maier emphasizes society's dependence upon the state as "an organized, central court charged with

1. Cf. H.F. Zacher, *Freiheitliche Demokratie* (Munich/Vienna: G. Olzog-Verlag, 1969), p. 115.
2. A.V. Campenhausen (Ed.), *Kann der Staat für alles sorgen? Zur Geringschätzung freier Initiativen durch die öffentliche Hand* (Düsseldorf: Pathmos-Verlag, 1976).

decision-making" (91). Von Campenhausen emphasizes "a constant quiet but persistent pushing and pressing" by which the state invades and legislates ever more domains of human life.

Both authors are right—and the problem remains unsolved. The question of whether or not the state should care for everything may be considered to have been answered: of course the state shall not care for everything. The questions that have not been answered, however, are how much should the state care for, and how much may the state be *permitted* to care for? This is a dilemma, and one with which we may have to live a while longer.

Yet we must be grateful for the dilemma in view of the thesis, vehemently upheld by the cultural and political world, that this dilemma does not exist at all. The argument carried on by B.F. Skinner and Noam Chomsky, the two matadors of Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, may serve as an example of this erroneous counter position. Skinner, the empirical psychologist and behaviorist, represents the view that human behavior is determined by our genetic endowment and through the history of "reinforcement." By "reinforcement" he means that the consequences of every behavior, interpreted as reward or punishment, reinforce or weaken certain innate behavioral tendencies. "When a bit of behavior is followed by a certain kind of consequence, it is more likely to occur again"[3] (27). The mechanism of this conditioning, according to Skinner, functions beyond freedom and dignity. (*Beyond Freedom and Dignity* is the title of his book published in 1971.) Freedom and dignity are illusions. Behavioral technology plus control, if they are perfect, guarantee virtue; Skinner offers the concept of "automatic goodness" (66). An ethical control—here Skinner means a control through praise and blame—may possibly survive in small groups, "but the control of the population as a whole must be delegated to specialists—to police, priests, owners, teachers, therapists, and so on, with their specialized reinforcers and their codified contingencies" (155). Skinner's theses are directed toward complete manipulation of man through behavioral technology and corresponding control. These may be employed equally for the purposes of a traditionalist as of a progressivist state. But the state then degenerates into a totalitarian socio-technocratic organization for the purpose of maintaining a culture that can no longer be legitimated.

Chomsky, not only an important linguist but also a committed moralist and critic of American Vietnam policies, has criticized Skinner's theses emphatically. According to Chomsky, there is no foundation for transferring the scientific methods of the natural sciences to the science of human behavior. Limited empirical material obtained in the laboratory, he states, though not disputed in itself, can not possibly be used as a basis for postulating far-reaching speculations on man. He considers such specula-

3. B.F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).

tions to be dogmatic and thoroughly unscientific. In contrast to Skinner, Chomsky holds the opinion that the sciences will discover, as they progress, "that even with full details about genetic endowment and personal history, a Laplacean omniscience could predict very little about what an organism will do."[4] (321) Basically, Chomsky argues, Skinner expresses trivialities in the guise of pseudo-scientific terminology. "Skinner confuses science with terminology" (364).

Chomsky argues for the freedom and dignity of man. Yet his defense of freedom lacks direction as much as does Skinner's defense of perfect conditioning and control. Chomsky wants freedom to be immediate and unmediated. He appeals to Rousseau and W. von Humboldt in pleading for "a community of free association without coercion by the state or other authoritarian institution . . ."[5] (402) He affirms "an anarchistic vision that is appropriate to the next stage of industrial society." Chomsky sides with Bakunin and the anarcho-syndicalists. As with them, he considers every political order to be political and social slavery. Man is subjected to a bureaucratic power in any case, whether the state protects private capitalism or carries on its own capitalism as a socialist state. According to the doctrine of this "libertarian socialism," the self-organization of industry, the syndicates, are to take the place of the state. Chomsky picks up the ideas of the anarcho-syndicalists and recalls attempts at their realization in France, Spain, or elsewhere—attempts frustrated by the respective political powers: the strangely one-sided and powerless recollections of a moralist whose idea of freedom thins out into an intellectual utopia.

Today Skinner's and Chomsky's works are discussed the world over. For both, the topic "state and freedom" does not exist. Skinner negates freedom; thus we have a state without freedom. Chomsky negates the state; thus we have freedom without a state. No doubt one root of these terrible simplifications can be found in these important scholars' lack of philosophical direction. They are satisfied with grandiose prejudices, one with that of scientism, the other with that of utopianism. They execute their "philosophy" on the unexamined basis of these points of view, on a high intellectual level and with a considerable display of specialized terminology.

II

Will the topic "state and freedom" have to be transformed into the topic, "either state or freedom?" This question is to be examined first with regard to its logical presuppositions. A logical examination suggests itself because two obviously entirely different concepts, freedom and the state, are treated (1) as if they were concepts of the same level of logic, able to enter into

4. Noam Chomsky, "Psychology and Ideology," in *For Reasons of State* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).
5. Noam Chomsky, "Language and Freedom," in *For Reasons of State, op. cit.*

direct relation with one another; (2) as if both concepts designated certain conditions; and (3) as if they were opposite concepts, rendering incompatible the conditions designated by them. A clarification of the logical presuppositions also may contribute to a resolution of the dilemma outlined earlier—that is, the dilemma that the social realization of our basic liberal rights exposes our very exercise of such rights to increasing government influence.

The antithesis is this: "Freedom" and "state" are concepts that belong to different levels of logic and cannot therefore be related to one another immediately; instead, they require mediation between them. They are not descriptions of empirical conditions, but rather a principle in the one case, a concept of order in the other. And finally, they are not opposite concepts, but stand in a certain relationship to one another.

First, let us deal with the question of the different levels of logic. A topic such as "Bavaria and the Federation" offers no logical difficulties or, at most, political ones. Both concepts are of states: species within one genus. A topic such as "state and society" is somewhat different. Yet, even here, there are no principal logical difficulties. Since both concepts are concerned with the organization of human relationships, this general generic character still offers them a mutual level of logic. In the topic "state and freedom," however, two concepts from different logical levels are brought into relation. The concept of "freedom" is a concept of reason, an idea. The concept of "state" is a concept of the understanding, of order. This difference requires explanation.

"Freedom" is a name not for something that can be grasped by means of categories and recognized as an object, an institution or a condition, but rather for something I have to *think,* as for instance when I make a person responsible for something, give him reasons for something, thank him or ask him for something. Such behavior, and the talk of responsibility, morality, insight, magnanimity—or, in short, reason—makes sense only if at least *one* element in an individual's actions can be attributed to him alone, and to him originally. All other factors of action may be conditioned by genetic endowment or by the history of the species or the individual; this one element is unconditional.

Freedom is the concept of an absolute. This unconditional element of action, which it is necessary to think, and which we designate "freedom," constitutes the moral character of action.[6] This concept is demanded and set

6. In order to avoid confusion, let it be noted that we can differentiate between a humane type of action and a moral type of action. Let us assume that traffic regulations are obeyed completely—automatically, as it were—by all drivers; one is reminded of Skinner's "automatic goodness," which in our case would be guaranteed by conditioning, owing to perfect driving instructions, perfect driver's education, and perfect traffic control. The resultant traffic and the driving behavior we can expect from this might be designated "humane." Thus an activity following the respective rules and regulations automatically and completely would be humane.

forth by reason, provided it wishes to assert itself as moral reason. But how can freedom be given if not as a condition? Freedom is "given" only insofar as man asserts himself as a moral being and understands this moral self-assertion as rational. It is in the self-understanding of man as a moral creature of reason that the sourse of the consciousness of freedom can be found. Or, as Kant states, ". . . morality initially discovers freedom for us" (*Critique of Practical Reason,* §6). Without moral self-assertion, freedom ceases to exist; and without the understanding of morality as reasonable, the consciousness of freedom disappears.

The concept of "state," on the other hand, is the concept of a categorially comprehensible relation—or more precisely, of a societal order drawn up by law and safeguarded through public authority. It sums up into a unity that complex of conditions by which a society merges into a sovereign organization. The concept has a synthetic function. "State" designates something that may be observable from certain points of view, as for instance a territory with boundaries. Since, for our present purpose, only the difference of logical levels of these concepts is important, there is no need to pursue the much-discussed concept of state any further at this point.

It is problematical to combine by simple addition the concept of an idea, or of an absolute, with the concept of a synthesis or a complex of order. Such a combination can further the understanding and guide action only if the difference in levels of logic is taken into consideration. If this is not done, it will appear as if freedom and state might either *crowd out* one another, or *change* from one into the other. We saw the first of these misunderstandings with Skinner and Chomsky: on the same level, freedom crowds out the state or vice versa.

The second misunderstanding—that freedom might become the state, and vice versa—is no less misleading. The concept of absolute freedom would then logically lead to the concept of an absolute state. With Rousseau, the idea of the absolute freedom of "natural" man corresponds to an "idea" of the state, which also is considered absolute since it is constituted of the union of absolute individual wills. This thread of thought, deducing from the concept of absolute freedom an absolute character of the state, has been spun by many, from Hobbes and Rousseau down to Fichte.[7]

From such philosophies, however, not only the ideology of an absolute state may be gained, but the opposite ideology as well—an ideology accord-

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The moral character of action is distinguished by three factors. (1) The rule or norm is not automatically obeyed but set apart as a possible obligation. (2) It is examined with reference to an absolute—be it for mere compatibility (negative criterion), or for groundability (*Begründbarkeit*) (positive criterion). (3) It is affirmed as something set apart so that one can assume a disposition toward it.

7. Cf. *Klassiker des politischen Denkens,* ed. H. Meier, H. Rausch and H. Denzer, Vol. 2 (Munich: Beck, 1968), p. 127f.

ing to which every existing state is disavowed, since it has not yet realized absolute freedom. This is an ideology of utopianism which, if—as is entirely possible—it conceives of itself as moral, does not exclude an ideology of terrorism.

Hegel's doctrine of the unity of reason and reality is the speculative culmination of this tradition of thinking, which arose in the late Middle Ages. His philosophy of law is an attempt to "comprehend the state as something inherently rational" (*Philosophy of Right,* Preface), and his thesis—that the ideal constructs for itself the real world "in the form of an intellectual empire" (*Ibid.*)—contains the dialectical *Aufhebung* [i] of the difference between ideal and real order.

Such philosophies suggest that we see in freedom an ideal to be realized by the state, even if only as an approximation. Yet the state, as the concept of a complex of institutional conditions, cannot under any circumstances be regarded as absolute; and freedom, as a concept of the unconditional, cannot under any circumstances be consumed in the realization of personal and political liberties.

Freedom is not an ideal that might become a future reality through some form of state. Freedom equally is not the concept of an ideal condition into which society will merge after the death of the state. The liberal idealism of the one sort as of the other is erroneous. Freedom is not at all the concept *of a condition, but rather a concept of meaning (Sinnbegriff).* It does not answer the question of what the state is, but why there is a state. The categorial-institutional order of the social world requires such a concept of meaning, since the state does not carry its significance in itself. And the state needs *this* concept of meaning if man, as a moral individual within the state, is to be able, as well as permitted, to assert himself. It is not the task of the state to produce significance or to confer moral meaning upon the human individual; its task is to mediate justice. Therefore, the state cannot have the realization of "freedom" as its goal. Hegel's assertion that the state is in itself "the moral whole, the realization of freedom,"[8] is

8. C.F.W. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right,* §258. Cf. §257: "The state is the reality of the moral idea." Cf. also §4 and §260.

i The Hegelian term *"Aufhebung,"* often rendered "sublation," is generally left in the original, since much of its multivalent richness seems lost in translation. *"Aufhebung"* can mean (1) the lifting-up, raising or elevation of a thing; (2) a keeping-in-reserve, putting-by, or preservation; and (3) the suspension, cancellation, or abolition of something. Thus a dialectical *Aufhebung* contains the seemingly contradictory notions of abolishing, on the one hand, and of transcending and preserving, on the other. For example, one ends one's childhood in growing up; but this childhood remains preserved as a moment of one's adult existence. In this sense the overcoming of childhood might be called an *Aufhebung.* For Hegel's treatment of this term, consult a note at the end of the first Chapter in his *Science of Logic.*

misleading—even when it is noted that these are not phrases from a political manifesto, but speculative-dialectical statements.

The unconditional cannot become immediately real; indeed, it cannot even be thought as immediately real. The unconditional can be real only insofar as an actual complex of conditions are founded upon it and thus given significance.

Meaning appears only as mediated. The notion of mediation is important here. If the behavior of two people toward each other has its significance in the fact that they are friends, then this does not imply that the behavior could produce friendship, nor that the friendship would become actualized directly through some ideal behavior; it is actual and visible as mediated. If the meaning of the Creation is the revelation of God's splendor, that does not imply that God's splendor has been brought about through the Creation or become immediately actual in it; God remains hidden while at the same time becoming present. If freedom is the meaning of the state, that does not imply that the state could produce freedom, or that fredom is the immediate goal of political measures such as external security, public welfare, prosperity, social security, and others. However, freedom constitutes the transcendental criterion for political measures; that is, the institutional rules set by the state as conditions for human community must lend themselves to being considered capable of being grounded by the unconditional or, at least, they must not be contradictory. In the former case, freedom is the positive criterion of the state; in the latter, the negative.

Freedom and state are concepts of a different logical quality and function. The "and" placed between the two words must not be used naively and without mediation, for it signals a process of mediation. This much we have worked out critically thus far and, also in the spirit of criticism, we have rejected the erroneous positions derived from a comparison of the concepts as though they pertained to the same level; that is, the disavowal of freedom or the state and the idealizing of freedom or the state. How now may we comprehend this process of mediation in a constructive manner?

III

As we stated earlier, following Kant, the origin of the consciousness of freedom lies in man's self-determination as a moral being. Man knows and acknowledges himself and the other as open to appeal, as responsible, as free—whatever the limitation may be. Man's acknowledgement of himself and his fellow men as free is the first mediation of freedom. Freedom here is conceived not as a thing, but as a decision and an affirmation: I acknowledge myself and the other as free. It is in this affirmation that the origin of good can be found. The decision—viewed from the perspective of form—can be made negatively as well; that is, I can deny my fellow man

and myself this acknowledgment and regard the course of world events as either determined or random occurrences. In this denial lies the origin of evil. Through non-acknowledgment, freedom is negated and actually disappears. Freedom appears with the decision for freedom. This decision, upon which morality is founded, may be termed an unconditional or transcendental decision—in contradistinction to historically determined decisions.

The transcendental act of acknowledging man as a free and moral agent is the foundation of *justice.* The origin of justice has fittingly been described as "divine" in the tradition of classical and Christian thinking, not because God, out of absolute caprice, declared an arbitrary dogma to be justice, but rather because the foundation of justice is the unqualified respect for the unconditional in man—the respect for his freedom. God himself, according to Christian doctrine, respects man's freedom: man is free to sin, and he can be redeemed—such are the signs of God's othering of himself (*Entäußerung*). And God's justice has been revealed without laws (Romans 3.21). To be conscious of those of one's actions that are not conditioned by genetic endowment or environmental influences, but are unconditional, is the mark of one fashioned in God's image.

Freedom is the foundation of justice—and of divine justice as well. In justice, freedom is mediated historically. Of course, justice is but a partial mediation: the more encompassing material mediation of freedom is love. This reminder is offered only in passing, since our topic imposes its limits here. We also need to be reminded of the moral convictions of justice.[9] The child has the right to acknowledgment by his parents, and parents have a right to acknowledgment by the child, for the human family exists not merely by a generational relationship, but by the fact that the generational relationship is freely acknowledged and affirmed. Such affirmation is no longer of a natural, but of a moral character. An ailing person has the right to acknowledgment by the physician; a probably powerful medical establishment is at work here, whose manner of action has not yet been fully elucidated, since to conceive of functional connections as open for a moral quality poses difficulties of method. The disregard of these and similar moral convictions of justice plunges both sides into unfreedom. The concept of "higher justice" (Hegel) cannot here be pursued; let it at least have been mentioned in passing, however, along with the concept of love as the more encompassing mediation of freedom.

The state, as the institutional mediator of justice in a concrete historical society, must be termed the mediation of mediation. We do not degrade the

9. Cf. P. Haerlin, *Recht und Anerkennung. Philosophische Untersuchungen zum psychoanalytischen Prozess* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1976). " 'Justice' in the moral sense of the term is synonymous with 'claim to acknowledgment.' " (22) " 'Justice,' understood morally, has to be distinguished from 'justice' in the legal definition." (23) Haerlin refers to Hegel's differentiation between 'concrete' and 'abstract' justice.

state by designating it as a condition and a mediation rather than an absolute or highest entity. The concept of the state has its place in a specific hierarchy of concepts. In this hierarchy it stands in the third place, following the concepts of freedom and justice. Were the state to place itself at the top of this hierarchy, it would rob itself of its significance. The state's dignity consists in mediating justice and thus rendering freedom possible. If it does not fulfill this significant purpose, it loses its dignity, and its degradation manifests itself in its becoming a mere instrument of power and, with that, at the mercy of power struggles.

If the significance of justice lies in the mediation of freedom, and if the state carries out the institutionalization of justice, then we may deduce that the positing of justice in constitution and legislation has to be the result of an institutional act of free consent. This consent cannot immediately be understood as a contract, for in order to seal a contract, the parties thereto will have to have acknowledged one another earlier as partners of a potential contract, and thus must have affirmed something akin to a contract as a principle governing their relationship. Without this transcendental acknowledgment and affirmation, the contract would remain the notorious "piece of paper." The basic act of free acknowledgment, incidentally, finds its expression in the fact that liberal constitutions contain fundamental stipulations regarding which no contract may be concluded, but which remain free. The sentence, "The dignity of man is inviolable" (*Grundgesetz* [Statute of the Federal Republic of Germany], Article 1) is not a phrase from a contract, but establishes the moral basis of potential contracts and regulations.

The state's permanent founding act is not a contract or its renewal, but rather an act by which man defines himself and others as free, moral individuals, and shapes this self-determination into the basis of legal and social order. The concept of self-determination thus contains two dimensions of meaning. First, it means that man defines himself in transcendental acknowledgment and honors this claim vis-à-vis the other individual. Secondly, it means that man himself posits the mediations of justice, that is, state and law; the elementary determining force of man as citizen is autonomy. The meaning of freedom as political self-determination is no ennobling euphemism for lawlessness and caprice. Self-determination is *ab ovo* a communicative and decisive act: be it of a nation in respect to the types of political structure it wishes to have, or be it of citizens in respect to the types of laws they desire to have.

IV

Freedom was determined to be the unconditional moment in human action fundamental to morality. The first mediation of this unconditional into finite human life takes place through justice in the broadest sense of the

term, that is, through a person's claim to an absolute right to acknowledgment, and his coming to meet the absolute duty of acknowledging others. A further mediation of the unconditional is carried out by the state, provided that it is understood as the institutional mediation of justice and constituted by political self-determination. Justice and state are the conditions under which freedom may become actual in the form of liberties.

Despite the preceding train of thought relating state and freedom, the latter concept remains problematical. It contains two contradictory notions—conditional and unconditional—without offering any suggestions on how to treat this contradiction. Is it now our task to eliminate the contradiction, that is, to suspend one or the other of the two contradictory elements? Does the contradiction signal the fact that ultimately a relationship of state and freedom is conceivable only in terms of the alternatives introduced earlier in the positions of Skinner and Chomsky? Can the contradiction be rendered comprehensible from the perspective of a wider context? Or, may we regard the contradiction as resolved with the designation of freedom as autonomy and self-legislation?

Regarding this latter question, one look at political systems founded upon the concept of self-determination will show that there can be no talk of having resolved the contradiction. On the other hand, a look at political systems not constituted by political self-determination will show that the contradiction has been resolved in a desperate manner. For, if freedom does not itself posit the conditions of its existence—if the conditions are not made legitimate by free self-determination, but dictated and made compulsory by a foreign power—then certainly freedom must be lost. The same holds true when self-determination is lacking because the individual negates any and all regulations and wishes to be unconditionally free. In such a case, freedom evaporates into irreality or utopia.

The contradiction between the unconditioned claim and the contingency of its realization in the historically political reality is by no means resolved through the criterion of self-determination; instead, this criterion makes it impossible to eliminate the contradiction. If freedom as autonomy posits the conditions of its own existence by legislating its own laws, then the contradiction of the conditional and the unconditional lives on in just this mediation, that is, in the state. Indeed, it *has* to live on. If it did *not* live on, this would be an indication that one of the two contradictory concepts had won the upper hand as an "extreme." In that case, we would have unconditional freedom in the form of anarchy, or complete dependence in the form of a totalitarian state. Apart from this contradiction, the state as self-mediation of freedom and justice would be lost. The theoretical and practical aporias resulting from the contradiction are not signs of a deficiency of this state, but rather of its peculiar character.

This shows that the two dangers of the liberal state—that of anarchy on the one hand, and that of totalization on the other—are structural dangers;

that is, they cannot be eliminated, but exist in principle. It is precisely these two elements generating the liberal state—the unconditional and the conditional, freedom and law—which, when not kept in their place in the logical order of mediation, can become a danger. The liberal state, posited by freedom itself as a condition of actual freedom, must structurally and permanently come to terms with the contradiction—a contradiction as dangerous as it is magnificent—between the absolute claim to freedom and the established institutional mediations. Herein lies the dignity, and the finiteness, of the liberal state. The aporias and the practical/political problems arising from this contradiction are indispensable; they are the life element of democratic politics, characterizing the liberal and democratic constitutional state; they are, as it were, the *felix culpa* of democracy.

It is not possible to idealize the state. It is, to be sure, the condition of concrete, personal, and political liberties of moral individuals, but it is not in itself a moral being. The individual's morality is the significance of the state, but not its purpose. Human freedom and dignity are inviolable. They neither are absorbed by the state, nor can the state be permitted to become a superindividual.

Yet this contradiction between the unconditional character of freedom, and the character of the state and of law as conditioned, prohibits more than just the fusion of state and liberty. Above and beyond this latter function, it renders itself concrete in *political contradiction.* Freedom as unconditioned has to be permitted to contradict the state; for, without the possibility of contradiction it would forfeit its character as unconditioned; that is, political freedom would be lost. The state, on the other hand, being constantly rendered questionable by the contradictions, must—if it is to avoid anarchy—possess adequate legitimation and power to maintain political order and mastery over a self-absolutizing contradiction.

Thus political contradiction proves to be a necessary structural element of a state affirming freedom, as well as of freedom affirming the state. Just as certainly as freedom itself affirms the conditions of its existence in the form of the state and the law, so it is certain that freedom will contradict the self-imposed conditions of its existence. Only thus can it maintain its character of being unconditioned in its historical-political mediacy. Freedom thus is the transcendental foundation of the law, as well as the basis of contradiction against the law.

Realized (*reale*) freedom therefore has to be concerned with realizing the contradiction. When real freedom is made concrete in the form of political-institutional liberties, this means that simultaneously with the institutionalization of the legislation, the opposition must be institutionalized as a structural element of precisely this legislation. The liberal state does not eliminate the contradiction, but rather posits it expressly and formally as a structural element of itself: *It institutionalizes the contradiction as political opposition.* A political system that does not make opposition its own condi-

tion is not a liberal system. Neither the absence of laws, nor the disregard for them is a sign of freedom. Rather, it is the possibility and the realization of political contradiction against a specific law that is a sign of genuine and inviolable freedom vis-à-vis the law.

It follows that the state is not a compromise of freedom and unfreedom wherein each side gives up a part of its terrain, but rather the mediation of absolute human freedom and dignity into the limitation of the historical-political situation of state domination. The majority, as well as the opposition, acts for the benefit of freedom and opposes lack of freedom. The thesis of classical liberalism turns out to be inadequate. Freedom is not safeguarded by the fact that a part of social commerce remains outside the law and "natural," while another part, *faute de mieux,* is left to the coercive power of the state. To be sure, the question is in what subjects or areas of life the state intervenes, but essentially what matters are the types of laws—whether, for example, an area is ruled by public or private justice. Initially, the purpose of the law is to mediate justice, thus rendering freedom possible wherever this becomes necessary. It is certainly not the purpose of the law to organize the perfect functioning of the course of events. A political socialism which believes itself empowered to suspend the hierarchy of concepts, and which regards the common weal as not merely a political aim but elevates it to become the purpose of the state—while freedom is postponed to a non-political future—not merely corrupts the significance of the laws, but must suppress the political opposition as well. Opposition thus appears to be nothing but an interference with politically organized functions and events, and this is so not through any fault of the opposition, but rather because of the distorted political system.

The liberal state is neither the minimal liberal state, nor merely the state acting as a subsidiary. That state is liberal whose legislation, on the one hand, fulfills the significant purpose of mediating justice and thus making freedom possible, and which, on the other hand, protects and upholds the political opposition as an institution of self-determination of the state. The freedom of self-determination in the form of parliamentary legislation corresponds to the freedom of contradiction in the form of parliamentary opposition. Where this basic rule is disregarded, political authorities should not be surprised when the awakened liberal consciousness of the citizens realizes the opposition in another form—be it in a political strike or in literature, or be it that the opposition unexpectedly takes to the streets.

The institution of opposition is an institution of dignity. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, even the freedom to "vote with one's feet," are aspects of the realization of the opposition. National borders there may be; but an "iron curtain" is a human and political disgrace.

The legislator, as well as the government, needs opposition; so does the judge. The defendant will initially contradict the plaintiff, but he also contradicts the trial and the sentence. Should he, however, absolutely con-

tradict the system of justice of which he himself is an integral part, then he disqualifies himself. Just as the division of power does not impair the dignity of the state, but rather counteracts a degradation of the state by a political absolutism, so it is with opposition. Without it, the legislator, the ruler, and the judge forfeit their dignity.

The rule of structural counterplay is valid not only for the state, but also for social systems, as long as they are institutionalized by a liberal order. In the labor system, for example, the right to strike is the institution of opposition against the rules within that system.

In our state, the administration shows itself to be relatively resistant to opposition. When, for instance, in the area of school administration—a branch of state administration with thoroughly absolutist traits—the parents occasionally show some natural opposition, this poses a problem. The opposition is non-institutional; it consists of alliances and federations of parents, consumers, tax payers, airport opponents, in various citizens' groups. There certainly always remains the appeal to the courts of law, an option attained just over a hundred years ago. Yet the recourse to law is different from the institution of opposition. It can not replace the latter—and, in any case, the courts of law should not be used as a vehicle of the opposition. The question of a form of administration in accordance with the liberal constitutional state is presently governed by the not very productive antagonism between democratization on one side, and reasons of state on the other. The problem appears to be largely unsolved.

In the democratic state, the individual citizen belongs to either the ruling majority or the opposition. A change is possible at any time—be it effected by the individual changing sides, or by a change in the plurality relationship as a whole. It is important with all change that both institutions uphold the state, and that the meaning of the legislation, as well as the opposition with reference to the legislation, is freedom. How much does the state need to do? How much is the state permitted to do? The sensitive balance in this dilemma which fundamentally affects the state, society, and the individual, cannot be established by a theory, although the Aristotelian doctrine of the "mean" between inadequacy and excess, to be determined by the Logos, may point in a direction.[10] But this mean is rarely achieved precisely, and even more rarely maintained for any length of time. All the more will the political instrumentalities and procedures have to be adapted to the structural dilemma. Without the political counterplay of government and opposition, there is doubtless great danger that the state will not do what it has to do, or will do what it is not permitted to do. The counterplay of affirmation and negation might most nearly approach the task of finding and maintaining that sensitive balance.

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10. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II. 6 (1107a).

ABSOLUTE IDENTITY: NEOPLATONIC IMPLICATIONS IN SCHELLING'S "BRUNO"*

Werner Beierwaltes

Translated by Darrel E. Christensen
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Schelling's dialogue *Bruno oder über das Göttliche und natürliche Princip der Dinge,* published in 1802, expresses that stage of Schelling's thought in which elaboration of the problems of identity, unity, and thus the Absolute, are central. The subject matter, inspired by Giordano Bruno's dialogue *De la Causa, Principio e Uno* (1584), is developed in platonic form.

In 1789, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi published essential passages from Bruno's text in a German (paraphrastic) translation. Schelling took this material into his own train of thought, using parts of the Jacobi translations verbatim.[1]

The purpose of this article is not to provide a complete interpretation of Schelling's *Bruno,* or even to consider all aspects of his thought. It is, rather, the more modest one of making clear that Schelling, in his approach to Giordano Bruno, indirectly took up into his own thought genuine

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* This translation was prepared for the Conference on Neoplatonism and Contemporary Philosophy held on May 17 to 19, 1973, at Eastern Kentucky University. Following a suggestion by the author, some of the notes were rendered shorter than in the original German text. A later revision of the German text involving principally stylistic changes, the greater part of these being in the introductory section, is in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* der Görresgesellschaft, 1973.

The present treatment belongs within the context of an attempt by the author to rethink the problem of identity and difference in reference to the history of these concepts. They are analyzed with particular reference to the historical outworking of the platonic conception and set forth by a paradigmatical treatment of neoplatonism, of the philosophical theology of the middle ages and early renaissance (Cusanus), of German idealism (Hegel and Schelling), and of the present (Heidegger and Adorno): "Identität und Differenz" (Frankfürt: Klostermann, 1980).

1. For the connection of Schelling's writings with Bruno, see note 49, below.

neoplatonic elements. This is directly linked to the consideration that certain philosophical tenets of Plotinus and Cusanus are constituents of Bruno's concept of principle and world.

Schelling's philosophizing in its second phase (after 1801) shows—in its form of thought and in many conceptions—a particular affinity to neoplatonism, especially with the philosophy of Plotinus. After 1805, this affinity was supported—at least to some extent—by a direct knowledge[2] of some texts of Plotinus. Decisive evidence of this affinity is, for example, Schelling's notion that the Absolute is one (primordial unity); that it is the self-affirming identity of thought and being; that it constitutes the circle of going forth and the returning of particular entities; that the function of intellectual intuition in the system of philosophy is analogous to the 'ekstasis' of Plotinus; and lastly, that nature is to be grasped as the productivity of Spirit.

The reception of thoughts and the form of thinking, which in different historical situations arises from an inner affinity, always works selectively. A transformation takes place: what has been received is differentiated by the receiver and, in turn, modifies his thought. The attempt to confront "system" with "system," that is, to consider the always differing historical presuppositions and intentions in their *entirety,* would lead necessarily—so I believe—to a stronger emphasis on the points of *difference,* in contrast to an effort to concentrate primarily on a *comparison* of *forms of thought* with corresponding constellations within the systems under consideration. I attempted the latter in *Platonismus und Idealismus,* in which I am concerned with Plotinus and Schelling, among others.[3] Inasmuch as a barren repetition of one "system" in another is not to be anticipated, and insofar as the possibility of pertinent affinities in different historical situations is not to be denied, I maintain the method I have employed to be more revealing. The other attempt to confront Schelling's system with that of Plotinus (whatever "system" might mean in reference to the latter's thought) might show that Schelling's concept of unity as an organic totality cannot be compared indiscriminately with the plotinian principle of all, the One. Nonetheless, from its *constellation* within the system and formally considered, Schelling's concept of absolute unity or identity is compatible with the plotinian concept of Intelligence. This compatibility follows from the consideration that Intelligence, by means of reflection *and* through the One, *is* its own unity and has retained and sublated all difference in itself. It would also be misleading to contrast a so-called ontological system with a system

2. W. Beierwaltes, *Platonismus und Idealismus* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1972), pp. 100 ff.

3. The complexity of the elements from the tradition of philosophy contributing to Schelling's thought shall be further explicated in another context, in which I shall consider the manner in which he was influenced by Spinoza.

which has received its structure from subjectivity. This approach would be misleading because, notwithstanding the difference between Plotinus's concept of a reflexive, absolute (that is, timeless) being and Schelling's concept of self-constituting subjectivity, it might suggest that the whole of being, according to Plotinus, was static or fixed in comparison with Schelling's organic totality. Plotinus's Intelligence and Soul, however, must be understood as the very dynamic elements in all being: they bring forth all being *and* lead it back, shaping the whole into a differentiated unity. The contrast to Plotinus, however, appears very distinctly in Schelling's decidedly transcendental foundations of subjectivity and in its explication in, or as, history.

I use the concept "Platonism" in such a way that it is to be taken neither as a fixed system of propositions whose meaning is settled definitely, nor as a creed (like Christianity, for example). The concept, rather, is taken primarily in the sense of a form of thought, without intending that Platonism be reduced to a mere formalism. Were this the case, a consideration of this question from a philosophical point of view would be superfluous. Essential features of the subject are retained in the form of thought itself. The inner form of thought, which its language exhibits, represents, at least in its intention, the subject itself which is to be mediated in reflection. The form is thus not separable from the subject, as is the exterior from the interior.

I

The Unity of Opposites is the fundamental thought of Schelling's *Bruno*: it determines and gives shape to the whole dialogue. The ontological actualization of this unity and its meaning for the theory of knowledge is explicated in the discourse. Schelling posits the following concepts as opposites which are constitutive of the entirety of particular entities, and which guide finite thought (they had already been intensively worked out by the philosophical tradition):[4] finite/infinite; limited/unlimited; particularity/universality; intuition/thought; possibility/actuality; activity/rest; plurality/unity; being/thought; object/subject; and, as the highest opposition which comprehends all others, the real versus the ideal. The idea that particular entities taken in their entirety are to be grasped not as a collection of diffusing opposites, but as an organism, is grounded in the

4. Cf. my article "Gegensatz," in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie,* ed. J. Ritter (Basel: Schwabe/Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974), Vol. III, cols. 105-117. Even in his later work, Schelling's special interest centers on the contrasting, and at the same time unified, concepts πέρας—ἄπειρον (finite/infinite; limited/unlimited) from Plato's *Philebus* (cf. his reference in "*Bruno,*" 242).

highest principle which unites all opposites,[5] sublating them in itself. Yet, this highest principle permits opposites to exist as particular, individual entities in separation from itself, at the same time that it is the moving element of the return, leading the opposites back to their original unity. This original unity is comprehended as a reflective act. As the "first which precedes all,"[6] it neither stands in abstract contrast to the opposites (existing in separation outside of it), nor exists as a mere sum of all of them. Rather, it executes by *thinking* the mutual interpenetrating of the opposites to an absolute, pure unity, which is not "obscured through difference."[7] It is a unity within which "the unity and the opposition, the self-identical and the non-identical, are one;[8] it is "the inseparability of the different from the One,"[9] the "absolute unity of the unity and of the opposition";[10] in it, the oppositions are "bound together in an absolute manner,"[11] or "sublated" in their peculiarity;[12] that is, in this absolute unity, they are not what they are in themselves and against one another: they *are* this very unity *itself.* Schelling conceives absolute unity as "pure *identity.*"[13] From this, it is clear that identity is not to be understood as the empty tautology of formal logic, A = A, but as the ground which thinks and sublates into itself all opposites—that is, all beings—and is thus absolute knowledge: unity which *actualizes* itself as self-reflection identifying itself with itself.

The conception of the opposites as "sublated" absolutely, or bound together in absolute unity or identity, prompts the statement: Identity is the "One *without* Opposition,"[14] or the "One that is elevated above all opposition"[15]—that is "above" difference,[16] with all opposition "under it."[17]

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5. "Bruno," in *F.W.J. von Schellings Samtliche Werke,* edited by K.F.A. Schelling (Stuttgart and Augsburg: J.G. Cotta, 1859), First Series, Vol. IV, p. 242. In what follows, this particular Work is abbreviated "B." Other works within the First Series are referred to by the abbreviation "I," followed by the number of the volume and page.
6. B 235.
7. B 236.
8. *Ibid.*
9. B 243.
10. B 295, 298.
11. B 244.
12. B 239.
13. B 323.
14. B 265, 302, 321.
15. B 310.
16. B 237.
17. B 302. Cf. below pp. 279 ff. Concerning the ἕν, reference should be made to Proclus, who conceived it to be without any difference—that is, to be above all being which might be comprehended in categories—for example, *in Parm.* 1076.35 ff (ed. Cousin), 1092.36 f, 1123.26-1124.38, 1127-20, 1203.40 f.

Analogous to the neoplatonic thought that the One is ground of all, and at the same time nothing of all (that is, nothing determinate), Schelling pursues the paradox that absolute unity is the totality of particular entities, comprehensive ground and sublation of all opposites; at the same time, it is none of these opposites in the same way in which they are opposites in themselves. That this One is "without" opposition or "above" it therefore means that it does not have the opposition or difference in itself *as* opposition or difference. In order to characterize absolute unity as the existing exclusion of opposites *as* opposites, or of difference *as* difference, which precisely thus contains the opposites as non-opposites, Schelling calls it "absolute *indifference.*"[18] If, therefore, it can be presupposed that unity is to be understood as reflective, dynamic identity, and at the same time as the inseparability of opposites, it follows that the highest principle may be called (in analogy to the formula "unity of the unity and the opposition") the *indifference of identity and difference,*[19] or, if identity is indifference, the identity of difference and indifference.[20]

Schelling's equation of unity and identity or indifference with the "Absolute,"[21] which allows him to understand the above noted concepts as predicates of the Absolute, forms the determinative character of his philosophy. Philosophy indeed is the reflection of the Absolute; it is the act of transcending the opposites, or of reducing them from the realm of imagery into its grounding unity; it is the progress into the "absolutely infinite," the "absolute identity," the "absolute One which *is* and which, being absolutely ideal, is absolutely real, because outside of it [there is] only non-reality, and which is thus the point of highest indifference."[22] Since philosophy in the sense of Schelling is therefore "ever and throughout in the Absolute,"[23]—that is, because it has its principle in the Absolute and hence

18. B 268: absolute unity "which contains the indifference of all things comprehended in it." Also see pp. 322, 323 ("absolute indifference"), 328.
19. To make quite clear that the opposites are at once separated *and* one in the Absolute, Hegel distinctly calls it "the identity of identity and non-identity; opposing and being one is at once in it": *Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie,* 64.13 ff. ed. Buchner-Pöggeler (Hamburg: Meiner, 1968).
20. Cf. also *Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen,* Werke I, Vol. VII, p. 445.
21. In *Bruno;* for example, 243.
22. *Propädeutik der Philosophie* (1804), I. VI, 130.
23. *Fernere Darstellungen aus dem System der Philosophie* (1802) I. Vol. IV, 388: "Die Philosophie ist ganz und durchaus nur im Absoluten, und betrachtet alle Dinge nur wie sie im Absoluten sind." *System der gesamten Philosophie und der Naturphilosophie insbesondere* (1804) I. Vol. VI, 176 f.: Philosophy is the expression of God's self-affirmation, of the One as the All. The highest mystery of philosophy: how God "*is himself,* being the *One infinite substance*" (*ibid.,* 198). Philosophy therefore is in principle theology and henology.

tries to explicate it in all realms of being—philosophy is, despite its purely transcendental starting-point and its sustained transcendental intentions, to be understood as the radicalized renewal of the onto-theological character of metaphysics. On the basis of this thesis, Schelling's differentiation of the relation of transcendence and immanence concerning the Absolute has yet properly to be thematized in contrast to metaphysical (non-idealistic) theology.

The question which must first be answered is in what manner, and to what degree, "the unity of opposites" as principle of being and thought is adequate to constitute the Absolute. Reference must here be made to the essential paradigms.

a) *Finite/infinite.* The finite is "necessarily always a determinate entity and, as this determinate entity, determined through another finite entity which in turn is determined through another, and so on, ad infinitum."[24] The finite is limited, separate from the other; being something determined in itself, among other beings determined in themselves, it is difference. The finite is *of itself* and *in itself* finite, but it is not real *of itself,* because, even in its finitude, it is thoroughly effected by the infinite, and its reality lies therefore in the ideality in which it is grounded. This also means that each finite entity has its ground not in itself, "but necessarily outside of itself,"[25] and therefore is a reality whose realization lies in another. Suppose that the infinite, according to platonic terminology, which Schelling employed in reminiscence of the *Timaeus* and *Philebus* and recast in conformity with his own interests,[26] is the "true Universe of infinite abundance," or is the "Idea," the "eternal[ly conceiving] concept," the absolute interpenetration of all possible determinations; then the finite is the "extended"[27] unity, expanding into boundless time, and the manifold image or anti-type of the Idea. In contrast to the "eternal concept," time is the index of the difference between being and non-being, cause and effect, possibility and actuality in the finite. The Absolute, however, is the negation of all finitude, and therefore also the sublation of all opposition dominating the realm of opposites. In the Absolute the finite, in contrast to the infinite, is indifferent; the finite is timeless, infinite in it, the particular is not as a particular something, but as the whole itself. The Absolute, or the absolute identity, is therefore the unity of the infinite and the finite *as the* infinite. "To disentangle entirely this essence in which the finite and infinite are intricately interwoven [viz. the Absolute as absolute knowledge] is only possible for him who perceives that and how all is comprehended in all, and how also in the particular the fullness and abundance of the whole is established."[28] This

24. B 247.
25. B 249.
26. For the contrast of true, eternal being and becoming in time, original (paradigm) and copy, cf. *Tim.* 27 d 6 ff.; B 242 f., 260, 263.
27. B 283.

indifference of finitude and infinitude, the unity of all possible oppositions—which itself is truly without opposition—has a pertinent proximity to Plotinus's notion that in the timeless *hypostasis* νοῦς "all [is] in all," that the light of the whole appears and shines through the clarity and reflective translucence of the particular intelligible (viz. the Ideas) within the νοῦς, and that the "light," the reflection of the whole, fuses all particular entities into a dynamic identity.[29] To the same degree, Leibniz's concept of the monad is here present; each particular monad is a mirror of the entirety of the monads.

b) *Potentiality/actuality.* The finite, which as the 'extended' image of infinitude keeps actuality separate from potentiality, shows also that this opposition, like the one of finite and infinite, merely arises out of and corresponds to finite conceptualization. In the "eternal concept" or the infinite unity, "each potentiality [has] its actuality, each actuality its potentiality immediately with or in itself."[30] Each particular being in the realm of the finite is what it *now* can be, yet it is not what *it ever could* be. The Absolute, on the contrary, is all that can be and therefore is "always what it [itself] can be, at any time and at once, without distinction of time; such a one, however, can only be One."[31] Certainly this notion of the Absolute as the unity of potentiality and actuality is at odds with some of Schelling's formulations which favour the idea of a becoming God, who explicates his own implication; this notion is also at odds with statements within his late philosophy which seek to provide a basis for the theogonic process. The conception of historicity, in which, or as which, God makes himself explicit, therefore transforms the pure identity into a progressive, extended identity, which only finds itself in the course of the history of consciousness.

c) *Being/thought; real/ideal.* The Absolute is absolute *comprehension (Erkennen)* or absolute *reflection.* Absolute comprehension, however, "is not thought in contrast to a being; it contains, rather, thought and being

28. B 291. In the Absolute, nothing is "obscured" by difference. "Here is nothing but translucency," B 239. Cf. *Plot.* V 8.4.4 ff. with reference to the intelligible realm, the timeless νοῦς.: διαφανῆ γὰρ πάντα . . . πᾶς παντὶ φανερὸς εἰς τὸ εἴσω καὶ πάντα . . . φῶς γὰρ φωτί . . . πανταχοῦ πάντα καὶ πᾶν πᾶν καὶ καὶ ἕκαστον πᾶν καί απειρος ἡ αἴγλη.
29. Cf. W. Beierwaltes, *Platonismus und Idealismus,* p. 116 f.
30. B 283, 246; in the Absolute, there is "absolute unity of potentiality and actuality." B 250: To the infinite—being the real—"there is joined immediately its potentiality; everything, therefore, in so far as it is in God, is absolute in itself, beyond all time, and has eternal life."
31. B 312. *Propädeutik der Philosophie*, I. Vol. VI, p. 86: "Whatsoever *is* not in actuality what it can be, is by necessity imperfect and finite, whereas that which *is* all that it can be, is perfect, infinite and beyond time; for what is perfect cannot become anything, since it is all."

already united in itself, and this in an absolute manner."[32] Finite comprehension, on the contrary, is determined through the difference between itself, the thinking subject, and the object of thought—a difference which cannot always be overcome and, having been overcome through evidence, falls into disparity again. The relation of finite thought to being is therefore essentially *intentional.* Due to this so-called "subject-object cleavage,"[33] finite thought is more a not-yet than an already-now, more a possibility permanently altering itself than a completed actuality. This constituent opposition of finite thought is sublated in infinite or absolute comprehension: in it, "being as well as comprehension [is] absolute, and in that each is absolute, it has no opposite outside of itself in the other, but absolute comprehension is the absolute essence [being] and the absolute essence [is] absolute comprehension."[34] Since being and thought are indifferent to one another in the Absolute, and since object and subject are identical—the Absolute thus being pure subject-object—the adequate expression of this relation is as follows: the unity of thought and being, viz. this absolute One, is "above" thought and being;[35] or, insofar as they are perceived as opposites, it is "*higher*" than either. The Absolute is therefore the unity of thought and being which is above opposites, that is, which brings them into unity and sublates them. In this unity, Schelling conceives the Absolute as the "absolute affirmation of itself"; it is the reflexive identity of the affirming (thinking) subject and that which is affirmed (the being which is thought of, object). The unity of subject and object, which is eternal because it is absolute, comprehends itself; absolute thought is the self-comprehension of its own identity, and thus the self-reflection of its own absolute indifference.[36]

Together with the account of the unity of being and thought,the unity of the highest opposition, that of the real and the ideal, which comprehends all other oppositions within it, is also described. *Real* means something finite, determinate, objective—something related to perception. The most universal predicate for the infinite, unlimited, and subjective is *ideal,* and can be articulated only through thought. That an adequate concept of philosophy does not separate the two—"Idealism is the soul of philosophy, realism its body; only the two together constitute a living whole"[37]—is based upon the conviction that the principle of such a philosophy is the very unity of the two: "The highest unity must be posited in the unity of the ground of both

32. B 323. The Absolute is "absolute comprehension": B 303.
33. For the so-called "subject-object cleavage" and its sublation, cf. especially the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* (1800).
34. B 203.
35. B 302, 323.
36. Cf. W. Beierwaltes, *Platonismus und Idealismus,* pp. 71 f.
37. *Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* I. Vol. VII, p. 356; B 321 ff.

the ideal and the real."[38] This means that the existing and forming principle of philosophy is the absolute unity: the identity of ideal and real, thought and perception,[39] thought and being, finite and infinite. Although the ideal is also always accorded absolute priority over the real, it would be a misunderstanding of Schelling's intention if one would consider the absolute unity only as ideal. Precisely the concept of identity implies a *reality* of the ideal; the self-reflection of the ideal/real, of pure subject/object, transforms, by a non-temporal act, the real into an *ideal* reality. Nothing but its own thinking is the very existence of the self-representing (divine) Absolute. This verifies Anselm's ontological argument on the level of 'idealism.'

With the concept of the identity of being and thought in the Absolute, Schelling participates—consciously and unconsciously—in the tradition and historical actualization of a parmenidean-neoplatonic proposition. The thought of Parmenides, that something can be thought only if it also exists, had been adopted by Plotinus in a restricted, but—in consideration of its usage at the same time—a broadened form: "The same is thought and being."[40] Plotinus had conceived the parmenidean tenet as the actual (active) synthesis of the *hypostasis* νοῦς, as the reflexive process of the first plurality or otherness into a unitv which differentiates itself: in thinking the ideas (the intelligible) the Intelligence (νοῦς) thinks its own being. Together with this parmenidean impulse, the aristotelian conception of God thinking Himself (νοήσεως νόησις)[41] has also become effective. The Intelligence is self-reflecting being in the mode of otherness over and against the One. It is a relational, dynamic identity *in* the difference.[42] Schelling has already developed this thought in the manner of transcendental philosophy in his treatise, *Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie, oder über das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen* (1795); the effort to provide an absolute basis for finite comprehension leads to the "absolute I" or (within the context of the 'System of Identity') to an Absolute which is conceived to be transcendent *and* immanent, and in which being and thinking merge into one. Thus Schelling attained a certain pertinent proximity to Greek metaphysics.

Schelling's philosophy of identity reflects, however, not only upon an

38. B 239.
39. B 240.
40. Frg. B 3 (Diels): τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι. For Plotinus' interpretation of this sentence, cf. W. Beierwaltes, *Plotin, Über Ewigkeit und Zeit* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967), pp. 25 f.
41. Arist. Met. 1074 b. 34 f.; 1072 b. 18 ff. Concerning Schelling, cf. W. Beierwaltes, *Platonismus und Idealismus,* pp. 115 f, 149 ff.
42. Cf. W. Beierwaltes, "Andersheit. Grundriß einer neuplatonischen Begriffsgeschichte," *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1972), Vol. 16, pp. 166-197.

Absolute which is the indifference of all opposites, but also upon a transcendental faculty in finite comprehension which is able to experience this indifference of the Absolute. This faculty is the often discriminated and, in its philosophical intention, misunderstood "*intellectual intuition.*" Already the name of this faculty intends the unity of opposites; the act is to be 'intuitive' because in intuition the subject "loses" itself, "positing [itself] outside of itself;"[43] but, at the same time, it is to be intellectual, because the intuition does not externalize itself into the object, as is the case in sense perception, but loses itself in something "which cannot be an object at all" since it must be conceived as the pure unity of subject and object. Intellectual intuition thus primarily means a completion of comprehension, which works in an immediate—non-discursive, non-objectifying—way. According to the principle of the Greek theory of knowledge, that the like only can know the like, the possibility of an insight into the Absolute as indifference, or as a pure identity of the opposites, demands a faculty of comprehension which corresponds to the absolute identity. It must be able to "identify" the opposites, that is, it must sublate them. Therefore it implies the transcending of mere empirical, finite knowledge, and of the constituent subject-object relation. The goal of this process of thought is the "point at which knowledge about the Absolute and the Absolute itself are one"[44]—that is, the execution of the absolute Act itself by giving up the finite subjectivity which is fixed in itself. At this 'point' the mortal eye closes; it is no more man who sees, but the eternal seeing itself sees in him."[45] Therefore intellectual intuition is, as Schelling puts it in *Bruno,* "the sudden moment of interweaving ["*Einschlagpunkt*"] of the finite and the infinite"; but it is also the point of transition of the finite into the infinite. It is the act which, starting from the realm of finite knowledge, arrives at the indifference of finite and infinite, identifies being and thought, and thus imitates and reaches the identity of the Absolute in the most intense philosophical evidence.

"The unity of thought with being is only absolute in the Idea and in an intellectual intuition."[46] It seems legitimate to draw an analogy between the systematic point of reference and aim of the mystical *ekstasis* of Plotinus, for example, and this mode of an evidence which is no longer merely sub-

43 The term *"Ekstase"* takes the place of *"intellektuelle Anschauung"* (intellectual intuition); it denotes, however, the same matter: *Über die Natur der Philosophie als Wissenschaft* (1821), I. Vol. IX, 229.

44. *Fernere Darstellungen aus dem System der Philosophie* (1802), I. Vol. IV, 361.

45. *Kritische Fragmente* (1807), I. Vol. VII, p. 248. For this matter, cf. Plotinus VI, 7.36.19 ff: *ἡ θέα πλήσασα φωτὸς τὰ ὄμματα οὐ γὶ αὐτοῦ πεποίηκεν ἄλλο ὁρᾶν, λλ' αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς τὸ ὅραμα ἦν.* Also, Vol. VI, 9.10.14 f., and 11, 4–6: *τέ μὲν οὐτε ὁρᾶ ουδὲ διακρίνει ὁ ὁρῶν οὐδὲ φαντάζεται δύο . . . ἐπεὶ τοίνυν δύο ούκ ἦν ἀλλ' ἓν ἦν αὐτος ο ἰδὼν προς τὸ ἑωραμένον, ὡς ἂν μὴ ἑωραμένον, ἀλλ' ἡνωμένον.*

jective, in which subjectivity, however, achieves its utmost.[47] Yet the difference from *ekstasis,* which is grounded in the ascetic element and the quite different religious context of Plotinus' philosophy, appears to be of equal importance.

II

Proceeding beyond the hitherto only indicated analogies between Plotinus and Schelling's Philosophy of Identity, I turn now to the elucidation of those relations to neoplatonic thought which can be verified in detail, especially in the dialogue *Bruno.*

The excerpts from Bruno's *De la Causa, Principio e Uno,* which Jacobi published as a supplement to his *Letters Concerning the Teaching of Spinoza,* should be understood as the "sum total of the philosophy of 'hen kai pan' "; Jacobi suggested that one could hardly "provide a purer and finer outline of pantheism in its broadest sense than Bruno drew."[48] The reproach of pantheism, and hence atheism, which Jacobi levelled at Spinoza

46. B 325. *Fernere Darstellungen,* I Vol. IV, 362: The intellectual intuition is "the very ability to see the universal in the individual, the infinite in the finite, and both unified into a living unity . . . to see the concept or the indifference in the difference." Intellectual intuition constitutes an absolute someness ("absolut gleich") between thinking and being; as cognition, it is "absolutely one" with the object of cognition (*ibid.,* 368 f).

47. More fully in W. Beierwaltes, *Platonismus und Idealismus,* pp. 92 ff, 134 ff., 200. Hegel refers (as did Novalis before him) to the affinity and difference between Schelling's concept of an intellectual intuition and the "[mystical] transport of thought" which is characteristic of the immediate comprehension of the Absolute in Neoplatonism [Hegel, *Werke,* Jubiläumsausgabe edited by Glockner (Stuttgart: F. Frommann, 1958). Vol. XIX, 66f.].

48. F.H. Jacobi, *Werke* (Leipzig: G. Fleischer D.J., 1819). IV, 1.10. The "Supplement" is to be taken more for a paraphrase, which comes fairly close to the text in reproducing its intention, than for a formal translation; Schelling calls it an "ingenious excerpt" (B 310). Jacobi's acquaintance with Bruno is presumably due to suggestions by Hamann, cf. for example Hamann's letter to Jacobi (16.1.1785), *Briefwechsel,* (ed. A. Henkel, 1965), Vol. V, p. 327. Jacobi to J.G. Jacobi (5.9.1787, concerning Hamann's principle of coincidence), *Werke,* (1816), Vol. III, p. 504. Hamann's reception of Bruno's concept 'coincidentia oppositorum' is as well the subject of Jacobi's correspondence with Herder (29.4.1781, *Briefwechsel.* Vol. IV, 287; 18.11.1782, *ibid.,* 462). The consequential reception of Bruno was initiated by Goethe, who, in 1770, controverted an article on Bruno by Pierre Bayle ("Ephemerides," *Sophienausgabe,* Vol. 37, p. 82 f.). Cf. my "Introduction" to Bruno, Von der Ursache, dem Princip und dem Einen, Philosophische Bibliothek 21 (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977).

was to be further intensified through Bruno. Schelling, however, did not accept this reproach as such; rather, he considered the philosophy which manifested itself in Bruno's text to be congenial to his own intentions. A passage from Bruno which Schelling took up verbally in his discussion,[49] provides evidence of the aim of Schelling's own thought; he calls it "the symbol of true philosophy":[50] "In order to penetrate the profoundest secrets of nature, one must not become weary of inquiring for the opposite and most conflicting extreme ends of things; it is not the greatest achievement to discover the point of union; to develop from it, however, its opposites as well, this is the genuine and deepest secret of [the philosopher's] art." Jacobi's excerpts contain Bruno's pronouncements on the principle and cause in the universal sense, on the world-soul, on matter ("the material principle considered as potency and as subject"), and finally, on the One (from the fifth dialogue): the universe is one, it is all that it can be at the same time and in its entirety (identity of potentiality and actuality); in it, the greatest is not distinguished from the smallest—the opposites coincide in it. The One unfolds itself and is still "nothing [but] center"; it is One in all, and as the highest understanding, it is at once the comprehension and the comprehended. Plotinus is twice mentioned in connection with the concept of world-soul and matter.

Already the mere specification of the problem-spheres expressed in the excerpts shows the pertinent connection with central questions raised in Schelling's *Bruno*,[51] such as those concerning the One or unity as the subla-

49. B 328; in Jacobi's "Supplement" 507, after the words "äußersten Enden der Dinge," Schelling omitted a phrase which referred to Cusanus: "dem Maximum und Minimum." Apart from this quotation, Schelling's text and Jacobi's excerpts are very close—not only in the issues they treat, but often even in wording.

50. B 332, note: Hegel too quotes this sentence in his chapter on Bruno, together with other passages from Jacobi's "Supplement" (*Weke,* Jubiläumsausgabe XIX, 233). He calls this explication of "the unity of opposites" (*ibid.*, 239) "a great word thus to comprehend the development of the Idea as a necessary correlation of distinctions."

51. It is uncertain whether Schelling was acquainted with texts of Bruno other than the one published by Jacobi. There was accessible to him J. Brucker's exposition of Bruno's philosophy (*Historia Critica Philosophiae,* (Leipzig: B.C. Breitkopf, 1744), Vol. IV. 2, pp. 12-62). Among excerpts from *De Minimo* and *De Immenso,* there can be found several citations which are pertinent to Schelling's topic: *"In minimo, simplici, monade opposita omnia sunt idem, par et impar, multa et pauca, finita et infinita"* (*ibid.*, p. 44, on the unity of rest and movement). *"Deus est simplicissima essentia, in qua nulla compositio potest esse, vel diversitas intrinsece"* [48]. *"consequenter in eodem idem est esse, posse, agere, velle, essentia, potentia, actus . . . in simplici essentia non potest esse contrarietas ullo modo, neque inaequalitas" [ibid.]. "Deus est essentia simplicissima, ergo in eo idem est posse et esse . . ."* [51]. "[Omnia]

tion of opposites, and the identity of potentiality and actuality, of being and thought. Precisely these questions converging with Bruno are also basic questions of neoplatonic thought. As found in Bruno, they are mediated through Nicolaus of Cusa (*'coincidentia oppositorum'; 'possest'*) and through Plotinus (*'unum'*). For a better understanding of the specific way in which Bruno adopted those questions, I begin with an outline of the cusanian principle of coincidentia oppositorum[52] and its neoplatonic elements.

Finitude, according to Cusanus, is the dimension of our comprehension. In finitude one entity limits another (*finitum*), is smaller or greater than another, stands in opposition to another. Therefore, comprehension, which has to respond to this structure, is primarily the comprehension of the interrelation (*proportio*) of entities to one another; through it, the functional place of each entity in the entirety of being can be understood. The limitation (*diffinitio*) and the function of an entity show its essence. The comprehension of the proportionality of the finite being, however, stands in the light of the attempt to know the infinite being (*infinitas absoluta*) itself, in its absolute truth and unity. The difficulty in thinking and expressing—howsoever approximately—the infinite, that which is not limited by another, is grounded in the *disproportion* between the infinite and the finite; there is no conceivable proportion in their relation to one another: *ex se manifestum est infiniti ad finitum proportionem non esse.*[53] In the realm of finitude, there is no "absolutely greatest" (maximum simpliciter) to be

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ab eodem principio manant, in eodem conservante perseverant, et ad eundem finem conspirant" [52]. D. Tiedemann's *Geist der spekulativen Philosophie* (Marburg: Neue Akademische Buchhandlung, 1796), Vol. V, pp. 570-582, was equally accessible, but certainly no standard at all for his philosophical intention. J.G. Buhle refers several times to Bruno's "Plotinism" (739; 831 f.; 854) in his detailed exposition, which is based on a fairly large knowledge of the original texts (*Geschichte der neuern Philosophie.* Vol. II.2, 703-856). But even so, Buhle's book is unlikely to have influenced Schelling's *Bruno,* since it did not appear in print before 1801 (Göttingen). (Bruno was in the press by the middle of 1801; the printing, however, was interrupted several times. Cf. the letter to A.W. Schlegel, undated, ed. Plitt. Vol. I, 346. Also, see pp. 357, 361, 373).

52. Cf. J. Ritter, *Docta ignorantia* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1927), pp. 14 f., 61 ff.: P. Wilpert, "Das Problem der coincidentia oppositorum in der Philosophie des Nikolaus von Cues," *Humanismus, Mystik und Kunst in der Welt des Mittelalters* (ed. J. Koch) (Leiden-Köln: Brill, 1953), pp. 39-55; J. Stallmach, "Zusammenfall der Gegensätze," *Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft* (Mainz: Grünewald, 1961), pp. 52-75; W. Beierwaltes, "Deus oppositio oppositorum," *Salzburger Jb. Phil.* 8 (1964), pp. 175-185. The pertinent connection between Cusanus' principle of coincidence and Hegel's dialectics was worked out by J. Stallmach in a suitably differentiating essay (*Scholastik* 39, 1964, pp. 495-509).

53. *de docta ignorantia* I 3, ed. Hoffmann-Klibansky (Leipzig, 1932), pp. 8, 20.

found; there is always conceivable a yet greater. If, however, God as *'infinitas absoluta'* is that compared to which there can be nothing greater—[54] the cusanian formulation of the ontological argument—then this absolutely greatest is not to be thought of as the apex of the continuously increasing finite dimension, but, rather, as the "absolute Other," which is the other in relation to finite being in no categorial sense. As the absolutely greatest, God is all that he can be;[55] that is, He is pure act, in Him all potentiality *is* actuality. Therefore, the proposition, *"[maximum absolute est] omne id quod esse potest,"*[56] means as well: He is all that can be. If He, however, is the greatest, and beyond Him there is nothing, He is also the smallest. The superlative therefore implies that He is *at once* the greatest and smallest, or that in Him, by analogy to the greatest and smallest, all opposites coincide (*maximum minimo coincidere; . . . in sua simplicitate absoluta omnia complecti*).[57] In Him, the antithetic is therefore not antithetic; in Him, the antithetic is the origin itself, whose essence is unity and oneness: *omnia in deo sunt deus.*[58] He is in no way to be defined, for He is the absolutely greatest; this implies that He is all, and all is in Him. He is absolute, infinite, dialectical unity,[59] and thus absolute being and pure reflection: *absolutus conceptus,*[60] *simplicissima et abstractissima intelligentia, ubi omnia sunt unum . . . et ipsum unum omnia; et per consequens quodlibet in ipso omnia.*[61] Thus being the absolute unity or the absolute One, He is beyond the opposites and their dialectical unity without opposition, their sublating-preserving interpenetration: *"supra omnia opposita per medium coincidentiae maximi et minimi videtur superexaltatum . . . "*[62]

This concept of unity beyond opposition refers back to Proclus, who thought the One as free of every categoriality, and hence free of any relation and beyond being;[63] but it also refers forward to Schelling, who again made the paradox of a unity of opposites beyond opposition the basic formula in his concept of identity. The other motive of this thought, the *coincidence* of opposites, has been penetrated in its theological intention by Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. Being the ground and pre-existing design of the op-

54. *de doct. ign.* I. 2. 7.4 f.: *"maximum, quo nihil maius esse potest."*
55. For this interpretation, cf. Wilpert, *op. cit.*, p. 17 (note 52).
56. This interpretation is supported by *de doct. ign.* I. 4. 11.1: *maximum absolute est omnia absolute actu, quae esse possunt.* And, by 12.31.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 10.16, 11.21.
58. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 22, 45.16.
59. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 5, 13.2: *'unitas infinita,'* that is, infinity, which is not confined or restricted by anything, and beyond which there is nothing, since it is All: *'maximum absolutum.'*
60. *de possest,* ed. R. Steiger, n. 38.11, 40.14.
61. *de doct. ign.* Vol. I, pp. 10, 20, 7ff.
62. *de principio,* ed. Feigl-Wilpert, Padua 1960, pp. n. 34.15 f, 23 f.
63. Cf. note 17.

posing entities, God is thus all of them "as one and united." The platonic-parmenidean (and afterwards also cusanian) categories—identity/difference, motion/rest, great/small, limited/unlimited—are in Him a dialectical (trinitarian) unity; at the same time, however, He must be "before" these opposites, as such, if He is to be the One.[64] But Plotinus is also of decisive importance in that he has formed a concept of unity which fits the opposites into *one* reflexive *being,* even though this concept is certainly not thought to pertain to the first principle, the ἕν which has no relation whatsoever in itself. For in the Intelligence, the first manifold-one, all *potentiality* is *actuality;* in Him, there is no *before* and *after* by virtue of His timelessness—there is all ever and *at once; movement* (of thought) is *rest* (unchangeableness), and the 'resting' of the Intelligence is to be represented as its reflexive movement; the *particular* is the *whole,* but the whole is through and in the particular; being *is* thought; the many in it is a dynamic *unity.*[65] This plotinian transformation of the categories of being (as expressed in Plato's *Sophist* and *Parmenides*) into the absolute—that is, non-temporal Intelligence, conceived as Hypostasis, in which the different and the opposed are fitted into an identity —was the pertinent presupposition for Dionysius, who could thus conceive of even the one divine principle as a reflexive unity of opposites. Cusanus raised this philosophical-theological concept to a central principle of his reflection about God and human thought.

In his *'De docta ignorantia,'* Cusanus had already conceived the thought that in God all *potentiality*—all that can be—is ever already actual. In this he had proceeded from the concept of the *'maximitas absoluta'* in connection with the *coincidentia oppositorum.'* He later set down this thought in one term: God is actuality-potentiality, *'possest' ('absolutum posse'* is *'absolutum esse'), 'possibilitas absoluta,'* pure actual-active being;[66] His potentiality is identical with His being, His being identical with His potentiality. Certainly without concrete connection with Cusanus, and also different from him in its function within a metaphysics of absolute will, precisely this identification has become formative for Schelling's 'Positive Philosophy.' Since God is that which each being is itself—"Lord of being"—He at the same time is the absolute *potentiality* of being. He is, to be sure, not a passive possibility not yet fulfilled, but, according to Schelling's concept, a highest and pure potency, that is, *actus purissimus qua omni-potentia.* However, He is pure potentiality of being through his *will*: He is what he

64. Ps. Dion. Areop. *de div. nom.* V. 7; PG 3; 821 B: τὰ ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία μονοειδῶς καὶ ἡνωμένως (sc. ἐν τῷ πάντων αἰτίῳ) 10; 825 B: πέρας πάντων καὶ ἀπειρίας καὶ πέρατος ὑπεροχικῶς τῶν ὡς ἀντικειμένων (sc. θεός). Cf. W. Beierwaltes, "Andersheit" (cf. footnote 42), especially pp. 189ff.

65. *W. Beierwaltes, Plotin* 25 f., and *Enn,* Vol. VI, 6.3.28 ff.

66. For example, *de vis. dei* c. 15. *de possest* n. 6.12 f. the term *'possibilitas absolutia.'*

wills. In this He has completed and confirmed His potentiality. Thus, being, potentiality, and will are in God to be grasped as elements of the one, most actual act, which is identical with the actualization of His essence.[67]

III

The cusanian principle '*coincidentia oppositorum,*' as well as the concept '*possest*' as a coincidental name of God, are constitutive elements in Giordano Bruno's attempt to explain the world and its creative and mantaining ground under altered physical presuppositions.

Bruno knew the main tenets of Nicolaus of Cusa's thought from the texts themselves.[68] Fundamentally, he thought highly of Nicolaus of Cusa, but nevertheless his relation to him was somewhat ambiguous because of their differing principles in cosmological matters.[69] For Bruno, the *coincidentia oppositorum* is the exegetical principle which explicates equally the being of the divine origin, or the One, and also—and this makes an essential difference to Cusanus—the structure of the Universe. Certainly in Bruno God, the absolute principle, and the world are not terminologically identified without further distinction; Bruno, to be sure, gave up what Cusanus and Plotinus emphatically conceived as the transcendence of God or the One (in spite of His immanence), insofar as he attempts to explicate not primarily God in Himself, but His omnipresent activity—in the world, in the Universe, in Nature—and his total self-abandonment to *everything* finite. In the performance of this attempt, especially in *De la Causa,* the concept of matter receives a new significance as compared with the philosophical tradition, in particular with Aristotle. Matter is not formless, but itself the fullness of forms, and therefore intelligible; it is not mere potentiality, but itself productive power, and hence the primordial ground and medium of being in its development and unfolding: Plotinus—at least in what concerns his concept of the One and of *intelligible* matter—and Democritus should thus be combined. Leaving aside Aristotle's rigorous distinction between

67. More fully in *Platonismus und Idealismus,* pp. 76ff.

68. Concerning the relationship of Bruno and Cusanus, see F.J. Clemens, *Giordano Bruno und Nicolaus von Cues* (Bonn: J. Wittmann, 1847); H. Ritter, *Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie* (Hamburg: F. Perthes, 1850), V. 595 ff.; H. Blumenberg, *Die Legitimität der Neuzeit* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1966), pp. 435 ff. (the central point of divergency: the fundamental scandal of the Incarnation).

69. Pieces of reference, for example: *La cena de le ceneri, Opere Italiane,* ed. Gentile (Bari, 1925²). Vol. I. p. 69; *De la causa* 260. *Oratio valedictoria* (1588), *Op. lat.* Vol. I, 1.17: *"Huius ingenium, si presbyterialis amictus non impertubasset, non Pythagorico par, sed Pythagorico longe superius agnoscerem, profiterer." De l'infinito, universo e mondi, Opere Italiane.* Vol. I, pp. 344 f. (a critical comment on Cusanus's cosmology).

form and matter (actuality of form; mere potentiality of matter, which is open to form) Bruno raises matter out of an evanescent "un-godly" *'prope nihil'* to the power of correspondance with the Absolute. Matter is thus the correlate of the Absolute within the universe, and the transition of the Absolute through the universe.

Bruno's assimilation of the principle of coincidence comes nearest to the original thought of Cusanus in a passage of the third dialogue of *De la Causa, Principio e Uno:* "The first absolute principle is sublimity and greatness; it is such a greatness and sublimity that it is all that it can be. It is not of such a greatness, that it could still be greater, nor that it could be smaller or be divided like all other greatness which is not all that it can be; rather, it is the greatest, the smallest, infinite and indivisible greatness, and of every measure. It is not the greatest, because it is the smallest; it is not the smallest, because it is at once the greatest; it is beyond all likeness (beyond comparison), because it is all that it can be."[70] Thus the principle is all entities in a unitary and undifferentiated way *"unitamente e indifferrentemente,"*[71] pure unity, in which all is in all; what otherwise is opposed, is in it one and the same, *"sense differenza e distinzione." The absolute principle is,* therefore, the coincidence of opposites.[73] Because its own potentiality and actuality, *and* those of all entities, are in it identical (because it is thus all that can be as well as all that *it* itself can be), Bruno calls it *'possibilità assoluta,'* absolute active potentiality or power to act: *"il possere essere è con lo essere in atto . . . Quello che è tutto che può essere, è uno, il quale nell' esser suo comprende ogni essere."*[74] Thus Bruno has conceived *'coincidentia oppositorum'* and *'possest'* as a unity, following the intention of

70. Bruno, *De la causa, Opere Italiane.* Vol. I. p. 220: *"Il primo principio assoluto è grandezza e magnitudine; ed è tal magnitudine e grandezza, che è tutto quel che puó essere. Non è grande di tal grandezza che possa essere maggiore, né che possa esser minore, né che possa dividersi, come ogni altra grandezza che non è tutto quel che può essere: però è grandezza massima, minima, infinita, impartibile e d'ogni misura. Non è maggiore, per esser minima; non è minima, per esser quella medesima massima; è oltre ogni equalità, perché è tutto quel che ella possa essere."* This passage undoubtedly depends on Cusanus, even though his name is not mentioned; cf. *de possest,* n.g. 10, 8ff. *de doct. ign.* I. 4 und 5.

71. *De la causa* 219.

72. *Ibid.*

73. The *term* 'coincidenza' occurs several times in Bruno's works, for example; *De la causa,* 222; Eroici Furori Vol. II, 478; *Spaccio de la Bestia Trionfante.* Vol. II, p. 24. Synonymous are 'concordano,' as in: *De la Causa,* pp. 260, 262; and 'convenire,' *ibid.,* 263. The following thought ascribed by Bruno to Heraclitus was described rather loosely by Jacobi (43 f.) as *"Coincidenz,"* which term does more truly befit the Cusanian conception: *"tutte le cose essere uno . . . e per tanto le contradittorio enunciazioni son vere"* (256).

74. *De la Causa,* 218 f.; *de l'infinito.* Vol. I, pp. 272, 300.

Cusanus. He departs from Nicolaus of Cusa, however, in that he also conceives the universe, that is, the world *and* its principle *together*, as identity of being and potentiality: the universe is all that it can be;[75] it is all that it can be through its principle, which in its entirety and everywhere is active in it. From this follows what sometimes has been called 'Monism,' that all entities are one with respect to substance: *"che il tutto, secondo la sustanza è uno,"*[76] the One is also all: ἓν καὶ πᾶν. Thus also the distinguishing feature of infinity (*infinitas absoluta*) which Cusanus reserved for God, and which was to be expressed precisely by the *'coincidentia oppositorum,'* is transferred to the universe; thereby, the cosmological infinite should be justified metaphysically.

Bruno's assimilation of certain cusanian terms serves fundamentally different intentions. This difference comes to light, for example, in the indicated transfer of *'coincidentia oppositorum,' 'possest,'* and *'infinitas absoluta'* to the world. Therewith also the sense of the cusanian and essentially Christian differentiation between inner-trinitarian generation of the Son, and the externalizing creation of the world, is lost: the *possibilità assoluta* is all that is and can be; it constitutes the world, without reserving a surplus of *possibilitas* to itself; it therefore makes the world into a mirror-image of its *omnipotentia,* into an image which seems to be congruous with it. The consequences of these henological and cosmological thoughts on Bruno's negation of the personality of God—quite contrary to Cusanus—and on his passionate opposition to the historical incarnation of the Divine, can be interpreted as a response "which touched the formation of the ending epoch,"[77] as an index to the threshold of an era.

IV

The reference to Nicolaus of Cusa's principle of *coincidentia oppositorum* and *possest,* to its neoplatonic implications, and to its assimilation and universalzing reformulation by Bruno, served to make clear the extent to which Schelling was confronted indirectly with tenets of neoplatonic philosophy, while Bruno's fundamental thought inspired him to an intensified philosophy of pure Identity or absolute Indifference. In this phase of Schelling's philosophy, however, the thought of an active unity of opposites is not an absolute novelty. The assimilation of Bruno, rather, meets with an intention of Schelling's thought which had already fundamentally determined the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* (1800), and which could, through Bruno, be confirmed, expanded, and concentrated in the direction of the problem of the unity of the Absolute. In accordance with the basical-

75. *De la Causa,* 223.
76. *Ibid.*
77. H. Blumenberg, *Legitimität der Neuzeit,* p. 585.

ly transcendental intention of his *System des transzendentalen Idealismus,* Schelling seeks to prove the unity of opposites first and primarily in the phenomena of consciousness, of comprehension, and of artistic production. Comprehension *[Erkennen]*, in the context of the *System*, is defined as a coinciding movement, as an 'identification': all that is real should be reduced to the ideal. At the end of the process of comprehension, this reduction has not led to an isolation of the real from the ideal, but to a unification of the two. The aim is the penetration to the absolute foundation of consciousness itself, for this absolute foundation is the point of identity of the real and the ideal. Aside from real versus ideal, the following fundamental opposites are thematized: objective/subjective, nature/freedom, conscious/unconscious. Also, these opposites should be reduced to their sublating identity. The unity of the conscious and unconscious exhibits itself uniquely in *Art,* where unconscious and conscious activity are absolutely one within the resulting work.[78] In the work of art, the artist sublates into an infinite harmony the contradiction which, in man, is apparently unresolvable.[79] The basis of the preestablished harmony between conscious and unconscious, however, is the absolute or the primordial self.[80] Thus, in the work of art, the Absolute itself comes to appear through this identifying activity of the artist. If, in the *System of Transcendental Idealism,* the Absolute-Identical is at the same time the not-objective, not objectifiable, and therefore no product or element of perceptive understanding, then it is adequately accessible only to an immediate intellectual intuition; for this intuition is, in the highest degree, the process of coinciding. From this it is understandable that art, as the presentation of the infinite in the finite, can be understood as the intellectual intuition become objective, because it brings into appearance the identification accomplished by the artist of genius.[81] Precisely from the relation of the finite consciousness to the Absolute-Identical there follows thus necessarily the higher regard for art over philosophy. Where philosophy, as the attempt to conceive in an objectifying way, lags behind, art succeeds in rendering accessible the Absolute-Identical without division as the unity of the opposites, conscious and unconscious, finite and infinite, real and ideal. It thus fulfills or completes the intention of philosophy: it resolves the bifurcation of opposing activities in the realm of finitude, and thus in the refraction of the individual mind. The creative intuition of the artist—his power of imagination—presents the unity of opposites not merely reflexively, which is all that philosophy can do, but displays this very unity in an outward, objective, and factual expression in which the infinite is shaped into

78. System, *Werke* I. III, 614.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 617.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 615.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 625.

the finite. Surpassing philosophy, art is the only means of objectifying the Absolute-identical, or pure Identity. Philosophy, within the *System of Transcendental Idealism,* is therefore brought down to form the *presupposition* of the realization of transcendental, or intellectual, intuition in art. Thereby art may be understood as the "only both true and eternal organon and document of philosophy,"[82] and is "for the philosopher the highest, because it opens for him, as it were, the sanctuary where in eternal and original unity burns, as in one flame,[83] what is sundered in nature and history and must needs flee one another in life and action, and likewise in thought." In achieving the identification of opposites—conscious/unconsciousness, subject/object, knowledge/action—art sets up a universal, and highest, claim.

Also, apart from the *System of Transcendental Idealism,* Schelling has maintained the thought—for example, in his lectures on the Philosophy of Art (1802)—that art brings the Absolute into appearance and that, in this, its realization of truth becomes manifest: art is "repetition" of his own system in its highest potency,[84] emanation of the Absolute.[85] Hegel's thesis of the "end" of art stands contrary to this apotheosis. On the "idealistic" level of consciousness, art can no longer be the only adequate concretion of the Absolute: "We count art no longer as the highest manner in which truth attains to its own existence"; it is no longer one of "the highest needs of the Mind."[86] This means also that art is not the final end, but, together with revealed religion and pure speculative philosophy, it is a necessary, yet to be sublated, moment within the progression toward the absolute Mind. Art therefore *passes over* into religion; religion however, sublates itself into philosophy and can only be understood from the standpoint of philosophy (*Enzyklopädie,* §556 ff). The completion of the process (the history of self-consciousness) therefore can only be accomplished in philosophy: "Thought and reflection have outflanked art."[87] The Absolute appears as the unity of opposites not in art, but in the Absolute Idea, and it is this Idea: it is the concept conceiving itself [*der sich selbst begreifende Begriff*], sublating and reconciling in itself all opposites that can appear for themselves as its moments.

V

Even if Schelling established the thought of the unity of opposites within

82. *Ibid.,* p. 627.
83. *Ibid.,* p. 628.
84. *Werke* I. V, 363.
85. *Ibid.,* p. 372. Cf. D. Jähnig, Schelling. *Die Kunst in der Philosophie,* 2 vols. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1966/69), especially Vol. II. p. 17 ff.
86. Hegel, *Ästhetik,* ed. H. Bassenge (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1965²), p. 110.
87. *Ibid.*

certain spheres already in his *System of Transcendental Idealism,* his conception of the absolute unity as *the One,* and his pronounced radicalization of its relation to the world and to finite comprehension—to be sure without permitting difference to be absorbed by the unity—is evidently conditioned to a considerable extent by Bruno's philosophy. Precisely through Bruno's emphasis upon the One as the Principle, however, Schelling is confronted with a modified form of the fundamental philosophical thought of neoplatonism. For in Bruno's philosophy, the intention to conceive the absolute Principle as the One has concrete as well as diffuse neoplatonic origins, which he combines with thoughts of Pythagoras, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Cusanus, and the Kabbala. Out of this complex, it is only the neoplatonic (Plotinian) aspect which I want to make clear now.[88]

Bruno became familiar with Plotinus through the Latin translation of Marsilio Ficino, who he often quotes verbatim or in paraphrase.[89] Pertinent points they have in common are, for example: the questions regarding intelligible beauty; comprehension as an ascending (transcending) movement directed by Eros; the capability of comprehension through the One immanent in us; the ideas in the Divine mind; the concept and function of the world-soul, matter;[90] and the One as the universal Principle. The latter is explicated by Bruno in the fifth dialogue of *De la Causa.* In contrast to Plotinus, but in conformity with Schelling, he identifies the One and the highest Intellect, so that in it "the conceived is at the same time the conceiving"[91]—that is, being is identical with thinking; this has been an enduring concept since the Christian assimilation of neoplatonic thought. Thus, essential aspects of these texts, with which Schelling was acquainted on the basis of excerpts from Jacobi, may be verified through Plotinus's

88. A more precise examination of Bruno's relation to neoplatonism will be presented in an individual essay. The investigation will concentrate mainly on Bruno's Latin works. Cf. "Introduction" (footnote 48).

89. Some pieces of reference in F. Tocco, *Le opere Latine di Giordano Bruno eposte e confrontate con le Italiane* (Firenze, 1889), and in the dissertation of Julie Sarauw (which is, however, only of limited use as a collection of material), *Der Einfluß Plotins auf G. Bruno Degli Eroici Furori* (Jena, 1916). Concerning Ficinus: *A Jugegno, Il primo Brunos e l'influenca di Marsilio Ficino, Riv. crit. Stor. Filos.* 23 (1968). pp. 149-70.

90. *De la Causa,* 183, 234 ff. 239.

91. *De la Causa,* 259: *"La prima intelligenza in una idea perfettissimamente comprende il tutto; la divina mente e la unità assoluta, senza specie alcuna, è ella medesimo lo che intende e lo che è inteso."* Jacobi, p. 46.

92. *De la Causa,* 223; Jacobi, 40. Parmenidian terms are to be found especially at the beginning of dialogue V, 247: unity, infinity and immutability of the universe (= the Parmenidian ἐόν in which there is no void.) *Sigillus Sigillorum* I. 34, *Op. Lat.* Vol. II, 2.180; *ens, potens et agens est unum: ita ut omnia sint unum, ut bene novit Parmenides unum omne et ens.*

statements concerning the One and Intelligence. These aspects, however, can also be interpreted as thoughts of Parmenides as seen from a Plotinian point of view.[92] The One, which—again in contrast to Plotinus—is merely terminologically distinguished from the universe, unfolds its omnipotence entirely in the world as the world; it is "nothing but center"; that is, its center is everywhere, its circumference nowhere.[93] This means, the One is the origin which is active in all. Thus each particular is a unity, and at the same time it is also *the* One insofar as it mirrors the One itself. The One is the "Father"; He actualizes the coming forth (πρόοδος) of all as "procreation"; he unfolds his unity into the many (into the "particular substances" by analogy of numbers arising out of Oneness)[94] and remains, nevertheless, one and "indivisible." The One is a unity, which in "descending" "comprises the entire whole";[95] it is the "source of all comprehension,"[96] that is, the conditioning ground of knowledge. Schelling calls the highest Unity in *Bruno*[97] the "principle of knowledge." We, however, ascend to it by "embracing the manifold" into the "unity of the concept," or—in the words of Plotinus—through freeing thought of plurality, through "abstraction" (ἀφαίρεσις ἀλλοτρίου παντός, ἄφελε πάντα).[98]

Insofar as Schelling, in *Bruno,* thematizes the absolute Identity or the One above all opposites, and as the coincidence of opposites, he pertinently

93. *De la Causa,* 249 f.: *"Sicuramente possiamo affirmare che l'universo è tutto centro, o che il centro de l'universo è per tutto, e che la circonferenza non è in parte alcuna per quanto è differente dal centro, o pur che la circonferenza è per tutto, ma il centro non si trova in quanto che è differente da quella."* Jacobi, p. 38. The sentence from the *Book of the 24 Philosophers: "Deus est sphaera infinita, cuius centrum est ubique, circumferentia nusquam,"* which explicates the dialectical unity of God's transcendent being and immanent action, is interpreted by Bruno in an entirely immanent way; even the *'nusquam'* is *'ubique.'* Cf. D. Mahnke, *Unendliche Sphäre und Allmittelpunkt,* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1937), p. 49 f; W. Beierwaltes, *Platonismus und Idealismus,* pp. 61f. A tendency analogous to Bruno appears in Anton Günther, *Janusköpfe,* (Wien, 1834), p. 408: *"Immer und ewig ist der Punkt in der Peripherie das Ende des Radius, und dieser das verlängerte Centrum, folglich Peripherie und Centrum wesentlich Eins oder Wesengleich."* ("Ever and eternally the point on the periphery is the end of the radius, and this the extended center consequently periphery and center, essentially one and the same.") Concerning different aspects of the same problem c.f. my *Introductin to Bruno,* pp. XXVI ff.

94. *De la Causa,* 256 f. Jacobi, 42.

95. *Ibid.,* p. 259: *"Cossi dunque, montando noi alla perfetta cognizione, andiamo complicando la moltitudine; come, descendendosi alla produzione delle cose, si va esplicando la unità." Ibid.: "a giamai credemo esser gionti al primo ente e universal sustanza . . ."* Jacobi, 43, 45.

96. Jacobi, 46.

97. *Ibid.,* 253.

98. *Enn.* V. 3.17.38; I. 2.4.6.

takes up essential aspects of the One as seen by Plotinus and Bruno, and places these in a context especially distinguished by transcendental thought. Thus, in this context, the basic metaphysical issue regarding the One Principle is pursued, and it can—at least by virtue of this pursuit and intention (not to be classified as merely formal)—appear in conformity with those aspects of Plotinus and Bruno. Although Schelling takes up Bruno's issue, his solution of it is in essential ways different.

An ever recurring question, especially emphasized by Schelling, is that concerning the relation of absolute unity to plurality, or of the infinite to finite, real being—in other words, how the finite comes into existence at all. Schelling firmly maintains the thesis that a "derivation" of the finite from the infinite, a continual transition of the infinite into the finite, is not conceivable in a "true philosophy."[99] Describing the relation of Absolute—Identity to the universe, he therefore emphasizes its remaining in itself. The attempt to mediate the 'outward bound' movement of the Identity, that is, the going forth while still remaining in itself, ends up in paradox. The One, it is true, is in *Bruno* the "eternal and invisible *father*," or the "king and father of all things";[100] but he "never goes forth from his eternity."[101] Thus, remaining in himself, he embraces "the infinite and the finite in one and the same act of divine comprehension."[102] The unity has "made distinguishable" what in itself "is indistinguishable";[103] that is, it has "posited" the world of appearance or the temporally extended image of the eternal original. For this timeless process of "positing" or "distinguishing" the world, however, no "transition from the infinite to the finite is to be admitted or presumed."[104] Since there is no mediating derivation or *continual* transition from the infinite to the finite, no unfolding of the Absolute by virtue of its own spontaneity to be conceived; Schelling attempts to resolve the resulting paradox with the help of the metaphors "leap," "tearing itself free," "rupture," "apostasy"[105] or—in *Bruno*—through the category of

99. Concerning the same problem: *Platonismus und Idealismus,* 118 f.

100. *Ibid.,* 252 (reminiscent of Plato, *Tim.* 28 c); 302 (cf. the second 'platonic' letter 312 e. Schelling quotes from this letter, as in I, Vol. VI, 28). In Jacobi's excerpts (8), *"Vater und Erzeuger"* ("father and procreator") is called a plotinian expression for the World-Soul as "general intellect," *intelletto universale (De la Causa,* 180).

101. *Ibid.,* 252.

102. *Ibid.*

103. Closely related is the dialectical unity of *'indistinctum'* and *'distinctum'* as conceived by Eckhart; the One, in itself un-distinguished, is the ground of distinction and is thus precisely by virtue of its oneness (*'indistinctio'*) distinct from the manifold in its character of being distinguished: *"sua indistinctione distinguitur" (Expos. libri Sap.* n. 154, LW 2, 490.7 f. and 39, 360.4 f.).

104. *Ibid.,* 282.

105. Those metaphors are compared with Plotinus's expressions in *Platonismus und Idealismus,* 122 f. The interruption or "transition from identity to dif-

separation or "sunderance."[106] It should be clear from this manner of designation that the ground of this movement lies not in the Absolute, but in the freedom of the self-sundering finite. The motivation of this freedom certainly remains unclarified. The finite is thus *"through its own will* a suffering God and subject to temporal conditions."[107] For Bruno, such a derogatory treatment of finitude would not have been conceivable, for the coming forth of the One Universe out of the One Principle constitutes the infinitely manifold, but not difference in the proper sense.

For Schelling, the "separation" of the finite from the infinite disallows the thought that the Absolute could spontaneously unfold itself—that is, its essence—into the entities external to it (universe, world, finitude), and could thus itself become the totality of the manifold without distinction. The separation pertains therefore not to the essence of the Absolute itself; it is merely "posited with respect to that which for itself is separated from it."[108] The existence of the finite thus also does not prove that the absolute Identity actually went forth out of itself; it merely proves that the being of the world, the finitude, ever already existed in the being of God in the manner of the infinite. Formulated in a radical way, this means that *all* that exists is the absolute Identity itself.[109] The separation does not disturb or "obscure" the Identity itself, but constitutes as a result a *relative,* "expanded" unity which, in its elements, is related to itself and to the Absolute. Although the proposition is valid that the "highest unity" is "the sacred abyss, from which all comes forth and to which all returns,"[110] this relation

ference" does not mean an "annihilation of identity" (*Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen* I. VII, 368).

106. *Bruno* 257 f, 263 f, 279, 293. Since the act of sunderance is called the "obscurity of the general unity" (264), this unity cannot mean the absolute unity "in which nothing is distinguishable"—the Selfsame without any difference— but a relative unity in which the particular beings (sundered apart) are correlated in mutual opposition.

107. The *possibility* of the apostasy is grounded in the freedom; its *actuality* is grounded in the apostate itself: *Philosophie und Religion* I. Vol. VI, 40. For Schelling's controversy with Eschenmayer on this point, cf. *Ibid.,* 28 f.

108. B285. The emphasis Schelling lays on the freedom of the self-sundering entity—that freedom which is the ground of the existence of the finite—stands in opposition to the conception of the highest unity as the "father of all things," but even more to the thesis of the *Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen* (1810), that the beginning of the creation was a "condescension of God" to the real and a "contraction" in it. "This act of restriction or condescension of God is his free will. There is no reason for the world except the freedom of God" (I. Vol. VI, 249). In this attempt to explicate the existence of the finite there appears a marked tendency towards "creation." Cf. especially the related concepts of love and of the divine *"Ek-stasis"* in *Die Weltalter.*

109. *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie* (1801) I. Vol. IV, 16.

110. *Ibid.,* 258, 320. For the term 'abyss,' *'profondissimo abisso': Causa,* 222; Jacobi, 27.

is not to be understood as if the Absolute, by going forth, differentiated *itself,* or as if it passed into a realm opposite to its own. The self-comprehension of the Absolute also is not conceivable as a self-division, a self objectification, or self-opposition in the form of subject and object.[111] The Absolute has not relinquished its absoluteness through the coming forth of the finite; it has not turned into difference. In spite of the "separated," or "different" existence of the finite, and in spite of the world as its contrasting image which has become real, the Absolute has remained what it is: pure identity, *In*difference. The separated, which as finite stands in a relation of relative difference to the infinite, has certainly the ground of *its* unity in the absolute Identity itself, from which it has separated itself.[112] Thus the Absolute is present in everything, yet not "entirely," not as Itself. It is the immanent ground of the return of the finite into the One.[113] Precisely the explication of the issue regarding the separation and return of the finite proves the inadequacy of the allegation, directed against Schelling, of a crude pantheism which posits world and God as indiscriminately identical.

Schelling also makes clear the intangibility of the absolute Identity by means of the metaphor 'light.' The "one and simple ray, which proceeds from the Absolute *and* is itself the Absolute,"[114] appears, it is true, separated into difference and indifference, finity and infinity, but remains—in spite of the separation of the finite—the "absolute point of unity" of all the separated elements. The light in itself is "inseparable" from its source, and is also without influence upon the fullness of being and the mode of being of its source, " . . . as the light streams from the sun, and the sun is not moved (altered)."[115]

Had Schelling in all points followed Bruno's treatment of the concept of unity set forth in the extant excerpts, he might well have advanced to the conception of a continual transition of the One to the many or even to an identification of the One, conceived as Principle, with the one infinite and manifold universe. Guided by his own concept of 'separation,' however, Schelling did not identify the world with the Absolute. He also did *not* equate it with the Son of God.[116] This thought certainly had been in conformity with Bruno's setting aside of the difference between inner-trinitarian generation of the Son, and externalizing creation of the world. In contrast to this, Schelling's insistence upon the remaining of its indifference

111. *Philosophie und Religion* I. VI, 31.
112. *Ibid.,* 268.
113. *Ibid.,* 320, 329: "dissolving" into the One.
114. *Ibid.,* p. 328.
115. *Philosophie und Religion* (1804) I. VI 32 (this passage is in direct pertinent connection with *Bruno;* cf. "Vorbericht" and Schelling's own references to his dialogue).
116. B 327 (inner-trinitarian). The correlation of the Son and the *World* is no topic until *Die Weltalter.*

in the face of finitude, appears as an intensifying "repetition" of the plotinian main thought: the One is *origin* of All but, precisely as such, it persists in itself. For only as remaining-in-itself (μονή)[117] can it be the center of a circle into which all that has come forth returns again (ἐπιστροφή). The going forth (πρόοδος) of the One is on this account not "equivalent to an overflow or super-abundance of the essence," as Schelling[118] wished to understand the concept of emanation; the One going forth does not go out of itself: "unfolded it is *not* unfolded" (ἐξελιχθὲν οὐκ ἐξεληλιγμένον); "It does not go forth beyond itself, but it is unchangeably itself and does not deviate from itself" (τὸ δὲ οὐ παρεκβεβηκὸς ἑαυτό, ἀλλ' ἀκλινὲς ὂν ἑαυτοῦ);[119] the "source" ever remains such—"permanent origin"—even if it streams forth. The same is true for the metaphors "seed" and "root," by which Plotinus characterizes both the unfolded power of the One 'before' it goes forth, and its power to preserve itself 'after' having gone forth. Analogous to Schelling's use, the metaphor of light expresses that all that is originated—even the temporal realm, which was formed through a "fall"—remains concentrated in the One and is, in spite of its "removal," unseparated from it. "What is to be thought of that persisting One? That light radiates from it, while it persists, like the brilliance which, as it were, turns round the sun and is continually generated from it; the sun itself, however, persists."[120] Or: "An example is the sun, which is like the center with respect to its light, which proceeds from it, but upon which it remains dependent; for it is with it everywhere and is not cut off, and if you would cut it off, in one direction, the light is towards the sun."[121] The metaphor of light should make clear the paradoxical unity of going forth and persistence. The absolute priority of the One origin, the center, the source of light over against the generated, the radii and the periphery (which is equivalent to the "illuminated"), makes possible also the affirmation: the

117. Cf. W. Beierwaltes, "Neoplatonica," *Phil. Rundschau* 16. 1969, 132.
118. *Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* I. Vol. VII, 355.
119. Enn. VI. 8.18.18; V. 8.9.32 f. The first-mentioned passage is to be found in the translation of Plotinus by Windischmann, which was known to Schelling: Through the radii spreading from the centre of the circle (*ev*), "the absolute being appears everywhere, unfolded, as it were, but yet not unfolded" (text sample no. 7 in *Platonismus und Idealismusp.* 214).
120. V 1,6, 27–30: *πῶς οὖν καὶ τί δεῖ νοῆσαι περὶ ἐκεῖνο μένον; Περίλαμφιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μέν, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ μένοντος, οἷον ἡλίου τὸ περὶ αὐὶὸ λαμπρὸν ὥσπερ περιθέον, ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ γεννώμενον μένοντος.*
121. I 7,1, 23–28: *Δεῖ οὖν μένειν αὐτό, πρὸς αὐτὸ δὲ ἐπιστρέφειν πάντα, ωσπερ κύκλον πρὸς κέντρον ἀφ' οὗ πᾶσαι γοαμμαί. Καὶ παράδειγμα ὁ ἥλιος ὥσπερ κέντρον ὢν πρὸς τὸ φῶς τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀνηρτημένον πρὸς αὐτόν' πανταχοῦ γοῦν μετ' αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἀποτέτμηται' κἂν απο-τεμεῖν ἐθελήσηζ ἐπὶ θάτερα, πρὸζ τὸν ἥλιόν ἐστι τὸ φῶζ.*

One is everywhere, but yet nowhere entirely itself; it is all and yet nothing of all, and is thus above being itself.[122]

For Schelling, Plotinus, and Bruno, it is true in an analogous manner that the One is inconceivable and difficult to express,[123] for language which can express the One, the Original, has been "derived from the copies." Due to its structure, in which subject and predicate are differentiated and kept apart, it is inadequate to the expression of indifference. The indifference of the opposites, or the ἕν, which is in itself without relation and opposition, requires an intellectual intuition congenial to unity or the mystical ekstasis as the medium for evidence which, it is true, is prepared by discursive thought, but which itself stands above this.[124] Intellectual intuition and mystical ekstasis are, however, not irrational acts of a self-deluding feeling, but the end point of the effort to cognize the inconceivable absolute One, and thus to ascertain the situation of the finite against the Absolute. In Schelling's sketch of the *Ages of the World,* it is stated: "That God cannot be conceived is not based upon His being an abstruse essence . . . Also there is a distinction to be made between conceiving and cognizing. What cannot be defined or grasped by a concept is inconceivable, but what is the purest actuality (*actus purissimus*) is also in itself the most completely cognizable, because it is, as it were, the purest material of cognition."[125]

Although affinities between Schelling and Bruno, at essential and pertinent points, and in characteristic forms of expression, have been shown, it cannot be said that Schelling has fulfilled or further developed Bruno's metaphysical or even cosmological intention; rather, he appears to have suppressed the theological-heretical in the thought of the "martyr to philosophy,"[126] precisely through such elements of his thought as link him with neoplatonic philosophy. This pertains to the *'coincidentia oppositorum,'* because he thought of it exclusively as the structure of the Absolute and not also as the structure of the infinite-finite universe, as well as to the relation of the Identity (Absolute) and the world, because the Identity does not totally pass over into indifference; and thus it pertains also to the relation of the infinite to the finite, because the infinite as Indifference of all opposites preserves itself against the world, even though it is *not without* the world, and the latter cannot exist without the Absolute-Infinite.

122. In this Plotinus agrees with the sentence "Deus est sphaera infinita, cuius centrum ubique, circumferentia nusquam"; cf. note 93.
123. Schelling, B. 302. Bruno, *Causa* 176. 222. Jacobi 27. Plotinus V. 3.13.1. VI 9.10.19.
124. For Bruno cf. e.g., *Eroici Furori* II. 359 ff.
125. *Die Weltalter,* ed. Schröter (Munich: Biederstein, 1946), p. 220.
126. J.G. Hamann, Letter to J.G. Steudel, 4.V.1788 (ed. Roth VII 414).

LANGUAGE ANALYSIS AND THE CRITIQUE OF ONTOLOGY*

Ernst Tugendhat

Translated by J.S. Fulton and K. Kolenda

A critique has weight to the extent that it succeeds in gaining from those whom it criticizes a recognition at least of its relevance, if not, indeed, of its cogency. This can be attained only to the extent that the critique really confronts itself with the position under criticism. It was typical of the language-analytic criticism of metaphysics by logical positivism that it characterized metaphysical statements only negatively, from the outside, as neither empirically verifiable nor analytic. Metaphysics could not even discuss the thesis that its statements are all meaningless, since by this claim it was stifled and prevented from making any reply at all. The thesis of meaninglessness, however, was not reached by pure language analysis, but had its foundation in a concealed and, therefore, dogmatic metaphysical assumption concerning the meaning of meaning.

On the other hand, the more radical, hermeneutic turn toward language in recent analytic philosophy was bound to lead to the rediscovery of

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* Translated from *Das Problem der Sprache,* ed. Hans-Georg Gadamer (Munich-Allach: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1967).

Note of the author:

The present paper represents my first attempt to approach the central issues of analytic philosophy with perspectives derived from traditional ontology as seen in the light of Heidegger's philosophy. The elaboration of this stance resulted in my book *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie* (Frankfurt, 1976), of which an English edition is in preparation. That book includes a development and a modification of some of the views expressed in this paper. In particular, my views regarding two concepts of existence and negation have undergone a serious transformation. The first issue has received a new treatment in my "Existence in Space and Time," *Neue Hefte für Philosophie* 8 (1975), and the second in *Vorlesungen,* pp. 67-69. As to 'being,' cf. now Charles Kahn, *The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek* (Dordrecht 1973), and my review in the *Philosophische Rundschau* 24 (1977), pp. 161-176.

[Editorial Note: A review of *Vorlesungen* is planned for Vol. 2 of *CGP.*]

metaphysical perspectives in language itself. One of the most significant works of analytic philosophy in recent years, Strawson's *Individuals* (1959), already bears the subtitle, "Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics." Here the qualification "descriptive" is directed against the reductionist metaphysics of positivistic and pre-positivistic analytic philosophy. This rediscovery of metaphysical questions provides a new chance for metaphysics itself, because the traditional terminology has not been simply taken over, but from the very outset was subjected to language-analytic criticism. And yet, from the point of view of metaphysics, this way of doing philosophy has the handicap of still being oriented on the very array of questions from which it is emancipating itself; that is, on the scientistico-epistemological questions of the older analytic philosophy and the traditional spectrum of disciplines. This partiality in the selection of problems is itself a traditionalism; it is not a consequence of the hermeneutic intentions of the philosophy of ordinary language. To be sure, the analytic philosopher could validly claim that it has been shown that not one of the words with which metaphysics had attempted to designate a universal theme will stand up under analytic criticism. But why then, we may retort, does analytic philosophy not attempt in its own way to designate the universal theme anew? After all, we understand the word 'everything,' and do so not only when we combine it with a definite qualification—every frog, every number—but also, remarkably enough, when we say simply, 'everything.' The history of our philosophy began with the thought of *hen-pan* (everything-one), and it is hard to believe that already the question concerning a universal theme of philosophy was mistaken, not just its answers. Not until language analysis takes into consideration the questions which stand behind the words of metaphysics and motivate them can its critique become genuinely productive, for both the subject and the object of the critique. I should like to try with the word 'being' [*Sein*] to demonstrate the possibility of making language-analytic criticism more profound in the way suggested.

The metaphysical distinction of the word 'being' consisted precisely in the fact that it seemed suitable for capturing a first substantive, and yet wholly formal, meaning of what the word 'everything' signifies merely as regards its scope. Of 'everything' we can say from the outset that "it is, is being" (*es ist, ist seiend*), because otherwise it would be nothing. So it is understandable that in the tradition the word 'being' came to be the guide of universal reflection, and metaphysics took the form of ontology.

Today, the relation of analytic philosophy to ontology in particular, and to metaphysics in general, is no longer an exclusively negative one, as it was for logical positivism. It may be useful to begin by reminding ourselves briefly of the stages of this new approach to ontology, in order to lay stress later on what, in this development, has remained constant in critical opposition to traditional ontology. Such an orientation must lead us to the point where all criticism that has been brought forth so far does not yet conform

to its object and will have to be made more fundamental. In logical positivism, for example in Carnap's article, "Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache" (1932),[1] ontology was treated as simply meaningless. Of course, the word 'being' was not. One uses it constantly, even in logically formalized statements. But 'being' has various disparate meanings—in particular: existence, predication, and identity. In logically formalized statements, this ambiguity is removed by symbolizing the different meanings differently. It is characteristic of metaphysics, on the contrary, that it would like to hold on to the ambiguous word; and from this, Carnap explains, meaningless questions arise. If that were all, one could still conceive an ontology that confined itself exclusively to one of the meanings of the word 'being,' for instance, to that of existence. Carnap is therefore forced to declare that the word 'being' makes sense if one merely uses it, but that any questions that somehow make it thematic would be meaningless. This thesis is, admittedly, not explicitly formulated in just this way in the article of 1932, but can be gathered rather from the later article, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology,"[2] in which Carnap was already taking issue with Quine.

Quine's essay, "On What There Is" (1948),[3] made the term 'ontology' fashionable again, even in the scientistic wing of analytic philosophy. And, in fact, he introduced the terms 'to-be' and 'entity' as indices of the universal. To the question 'What is there?,' he explains at the beginning of this essay that the trivial answer is '*everything*,' but that the further non-trivial question would be: What is everything? Which entities, what types of entities are there? Only sensations, or also material things or persons? Only particular things, or also universals? However *we* may decide these questions, every *language* that we use involves in any case definite ontological presuppositions, specifically in its subject expressions or—what Quine reduces these to, ultimately—in the variables of its existential and universal statements. With this, Quine expects to arrive at a linguistic criterion for deciding when we can consider an attempt at phenomenalistic or nominalistic reduction to be successful.

Two things are characteristic of Quine's concept of ontology. First, he keeps exclusively to just one of Carnap's meanings of 'being'—that of existence. Second, ontology does not stand for a philosophical discipline, a kind of inquiry, but solely for the ontological assumptions ('the ontological commitment') of a person or of a language. (According to Quine's usage, a person does not *engage in* ontology, but *has* this or that ontology). Quine

1. *Erkenntnis,* II, pp. 219-241.
2. *Revue Intern. de Philos.,* XI (1950), pp. 20 f.
3. Reprinted in Quine's collection of essays, *From a Logical Point of View* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 1-19; *cf.* also his article, "Designation and Existence," *Jr. of Philosophy* 36 (1939).

does not recognize any such thing as a question about the meaning of existence of different types of entities; indeed, he expressly rejects the idea that the existence of different types could have different meanings. But he also does not recognize anything like a question about the meaning of existence in general, or, what would be the same thing, about what makes an entity an entity. This second limitation indicates how much Quine remains oriented toward Carnap's logical positivism. That this limitation does not belong to the essence of language-analytic philosophy is shown by more recent English philosophy, especially by Strawson, who asks just such questions as: What constitutes an entity as an entity, and how are the different types of entities constituted? The limitation to existence is, to be sure, retained. But nevertheless, with Strawson, a position has been reached in which, to a certain extent, everything ideological in the rejection of traditional ontology has been dropped—a position in terms of which, therefore, the genuinely substantive analytic critique of traditional ontology can be recognized and made intelligible in its relevance to ontology. The substantive essence of the critique has remained constant throughout its various stages; indeed, it goes back beyond logical positivism to the beginnings of analytical philosophy, in particular, to Russell's essay "On Denoting" of 1905.

This critique, I believe, may be summarized in three points. The first is not found stated in so many words, because it is simply the self-evident presupposition of a language-analytic discussion of being, and seems trivial. According to it, we can understand by 'being' only what we mean in natural language by the verb 'to be.' But by the verb 'is' in any of its various meanings, we never understand a *content*; it is no "real predicate." In that case, we cannot understand its universality, as the Aristotelian tradition has in such a way as to bring out a most universal determination. The 'is,' just as the 'is not,' can somehow concern or combine all possible contents; but these contents cannot for their part be addressed as beings. The universality of the 'is' can be, if anything at all, only a formal and not a material universality.

With this the traditional conception of *essentia,* according to which the meanings of real predicates were to be understood as beings, falls away. This traditional notion obviously has its ground historically in the fact that Greek philosophy, when it became aware of 'is' and 'is not,' was still so exclusively oriented toward content that it simply transferred being into the content, and could think of non-being only as null content—as "nothing." That *essentia* should form a possible meaning of being would have to be shown anew, in any case, in terms of the verbal sense of 'is,' and cannot simply be assumed as self-evident. This first point of the critique corresponds to Heidegger's thesis that traditional metaphysics transferred being (*das Sein*) into entities (*das Seiende*). The congruent criticisms of traditional ontology by these seemingly antithetical positions is not surprising;

the congruence rests on the fact that both start out from what being means in language. Only the ideological antagonism between Heidegger and analytic philosophy concealed their objective interrelations, and, injuriously to the subject matter, hindered mutual complementation, which would have been possible and necessary—as will be made clear in what follows. The second relevant aspect of the criticism concerns the already mentioned ambiguity of the word 'being.' Why, in that context, *essentia* was not included among the various meanings is now clear from what has been said. Besides existence, it was predication and identity that appeared as further meanings of 'is.'

I cannot enter more closely into the second point until I have at least touched upon the third point of the critique, which concerns the meaning of being as *existence.* In analytic philosophy there is general agreement that existence must be understood not only, with Kant, as not a real predicate, but also as not a predicate at all. Sentences like "Lions exist" or "The devil does not exist" are verbally misleading. They are not statements about lions or the devil, but about objects of our world. They assert: None of these objects is a devil; some are lions. This conception frees us from the notion that in a statement of existence we would be talking about a something that does not as such exist at all, but—perhaps as a possibility—ekes out an attenuated quasi-existence. Anybody who does not find this objectionable might consider in addition that we must understand the sense of the statement in terms of the way in which it would be verified; and in order to determine whether there are lions, we shall not investigate possible lions—to see whether the predicate of existence belongs to them—but objects in the world, to see if some of them are lions.

According to this conception, all existential statements would be general statements, and the weight of individualisation, which was precisely the ontologically interesting feature of the concept of existence, would have vanished, to the distress of the traditional ontologist. I believe, however, that to his consolation we must say: every such general existential statement of the type, "Some objects are such and such," says as much as "Some *existing* objects are such and such." It thus presupposes the existence of objects. Nevertheless, existence now means something different; the normal existential statement refers to a predicate—in traditional terms, to an *essentia*—or to an agglomeration of predicates; and it states that this predicate or agglomeration of predicates finds application to existing objects. On the other hand, existence in the second sense concerns the indefinite objects underlying such application, objects to which we can refer with pronouns, such as "This is," "I am." Quine, to be sure, tried to reduce all statements with singular terms to general existential statements,[4] but this reduction, as Strawson also tries to show,[5] cannot be convincing, because we can under-

4. *Cf.*, Methods of Logic, pp. 36 f., *From a Logical Point of View,* pp. 167.
5. *Individuals* (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1959), p. 196f.

stand general statements (both existential statements and universal statements) only as statements about indefinite singular statements. As a matter of fact, this second concept of existence seems to be recognized implicitly by Quine when he says, " 'to be' means 'to be the value of a variable' or 'to be in the range of reference of a pronoun.' "[6] *This* being holds of individual objects. Since, in the language of formal logic, it underlies the universal operator as well as the existential operator, it cannot be given expression by the existential operator itself; therefore, Quine always speaks here simply of 'to be' and not of existence, but without elucidating this difference in terminology. In this 'to be' there seems to lie that meaning of existence which was really the relevant one all along in metaphysics. Only in this sense of existence can we understand such a sentence as, for example, "True being can be thought of only as life." Thus a twofold result for traditional ontology follows from this third point of the language-analytic critique. First, the traditional concept of existence, insofar as related to predicates—essences—is to be subjected to a fundamental revision. Secondly, the critique that leads to this shows at the same time that two concepts of existence are traditionally intertwined. How they differ must first be made clear if metaphysics is ever to become intelligible to itself in its central theme.

I wanted to go into this complex of problems only so far as was necessary for reflecting with some prospect of success on the second and decisive point in the linguistic critique, namely, the thesis concerning the ambiguity of the word 'being.' For if in fact one of the different meanings of the word 'being'—and precisely the one, existence, which alone is admitted in the ontologies of language analysis—does itself have two different meanings, then we must know which we are talking about at any time when its difference from, or consonance with, the other meanings is under discussion. I shall accordingly employ the word 'existence' at first only in the less usual but more fundamental sense of Quine's 'to-be,' in which we speak of the existence of objects. Our further train of thought will of itself lead to the other meaning, which finds expression in the existential operator.

The discrimination of three meanings of 'being'—existence, predication, and identity—is already found in Plato's *Sophist;* but the distinctive feature of the language-analytic thesis is the claim that these meanings have nothing in common. This thesis has been most thoroughly argued, with additional meanings distinguished, in several publications by Stegmüller,[7] but in his case as in the others, the intention was purely destructive and the results purely negative.

Because no one ever asked why traditional ontology attached so much im-

6. *From a Logical Point of View,* p. 13.
7. "Sprache und Logik," in *Studium Generale* 9 (1956), pp. 57ff.; *Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie,* 2nd ed., pp. 188 ff.

portance to the unified concept of being, the attempt was never made to give a new, positive formulation to the old problem. This problem was that of universality. That the problem of being is directed at universality has been, in the meantime, brought out by analytic philosophy itself and, in its own way, in terms of Quine's formulation of ontology. In fact, ontology in Quine's sense includes "everything," though only in the sense of "all objects," all "entities," as Quine says. But not only objects belong to the universe of our understanding; so do their properties, relations, activities. Because these should not be left out of the universal ontological problem, traditional ontology could not give up predicative being; and because the universal theme had to be kept unified, the unity of the concept of being had to be insisted upon.

That does not say, of course, that this unity of concept is justified; it only shows what depends on it, namely, the universality of the problem. The analytic philosopher could reply: If we count predicates as belonging to the universe, they will be illicitly objectified. But we can put it also the other way around: the universe of our understanding is not a universe of objects only; and if, therefore, being can function at all as the guide of genuine universal reflection, then it cannot be limited to existence, the being of objects. The word 'object' shall here be only a formal pointer for what is verbally indicated by a sentence subject, and thus includes Heidegger's 'things,' as well as the substances of the Aristotelian tradition and the 'entities' of analytic ontology. Thus with the word 'object,' no special 'objectification' is presupposed. The seemingly more neutral word [a] 'being' (*ens, on*) would, on the other hand, be ambiguous in the present context. Although it seems to say the same thing as 'entity,' it can be stretched only with difficulty to cover predicative determinations, as with Aristotle. On the other hand, in the substantive form of the word there is an implication which, however unintended, limits ontology to substances or things, not only for Aristotle but for every philosophy that understands the ontological problem as the question about the meaning of the being of *beings.* Although analytic ontology has gone back to the verbal meaning of the word, it has, nevertheless, still remained so traditionally oriented towards objects that, from the very first, it finds only that sense of the word 'is' ontologically acceptable which refers to entities.

The result, in criticism both of traditional ontology *and* analytic ontology, is that the word 'everything' by no means suffices as a genuinely universal thematic guide, because it has the same reifying effects as the word 'beings' or 'entities' (*Seiendes*), since it likewise refers only, or primarily, to objects. The first point of the analytic critique—that the word 'being' must be understood verbally as a form word and not as having content—would thus reach its logical conclusion only in the insight that its universality, too, may no longer be understood as related only to objects, but as formal. The question then becomes whether the word 'being' is ade-

quate to this formal universality, which is broader than the universality of entities. It is doubtful in any case—such was the analytic critique—whether the various formal meanings, in fact possessed by the word 'being,' have a unified sense at all. As we follow up this question, the talk, at first unclear, about a formal universality will gain a precise sense.

'Being' in the sense of existence, and 'being' in the sense of predication, are certainly both form words, not real predicates; but what they have in common is so far only something negative. Can a single positive sense of the two meanings of the word 'being' be specified? In response to this question, metaphysicians customarily point with a superior air to the Aristotelian dictum of *pollachos legesthai,* according to which basic, philosophically relevant words often have several meanings, which are not to be subsumed under the unity of a genus, but do nevertheless stand in a unified interrelationship. But this explanation remains empty as long as we do not actually spell out the postulated unified interrelationship. In Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition, the ambiguity of 'being,' to which this idea of *pollachos legesthai* was applied, was not that of existence and predication. The only text known to me in which a unified clarification is sought for existence and predication is Kant's *Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes.* Existence is there defined as "absolute position,"[8] and 'being' in the sense of predication as "relative position." Common to the two would thus be the concept of 'position,' and this concept is, as Kant says, "identical with that of being in general." But what does 'position' mean? To make certain that a unified point of view is designated by 'position,' an identifying feature must be provided that would be common to absolute and to relative position. Now, what is more obvious than to characterize position by its antithesis to negation? Therewith exactly the point of view would also be denoted which, from the first, was decisive for establishing the word 'being' as the guide for reflection with regard to universality. The universality of 'is' indeed resulted from its antithetical relation to 'is not.'

This antithesis to negation is characteristic of predicative as well as of existential being, and so in negatability we seem to have found the desired uniform characteristic, especially as it also holds, of course, of identity, the third meaning. But this attempt encounters a difficulty: being, in all its meanings, is subject to negation, to be sure; but so is every other verb. In negatability, a characteristic common to the different meanings of 'being' would of course have been found, but one which at the same time reaches far beyond them. One could thus suppose that a more specific identifying feature ought to be found for the uniform delimitation of the meaning of 'being.' But though perhaps this unity of the concept of being could be saved in this way, its universality would, on the other hand, be placed in

8. Kant WW (Cassirer) II, p. 77.

jeopardy. For if there are affirmations that are subject to negation outside of being, then that assuredly means that the required universality is in no way to be reached with the word 'being,' even with the inclusion of its predicative meaning.

Thus if we want to retain the word 'being' to guide universal reflection, we must assert the claim that every verb can be negated only because there is being contained in it implicitly. In fact, it has been usual in ontology since Aristotle to preserve the universality of being by translating verbal sentences into corresponding nominal sentences with 'to-be' and a participle. We say "He swims" means the same as "He is swimming." Linguists rightly object that this translation actually implies a modification of sense. What gets expressed in the verbal sentence as activity of the object is, in the nominal sentence, set off by itself as a real content and is, as it were from outside, established as a state or condition.[9] The difficulties mount when we take into account impersonal constructions and many other peculiarities of verb systems in diverse languages. If traditional ontology reduces such differences in meaning to one uniform ideal language, it does exactly what it otherwise objects to in positivism. Therefore, this reduction of the verb was not protested against by positivism, since it, for its part, is oriented on just such an ideal language—that of formal logic; verbal sentences are also treated in formal logic as nominal sentences. In contrast, in the philosophy of ordinary language it is recognized that distinctions can be essential semantically, even though for purposes of logical deduction they come to the same thing. Surely ontology can rise above the structural differences of empirical languages not by ignoring them, since then it actually falls into their power, but only by trying to take them into consideration.

For analytic philosophers of the older school it would have been more natural to refer here to relations rather than to verbs for evidences of the non-universality of being. In modern logic, relations are no longer understood as predicates—that is, as determinations of an object in relation to others—but are understood to hold uniformly of the manifolds of relata. Viewed thus, a relation cannot be regarded as a determination of being, and yet it may be negated in respect of a particular manifold. But for pure language analysis this conception of relations is not compelling, and the traditional metaphysician could now appeal to the natural languages, as he formerly appealed to an ideal language. Only if the non-universality of the concept of being could be compellingly proved by further arguments would the new understanding of relations in logic have a liberating effect on ontology, since relations would become intelligible on their own terms and not as quasi-properties of objects. The metaphysical center of gravity thus would get shifted from entities to the dimension between them.

In fact, 'not' has at least two further areas of application that cannot be

9. *Cf.*, J. Lohman, *Lexis* I, p. 59.

understood as being either in an ideal, or in a natural, language. In the first place, there are sentences which do not express assertions at all, but wishes or commands, and are thus grammatically in the optative or imperative. That a being is negated when, for example, I say, "Don't come," was not asserted even in traditional ontology, which therefore confined itself to a world of indicatives. But that contradicts the original aim at universality.

In the second place, not only verbs can be negated, but also complex sentences formed by means of words like 'and,' 'or,' 'because.' To this class belong also the all-statements of the general existential assertions, which I had set aside and which are to be understood as series of conjunctions or disjunctions. When we say, "Not all philosophers are happy," we do not negate predicative being, but the second-order affirmation contained in the word 'all.' But the claim that a being gets expressed in such words as 'and' or 'all' gets hardly any support from language.

It would fit the style of the positivistic critique of metaphysics to stop short with this negative result. The attempt to defend the unity of the concept of being against analytic criticism appears not only to have failed but also to have resulted in a dissolution of its claim to universality. But that happened only on the basis of a new criterion of universality, of which we now have only to form a positive conception. This new criterion was negatability. The word 'being' once owed its metaphysical eminence to the circumstance that, through its antithesis to 'not,' it seemed to possess a universal scope. If it now turns out that the antithesis to 'not' has a wider scope than 'being,' what more obvious move could ontology make than to renounce 'being' as the guide to universal reflection, and instead to look for another, the genuinely positive, correlate of 'not'?

But if being is not the universal positive correlate of 'not,' what is? I believe the answer to this question is not hard to find. Language uses a special word for negation, but it has no special word for affirmation, because it makes an affirmation in every sentence. Thus we can understand from the nature of the case that the real theme of universal reflection is accessible to us in language only in the mirror image of negation. No one has ever doubted that the word 'not' has a uniform meaning. Furthermore, it does not share the fate of the word 'being,' so painful for language-conscious ontology, of being differently distributed in empirical languages. But without more ado, we can say *a priori* that there is no human language without a way to express negation, and there is none in which not every sentence is subject to negation, since a sentence is constituted as a sentence by this possibility of negation—which is affirmation.

Since the universal phenomenon of affirmation is wordless, we can understand why we are tempted to put in its palce the special case of being, in which we indeed have a pure affirmation word. This specific case is given, though not in all languages, precisely in the case of existential judgments—attributive nominal sentences and identity statements—

because in them, an objectified content distinct from the aspect of affirmation is represented; so that a special word becomes requisite, for affirmation, a word which expresses a naked synthetic position only. It is, therefore, possible, after all, to bring into relief, in the more comprehensive theme before us, what is common to those three meanings of 'being.' But this question would no longer have any fundamental significance for ontology (we would, of course, have to use the name of this discipline only with inverted commas). For now, the affirmation available only in the 'not' would have to provide guidance both for the universal theme as a whole, and for its subdivisions. The universal dimension in which we understand the 'not' is not a dimension of being but—between indicative, optative, and imperative—a dimension of praxis. Reflection on the meaning of being cannot suffice to clear up this dimension in its totality; instead, we would have to investigate the entire complex of linguistic features that are irreducible vehicles of affirmation in their interconnections. With this, the previously vague talk about formal universality becomes clear. The multiplicity of forms by which all content is conveyed are forms of completed affirmation.

Within this universal dimension of affirmation, we can then mark off the realm of assertions as a special though still comprehensive realm, which in a certain way can already be understood as a realm of being, represented linguistically by the fact that we can introduce every assertoric sentence with the words, "It is the case that . . . . " Within this realm of the assertoric, entities with their predicates—the so-called beings—would form a yet narrower segment, in which, however, not only attributive determinations of being would belong among the predicates, but verbal sentences as a special affirmative form, as well. These two possibilities of an, as it were, inner verbal determination and an objectifying, attributive one, which appeared in the case of the predicates, would finally have to be considered also for the innermost core of the ontological problem, that is, the "existence" of entities. This must be done in order to grasp more adequately the obvious distinction between, on the one hand, speaking of the "existence" of objects, because this existence is confirmable from without; and, on the other hand, speaking of the "existence" of living subjects, because it is brought about by themselves. With this existence of living subjects, which thus is not a being in the proper sense but a praxis, the innermost circle of our problems has again joined up with the outermost.

As it seems to me, the philosophy of language analysis would have gained its appropriate ontology only with an ontology of this type. By adopting motives that derive from Heidegger, this ontology results from language-analytic criticism that is aware of the original meaning of metaphysics. Ontology in Quine's sense, of course, thinks of language in analytic terms, but gets its theme—entities—from the pre-analytic tradition. However, in the perspective of language itself, the universal dimension in which we live with

understanding is not primarily a world of objects, entities, or facts, but a world of sentences, of unities of meaning. To be sure, our understanding constantly transcends its articulation in sentences: the dimension in which we pass from sentence to sentence is plainly not itself a sentence, and much less is it an entity. Every naming, such as 'entities' (*das Seiende*) or 'objects,' itself remains within language and uses an abstract linguistic means, which *in concreto* is always imbedded in a sentence. If, in philosophy, we must talk about that universal dimension of our experience, which is no longer linguistic, we cannot do this with linguistic means that are already within language demonstrably limited.

THE CATEGORIES IN THE "HABITUAL" AND IN THE "SPECULATIVE" PROPOSITION: OBSERVATIONS ON HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF SCIENCE*

Josef Simon

Translated by Gunther Heilbrunn

I

Categories are forms whereby concepts are linked together so as to bring forth propositions for which objective validity may be claimed. The concepts to be linked are designated by words such as substantives and verbs which are found in various languages, and are classified in accord with the grammars of these languages. Neither in content nor in mode of classification need the words of one language correspond to those of all other languages, nor need direct translation of one into all others be possible—as though these languages afforded no more than different ways of designating an identical concept.

The observation that each language possesses a perspective of its own for articulating the "world" led early in the history of philosophy to the at-

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1. L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* 4.0312, trans. by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 42.

tempt to free philosophical reflection, which aims to be universal and binding on all men, from such a restriction imposed by linguistic perspectives. To this end, the *forms* by which concepts are linked held center stage, on the assumption that the origin of these forms was reason itself. "Formal" concepts came to be set in opposition to "symbolic" concepts, that is, to those concepts characterized by their material designation and thus confined to the system of a single, particular language. Formal concepts were intended to hold for any conceivable language, provided only that the language was used in an intelligible way. It made no difference whether a language designated them expressly through special form-words, or expressed them through other syntactical devices such as word order, or through stress; nor did it matter even if speakers were expected to supply the concepts in thought without having recourse to signs. Like a mirror, the categorial component of the individual language was to point the way beyond any possible confusion brought on by the variety of languages, to the realm of the universal that lay above and beyond language. Here was the impetus which gave rise to the idea of a "speculative" (from speculum, mirror) or "transcendental" grammar of reason, in contradistinction to the special grammars of the individual languages.

The categorial linking of concepts produces a proposition. According to the brief description just given, the proposition has essentially two parts: the "symbolic" concepts which appear in it, each meant to refer to a definite idea (*Vorstellung*); and the categorial part, which moves beyond the stock of ideas lying ready to hand in the individual languages, and of course also beyond subjective notions. There is no reference to content, and the form-words of individual languages which may denote the categorial part remain, as far as content is concerned, devoid of significance. Wittgenstein, faithful to this tradition, propounds in the *Tractatus* his fundamental idea that "the 'logical constants' are not representatives."[1] Whether or not perceptible labels are affixed to them is, according to this line of thought, a distinction of interest only to the individual language and one that has nothing to do with their universality; their genuine home is not language, but rather the mind, which forms any given language in the act of using it.

The distinction between speaking and thinking would appear to be oriented towards such a distinction between words which express content and "represent" a conception, and the form-words within the language itself. Corresponding to this is the additional notion that on account of the parallel structures which pervade the linguistic realm (derived from their logical usage), the "thought," however linguistically expressed, is translatable into all other existing, or even conceivable, languages; moreover, that the possibility of conceiving languages in thought, and hence of construing them, rests on this principle, viz., that one can express

in them whatever can be expressed in a given language, however much a particular language may conceal the "thought" within the constellation of symbolic concepts. The difference, then, should be merely one of clarity. The one thought stands in opposition to the multiplicity of words which may obscure its clarity.[2]

Keeping in mind Chomsky's notion of a "Cartesian linguistics," one might call this conception of language, in which differences of structure are to be interpreted as differences of clarity, Cartesian.[3] On this view, languages which designate formal relations through special signs hold a great advantage over those in which categorial distinctions—the logical distinction, for instance, between subject and predicates—are designated only through the order of the words, or perhaps not at all. Since they have to be "added in thought," the result is that different interlocutors may apprehend them in different ways. Kant and Humboldt appear to agree on this point. In his *Anthropology,* Kant observes that there is a dearth of conceptions of the understanding corresponding to "a poverty of words to express them;"[4] and Humboldt requires of a highly developed language that it possess "pure expressions for relations." It is in this sense that language ought to "accompany" thought. "Thus thought ought to be able to pass on from one element to the other in a continuous sequence in language, encountering also signs for everything it requires for itself for a context."[5] However, Kant's motive for this demand is very different from that of Humboldt. Kant follows the Cartesian tradition in regarding the form words as external props for the categorial realm, whose true locus is in the intellect and remains there. For Humboldt, on the other hand, the "development of ideas" itself requires that the categorial realm possess its very own linguistic designations and that they not merely be "added in thought." The perceptible sign or mark should not merely express thought; rather, as is apparent in the lecture from which we have just quoted, it frees it from the burden of thought through institutionalization, thereby opening up for it fresh possibilities. Thought encounters an external, sensibly perceptible, precipitate of itself—traces of its own previous activity—in language; this enables thought to elevate itself over the "basis" of pre-given empirical concepts, a basis as it is afforded by an actual languge. It can then lay down its own perceptible marks—that is, those given in the sensibly perceptible designations of its own previous productive activity—as a new basis, and so continue to build upon it and develop, on the same basis,

2. Cf. *Tractatus* 4.002, "Language Disguises Thought." Pears and McGuinness, p. 36.
3. Cf. N. Chomsky, *Cartesian Linguistics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).
4. Kant, *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht,* Akademieausgabe Vol. VII, p. 191.
5. W. V. Humboldt, *Über das Entstehen der grammatischen Formen, und ihren Einfluß auf die Ideenentwicklung,* Akademieausgabe Vol. IV, pp. 306, 308.

beyond the previous point attained. The self-objectification of thought in language is what first makes it possible to progress beyond the notion of simply drawing connections between thoughts on a basis previously given, and so to introduce the concept of the "new," or of "development," into that of "the conditions of possibility."

If on each occasion the rational category had to be "added in thought" with regard to the material basis, then the material of categorial connections would remain always identical, as that which was mapped out by the symbolic concepts. The synthesis itself would remain a synthesis on the same level. Reason, despite an attempt at self-reflection in the mirror of the formal aspects of each language, would remain bound up in a particular language. Although reason, as a synthesis of what was presented to it, might presume that it was productive, it would be so within a framework of symbolic concepts; since there can be no question of these being "its" concepts (concepts of "reason"), its activity in regard to them would be essentially receptive. Insofar as reason is the capacity for making combinations, the elements of the combination would be designated beforehand. Thus, given the standpoint of a "transcendental grammar,"[6] to break out of a language composed of symbolic concepts is possible, according to Kant, only for a language in which the concepts to be synthesized are to be constructed—precisely as in mathematics as Kant understands it—in a pure intuition that is not modeled on the empirical concepts of a conventional language. So philosophy subsequent to Kant certainly had an obligation to continue to discuss this problem.

Now Humboldt's understanding of language seems to point to a tendency which, in a more pronounced way, appears in Hegel. Even though the history of philosophy has many unanswered questions about Hegel's relations to Humboldt, some remarks made by Humboldt on the connections between thought and language afford a good transition to Hegel's conception of the categories. The two have in common the following fundamental idea: the task of thought is not, to begin with, to be conceived of as one of performing synthesising acts on an "immediate" material, a conception which of necessity prompts the question: How is thought, in the first place, capable of drawing aside, as it were, the curtain of material already given form through the heritage of a particular language, in order to fulfill the postulate of the Enlightenment of calling into action reason itself as opposed to all that has been handed down? Neither philosopher supposes that the material with which thought is concerned is immediately perceptible to sense; hence, the question of how it can be approached without mediation does not arise in the first place. In opposition also to all contemporary "fundamentalist" theories, the material is conceived of as the linguistic precipitate of previous thought acts. Thus the problem of symbolic concepts

6. For this term, cf. Kant, *Vorlesungen über die Metaphysik,* (Darmstadt, 1964), p. 78.

is no longer passed by, nor is it thrust aside with reference to a putatively possible "pure" thought; rather, it has itself moved to the center of attention. This presupposes a conception of language in which thought can, and indeed must, linguistically oppose itself to itself *as a result*, if it is to be comprehended as a "possibility" as opposed to the inherited language and the δύναμις τῶν ὀνομάτων, as enlightenment thought from Plato onward has demanded it.

At the outset of the *Phenomenology of Mind,* Hegel took to task the "opinion" of "sensuous certainty" that it has to do with non-mediated material. Hegel, appealing to the "language" of this level of consciousness itself, sets it in opposition to "perception," which apprehends the *supposed* "this thing here" already in a linguistic and conceptual form; its object actually already contains an objectified synthetic performance. Humboldt, in his early thesis "Concerning Thinking and Speaking," maintains that language is a necessary function of thought. "The essence of thought is to be found in reflection, that is, the distinguishing of the thinking being from what is thought. In order to reflect, the mind must pause for a moment in the progress of its activity, must comprehend in a unity what it has just called forth, and in this manner present it to itself as its object. The mind compares such units, of which more than one may be formed in this fashion, one to the other, and according to need distinguishes or connects them." "The sensuous designation of the units into which certain parts of the thought process are united, so that as parts they are set over against other parts of a larger whole, and as objects over against the subject—this designation is language in the widest significance of the term. And so language begins immediately and all at once, right at the first act of reflection."[7]

Insofar as language takes on a constitutive function in the conception of the categorial realm, in the manner that Humboldt but above all Hegel elaborated it, this conception represents a continuation of Kant's critical approach, that of "metacriticism," as opposed to Kant's unmediated attempt at a solution, in which he remained bound to the tradition of speculative grammar in a "transcendental" sense. To resume Humboldt's line of thought: the fact that the formal concept itself is designated as a "grammatical word" in a *particular* language, in accord with the formal possibilities of this language, is a condition for thinking to pass beyond that which has already been thought. Thereby thought acts performed in the past can be drawn into the critical reflection; to begin with, of course, it remains entirely open whether the acts in themselves had represented true knowledge or not. Both the criticism of a previously fixed judgment (Vorurteil) and the progressive cumulation of "knowledge acts" call for such a linguistic objectification of thoughts as the basis for all further thoughts.

7. Humboldt, *Über Denken und Sprechen,* Akademieausgabe Vol. VII, p. 581f.

While it is true that Humboldt, unlike Kant, did not write a criticism of knowledge, it may be that he constructs *in nuce* a formulation of language in which the gnoseological problem of Kant takes on a somewhat altered significance. Kant's question as to the conditions for the possibility of objectively valid judgments implies in itself a certain conception of language; according to this conception, the (translinguistic or universal) category shapes the material of symbolic concepts belonging to a particular language into thoughts, and expresses itself in a correspondingly shaped sentence. This material purports to be the empirical "basis," "representing" a reality distinct from the language. On this view, a proposition formed in this way is the primary product of the mind, its precipitate in language. The proposition intends to refer without intermediation to the non-linguistic reality, so that its very own intention or tendency gives rise to the question of whether or not this isolated formation is true. On the other view, represented here by Humboldt, a thought presupposes that an objectified precipitate of mental activity already exists, that is to say, that there is a history of languge acts. The starting point is not the conception of a languge capable of expressing "original" acts by virtue of which thoughts are synthesized, revealing no traces of previous activity. By way of interpreting Humboldt and, in a certain sense, moving on to Hegel's conception of the categorial realm, one might say that the special designation of the categorial realm sought by Humboldt preserves thought from having to function as a mere synthesis within the framework of a given language. Thought, rather than referring to a supposed immediacy of the already given material in the symbolic concepts, has granted to it the possibility of referring also to thoughts—in order either to preserve them and build upon them, or to criticize and ultimately reject them, by whatever criteria or "needs"[8] may be relevant. Thought, then, gains the possibility of building itself up by stages or, as Humboldt puts it, of a "development of ideas."

The grammatical distinctions between languages with regard to the possibilities they afford of designating categorial forms by means of special "grammatical words" mirror the different degrees of the objective possibility of this reflection. This insight of Humboldt introduces a novel dimension into the notion of a "speculative grammar." Previously, one supposed that thought gained assurance of its abstract possibility "speculatively," in the categorial realm of each language, a realm which was common to all languages, without being able fully—as the consequences of the Kantian approach show—to make real use of the assumed concept of a capacity for determining concrete existence (since for this purpose empirical, that is, symbolic, concepts are assumed). In Humboldt's approach, thought can "speculatively" win assurance of its special possibility, that is to say, the possibility which transcends its already

8. *Ibid.*, p. 581.

designated route or its already designated "language game," in every instance with respect to the particular language in which thought expresses itself. Only in this way could thought come to a conception of the conditions of its concrete possibility as free, genuinely not be bound to a pregiven basis of linguistic possibility.

Thus "speculation," understood as the way in which thought experiences itself, would receive a fresh meaning. With the old meaning, it bears the odium of recklessness, in that an inference is being drawn from what is given and made to pertain to what is not given, thus evasively transcending reality. With this new meaning, reference would be made to the special character of concrete languages, which, precisely on account of the objective state of their development, might offer the conditions for overcoming stubbornly inherent peculiarities.

II

Before we go on to interpret the Hegelian conception of category on the basis of these preliminary considerations, let us review the gnoseological context which alone will make this conception intelligible. Since all speech is speaking about something, no philosophical theory of language can avoid becoming a theory of the fundamental structure of that which language intends, that is to say, a general ontology. In the theory of language in which language is taken to be a "designation of thought"[9] which, for its part, links one-dimensionally symbolic concepts by virtue of an original capacity, the "object" can be conceived of only as something which corresponds to the categorial specificity of a proposition. Only the *form* of the sentence can have objective validity, since its matter is conceived of as already formed with respect to the process of language, and thereby as principally detached from an "original" act of understanding or knowing, to the extent that constructible concepts of mathematics are excluded. If, as regards such judgments, the criticism of knowledge oriented to such a conception of language proves inadequate for arriving at the concept of a judgment of apodeictic certainty (because of the indispensable empirical concepts), it can at least reveal (on account of its transcendental orientation) their *a priori* form as a form of *possible* knowledge. Correspondingly it arrives at the concept of a possible, though not of a certain, object. In contrast to mathematical objects which are *a priori* certain, the transcendental "conditions of the possibility" of the object are conditions only of the possibility of objects "in general," and not of definite objects. If knowledge "in general" is to be construed as possible, then it is possible only as regards the form of the judgment which is devoid of content since, as Wittgenstein puts it, "it does not represent." The consequence of this approach is that the

9. Kant, *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, op. cit.*, p. 192.

pure form of a judgment, as it is mirrored in sentences, is perceived as that which alone comprises the objectivity of possible objects. This pure form is that of the possibilities of making judgments which lie in the mind, that is to say, of an *action* of the understanding. This action of synthesis projects itself onto the ontological conception of possible "objects in general" as their objective substance. From the point of view of language, we are dealing with the form of propositional construction in the sense of a "transcendental grammar" of the understanding, not of the sense of an individual language. What is here being gnoseologically projected is, at bottom, the presupposed capacity of *being able* to form true sentences or propositions—a presupposition which is made in spite of all *a priori* uncertainty as to whether a given sentence about an existing object is true or not. Certainly it is an indispensible condition of all speech that one be able to utter the truth. However, the conception of a transcendental grammar narrows down this indispensable condition of the meaning of speech acts. Recourse is had to the additional assumptions that in sentences regarded as structures that can be formed spontaneously—no account being taken of the conditions arising out of the history of the language, of the society, or of the concrete situation—it is at least possible to utter the truth; and that, given this possibility, this truth would find utterance in isolated propositions formed in the way described. Even if the sceptic cannot exclude this as a possibility, still it smacks of dogmatism to identify it *a priori* as *the* possibility, leaving out of consideration the possible constraints the speaker's language lays down on him. Only on this *a priori* approach to the judgment, and to the isolated sentence as the possible realm of truth, do there arise the gnoseological questions and reflections concerning the conditions of the possibility of congruence between the "thought" expressed during the formation of a structured proposition and the "reality" which one must assume to exist in a correspondingly general structure.

This conception—save in the case of "empirical concepts" or concepts that have to do with content, which are left aside for this reason—seems not to depend on a particular language. It is all the more beholden to a peculiar conception of language and of the relation between language and thought, itself left unreflected, the conception, namely, that a thought is expressed through the formal structure of a *single* proposition (free of context) and that "something" must be capable of corresponding to this proposition as a finite form. According to the transcendental approach, it is not a question of the boundary of sentences, in the sense of the grammar of a particular language; this is demonstrated precisely in Kant's example of the category of causality, associated with the hypothetical judgment composed of two propositions. In this case, the structure of the sentence joins together synthetically two empirical judgments, neither of which, taken by itself, can lay claim to objective validity, as is clear from their hypothetical character. Since, according to Kant, a judgment is defined as "a relation which is ob-

jectively valid,"[10] the judgmental aspect of the parts of the judgment is sublated when the composite hypothetical judgment is formed. The judgmental aspect is then solely attributed to the hypothetical judgment as a spontaneous formation. Only the hypothetical judgment as a whole can be objectively valid; the partial judgments are no more than sentences, in the grammatical sense of a particular language, and perform the function of empirical concepts as subject and predicate. "Judgment" in each case is that structure formed spontaneously by reason into a unified whole, constructed on the suppositions that it could be formed as objectively valid without regard to the conditions implied in the content of the language, and that language was but the subsequent "designation" of this "thought," which is possible at any moment whatever.[11]

The simple basic form of the judgment so understood is the categorical judgment. In the course of its formation, both subject and predicate are distinguished within it. When two words are so joined together, and at the same time formally distinguished in such a way that one is the subject, the other the predicate, they are linked together into a proposition. It makes no difference, then, unless solely in the interest of clarity, whether or not the apprehension of subject and of predicate is accorded a special semantic mark, or whether this has to be "added in thought," since, according to this conception of language, the categorial realm is in principle located in the mind (*Verstand*) and not in language. The important point is that, apart from the ideas conveyed by symbolic concepts, the formal category produces this apprehension of what is present to the mind as subject and predicate. In Kant's "Table of Categories," the category coordinate with the categorical form of judgment is "substantiality" (*substantia et accidens*). From the point of view taken by Kant, this category has the function of characterizing the idea expressly marked as subject, or to be understood as such, as the indeterminate basis; and it characterizes the idea that is marked or understood as predicate as a merely accidental determination. It follows that both the linguistic form into which the content of the subject of the proposition is cast, and the predicate determination, are indifferent. The predicate determination, to be sure, is what the sentence achieves, but it remains external to what is designated as subject insofar as this designation occurs wholly apart from its content. This abstracted apprehension as subject and as predicate joins together symbolic concepts in the pure form of relation—heedless of content—a relation in which they constitute in general the "simple" form of a sentence formed on a "basis."

10. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 142.
11. The "contexts" made up of several propositions which "generative grammar" studies, in lieu of single sentences in the grammarian's sense, are to be understood from this point of view as *one* sentence, so long as they are taken to be spontaneous formations solely according to a syntactical and semantic system of rules as a system of *a priori principles* of generation.

III

Hegel called the proposition which corresponds to this conception "the habitual relation of subject and predicate."[12] What he has in mind is not any definite grammatical grouping of propositions, but rather a conception of the proposition which issues from a certain understanding of language—one which is in keeping with the "habitual procedure which takes place in knowledge." Hegel describes two not dissimilar kinds of such a "customary procedure": one is the "habit of always thinking in figurative ideas," or "material thinking"; the other is "formal thinking" as a supposed "detachment from content, and conceited superiority to it."[13] For "formal thinking," the formal category, engaged in drawing connections, predominates, while "material thinking" progresses by association from one habitual notion that is linguistically symbolized to another (for example, the notion of a semantically regulated associative scheme of symbolic concepts), and does not rise above it. "Material thinking" finds interruption "just as annoying as does formal thinking, which in its reasoning rambles about with no real thoughts to reason with."[14] Since its consciousness of itself (*Selbstbewußtsein*) is mirrored solely in the associative links, formal thinking remains just as locked into a predetermined framework, or into a well worn "language game," as is "material" thinking.

The philosophical concept, according to Hegel, requires of "material thought" that it "interrupt" its "customary procedure," and of "formal thought" that it make "the effort to give up . . . this supposed or make-believe freedom, and instead of being a merely arbitrary principle directing the content anyhow, this freedom should sink into and pervade the content, should let it be directed and controlled by its own proper nature . . . and should observe this process taking place."[15] This corresponds to Humboldt's notion of reflection, according to which "mind for a moment pauses in the progress of its activity," "comprehends in a unity what it has just called forth," and "in this manner" opposes it to itself in its linguistic designation as an object.[16] Formal freedom we take to be the consciousness of the "supposed" ability immediately to make judgments which lay claim to objective validity, to the neglect of the immediately given symbolic concepts and their associative connections.[17] This freedom is opposed to

12. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes,* ed. Hoffmeister (Leipzig, 1949), p. 42; Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind,* trans. J.P. Baillie (London, 1931) (henceforth cited as *"Phänomenologie"* and *"Phenomenology"*).
13. *Phänomenologie,* p. 48; *Phenomenology,* p. 116f.
14. *Phänomenologie,* p. 48; *Phenomenology,* p. 117.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Humboldt, *Über Denken und Sprechen, op. cit.,* p. 581.
17. Cf. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 142.

material dependence upon set patterns of envisaging things (*Vorstellungsbahnen*). This opposition denotes merely the abstractly opposed aspects of the identical "habitual procedure," and has to be sublated into a concept which causes form "to sink into and to pervade" content. That is to say, the form, thanks to the systematic possibility which is presented objectively by a *particular language,* is designated in a way that can be perceived and so takes its place among the symbolic words. Because of this objective possibility that a particular stage of language makes available, thought is enabled to rise above what has thereby been objectified to true freedom; it does this not in an abstract negation of the constraints imposed by language, but rather in a concrete negation of objectified constraints.

Corresponding to this concept is the so-called "speculative proposition." Previously, speculation had been held capable of mirroring itself in the formal construction of the units of a proposition, as an abstract, free-floating faculty of judgment making. Now, thought is seen to be mirrored or reflected in the particular linguistic possibilities to the extent that actual languages make them available; or, it has experience of itself as a faculty that has been set free, as over against a linguistically frozen "habitual procedure which takes place in knowledge."[18]

In this concept there is no 'basis' purporting immediately to symbolize an external reality which is viewed as 'material' for a synthesis, but rather, some 'knowledge' that has solidified into a 'habitual procedure.' Since it is habitual, it had defined—anonymously, as it were—the faculty of judgment which understood itself as purely formal; now it can find its way into self-consciousness. Hegel's characterization of knowledge which immediately posits itself as free, or quite simply as a faculty of judgment, is intimately bound up with the understanding of the category. On the one hand, "formal knowledge" comprehends itself as immediately free or as "the self," in that it categorially construes the symbolic concepts through their *modi legendi* "as" subject and "as" predicate; on the other hand, this distinction, through which the proposition comes into being, signifies that in the actual exercise of the freedom presupposed in the abstract negation ("in its positive cognitive process"), "the self is a given *subject*," "to which the content is related as an accident and as a predicate."[19] Not the judging subject, but the subject as it presents itself (*Vorstellung*), designated in the sentence as "subject," "constitutes the basis."[20] Knowledge which takes itself to be a free faculty of judgment that is immediately possible, at the same time that it moves to make the categorial distinction between subject and predicate, posits as its own basis what is presented in the concept of the sub-

18. For an interpretation of language as the concrete condition for the experience of self cf. J. Simon, *Das Problem der Sprache bei Hegel* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1966).

19. *Phänomenologie,* p. 49; *Phenomenology,* p. 118.

20. *Ibid.*

ject; the act of judgment causes the predicate to adhere to it in a merely external way, as something which accidentally 'supervenes.' In forming judgments, the subject cannot neglect semantic predeterminations which might possibly preclude objectivity. It is, rather, the semantic concept interpreted as subject which permits the judgment in accordance with a well-practiced and rehearsed semantics.

Hegel points out a paradox in the distinction between logical syntax and semantic interpretation in the particular language that has been learned, from which the formal approach cannot extricate itself. The formal capacity for linking concepts cannot be a translinguistic, or pure transcendental, faculty of reason, because the actual formation of propositions does not proceed according to pure syntactic rules; rather, it depends as much on such possibilities as there are for forging connections "understood" from the point of view of the particular languages—for example, that this word, on account of its meaning within a linguistic system, can become the subject to that word, and that that word can become predicate to this one. Precisely a logical syntax which aims at purity, to whose concept of sentence and of language belongs the "transcendental," non-contingent and unequivocal comprehension of the distinction between subject and predicate, requires strict semantic regularities of this kind. For circumstances or context to give the cue, and to determine in each case what is logically to be understood as subject and predicate, is rigorously excluded by an approach which considers itself to be the transcendental principle of the formation of judgments supposed to find expression in isolated propositions.

To such an implicitly static conception of language Hegel opposes a concept in which "the very self of the object" is not "a quiescent subject," "passively supporting accidents," but rather "manifesting itself as the development (*Werden*) of the object."[21] This statement by Hegel concerning the concept of the category in the speculative proposition is preliminary to the analysis he makes in the *Science of Logic.* It owes its development above all to critical reflection on the doctrine of categories in Kant's "transcendental logic." In this reflection is found the insight that the older approach of "transcendental grammar" requires as supplement a semantics which cannot be the result of a transcendental deduction. This semantics, understood as the abstract supplement to an equally abstract syntax, leads thought to the supposition of a strictly regulated semantic network, one already present and active in the particular language (in the sense that it has become routine); with this approach, objective reality lying beyond this pre-existing network is rendered unattainable.

There remains only the possibility of criticizing this approach itself. This criticism consists, ultimately, in transcending (*aufheben*) the idea that the boundaries of the proposition constitute also the boundaries of speculation.

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21. *Ibid.*

According to Hegel, because the philosophical proposition is a proposition, it at first awakens "the accepted view of the habitual relation of subject and predicate and suggests the idea of the habitual procedure which takes place in knowledge." Its "philosophical content," reflecting on and objectifying what is habitual, must first do away with "this way of proceeding and the ordinary view taken of this process."[22] That is to say, content is the point at which the pre-existing categorial form has to be broken through, and with it, the rule-determined semantics of concepts that is required along with this form. One may say that, in becoming itself the content, the categorial form is already done away with as a transcendental moment of formation. As content, it is viewed as a "something" which is *itself* subject to judgment, and is thereby set apart from a purely functional form of judgment formation.

In the approach which begins with the capacity for forming propositions, the basic philosophic question is: how is it possible to think in such a way that *in consequence* of a category, a formation such as this can be true? The new question which now arises is: can these categories at all be the true forms through which statements about reality can be made? With an eye to the Kantian table of categories, Hegel replies in the negative.[23] In the preface to the *Phenomenology of Mind,* he develops this criticism with reference to the categorial relation of subject and predicate. Like Kant, Hegel begins with the natural assumption that reality can be presented through language. His criticism is only that the formal distinction between subject and predicate, and the corresponding conception of the proposition, in themselves already furnish a concept of the possibility of this. Precisely because language discloses the intention of having to do with existent things, Hegel finds this approach of reflection to be transcended (*aufgehoben*). It is not truly the intention of language that what is represented in the concept of the subject be a "basis" to which the predicate determination adheres only accidentally; and what is meant in the concept of a predicate is not the merely noetic determination or "a universal that can be detached from the subject, and adapted to several indifferently."[24] It may not be amiss to introduce an example, not in Hegel's text, of a possibly meaningful statement uttered in some situation or other and in some context, perhaps a descriptive one. In "this table is round," the subject-concept "table" does not mean something which, as a basis underlying the determination, could accept "accidents." What is meant is that this certain round table has not fortuitously *taken on* the property "round," but rather

22. *Phänomenologie,* p. 52; *Phenomenology,* p. 122.
23. Cf. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik,* ed. Lasson (Leipzig, 1951), Vol. I, p. 27, or *Hegel's Science of Logic,* trans. by A.V. Miller (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969), p. 46f. (Henceforth *"Logik"* and *"Logic"*).
24. *Phänomenologie,* p. 50; *Phenomenology,* p. 119.

exists only in this shape. Further, the predicate does not signify a property which could "belong to" other objects as well. Only in a mathematical judgment could the "universal round" of a geometrical circle, constructed in pure intuition—that is, a concept that is to be constructed and not one *necessarily to be exemplilfied*—be intended, and only here could this constructed figure be the "basis" of the determination round, since in this case the free *action* of constructing is itself as "pure capacity" the "basis" of the various properties of figures. In this mathematical possibility, the categorial forms must synthesize an appropriate conceptual material, namely, concepts that have been constructed, with no reference made to an external, individual, real object. This possibility finally accounts for the form of the proposition, which "involves" the (fixed) "distinction between subject and predicate"[26] and thus refers to fixed meanings. In language, which is concerned with existent things, however, it is not the case that quiescent and passive "meanings" are linked together in a purely formal way. Rather, it happens that the subject with which a certain predicate is linked determines, on the basis of its meaning, that of the predicate, and the predicate determines the meaning of the subject. It is necessary to add that such a reciprocal determination is not to be found solely within the confines of a sentence. The situation-bound ("pragmatic") context has always already entered into the meanings which are present in the proposition, just as the proposition is not serving as a copula for predetermined meanings, but rather is modifying these and heightening their precision with a view to future employment. The proposition, then, appears as a moment in a context of determination which is in principle unlimited. For this reason, according to Hegel, the "object"—which for Kant corresponded to the proposition, shaped into a formal unity by the rational category—"manifests itself as its development."[26] Similarly, knowledge is essentially knowledge that is developing. *Eo ipso* it cannot comprehend aspects of external reality in *one* act of judgment. In approaching external things, it has reflexively to approach the language in which it expresses itself, representing to itself the form of the language as the condition for sublating (*aufheben*) the circumstances which are its conditions.[27]

25. *Phänomenologie,* p. 51; *Phenomenology,* p. 120.
26. *Phänomenologie,* p. 49; *Phenomenology,* p. 118.
27. Cf. W. Marx, *Absolute Reflexion und Sprache* (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1967), p. 22: "The simple proposition can at best denote a 'fixed result.' In the portrayal of the life of truth and completing itself as a whole, the proposition in its particularity is sublated. The single proposition becomes a link in a chain of propositions. The propositions are linked together as presupposing and as positing; therein lies the sole possibility of showing how the totality of determinations is fused into a true association. The speculative presentation must take command of an entire system of propositions. The 'dialectical movement' is such a network and as such has 'propositions as its parts or elements.' "

Since, however, the dialectical movement consists of "parts or elements which are propositions," the fixation of speculation on the form of the proposition seems, as Hegel remarks, to be a recurring phenomenon, and along with it "the difficulty indicated [which] seems to be a difficulty inherent in the nature of the case."[28] Nonetheless, the category as the supposed focus of the formation of propositions is the target of criticism on account of the claim it makes to an immediate objective validity. At bottom it cannot signify immediate knowledge in itself, but only a pause and cessation in the process of attaining knowledge. That is, it signifies only the objectification, at a certain point, of a process of knowledge for the purpose of reflecting on it, and so is a moment in the process of knowledge. No longer has this process, as was requisite in the Kantian concept of the category, to be understood as a progression of one dimension, but rather, as a continual objectification of the means of knowledge. The category that is employed acquires thereby the function of bringing itself into the open as "something untrue" both in its employment and in the reflection on it, as it does also the "habitual procedure"[29] governing its use in the "language game" whose "rule" it was.

The Hegelian concept of the proposition "destroys" the ordinary notion of the proposition. Therewith it destroys the mirror of traditional speculation, setting up in its stead actual linguistic usage. Here the possibility of constructing propositions cannot be derived purely from a logical syntax and from a fixed semantic system of rules for linking together units of meaning; conversely, the formation of propositions within an unbounded epistemological process determines what the meanings are to be. Such a "mirror," to be sure, provides no sharply defined contours and no self-consciousness of the "certainty" of the object, but it does supply to the consciousness engaged in knowing a true conception of its stance towards objectivity. This "dialectical movement of the proposition" is the "*actual* speculative element"[30] since, in contradistinction to that fixation solely on the form of the proposition in abstraction from all else, it answers to the proposition as a real element of the situational context given in real language. In this context it is the case that only units of meaning already established are linked together, but that these only acquire their meaning from their being linked together, so that a clean logical sundering of a logical syntax from the semantics of symbolic concepts proves impossible. In the face of this linguistic reality, "speculation" in the "ordinary" sense is sublated.

According to Hegel, the "philosophical content" of philosophic sentences ought to assume the task of subverting "the accepted view of the

28. *Phä*nomenologie, p. 53; *Phenomenology,* p. 123.
29. *Phänomenologie,* p. 48; *Phenomenology,* p. 116.
30. *Phänomenologie,* p. 53; *Phenomenology,* p. 123.

ordinary relation of subject and predicate" and "the habitual procedure that takes place in knowledge" which takes its orientation from that view. The common view apprehends through the unusual nature of this content "that it is intended in another way," "and this correction of its opinion compels knowledge to recur to the proposition and take it now in some other sense."[31] *This,* then, is the function of philosophic contents! They are in every case "examples"[32] of the process whereby an existing habit is undone as these contents enter into the habitual language and compel the ordinary understanding of the proposition, which takes it to be a purely formal connection, to "recur to the proposition," that is, in fact, to objectify the "form of representation itself." For this reason, these "contents" are wholly distinct from the contents of the symbolic concepts; at bottom, they are "categorial." An example of this is the proposition, "God is Being." Formally, "Being" is the predicate. But since it has substantive meaning, it is not attached merely as an accident, but appears rather as "the essential nature." "Thereby God appears as ceasing to be what he was when the proposition was put forward, viz., a fixed subject." "Thinking, instead of getting any farther with the transition from subject to predicate, in reality finds its activity checked [in the "habitual procedure" marked out for it by the category] through the loss of the subject and it is thrown back on the thought of the subject because it misses this subject or, since the predicate itself has been pronounced to be a subject, to be *the* being, to be the *essential reality* which exhausts the nature of the subject, thinking finds the subject directly present in the predicate too."[33] We may add: it finds the abstract disjunction between the subject (literally, what lies underneath) and the determination, annihilated. The "material" of the synthesis already had in itself a synthetic character and so a history.

The examples of "philosophic contents" take the general form of saying that what is meant or intended in the subject does not have the character of content but rather that of category, for example, Being or the Universal. "The real, *qua* subject, passes away in its predicate."[34] It follows, of course, that "linguistic rules" are violated. But Hegel adds that the "*actually* speculative" is not made up, after all, of these contents; rather, it is their function of checking the syntactically regulated, habitual train of images (*Vorstellungen*) and turning a reflective view on this same train. The purpose of these propositions is to elicit reflection on the ordinary understanding and sublation of the proposition, and on the comprehension of the linguistic reality of sentences as a mere *element* of determination imbedded in a shifting context. The specific content serves only as an example. By way of interpretation, one may add that this content is relative to whatever

31. *Phänomenologie,* p. 52; *Phenomenology,* p. 122.
32. *Phänomenologie,* p. 51; *Phenomenology,* p. 121.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*

habitual ideas or images are, as Hegel puts it, to be "lost" in the predicate. The movement of the content makes manifest the process in which the naive idea—that which is meant by the concept (*Begriff*) of the subject, what "underlies" and is substantial—becomes lost through the formation of such "meaningless" categorial predicates. The philosophical content is, at bottom, no more than the reflection of the habitual procedure upon itself, issuing in the insight that the *category* of substance *posits* what is meant in the subject as the "one" that "underlies," so that it obtains its basis not from itself, but rather in the course of its categorial distinction from the predicate (all possible predicates), in which it is determined or asserted to be the "one." The "one" is its true predicate, determining or positing it as subject. However, as soon as the assertion is made, it is, *qua* idea that was meant, "lost" in the predicate.

"Philosophical contents" refer not to content in the sense of ordinary ideas; they bring about reflection on the rules which govern the stability of such ideas. The category in the "speculative proposition" is not the form by which ordinary ideas are connected, but rather reflection on the form of such connections, insofar as this form is supposed to keep the ideas at the same time separated; that is, insofar as it is understood in a purely "formal" way. The category in the speculative proposition is the category which reflects on the nature of category. It is true that this amounts to an annullment of the rigorous distinction between object-language and meta-language. One may even say that the philosophic significance of a "philosophic content" is that it brings to critical awareness such a tacit distinction, which gives "meta-linguistic" stability to the functioning of an "object-language" in dealing with ordinary trains of ideas. In this sense it is hortatory, and it is here that its epistemological function lies.

IV

It was not the logic of a "scientific language" (*Wissenschaftssprache*) which Hegel set out to write, but rather a logic of science—not of a definite science, syntactically and semantically regulated in the "language" of this science, but of a science of human knowledge, understood not as a possibly definitive "state of knowledge" but rather as an unending process. The "Science of Logic" has to do with the logic of "the process of training and educating consciousness itself up to the level of science," a level which cannot be "predicted."[35] To the "process of training and educating consciousness itself up to the level of science" Hegel opposes "instinctive" thinking, "enmeshed" "in the bonds of its categories." Only after they have been "brought before consciousness" are these categories "independent, self-existent concepts (which are in and for themselves) of its

35. *Phänomenologie,* p. 67; *Phenomenology,* p. 136; *Logik* I, p. 23; *Logic,* p. 43.

essential nature." To bring them before consciousness "is therefore the higher task of logic."[36]

The *Science of Logic* carries on this task, "watching" the categories in the actual movement of the proposition to observe how in themselves, thanks to their function, they are "firm knots which give stability and direction to the life and consciousness of spirit."[37] These are categories which are not "first" to be found in a transcendental understanding, as a supposed "original" faculty of judgment, but rather in a language. "The forms of thought are in the first instance displayed and stored in human language . . . Into all that becomes something inward for man, an image or conception as such, into all that he makes his own, language has penetrated, and everything that he transforms into language and expresses in it contains a category, concealed, mixed with other forms or clearly determined as such."[38] For Hegel, as for Humboldt, it is especially important whether "the" categorial element of a language has assigned to it a special designation or not. "It is an advantage when a language possesses an abundance of logical expressions, that is, specific and separate expressions for the thought determinations themselves. Many prepositions and articles denote relationships based on thought. The Chinese language is supposed not to have developed to this stage, or only to an inadequate extent. These particles, however, play quite a subordinate part, having only a slightly more independent form than the prefixes and suffixes, inflections and the like. It is much more important in a language that the categories should appear in the form of substantives and verbs, and thus be stamped with the form of objectivity. In this respect, the German language has many advantages over other modern languages. Some of its words even possess the further peculiarity of having not only different but even opposite meanings, so that one cannot fail to notice a speculative spirit of the language in them . . . Philosophy therefore stands in no need of a special terminology,"[39] even when it cannot leave the words that exist prior to it "in the language of common life, which is made for the world of (customary) pictorial thinking."[40]

These passages make it plain that for Hegel, as for Humboldt, a specific, objectively realized stage of knowledge corresponds to a stage of the "education and training of consciousness to the level of science," and that to the "advance of culture and . . . of the sciences"[41] above and beyond a "habitual procedure" that is solidified in language there corresponds a fur-

36. *Logik,* I, 16; *Logic,* p. 37.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Logik* I, p. 9f; *Logic,* p. 31.
39. *Logik* I, p. 10; *Logic,* p. 32.
40. *Logik* II, p. 357; *Logic*, p. 708.
41. *Logik* I, p. 11; *Logic,* p. 32.

ther development of language brought about by the possibilities of self-transcendence inherent in its own grammar. This implies that when Hegel mentions language, he always has in mind a definite condition of language as it has developed in a living context (*Lebenspraxis*), not language in general. Hegel mentions the "speculative spirit" of a particular language, that is, of a language as it has developed and could develop in step with the advance of consciousness and as it corresponds to a definite state of the progression towards science. From the point of view of formal logic, it must be set down as a defect that "already in the dictionary" there should appear in a language "one word with opposed meanings."[42] But the consequence is that philosophy, which requires such words, "stands in no need of a special terminology." With the help of such words, it can demolish opinion and "habitual" understanding, and direct attention to the actual movement of the sentence. Indeed, philosophy has to "find" such words, which "seem *to approximate* to the determinations of the concept (*Begriff*)"[43] *within* the ordinary lexical material, as, so to speak, semantic weaknesses of a linguistic system whose usages have become thoughtlessly routine. With constructions of its own devising, it would not reach the level of "habitual," practiced linguistic behavior and could only play its own solitary language game. What is destined for "demolition" is, after all, not language, but a specific, narrowed down—or, we may say, one-dimensional—use of language and a corresponding view of it, against which only language itself can be brought to bear. A philosophical language as well, with a terminology that has settled into routine, could be overcome only through the "speculative spirit" of the language itself. In the statement that the category lies concealed throughout the entire extent of language, "category" *eo ipso* signifies such a speculative category as the point at which a pre-given state or condition of language is overcome.

How categories are to be comprehended concretely as categories of the development of knowledge—which, because of the constraints in which it is caught up, is not immediately possible and so must have "the conditions of its impossibility" brought to light—is shown at the beginning of Hegel's *Logic*. From the outset, Hegel is dealing here with propositions that have "philosophical content." When the "ordinary" or "habitual" understanding of the proposition engages in self-reflection, it also expresses itself on a philosophic level by identifying itself with a supposed "possibility" of an immediate determination of something that is "undetermined." However, this reflection, which makes up the core of the "philosophy of reflection" which Hegel attacked, is itself the object of reflection carried on by "speculation" that has the actual movement of the proposition in its linguistic context in view. The proposition in the *Logic* that "Being is the in-

42. *Logik* I, p. 10; *Logic*, p. 32.
43. *Logik* II, p. 357; *Logic*, p. 708.

determinate immediate''[44] is the expression of a philosophical opinion—so to speak, a ''metalinguistic'' statement; but it is not the opinion of Hegel. In this form, the proposition is not yet a scientific dictum, but rather the first opening step on the path to science; true statements in their immediacy are possible only at the unforseeable end of this path. Since the traditional category in which philosophical thought is caught up regards itself as purely determining, and not as itself in turn determined, it posits itself against all else that is indeterminate and immediately determinable, that is, against ''Being.'' Hegel is here making no scientific statement about an object, ''Being.'' He is doing no more than drawing a consequence from a prevailing view, one that is encountered in every ''fundamentalist'' approach. ''Being'' is determined as ''the indeterminate immediate'' ''without any further determination.'' This follows analytically. For this reason, it cannot possibly have a predicate. There is a vacancy where the predicate ought to be. It is, ''in fact *nothing*.''[45]

The objections which have been raised against this type of logic are well known, yet the distance between Hegel and his critics on this point is not terribly wide. Hegel does not, after all, regard a proposition which begins with ''Being'' as its subject to be a proposition that is ''meaningful'' in itself, if he is not able to attach to it any possible predicate. Here, too, the out of the ordinary ''philosophical'' content has its function in drawing attention to the true movement of a proposition. As regards its meaning, this content is for Hegel the outcome of a linguistic misunderstanding; but, contrary to what we find, say, in Wittgenstein, its function, and so its ''sense,'' is to remove a misunderstanding of this sort which is prevalent in the ''ordinary notion.'' Here it is not philosophy which brings about the misunderstanding; philosophy reflects on a misunderstanding caused by an objectifying view of language. The opinion that it is possible to begin with an indeterminate, pure ''Being,'' and so be able to carry out an immediate determination, is worthless. Nonetheless, philosophy has to begin with this opinion, which is not simply nothing, but is in fact pervasive, and the determinant of thinking. Its content reflects the *topoi* of the traditional language of philosophy, is relative to it, and is true in that thinking is unable *immediately* to renounce its dependence on such, and therewith its being enmeshed in this language, and unable immediately to bring forth ''the'' truth. Thus the proposition, ''pure being and pure nothing are the same,'' is therefore also to be understood as though it said that ''what the truth is'' is ''neither being nor nothing''; ''being does not pass over, but has passed over—into nothing, and nothingness into being.''[46] What follows reveals that the nature of such pronouncements is that of

44. *Logik* I, p. 66; *Logic,* p. 82.
45. *Logik* I, p. 66f.; *Logic,* p. 82.
46. *Logik* I, p. 67; *Logic,* p. 82f.

"philosophic contents," whose function it is to destroy the "procedure of opinion . . . about the habitual relation of subject and predicate,"[47] and to point to the "dialectical movement of the proposition itself" as that which is the "*actually* speculative."[48] "Their truth therefore is this *movement* of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: *becoming.*"[49] This movement is that of the proposition in the actual linguistic process, in which the notions of an independent subject and an independent predicate, linked together in the proposition in a merely external or formal manner, vanish each into the other. In this movement, the subject and predicate first *become* what they concretely signify.

"Becoming" stands opposed to the immediacy of "Being" and of knowledge as the "truth"; and it does so as a result of reflection on the "movement of the proposition." Since "the dialectical process likewise consists of parts or elements which are propositions,"[50] this result—which no longer understands a proposition to be immediate knowledge, but rather knowledge coming into being, a way-station leading towards the "education and training of consciousness itself to the level of science"—once again appears in the form of *one* proposition, and so again necessarily as a "philosophic content." However, this content, since it no longer is the immediate beginning, has itself "become," and thus points with greater clarity to the process or movement which has brought it about, that is, to the fact that it is not an expression of immediate knowledge, but of knowledge mediated by its history. To interpret it immediately as though it were a dogmatic pronouncement is no longer possible. The phrase "does not pass over, but has passed over," makes it plain that in the case of all these propositions which have a "philosophic content," we are not concerned with genuine contents of propositions, to which these propositions are meant to provide straightforward expression, so that the form of the proposition would be subordinate and withdraw behind the intended meaning of the content. On the contrary, they issue from reflection on the habitual conception of what constitutes a proposition, which is abstract, in distinction to the movement that actually occurs in speech. That these propositions are out of the ordinary points back to the actual proposition as a vanishing element in a linguistic process without boundaries.

In the same way, all the further "propositions" of the *Science of Logic* have always "already" passed over into ones that lie still further on, and the categories of this logic are to be understood accordingly. In contrast to the Kantian categories, their purpose is not to form individual judgments so that they can assert their immediate objective relevance; rather, they are

47. *Phänomenologie,* p. 52; *Phenomenology,* p. 122.
48. *Phänomenologie,* p. 53; *Phenomenology,* p. 123.
49. *Logik* I, p. 67; *Logic,* p. 83.
50. *Phänomenologie,* p. 53; *Phenomenology,* p. 123.

categories which at one and the same time reflect their own provisionality and identify the propositions formed by them as a sublated element which moves towards the working through of the conditions of the possibility of objective relevance. Taken as a whole, they are both forms of reflection on the process by which they become what they are, and on the traditional character of the conditions of their being or on the untruth of the judgment that asserts itself through them. From an absolute point of view, they have always already "passed over." They owe the manner of their appearance to the concentration on the particular proposition which is also necessary in the dialectical movement.

The category which follows "becoming" is "determinate being" (*Dasein*). "Determinate being" is understood as the sublation of the category of "becoming," as "being that has become." On account of the logical classification of this category, according to Hegel, it is well to bear in mind that "being," understood as an "indeterminate immediate," and so as what is to be immediately determined, cannot be the possible "subject" of a determination or of an actual proposition. It has always and already passed over into union with "nothing," with the negation of being as immediate being. To be the subject of a determination it must, essentially, be already determined. Determination is not that of something immediate, but rather a further determination on the basis of a previous determination. In truth, "being" was always already a pausing position within a process, that is, being that has become; knowing, in its quest for objectivity, must at the same time glance in a critical way at these, its own predeterminations with which thought cannot dispense.[51] The insight of Kant's *Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science* is from the outset incorporated into Hegel's concept of determinate being: the categories of "pure" reason cannot be employed immediately to determine "determinate being"; and if, as opposed to mathematical determination, "determinate being" is to be [further] determined, "detached (though in themselves empirical) concepts" must be employed, so that reason can begin with that which it "encounters" in them, that is, with predeterminations not to be deduced from reason itself.[52] The opening sections of Hegel's *Science of Logic* once again retrace this boundary line of "transcendental logic" and, from the beginning, incorporate awareness of the line into the concept of category. The categories of this logic are not categories of pure reason—which at best might consider itself "pure" with respect to the categories of mathematical judgments—but rather those of a kind of thinking which is dependent upon

51. In Hegelian logic, "objectivity" is *"an immediacy,* which has issued from the *sublation of the mediation,* a *being* which is no less identical with the mediation, and which is the concept which has restored itself out of, and in, its otherness." *Logik* II, p. 352; *Logic,* p. 704.

52. Cf. Kant, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft,* Akademieausgabe, Vol. IV, p. 472.

language, and which strives for objectivity in awareness of such a dependency. Therefore, it can be said to be aware in a positive sense of its own preliminary character, rather than to be certain that, at the end, its concept of objectivity will be realized.

The concept of the "preliminary character" of a judgment is constitutive for the possibility of judging the objects differently, that is, outside of the boundary of the judgment that has once been formed in a proposition. "The wavering of the firm ground . . . is shown here to belong expressly to the act of knowing."[53] With regard to knowing and to the philosophical concept of science, the problem is not only that of how judgments as such are possible. Into the concept of judgment, and of the category which forms the judgments, there needs to be incorporated the possibility at least "of making a single amplifying judgment,"[54] thereby annulling the judgment as the definitive determination of the object and reducing it to, or reinterpreting it as, a "moment" in a more comprehensive context.

From the standpoint of a dictionary, the categories in the "speculative proposition" are not different from those of the "habitual," the "ordinary" understanding of propositions. But whereas the speculative object in the "habitual" understanding of its function of forming propositions as a "form of judgment" is a faculty of judgment engaged in certifying its own possibility, in the "speculative proposition," category as category, in distinction to the understanding of category as a mere form of judgment, is the object of speculation. This distinction can be sensed already in Kant's definition of the categories as concepts "of an object in general, through which the intuition of an object is regarded as *determinate* with regard to one of the *logical functions* of judgment."[55] Save for mathematics, the intuition of an object presupposes empirically determined existence. In Hegel's understanding of the category, this presupposition is taken as the starting point. For example, according to the "habitual" notion, the category of "substance" forms a proposition through the categorial distinction between subject and predicate. According to Kant, the title to objectivity which this judgment claims is the reason why the logical form of judgment becomes a category which determines the object; besides this, the notion pronounced to be the subject is taken to be the "substance" that is the basis of the determination. However, in the actual movement of the proposition, the subject-concept is determined first in the concrete meaning which it has in this use through the predicate, just as the concept of the predicate is determined through the subject. As "what lies under," it is

53. B. Liebrucks, *Sprache und Bewußtsein,* Vol. 5, (Frankfurt/Main, 1970), p. 387.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 388.
55. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 128.

sublated through this movement; it forms the basis, being "identical" with the predicative determination.[56]

56. The designation of the "speculative proposition" as the "identical proposition" (*Phänomenologie,* p. 51; *Phenomenology,* p. 121) certainly has contributed to the view that Hegel is an *Identitätsphilosoph.* In rebuttal, E. Heintel observes that this "formulation" by Hegel can "without doubt" be traced back "to the ideas worked out in the writings of the Jena period," that is, to the historical controversy conducted particularly against Kant and Fichte, one which was carried on in the language of their philosophical systems. In his historical analysis, Heintel demonstrates how the "philosophical content" of any period (on the concept of the "philosophical content," see above pp. 25f., 31f.) including that of Hegel's philosophy, understood as the "phenomenological" mode of the appearance of knowledge, assumes a formulation which is necessarily relative to the philosophical situation of the time. Fichte took "A = A," the proposition of identity, to be the highest principle of knowledge. Against this Hegel writes: "Reflection is incapable of expressing the absolute synthesis in one proposition . . . what is unitary in the absolute identity it must disjoin, and express separately the synthesis and antithesis in two propositions, identity in the one, disjunction in the other." (*Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie,* Hamburg, 1962, p. 27; cf. E. Heintel, "Der Begriff des Menschen und der 'spekulative Satz,' " *Hegel-Studien,* Vol. I, p. 222). This cannot, of course, mean that an absolute truth might be imparted in two propositions rather than in one. The "philosophical content" bifurcates into proposition and counter-proposition, "if in fact this proposition is to be regarded by reason as an authentic proposition" (Hegel, *loc. cit.*); that is, if the proposition, in accord with the traditional philosophic view of language, is subsumed under the "habitual" formal understanding of a proposition in general, instead of being understood in its actual working, imbedded within a context. Clearly, this "philosophic" content, conveyed through the history of philosophy, is of its own accord trying to break through this conception of what a proposition is, and trying to refer to the "dialectical movement of the proposition itself." The formal scheme of "the identity of identity and non-identity," which Hegel here employs, reveals itself for its part as a historically conditioned expression of the epistemological position of his concept of the category and the proposition; this concept is that "mediation as identity which knows itself, only knows itself together with that which it is not." "As ἐπιστήμη κατ' ἐνέργειαν it is "the identity of identity and non-identity" (Heintel, loc. cit.) and thus also knowledge of non-knowledge; but the identity of two opposed propositions should not be a formula for a possible "absolute" knowledge following from this identity. "Non-identity" stands for the sublating movement opposed to the "habitual understanding of the proposition," a movement which brings back into the mediating process of a—in principle—boundariless context the proposition that would claim to be immediate knowledge and that, in its syntactic form, is said immediately to possess the function of constituting objectivity.

The form, then, which reflection takes on the relation of subject and predicate—that is to say, on the categorial form of judgment in its function as the category which determines "determinate being"—is the hypothetical judgment. We return to our previous example: it is not the case that an object designated "table" (*mit "Tisch" Gemeintes*) underlies the accidental determination "round." In the concrete determination of any given existing thing, this determination is not accidental. It is accidental only so long as the pure possibilities for connections within a semantic system are being studied. The given existing thing in the determinateness it already possesses constrains the act of determination, so that: *if* this round table is *there*, then this specific round table also is *there.* In reflecting on its categorial employment (that is, the employment which determines existence) within the context given by experience—which always implies a linguistic context in the sense of previous and possibly subsequent determinations—the categorial judgment does not pass over into the hypothetical one but *has* always already passed over into it. The *Science of Logic* does not (by availing itself of the tables of the forms of judgment) deduce categories; rather, it "watches" this movement.[57] The same holds true for the next step: if the hypothetical judgment is "regarded" as a category—that is, is actually employed in the determination of being—then it is not merely the case that when in accord with the rule "if A, then B," B is if A is; rather, A is already, if B is, and B, if A. For the object so determined, insofar as it is *determined and all the same time existent,* implies the togetherness ("reciprocity") of A and B. A is the cause, but it is the cause of B, and so it is not only determining but, in its being determined as cause, is determined also by the effect, B, and so on.[58] These examples of categories show that every specific category, as soon as it ceases anonymously to govern a routinized linguistic behavior and instead is given voice in its claim to objective validity and taken up into the reflecting consciousness, fails to correspond to the "simple" *notion* of category as the conjoining of thought and being—which, according to Kant, the category already should be.[59] The category, insofar as it is singular, negates its concept; in its immediate claim to bring forth knowledge, it immediately passes over into the form of reflection upon this claim. The multiplicity of categories is the outcome of a process of successive negations of the claim, each boasting immediately to realize the concept of category as an objectively valid form of judgment. Thus the claim made by each single category can be maintained only as the

57. Cf. the transition from the relation of substantiality to that of causality in *Logik* II, p. 188; *Logic,* p. 557.
58. *Logik* II, p. 202f.; *Logic,* p. 569f.
59. On the "simple" concept of category (in the "idealistic" sense criticized by Hegel) as a conjoining of the "I" (or thought) and being, supposed to be immediately possible, cf. *Phänomenologie,* pp. 178ff.; *Phenomenology,* pp. 273ff.

claim of a subjective, or perhaps an intersubjectively valid, form of relation *to* objectivity.

This concept of category may throw some light on the historical function of certain categories within the history of thought, for example, the concept of causality. At the beginning of the modern age, the causal relation, in contrast to the relation of substantiality, had come to be taken as the "truth," as soon as changed circumstances precluded the transmission of the latter as the "habitual procedure which takes place in knowledge." Since the beginning of this century, the scientific determination of natural objects has brought it, in its turn, to the status of a "sublated" element. However, the relevance of the Hegelian notion of category may lie less in such "phenomenological" examples as in the fact that we encounter here an attempt to write the logic of science not from the aspect of its institutionalized "procedure"—which of course belongs, and ought to belong, to science—but rather the logic of a science that is in flux, in which such distinctive procedural forms of knowledge are sublated. From the "resolve" of finite particularity "towards judgment," "objectivity" itself becomes one of the categories in this logic,[60] in which the act of judgment, passing beyond the judgment made at any one time, still has essentially to "realize" itself. Thus, judgment might attain a concept more adequate to its own reality, and therewith to the reality of the science associated with it—a concept of itself that is *severed* from speculation within a contingently attained state of knowledge.

60. *Logik* II, p. 354; *Logic,* p. 706.

SIDE-EFFECTS AS A MORAL PROBLEM*

Robert Spaemann

Translated by Frederick S. Gardiner

The one principle of disdaining the consequences of acts, and the other of judging acts by their consequences and making these the measure of what is supposedly right and good, are both equally abstract understanding.

Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts,* §118

We distinguish between acts and occurrences. The essential distinguishing feature of acts was already seen by Aristotle. He called it *prohairesis:* intent *(Vorhabe)*, anticipation *(Antizipation)*. This distinguishing feature is of course only accessible to acting beings. The awareness of it presupposes par-

*Translated from "Nebenwirkungen als moralisches Problem," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 82 (1975): 323–35.

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ticipation in the processes of interaction and communication. Anticipation is understood here in a twofold sense. First: Foresight concerning the necessary or possible consequences of my acts. Second: The selection of one of these consequences and the designation of it as the intent or end of the act. The selection of the end first makes acting possible.[1] Anticipation merely as the foreseeing of a boundless complexity of consequences would, on the contrary, render acting impossible. Foresight comprises more than the intent. It foresees more consequences than those intended, but it does not foresee all consequences. The complexity of consequences is therefore subject to a double selection. The one occurs through foresight and the other through intent. The selection through foresight is not a clear delimitation. Foresight becomes gradually indefinite the more extensive the consequences become or the more they are absorbed by enveloping structures and processes. Acting involves therefore 1) intended, 2) foreseen and accepted, 3) unforeseen consequences. Because of the unforeseen consequences human acts always have an aspect of an unintended occurrence in the complex of the world process, and it is of the nature of acting to know this. Intent and foresight on the one hand and foresight and the totality of consequences on the other are not coextensive. This difference is constitutive for human acting. Human history is the history of the continual solution of problems arising from the unintended consequences of solutions to past problems. The problem that we have before us, that of the side-effects of purposeful acting, is not new, but nowadays it has reached a new dimension. The long-term absorption of the consequences of human acts by the substructures that are acted upon and which we call nature, appears to be no longer succeeding. The side-effects of human activity have reached proportions that overtask the absorbing capacity of nature. Over against this incidental aspect of acting the purposeful "inner aspect" seems to dwindle more and more in significance. This is reflected by the advance of systems theory and the retreat of ethical theory. A long history of 'subjectivity' (*Subjektivität*) appears to be coming to an end. Oedipus, upon whom the responsibility falls for deeds he did not intend, seems to be more contemporary than Abelard or Kant, for both of whom intent forms the basis of the definition of acting.

But does the concept of responsibility then still have meaning? For what can the agent be responsible? The reply that still suggests itself most readily to us is this: the state of affairs the agent intends to bring about through his acting. This answer is modern. Oedipus stabbed out his eyes because he unwittingly married his mother. Lucretia killed herself because she had been violated. That is archaic, as is the blessing that Isaac gave Jacob disguised as Esau, and which then could not be taken away from Jacob. Roman law to the contrary, and aristotelian philosophy as well, knew the category of in-

1. Cf. Niklas Luhmann, *Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität: Über die Funktion von Zwecken in sozialen Systemen* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1968).

tent. For the Stoics it was the intent alone that decides the worth or worthlessness of the person. Christian writers such as Augustine went even further than the Stoics. Augustine reproached not only Lucretia but also those women who avoided rape at the hands of the barbarians by committing suicide. Purity is a matter of the heart and has nothing to do with what happens to us from without against our will.[2] In the twelfth century Abélard made it a fundamental tenet of moral theory that intent alone determines the morality of an act.[3] But what does intent mean? First of all it can mean the deliberate intention of an act, i.e., the subjective designation of that particular state of affairs in an overall future state of affairs which the agent singles out from other states of affairs and in relation to which he subordinates those others to means or side-effects. We call those things means that we also bring about intentionally, and which for their part are therefore themselves also ends, but only inasmuch as they are necessary for the attainment of that which is actually intended. Side-effects, on the contrary, are things that we do not actually intend at all, but whose simultaneous occasioning we accept, inasmuch as they are inextricably connected with the intended thing. If the intent alone established responsibility, then that would certainly entail responsibility for the means chosen for our ends, but not for the side-effects. However, this contradicts our everyday practice, in which we expect each other to abstain from reaching certain ends in view of their side-effects. In criminal law the concept of *"dolus indirectus"* designates the assumption of responsibility for unlawful side-effects of the pursuit of our aims. Do we intend such side-effects or do we not? One could say that we intend an overall situation of which the side-effects are a foreseen constituent, inasmuch as we have designated another constituent of the situation as the intent. This limited intent we also call 'accepting into the bargain' (*Inkaufnehmen*). There can be a deliberate decision behind this acceptance; it can also come about by overlooking the side-effects. What we call moral guilt is almost always such an oversight, the failure to attend to a certain side of our acting that, in order not to endanger our aim, we would rather consider as an occurrence which is not a part of the act at all.[4]

But let us first consider the acceptance that we deliberately decide upon. The question is whether the end of the act justifies accepting all possible sorts of side-effects. This question is related to, but not identical with, the more familiar one of whether the end justifies the means. Indeed, every means is itself the end of an act. Means must therefore be intended; it is not enough simply to accept them. A favorite example in moral casuistry is the

2. Augustine *De Civitate Dei* 1.16.
3. See Abelard *Ethica seu Scito teipsum* (Migue, PL 178).
4. See Karl Klee, *Der dolus indirectus als Grundform der vorsätzlichen Schuld,* Berliner juristische Beiträge zum Zivilrecht, Handelsrecht, no. 10 (Berlin: R. von Decker, 1906).

following: One can administer an injection to a terminally ill patient with the intent of shortening his life, and one can give someone a pain-killing injection that has the effect of shortening his life. Or, as another example, an air-raid with a military objective can affect civilian housing. This can also be the direct aim of a terrorist bombardment. In the latter case it is a question of ends and means, in the former it is a question of a side-effect, a so-called *actus duplicis effectus.*[5] The difference is quite obviously solely one of subjective intent. It would seem that only the subjective intent, and not the act as an external occurrence, permits the distinction between primary effects and side-effects.

But this conclusion is just the reason for the uneasiness of the moral feeling with this particular casuistic distinction. We feel that making the intent the measure of the morality of an act puts too much of a demand on the human capacity for rectitude. "*Diriger l'intention*" was the art, attributed to Cajetan, of those moral casuists in the seventeenth century whom Pascal's *Lettres à un provincial* exposed to ridicule. "You may do what you intend—so goes the rule—if you are successful in pursuing the right intent, i.e. in relegating the bad consequences of your acting to side-effects of an ethically irreproachable end." The doctrine of justification by good intentions alone is a school of disingenuousness, because that which is essentially a matter of subjective immediacy, the 'intention behind the act' (*Gesinnung*), is itself made an object of intention and becomes thereby an object of manipulation. The intention behind the act is namely that which underlies acting. Making the good intention the object of intentional acting is synonymous with disingenuousness.[6] In defense of the theory Peter Lombard made good the point that a good intention which is pursued with bad means is not a good intention at all, because the choice of means is an integral part of the intention itself. However this point is not valid in the same measure with respect to side-effects, which are just those that I do not necessarily bring about intentionally. The Jesuits defended themselves quite rightly against the reproach that they taught the justification of the means by the end. "*Diriger l'intention*" does however mean that the intention is supposed to relieve responsibility for the side-effects. The idea that the in-

5. However, the intending of means desired *solely* as means does on second thought admit of an interpretation as 'accepting into the bargain': we accept the necessity of wanting those means without which the end cannot be attained, as in the case of the individual who jettisons his belongings in a storm at sea in order to save the ship from sinking. See Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 110a8-9.

6. Cf. Max Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik,* 5th. ed., rev. (Berne and Munich: Franke, 1966), p. 48 ff; or Max Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values,* trans. by Manfried S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 26 ff.

tention behind the act can be made the object of an intentional act has to do with a theory of freedom according to which only acts of a conscious choice are free. We could therefore only be made accountable for our underlying intention if it is itself a freely "chosen" one. Hence follows the paradoxical conclusion that the intention behind *this*[i] choice is not at all free and to be accounted for, while conversely the "chosen intention" is just another expression for the pretended intention. The recourse to the intention as that which alone is in a position to justify an act seems therefore at least incapable of being made operational. The intention looks away from itself and has something else in view. This something cannot again be an intention. But this something seems to be what matters most. However, if the distinction between the end and the side-effect cannot otherwise be defined than by resorting to the intention, then the distinction seems to be irrelevant for ethics. It would appear that the agent must bear the responsibility for all the consequences of his acting so and not otherwise. That would mean that he would also bear the responsibility for everything that follows from his not having done A instead of B, i.e. responsibility would lie with the agent for everything that happened which he could have prevented. Now omitted assistance does indeed belong to the acts punishable by law. But if we expand the concept of omission to the extent that it refers to all alternative, not chosen possibilities of acting, as well as to all conditions of the world at large that have our deeds or omissions as the conditio sine qua non of their originating to start with, then such a responsibility would be suited to elicit Hamlet's outcry from even the strongest: "O cursèd spite, that ever I was born to set it right!". Directly confronted with all the general states of affairs that could be fostered by our acts or omissions, it seems that we are left with the sole consolation that in the long run the consequences of individual acts are absorbed in the course of what happens in any case. Medieval philosophy could at least console itself for its omissions with the thought that these omissions would leave the world as it would be without us anyway, so that we can always withdraw ourselves into inactivity at such times when there does not seem to be sufficient warrant that our acting would be meaningful. So Thomas Aquinas distinguished between the freedom to act in one way or another, the *libertas specificationis,* and the freedom to act or not to act, the *libertas exercitii.*[8] This distinction, however, presupposes a world view in which the world is the way it is, even if we do not involve ourselves with its course. Thomas was of course aware of the concept of omission as well. But the idea that every inaction is an action, i.e. that the *libertas exer-*

i. The italics are added for clarification with the approval of the author.

7. Peter Lombard *Libri IV Sententiarum* (Quaracchi, 1916), p. 522. Cf. D. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles,* vol. 4, *Problèmes de morale* (Gembloux, Belgium: J. Duculot, 1954), pt. 3, bk. 1, p. 310 ff.

8. E.g., Thomas Aquinas *Quaest. Disp. de Malo* 6.

citii is identical with the *libertas specificationis,* is a specifically modern one. The idea of an inescapable responsibility as known to the Greek city-state is given a universal applicability. In times of civil war the Athenians sentenced whomever did not choose sides to death for lack of involvement (*apragmosyne*). Pascal gave this idea a theological turn in his argument of the wager and declared thereby the state of emergency as antiquity knew it to be the normal state of affairs: Unbelief is not merely the indifferent opposite of belief but rather active opposition, i.e. disbelief. This was good Christian doctrine. The formulation in the New Testament is, "He who is not with me is against me." The dialectical notion that even inaction is action, that every *libertas exercitii* is at the same time a *libertas specificationis,* comes from theology. The pronouncement of this assertion means of course the formulation of a godly claim, i.e. the pretention to an absolute frame of reference for human acting, which defines all conduct *essentially,* that is to say in such a way that consequences, since they concern this reference, may never figure as side-effects. One must make it clear to oneself what it means to assert this from a finite standpoint: it means heteronomy, and, where this is not submitted to, war. Time and again there are negative elements in the total constitution of the world that make it possible to qualify every activity as an omission that is not directed at their removal. Whoever paints a picture, reads the correction of an edition of Haydn's quartets, or takes part in a panel discussion of Scots-Irish monks in Salzburg, would then be doing something unallowed. He would have a share in the guilt for all the evils of the world, because he did nothing during this time to eliminate them. The thesis behind this is the exact opposite of that defining acting on the basis of subjective intention, the assertion namely that oversight is never allowed; full responsibility rests with the agent for all forseeable consequences of his acting or not acting. The agent has to answer for the total situation that he either helped bring about or did not prevent. On this view acting is not primarily defined by the intent of the agent. Acts have rather an objective nature over against which the subjective intent is incidental. The adequate appraisal of the objective meaning of the act is required of the agent.

We have to make it clear to ourselves what this view means. It is as little defensible as the first. It would make acting impossible altogether, since the selective function of the subjective intent is that which, by relieving the agent of the responsibility for the equal consideration of all consequences of his actions, makes acting possible. The contrary thesis presupposes the idea of a dynamic world, a world process in which we are all involved, and for whose course each one of us bears responsibility through his acts and omissions. This notion was foreign to the older philosophy. From its inception Greek philosophy assumed that the cosmos exists apart from us and has a stability independent of us. Cosmos means order, normality. Exceptions are definable as such. This is not the case where the world is thought of as a

[process][ii] in which each stage is unique. Here there is, strictly speaking, no normal state. Christian theology views history as such a unique process, which even includes the cosmos. However, the sole instance responsible for this process—the sole universally responsible instance—is God. As far as man is concerned there is indeed a normal situation. Human action can never interfere with the [process] to such an extent that every disturbance could not be reintegrated as a welcome addition to the soteriological plan. Therefore for medieval theology as well human action received its meaning and regulation not from a responsibility for the total process but rather from rules specific to the social roles, rules which could at most be interpreted in a rule-utilitarian manner. God is like the Elector in the German Empire who disapproved of the Prince of Homberg breaking the rules even when this helped him win a battle. It is God who keeps the universe on its course in the long run and man can help him only indirectly.

However, the detachment of the idea of a unified, directed world process from its theological presuppositions leads to the idea of a total responsibility that makes responsible acting impossible. The morality of total responsibility is just as deadly an abstraction as the morality of pure intentions. If we may not overlook the countless alternative possibilities and the innumerable possible aspects of our acting which are independent both of the subjective aim and of a normative framework in which the act takes place, then we cannot act at all. Responsible acting always presupposes a well-defined, i.e. finite responsibility. After a certain point, theerfore, responsibility ceases. This is an acute problem nowadays. In the mass media we are confronted with an extent of human misery that for the most part we cannot influence. The churches and other moral institutions nevertheless lay this suffering on our conscience daily as an instance for demonstrating love of our neighbor, which, literally speaking, certainly does not mean those farthest away. They can rightly point out that today proximity and distance have become relative. They can also point out the increasing interdependence of world affairs. But does that mean that everyone has to orient his comings and goings, his consumption and work, viz. the use of his working hours, with respect to the consequences of a social-utilitarian viewpoint extending to the whole human race? Bringing such a demand to bear must lead to the emptying of the very idea of personal responsibility. At this point the sayings, "we are all sinners" and "we are all going to heaven," come to mean all too nearly the same thing. The idea of the total responsibility of the agent for all the consequences that in any manner, even in the long run, result from his acts and omissions, viz. even the non-occurrence of all those events that could have occurred had he acted otherwise, can as little do justice to the phenomenon of the moral responsibility of the agent

ii. In the two instances indicated by the brackets, the word "process" ("*Prozeß*") in the English text is a correction of the printing of "*Progress*" for "*Prozeß*" in the German text.

as can the reduction of responsibility solely to the subjective intention of the agent.

It follows from the above considerations that a theory of acting that exposes the individual agent directly to the totality of natural and historical occurrences is an abstraction. This abstraction, in contrast to the moral that is actually lived, is admittedly widely characteristic of the average moral reflection. It shows itself to be particularly unrealistic with respect to the concept of omission. At this point it is worthwhile to recall the results of the subtle discussions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries concerning the *actus duplicis effectus.* These results represent a further development of Aquinas's theory of the *voluntarium indirectum.*[9] Thomas had written that the agent is responsible for the consequences of an omission only "when he can and should act" (*cum potest et debet agere*).[10] It is thereby presupposed that obligation is not simply a function of the abstract evaluation of the merits or demerits of the general states of affairs that result from an act, but rather an independent constant that restricts the responsibility to evaluate such states of affairs. In the sixteenth century the Spanish theologian Medina interpreted this obligation to mean that it is derived from the specified role of the individual in a society based on such specification. The examples speak for themselves: the arms merchant is not responsible for the use made of the weapons by the purchaser; the butcher is not answerable for the sacrilegious use of meat by the jewish customer; the medical student cannot be held to account for sexual stimulation in the course of obligatory involvement with the respective subject matter.[11] Applied to a modern case, physicists or biologists would not be answerable for the use made of their discoveries. Behind this "subjectivistic" thesis is the idea of a pre-established harmony of the social system in which the intentions specific to the roles are rooted. The tacit assumption is that if everyone sticks to his role then things cannot go wrong on the whole. Or, as Goethe put it, "Just do the right thing in matters concerning yourself and everything else will take care of itself." The idea of an involvement in a responsibility for th entire universe, which destroys the very idea of responsibility, is held at bay in principle. Gabriel Vasquez maintained to the contrary a moral objectivism, an "ethic of responsibility" according to which every intrinsically bad (*in-*

9. Cf. among others: G.H. Kramer, *The Indirect Voluntary and Voluntarium in Causa* (Washington, 1964); J. Mangan, "An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect," *Theological Studies* (1949), pp. 41-61; W. Conway, "The Act of Two Effects," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 18 (1951): 125-137; J. Ghoos, "L'Acte á double effect," *Theol. Lovaniensis* 27 (1951): 30-52.
10. Thomas Aquinas *Summa Theologica* 1.2.6, art. 3.
11. B. Medina *Expositio in Primam Secundae Angelicii Doctoris* (Salamanca, 1578), 9.74, art. 6. Cited by Ghoos. See note 9 above.

trinsecus malus) effect, even an indirect one, must be avoided.[12] His maintenance of this position is not consistent, however; he finds, for example, that the ingestion of medication with the side-effect of abortion is permissible. Vasquez was in turn criticized by Johannes a Sancto Thoma. Johannes a Sancto Thoma sets forth three criteria for the moral justification of the accepting of a side-effect that would not be justified as something directly intended:[13] 1. The adverse consequence must genuinely be "*praeter intentionem,*" i.e. a side-effect. (This raises the problem of rectitude). 2. The adverse consequence must not be a primary effect of the goal that is sought after, but only an accidental consequence. This requires elucidation. It presupposes the existence of some sort of specific nature of an act, which does not necessarily have to be identical with the intention of the agent. The idea behind this is the aristotelian assumption that there are essential and accidental causal relations. This distinction depends on a teleological interpretation of causality; specific causes have the tendency to bring about specific effects. Fire, for example, has the tendency to bring about warmth and light. If fire startles someone to the extent of bringing on a heart attack, that is an accidental effect. This understanding of causality is anthropomorphic. It projects an intentional model of primary and side-effects on inorganic nature. Johannes a Sancto Thoma clearly says that the subjective intent of the agent does not alone decide the issue of the moral justification of adverse side-effects. What is shunted aside as a mere side-effect must also have the objective character of a mere side-efffect. This point is the most difficult and will have to be dealt with again below. But first it is necessary to mention the third criterion: the requirement of proportionality. This criterion requires that the side-effects be taken into consideration above and beyond the extent demanded by the first two imperatives. If they do not stand in any reasonable proportion to the intended end, then the acceptance of them cannot be justified. Side-effects, even if they are subjectively and objectively merely such, do not stand outside the sphere of moral responsibility. Here Johannes a Sancto Thoma introduces the concept of the "virtual will," with which he designates what we call 'accepting into the bargain.' And, in contrast to the purely legalistic thinking of the casuists, Johannes a Sancto Thoma brings in the concept of love as well. For instance love requires that overabundance be given to the poor. If I squander it on luxury, then the death of a destitute person, albeit an unintended side-effect, is nevertheless my guilt.

Does not, we must ask, the concept of love reintroduce the demand,

12. Gabriel Vasquez *Commentaria et Disputationes in Primam Secundae Partem* (Antwerp: D. Thomae, 1621), disp. 73. Quoted by Ghoos. See note 9 above.
13. Johannes a Sancto Thoma *De Bonitate et Malitia Actuum Humanorum* (Paris, 1885).

undermining all particular responsibility, that we compare states of the world at large with one another? And is not thereby the previously established distinction between primary and side-effects again made illusory? So it would seem. But Johannes a Sancto Thoma avoids the idea of such an abstract responsibility for the whole by interpreting the demand of love with tacit recourse to certain conventional rules. The concept of overabundance is not determined simply as that which exceeds the biological survival minimum. It is rather always understood in the scholastic literature as that which exceeds the requirements necessary for leading a life appropriate to one's social station. In a 'fixed class society' (*ständische Gesellschaft*) there is a standard that cannot be moved up and down at will. As far as the demand of the right proportion is concerned, it includes on the one hand the imperative against occasioning more disadvantages than the end requires—an imperative such as that which the prohibition of excess in self-defense expresses. It can on the other hand also mean that an act aiming at the attainment of a particular end has to be abstained from entirely if the side-effects are disproportionate. Are there any criteria for this? The writers of the period are vague on this question. They presuppose a certain concensus based on natural law concerning the hierarchy of values. What matters here is not the concensus of everyone; in good aristotelian fashion the opinion of wise and temperate men is referred to, for instance by Sanchez, a predecessor of Johannes a Sancto Thoma.[14] The assumption behind this, which was still shared by Descartes, is that a general consensus about those competent to make ethical judgments is easier to reach than a consensus about any single ethical judgment itself. However, the concept of responsibility is made precise above all with reference to the biblical concept of the "neighbor" (*des "Nächsten"*). Here as well the agent is in any case not burdened with the necessity of a direct decision between different global states of affairs.

The problem of side-effects is raised even more acutely by omissions than by acts. It is not possible to define omissions at all without reference to a *debitum,* i.e. a limited sphere of obligatory responsibility. For the possible consequences of all acts possible at a given time are incalculable. The reduction of this complexity by institutions in the broadest sense is therefore the condition for any sort of responsible acting at all. Customs and laws have on the one hand the function of prescribing a specific area within which the agents are obliged to answer not only for the side-effects of acts, but for the side-effects of not acting, viz. of omissions, as well. But on the other hand it is the function of the same institutions to relieve the agents of the responsibility for the unforeseeable complexity of the side-effects of their acts by assuming this responsibility themselves. He who takes refuge in capital goods during periods of inflation promotes thereby indirectly the infla-

14. T. Sanchez *Opus Morale in Praecepta Decalogi* (Antwerp, 1624), bks. 1, 12.

tionary tendency. But it is hardly reasonable to expect the individual to abstain from this avenue of escape if no one can guarantee that others will do so as well. It is therefore a matter for the state to take appropriate measures with respect to the economic trends. The alternative of mobilizing ethical residues such as frugality or generosity from case to case—depending on the market outlook—has rather the effect of wearing down the ethical sense. It is a legislative matter to determine the extent to which a company has to make reimbursements for the environmental damage it causes. It would be cynical to appeal to individual morality in the absence of such laws. Institutions in general can be defined as arrangements for the neutralization of the complex side-effects of our doings, and therefore as arrangements for rendering acting possible in the first place. In a period of industrial development such as ours, in which the side-effects of production endanger the very conditions of life, addressing the issue of ecological side-effects becomes a central task of political institutions. The distinction between primary and side-effects, viz. between essential and accidental effects, can first be objectively stabilized on the basis of an institutional directive. This distinction is a prerequisite for acting, and can neither be reduced to the subjective intent of the agent nor be derived from a teleological theory of nature such as Aristotle's.

In his *Philosophy of Right,* Hegel contrasted the "universal quality of the act" with its subjective character, defined by the abstraction of the intention, and designated this universal quality as the societal nature of the act.[15] The knowledge of this universal nature must be required of a rational subject. Driving under the influence of alcohol is punishable by law even though intoxication is not prohibited, and even though an intoxicated individual who gets behind the wheel is no longer responsible. The essence of rationality consists in being able to answer for an act in its concrete totality, which cannot be fragmented arbitrarily into atomic elements. According to Hegel the characteristic greatness and worth of the heroic self-understanding of antiquity was its full assumption of responsibility for all the consequences of acting. For acting meant exposing oneself to the law of finitude and chance. The modern world, however, is for Hegel not tragic but Christian. It knows the difference between intent and intention. The intention directs itself to the "universal nature" of the single act, to which belong the "necessary consequences connected with every act, even if I only bring about a single, immediate thing."[16] This universal nature does not materialize behind the backs of the acting subjects, but is rather known by them. According to Hegel it is a matter for institutions to sublate the accidental character of unintended side-effects. "The right that holds sway in concrete circumstances includes the sublation of incidental aspects with

15. G.W.F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts,* pars. 115-128.
16. *Ibid.,* par. 118, n.

respect to the one end or the other."[17] For instance the creation of poverty is for Hegel a side-effect of the overall free competition for wealth in the bourgeois society that the institution of the corporation is supposed to neutralize. The precise meaning of Hegel's designation of the state as the actualization of freedom is that nothing happens behind its back. It does what it wills, i.e. it does nothing inadvertently. And when adverse consequences result from its action, then it is the task of the state to redress them. The state acts with clear vision. The state and only the state never has the right of overlooking what it accepts. It must strive for the greatest possible completeness of information concerning the consequences of its measures. The differences between intent, intention, act, primary and side-effect are for the state matters of indifference. The state is almost never the intended end of the activities of its citizens, but rather the side-effect. For the state it is possible to say, "Whoever is not against us is for us," since all acts that are carried out within a given normative framework reproduce the validity of that framework. There is a concrete instance in which the individual can negate this validity. In the place of other ends he can intend the negation of what is otherwise a latent function of his private acts: the reproduction of an institution. The denunciation of purely private affairs as "privatism," making an issue of the latent function of "system-stabilizing," only then has a point when the suspension of this function and the negation of the institution is intended. For no one can assume responsibility for the institutional framework which he necessarily reproduces by acting within it. The relief from the responsibility for the whole is just precisely the meaning of the institution. It first creates the situation of normality which makes it possible to de-emphasize side-effects and define omissions as such. The coercive power of the institution, however, has the meaning of bringing such disadvantageous consequences to bear on the individual for revolt against the normal state of affairs that they are not balanced out by the attainment of the end of the act. That is to say, it compels attention for its part to consequences for the individual. Times of crisis are those in which the idea of normality has lost its self-evidence (*Selbstverständlichkeit*), times in which it is debatable who establishes the distinction between primary and side-effects and who defines omissions.

Now it is certainly not the case that state actions do not bring about unintended side-effects as well. The knowledge and power of the state is finite. In his early essay on natural law Hegel based an argument against the idea of a world state on just that fact. Every state is finite, and, as a result, partially blind, its claim to absoluteness notwithstanding. By opposing this fate as something external, for instance by recognizing and acknowledging the potential enemy only as external, the state frees itself internally from its own finitude. It can meet its downfall only from without and by risking it in

17. *Ibid.*

battle with full consciousness and freedom. The world state, however, would on Hegel's thesis incorporate the moment of destined finitude as deadly poison.

Marxism brushed aside this misgiving. It understands the revolutionary movement as the direct executor of the meaning of world history. This movement is not hindered by the moment of finitude. Even defeats are only stages on the way to victory. The subject of the movement, the producing class, is, in contrast to a particular state, incapable of being destroyed. There are therefore in the final analysis no side-effects and no fate for the party equipped with the science of history. It is all-seeing. "The party has a thousand eyes." But this vision is excessive. The faith upon which it is based is at the very latest untenable at the moment when two competing groups appear as the executors of this historical meaning. The result of their competition is not forseeable for either one of them. The process of this competition is therefore 'in a certain sense bereft of intentionality' (*naturwüchsig*); it has no one subject, but rather results from the strategic action of two subjects, thereby revealing itself as accidental over against the intentions of the protagonists. But, above all, according to marxist theory, the goal of the historical process is supposedly the elevation of the human race to a unified subject of the progressive domination over nature. Nature appears on this view merely as the object of control. Not the cosmos but praxis is Marx's term for the encompassing system of reality. In the dialectical materialism of Engels, praxis is indeed understood as itself an occurrence of the history of nature, but of a natural history that culminates and becomes transparent to itself in man's control over nature. All the advanced industrial countries are by contrast becoming aware lately of the fact that their collective exploitation of nature is reaching externally imposed limits. The side-effects of this process are not such that they can be compensated for indefinitely simply with new and deeper inroads. And there is no collective goal of mankind that would justify the acceptance of all side-effects. For nature's capacity for the neutralization and absorption of these side-effects is as limited as nature itself. This insight can lead to a new view of what morality means: There is no goal in view of which we could give a functional interpretation to the elementary rules of morality, i.e. in view of which we might subordinate all other effects to side-effects. It is not only "mankind"—in the person of every single individual—that may not be treated merely as a means but must rather also be treated as an end: *there is absolutely nothing that we could or may afford to treat merely as a means.*

On the one hand we cannot possibly take all side-effects into considera-

18. This would amount to formulating H. E. Hengstenberg's fundamental ethical principle of 'realism' ("*Sachlichkeit*") as a categorial imperative. See Hans-Eduard Hengstenberg, *Grundlegung der Ethik* (Stuttgart and Berlin: W. Kohlhammer, 1969).

tion, but in view of the threats to mankind it would on the other hand be irresponsible to shrink back only from those side-effects which are known and proven. The modern rule of probability with respect to the burden of proof, "*in dubio pro libertate,*" presupposes a cosmos that cannot be disrupted by human action. But the reversal of this rule would make impossible a life worthy of human beings. If we wanted to formulate a fundamental ethical rule in view of this situation, it would have to rest on the insight that the optimum of anything is never the maximum. And then it would indeed have to be that most ancient rule of Greek ethics: "Nothing in excess."

OBJECTIVITY THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVE PROCEDURES:*

Kant's Doctrine of the Schematism and the Foundations of Mathematics, Communication and Information Processing Machines[i]

Klaus Mainzer

Translated by Louis Agosta

Posing the problem: Kant's Copernican turn hinges on his doctrine of the Schematism. There, self-subsisting facts are no more the mere correlates of formal judgments of logic. Self-subsisting entities are no longer correlates of concepts. The epistemological subject sketches procedures of construction which originally constitute objects in space and time; then these procedures discursively prepare the forms of judgment of logic in order, finally, to realize in space and time the validity conditions of judgments about objects. This interplay of constitution in intuition, discursive understanding, and realization through the Schematism describes, according to Kant, the posture of the modern epistemological subject towards its object of knowledge: the interplay furnishes an objectivity through constructive procedures (1.).

* Klaus Mainzer's essay explores the shared Kantian heritage of Brouwer's intuitionism, Lorenzen's operative calculi, and the later Wittgenstein's approach to the communication of information. The basis of mathematical objectivity is shifted from a system of axioms, allegedly free of contradiction but themselves ungrounded, to elementary instrumental activities such as counting, entering strokes, and interpreting notation. Expanding on Kant's argument about the mediating function of the schemata, the essay's application of procedural strategies in a dialogue about arithmetical assertions (reminiscent of Wittgenstein's builders) establishes the continuity between mathematical formalism and everyday life. This leads to the practical application of constructive logic in processing data in information theory. The author explains: "At the basis of this work are theses which I expounded at the Fourth International Kant-Congress in 1974, in the section chaired by S. Körner ("Objectivity and Knowledge"). The first printing appeared in the *Kant-Studien* (Volume 66, number 4, 1975, pp. 446-447), whose editors (G. Funke and J. Kopper) and publisher (Walter de Gruyter: Berlin-New York) the author wishes to thank for their kind permission for translation and for printing in *CGP*. Some footnotes are supplemented in the translation."

i. Subtitle by the author for the English translation.

In what follows, I shall show how Kant's transformation of objectivity is realized in the context of inquiry into the foundations of mathematics. The constitution of mathematical objects in intuition occurs through constitutive procedures as exemplified by Brouwer's constructions in intuition, or by Lorenzen's operative formal systems (*den operativen Kalkülen*) (2.1). Discursive understanding is displayed in procedures for building up formal languages of logic and their rules of derivation (2.2). Interpretations of models provide the realization of validity conditions[ii] of formal propositions in relation to previously constituted objects for classical logic, dialogical strategies, and Turing-programs for constructive logic (2.3).

Thus we are referred to ways of mastering communication that characterize our contemporary technological civilization: objectivity attained through mechanical realization, and objectivity attained through rational argumentation (3).

1. The Condition of the Possibility of Constructive Procedures

The chapter on the schematism of the *Critique of Pure Reason*[iii] is not a doctrine of *those* constructive procedures. Rather, it describes the universal conditions which procedures must follow if they want to provide objective knowledge. Stated in a Kantian way, the Schematism is the doctrine of the conditions of possibility of constructive procedures. For this reason, the chapter on the schematism is a treatise encompassing "the *philosophy* of mathematics or natural science." Section Two of our investigation will deal with the definitions of individual constructive procedures in *inquiry into the foundations of mathematics.* The distinction between mathematics and philosophy will then also be discovered to lie here. If care is not exercised here, philosophy becomes a "hand-maiden of mathematics"—a danger to which mathematicians who were also philosophers were especially susceptible.[1]

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1. As regards the controversy between the intuitionists and formalists about the foundations of mathematics, O. Becker has already detailed the role of the Kantian and Leibnizian philosophies: Cp. *"Mathematische Existenz"* in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* (Halle on S., 1927), p. 748f. Building on the pertinent investigations of F. Kaulbach and F. Kambartel, I have tested this thesis in my dissertation *Mathematischer Konstruktivismus* (Münster 73) in the context of contemporary orientations in the theory of foundations. <As regards the position of philosophy in the history of mathematics, also compare K. Mainzer: "Wie ist das Wachstum apriorischer Wissenschaft möglich," in *Logik-Ethik-Theorie der Geisteswissenschaften,* XIth German Congress of Philosophy in Göttingen, 1975, eds. G. Patzig, E. Scheibe, W. Wieland (Hamburg, 1977).>

ii. . . . *Geltungsansprüchen* . . . *Maschinenprogramme* . . .

iii Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968). References will be cited in the text according to the Akadamie (B) pagination.

1.1 Constitution in Intuition

Every mode of knowledge, insofar as it is related to objects, is combined with intuition. In addition to the 'matter' of knowledge, which is represented as an 'appearance' corresponding to sensation, we also have to consider the capacity "by which the manifold of appearances can be ordered in certain relations" (B 34): the *form* of appearance. Seeing that a representation of the form of intuition is free from empirical data, Kant calls it 'pure' (*a priori*). Consequently, he characterizes the pure form of sensibility as a pure intuition which organizes the objects of knowledge as appearances in a succession in time and a juxtaposition in space. Objects are thus constituted as appearances in the intuition of space and time. *Pure intuition* makes possible an investigation of the constitutive forms 'space' and 'time.' A pure intuition arises, for instance, when, as in Kant's well-known example, we abstract from the five points set alongside one another: ". . . . . ", which are supposed to be an image of the number five (B 179), and only their "pure substratum" (Brouwer) is left over in a succession in time.

This characterization amounts to an affront against the entire history of science, down to Newton. Space is conceived in classical physics as a system of relations which adheres to things—thus as an abstract conceptual network that can be extracted (cp. Lat.: *ab(s)-trahere*) from external experience for the purpose of analysis. The epistemologically constitutive character of space is not glimpsed. Thus Leibniz writes in a letter to the French mathematician Varignon (*Phil. Bibl.* Vol. 108, pp. 74-78): " . . . Just as I believe that a continuity predominates in the arrangement of temporal succession, so likewise does it predominate in the arrangement of the simultaneous. Thanks to this order the universe is completely filled, and empty spaces are expelled into the realm of the imaginary . . . " In the "Notes to the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection," Kant criticizes this "intellectual" system of the world inasmuch as Leibniz merely compared all objects with the understanding and with its separated, formal concepts of thought, without heeding the necessity for sensible intuition. In his delineation of tradition, Kant traces certain biases: Leibniz 'intellectualized' appearances, Locke's 'sensualized' concepts. This already becomes clear in the above passage on the problem of space and time: Leibniz remains a formal logician, who—as we will say in section 2.31—defines a formal structure of the world, and then generalizes this structure in his monadology with the means provided by classical metaphysics.[2] Stated in a Kantian idiom, the forms of sensibility, space and time, are thus characterized merely conceptually, without comprehending the status of these forms of intuition in constituting knowledge.

1.2 Discursive Understanding

In addition to the capacity for receiving representations (receptivity of intuition), Kant distinguishes the power of producing representations oneself. The understanding carries out this spontaneous aspect of knowledge; it produces formal concepts; and it determines in intuition the empty forms of judgment [forms of assertion (*Aussageformen*)] about objects or states of affairs. Whereas all intuitions thus rest on affections (impressions), the understanding operates discursively according to definite logical functions.

Correspondingly, the science which has to investigate the formal functions of the understanding is, according to Kant, *formal logic.* In describing the logical functions, Kant is guided only by the inherited tradition; and he selects the Aristotelian organon with its figures, procedures and moods as the model of a formal (in Kant, usually, 'universal') logic.[3] Concepts which arise through abstraction are interpreted by Kant as predicates of possible judgments. Stated in a modern terminology, a judgment (assertion) "S is p" then arises through the substitution of an object S for a variable x in a judgment form (assertion form)"x is p" with a predicate (concept) p, which was formed by abstraction from various individual representations united under one 'common' representation. Accordingly, Kant selects the example "x is a body" and substitutes "metal" for "x" (B 94).

In the section "The Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgments," Kant's system of formal logic is presented as follows (in the following, S is a subject, p a predicate, $\bar{p}$ the complementary predicate of p; A, B, . . . are metavariables for judgments):

1. Quantity of Judgments
1.1 Universal J (generalis): for all x: x is p
1.2 Particular J (particularis): for some x: x is p
1.3 Singular J (singularis): S is p
2. Quality
2.1 Affirmative J
2.11 generalis 1.1

2. *"Having no such transcendental topic, and being therefore deceived by the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection, the celebrated Leibniz erected an intellectual system of the world,* or rather believed that he could obtain knowledge of the inner nature of things by comparing all objects merely with the understanding and with the separated formal concepts of its thought" (B 326). <On this point, also see K. Mainzer: "Geometry and Intuition of Space" (German and English), in *Akten des Leonard-Nelson-Sympsions in Göttingen 1977*, ed. G. Henry-Hermann (Hamburg, 1978).>

3. Cp. also G. Tonnelli, "Die Voraussetzungen zur Kantischen Urteilstafel in der Logik des 18. Jahrhunderts," in *Kritik und Metaphysik*, eds. F. Kaulbach, J. Ritter (Berlin, 1966).

2.12 particularis 1.2
2.13 singularis 1.3
2.2 Negative J
2.21 generalis: for all x: x is not p
2.22 particularis: for some x: x is not p
2.23 singularis: S is not p
2.3 Infinite J
2.31 generalis: for all x: x is $\bar{p}$
2.32 particularis: for some x: x is $\bar{p}$
2.33 singularis: S is $\bar{p}$
3. Relation
3.1 Categorical J: 1., 2.
3.2 Hypothetical J: if A, then B
3.3 Disjunctive J: either A or B
4. Modality
4.1 Problematic J
4.2 Assertoric J
4.3 Apodeictic J

From the standpoint of formal logic, the following comments are relevant to this system:[4]

To (1): Singular judgments can be replaced by universal and particular ones. For example: Kant is a philosopher if and only if there is a person such that Kant is a person, and the person is a philosopher; and, for all persons: if Kant is a person, then the person is a philosopher.

To (2): From the formal standpoint an arbitrary choice is under consideration here primarily inasmuch as a concept from the theory of classes (the complementary class $\bar{p}$) is admitted into a system of logic.

To (3): Here parts of predicate logic (categorical judgments) and parts of propositional logic (implication and disjunction) are conjoined. This selection is not motivated from the formal standpoint.

To (4): Here the traditional conception of modal logic is assembled.

In reply to these formal objections, one should note that Kant's presentation aims at transcendental logic, that is, a logic that also reflects possible contents of knowledge. Thus the over-determination of Judgments of Quantity and the 'arbitrary' compilation that occurs under Judgments of Relation receive their motivation from transcendental logic.

The position of 'infinite' judgments next to affirmative and negative ones appears surprising and novel. This distinction is considered by Kant to be ir-

4. A critique from the standpoint of formal logic is also to be found in H. Scholz, "Einführung in die Kantische Philosophie," in *Mathesis Universalis—Abhandlung zur Philosophie als strenger Wissenschaft,* eds. H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, J. Ritter (Basel/Stuttgart, 1961).

relevant in a formal system of logic. Nevertheless, the distinction becomes essential in his conception of transcendental logic, which is supposed to allow for the possibility of its application in space and time: "But transcendental logic also considers what may be the worth or content of a logical affirmation that is thus made by means of a merely negative predicate, and what is thereby achieved in the way of addition to our total knowledge" (B 97). In conjunction with a constructive logic, Kant's statements about infinite judgments appear in a new light.[5]

1.3 Realization Through the Schematism[6]

The 'faculty of imagination' accomplishes the unification (synthesis) of the forms of judgment of understanding and appearances in intuition: "This mediating representation must be pure, that is, void of all empirical content, and yet at the same time, while it must in one respect be intellectual, it must in another be sensible. Such a representation is the transcendental schema" (B 177). The *schemata* are procedures of the imagination under which the pure (formal) concepts of the understanding obtain their relation to objects, and consequently their significance and reality (B 185). Accordingly, an image in intuition (and thus in reality) is obtained for the concept of natural number by a successive (synthetic) procedure of writing numerical ciphers (/, //, ///, . . .) alongside one another. Likewise, an image in intuition (and so in reality) is obtained for a concept of geometry (such as a pyramid) through a constructive procedure with a compass and a straight edge. Finally, an image in intuition is provided for the concept of time through a constructive procedure involving a measuring instrument (like a mechanical clock). The images of these schemata of quantity are called 'extensive' magnitudes in Kant.[7]

Conversely, a material sensation (such as the heaviness of a specific body) is brought to a universal concept (such as that of physical weight) through a constructive procedure involving a measuring apparatus (like a scale). Fur-

5. Cp. my dissertation, p. 26f. This justification of infinite judgments concerns above all the decisive aspect of the infinite domain of validity. Since both H. Lenk, in his *Kritik der logischen Konstanten* (Berlin, 1968), and also H. Scholz, in the above-cited investigation, exclude this aspect, infinite judgments consequently appear in them either as "linguistic-grammatical" (Lenk) or "set-theoretic" (Scholz) overdeterminations of the system.

6. In "Kants transzendentale Theorie der Beschreibung" [in *Der Methoden-und Theorienpluralismus in den Wissenschaften,* ed. A. Diemer (Meisenheim on the Glan, 1971), p. 27-39] Kaulbach points to the central role of the concept of the schematism: "Kant's principle program is gathered together in the concept of the schema, in consequence of which a concept can win meaning and significance in science only as a dynamic operative principle of the process of construction."

ther properties (qualities) of empirically reconstructed magnitudes are exemplified by color, heat, and taste. The material stimulus (the wavelength of a color, the stimulation of the nerves, and so on) is always merely empirical and cannot be represented *a priori.* However, as we, for example, form the concept of weight or of temperature following a procedure for measuring physical qualities, we continually reconstruct an intensive magnitude which, according to Kant, then becomes intuitively representable (such as in the shape of a temperature curve on a graph). Kant obviously has in mind the image of continuous functions of the mathematical continuum, which are "dense" at all points without "gaps," in his description of sensations (heat, pressure, and so on) that continually become weaker and stronger. Subsequently Cohen undertook a thorough investigation of this *schema of quality* from the perspective of the infinitesimal calculus.[8]

Those forms of judgment, or concepts of the understanding, respectively, which concern the possibility of application to representations of intuition (those that are supplied with a schematization) are called 'categories' by Kant. Corresponding to the twelve judgment-forms of formal logic, Kant distinguishes twelve categories: "The categories, therefore, without schemata, are merely functions of the understanding for concepts; and represent no object. This objective meaning they acquire from sensibility, which realizes the understanding in the very process of restricting it" (B 187). Stated in a modern usage: the system of categories presents a formal system of judgment that is supplied with a (re-)constructable domain of validity (that is, with a *constructive semantics*).[9]

Indeed, Aristotle had already pointed towards a semantically determined concept of truth. Leibniz, however, was the first to distinguish the truth of an expression that is relative to a determinate 'world' (validity) from

7. The distinction between image and schema is thus determined by Kant: " . . . The *image* is a product of the empirical faculty of reproductive imagination; the *schema* of sensible concepts, such as of figures in space, is a product and, as it were, a monogram, of pure *a priori* imagination . . . " (B 181). In the schema, the imagination is thus made concrete and it is precipitated as the image of intuition.[XV] Concerning this, Kaulbach writes in the above-cited article (p. 31): "Every image is a character of the descriptive process which has become externally visible." Kaulbach carries further the Kantian thesis of the monogram in the image of the "type, a universal written character, by which any number of individual 'images' can be generated through expression" (p. 32).
8. Cp. my dissertation, Chapter II.1, and note 35.
9. Suggestions for emphasizing this linguistico-logical aspect of the Kantian theory of science are to be found in Kaulbach: "Kant's question is the question *quid juris:* With what right does a language advance the claim of semantic validity? Or, expressed in a Kantian way, with what right does it advance a claim on *objective reality*?" (p. 28).

one that is independent of all possible 'worlds' (universally valid). So, for example, the formal expression $\exists x \exists y \neg (x = y)$ is valid only in a world in which at least two objects exist; while the expression $\exists x(x = x) \vee \neg \exists x(x = x)$ is valid even in an empty world, and is thus universally valid. Leibniz's 'worlds,' as well as Bolzano's 'variable representations,' however, are supposed to exist independently of the epistemological constitution of human knowledge. In modern terms: There are several (perhaps infinitely many) domains of validity (models) for formal systems of judgments ('formal logical systems').[iv] In contrast, Kant outlines a formal system of judgments that realizes exactly one 'world' in accordance with the constitutive spatio-temporal structure of intuition involving reconstructed data of measurement. This world is thus not somehow given alongside of others (whether empirically or Platonically as a mathematical model).

Thus, in Kant's sense, three procedures play a role in the objective knowledge yielded by the categories: (1) The procedures of constitution of space and time in intuition; (2) the discursive procedures for the derivation of formal judgments; and (3) the procedures for the realization of formal judgments in intuition. These procedures of realization define in various ways the constitution of time in intuition: "The schemata are thus nothing but *a priori* determinations of time in accordance with rules. These rules relate in the order of the categories to the *time-series,* the *time-content,* the *time-order,* and lastly to the *scope of time* in respect of all possible objects" (B 184).[10] The grounding of these procedures of realization through the inner sense of time has been misunderstood (a frequently demonstrated thesis) by the mathematicians of the nineteenth century due to reasons based in scientific pragmatism (mistrust of talk about 'intuition,' the physicalization and mechanization of the picture of science, the conception of time as a mere physical magnitude). It is only with Brouwer and the contemporary constructive approach to mathematics that this project of grounding mathematics is again resumed.

2. The Definition of Constructive Procedures in the Logico-Mathematical Sense

Procedures of constitution in intuition, procedures of derivation of formal logic, and procedures for the realization of formal judgments in intuition all participate, according to Kant, in the formation of objective

10. Recently P. Krausser has again shown the central role of the chapter on the schematism in "Der Schematismus der Kategorien" in *Festschrift für Landmann;* forthcoming. <A very clear reconstruction of the schematism from the standpoint of logic is to be found in J. Hintikka: *Logic, Language-Games and Information* (Oxford, 1973), p. 213f.>

iv *'Formale Logik-Kalküle.'*

knowledge. Mathematicians and others inquiring into the foundations of mathematics have formed an alliance with this Kantian characterization of the epistemological situation and have proposed precise specifications of the procedures which have a role in the establishment of objective mathematical knowledge.

2.1 Procedures of Constitution

2.11 Intuitionistic Constructions. Since the time of Kant, a frequently debated question has been whether the categories are based on the forms of judgment, or the forms of judgment on the categories.[11] This question is a typical pseudo-problem of Kant interpretation. The foundation of objective knowledge is grounded—as indicated in section 1—in procedures of constitution, of formal derivation, and of realization. The procedures of constitution are originally independent of the language of logic. Brouwer takes up this aspect of the problem in his discussion of the grounding of intuitionism: "The first act of intuitionism completely separates mathematics from mathematical language, in particular from the phenomena of language which are described by theoretical logic, and recognizes that intuitionist mathematics is an essentially languageless activity of the mind having its origin in the perception of a temporal change . . . "[12] The *constitution of time* (as the inner sense of intuition) is the succession of empty substrata in intuition. For Brouwer, the intuitionist, this operation is the only one that is evidence of, and constitutive for, the operation of counting.[13]

All other concepts must be effectively generated (*hergestellt*) from this operation: this occurs through the construction of *Brouwer's choice sequences,* according to which first a sequence of natural numbers, a_n, is originally chosen and then every choice a_n is connected through an effective procedure f with an object b_n that depends on the sequence of the choice. The objects that Brouwer correlates with his choice sequences are natural and rational numbers, intervals of rational numbers, and similar items. These procedures of constitution, according to Brouwer, are what constitute mathematics. The following discursive, formal definition (*Urteilsbildung*) is the result. In case an object b_n can be indicated for every arbitrary choice a_n, then that object b_n can be indicated by an effective and

11. L. Krüger has guarded Kant against such excessive pedantry. On the completeness of the table of categories cp. M. Frede/L. Krüger, "Über die Zuordnung der Quantitäten," in *Kant-Studien,* Vol. 61 (Berlin-New York, 1970), pp. 28-49.
12. Cp. F.J. Brouwer: "Historical Background, Principles, and Methods of Intuitionism," in *South African Journal of Science,* (Cape Town, 1952), p. 142f.
13. Cp. also S. Körner's presentation in *Philosophie der Mathematik* (Munich, 1969), where he works out the relation between Kant and Brouwer's project of an inquiry into the foundations of mathematics.

determinate procedure *f* in a finite number of steps. This case is formalized in a judgment form: C(x,y) as $Va_n \exists b_n C(a_n, b_n) \rightarrow \exists f Va_n C[a_n, f(a_n)]$. The procedure of constitution that is described by this judgment <restricts>[v] the *axiom of choice* of classical mathematics. The classical axiom of choice requires, under the premise $Va_n \exists b_n C(a_n, b_n)$, the existence of any procedure *f* as in $Va_n C(a_n, f(a_n))$ that is not necessarily effective.[14]

Once again, an effective procedure means a procedure of constitution that determines the values of the function $f(a_n)$ by well-defined rules in a well-defined series of steps. Thus Brouwer does indeed sketch a constructively grounded, but nonclassical, account of analysis. However, Brouwer's project of a step-by-step construction of mathematics on the basis of the procedure of constitution for the determination of time remains unintelligible to many mathematicians inasmuch as he presented it in an inaccessible language.

2.12 Formal Systems of Operations.[vi] Procedures of constitution may indeed rest upon "successive empty substrata"; but the mere certification by a mathematician that he may have determined the empty substrata through intuition, introspection, or some other arrangement does not suffice for attaining objective knowledge. Procedures of constitution must be communicable. This problem of communication—the communication of procedures—also is at the center of the later Wittgenstein's philosophy of language.[15]

If someone maintains that $3+1=4$, then he has at his disposal an operative procedure that enables him to advance from one configuration of strokes (///, /) to another (////). The mastery of a procedure is preceded by an apprenticeship during which its usage is practiced on examples (paradigms), and its correctness is tested. One must arrive at a linguistic

14. Here we have chosen the simplest case of a choice sequence: Natural numbers are correlated with natural numbers. Also conceivable in a choice sequence is the correlation of objects b_n to growing segments of the series of numbers. However, the decisive distinction from classical mathematics is already visible in the different axiom of choice. The significance of the *axiom of choice* for modern structural mathematics (especially algebra and topology) has often been referred to. Cp. for example H. Ruben/J. Ruben: *Equivalents of the Axiom of Choice* (Amsterdam, 1963); K. Mainzer, "Konstruktion IV," in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie,* ed. J. Ritter, Vol. IV (Basel, 1975).

15. For an interpretation of Wittgenstein's theory of language-games in the constructive sense, cp. F. Kambartel, *Erfahrung und Struktur* (Frankfurt, 1968); K. Lorenz, *Elemente der Sprachkritik* (Frankfurt, 1971).

v *The original says 'widerspricht'* ('contradicts'). The author has asked that this be changed to *'schränkt . . . ein'* ('restricts').

vi *Operative Kalküle,* translated following Lorenzen's suggestion (see Mainzer, note 19, p. 2).

understanding of the conditions for teaching or learning the procedure in question. For this reason Wittgenstein writes of 'language-games,' in which partners are able to communicate about their procedures according to rules. For Brouwer, however, such communications merely have the status of reports about constructions carried out in intuition. Therefore, a communication of the form $\forall x[C(x) \vee \neg C(x)]$ over an infinite domain of validity (such as the natural numbers) would be without significance, since the validity of the property $C(x)$ for an infinite number of examples cannot be definitely decided. The distinction of a language-game which does not allow a *'tertium non datur'* is unintelligible to Wittgenstein, who, on this point, is a conventionalist. Lorenzen's *operative grounding of mathematics* takes up this problem again.

The foundational procedure of constitution for arithmetic is presented as the operative generation of numerals: (i) $\rightarrow$ /, (ii) n$\rightarrow$ n/, in which (i) states that one begins with a stroke (/) and (ii) states that a stroke (/) is to be added to every computational sign already operatively generated. The placeholder for already generated sequences of strokes is n. Brouwer's "empty substrata" arise by abstracting from the concrete numerical shapes; and what remains is, in Kant's sense, a "pure *a priori* determination of time, namely, the time-series"—a constitution through inner sense, which becomes intuitable in a numerical series (/, //, ///, . . .) and whose constitution becomes communicable through the pair of rules (i, ii). Arithmetical equations are yielded by the rules: (1) $\rightarrow$ / = /, and (ii) n = m $\rightarrow$ n/ = m/. The universal form of a constitutive rule of arithmetic is (i) $\rightarrow$ C(/), and (ii) C(n) $\rightarrow$ C(n/). With the help of this [two-part] rule of constitution, the scheme of the axiom of induction presupposed by classical mathematics can be provided with a foundation.[16]

2.2 Procedures of Derivation in Formal Logic

In summary, we can say that acts of mathematical construction are independent of logical language-systems in that they are not reducible to language alone (a thesis maintained, for instance, by Logicism). On the other hand, mathematics requires these logical language-systems to transmit intersubjectively the results of its constructions. Stated in a Kantian way: *States of affairs that were constitutively grounded in intuition become intersubjectively transmittable through the logical forms of judgment.* As Kant indicates, the forms of judgment are made available through discursive procedures of the understanding.

16. Cp. C. Thiel, "Das Begründungsproblem der Mathematik und der Philosophie," in *Zum normativen Fundament der Wissenschaft,* eds. F. Kambartel, J. Mittelstrass (Frankfurt, 1973).

Classical Aristotelian logic had paid no regard to defining its domain of validity, as was indicated by the above-cited example of the 'tertium non datur.' Then Brouwer—in alliance with Kant—elevated intuitionistic logic above the classical through reference to a constructively grounded domain of validity.[17] Lorenzen, in his operative logic, has now proposed a way *to accord a special status to constructive logic above all conceivable discursive procedures of the understanding.* Systems of rules for the generation of configurations of symbols ('operative formal systems') have already been presented in section 2.12. Now a *system of rules for logical constants* must be introduced.

In order to introduce implication, let us consider operative formal systems for the generation of rules ('formal metasystems'):[vii] Let K° be any basic operative formal system,[viii] K^1 be the formal metasystem of the first level for the generation of the rules of K°, and generally let K^n be the formal metasystem of the n-th level for the generation of the rules of the formal system K^{n-1}. Corresponding to this hierarchy of formal systems, the concept of an assertion is inductively introduced over a symbolic alphabet consisting of the comma (","), the arrow ("$\rightarrow$"), the letters *F, G, H* . . . , and the metavariables for the communication [ix] of assertions A, B, . . . , A_1, . . . , B_1 . . .

(1) Let *F, G, H,* . . . be assertions in K°; (2) if $A_1, \ldots, A_n$, A are assertions in K^{n-1}, then $A_1 \ldots A_n \rightarrow A$ is an assertion in K^n. In the following, let parentheses be replaced by dots over the comma and arrow.[x]

We can now define procedures of derivation[18] (abb: "$\vdash_R$" for "derivable in R") through the formal system of rules $R = (R_1, R_2, R_3)$:

$(R_1) \vdash A_1, \ldots, A_m \rightarrow A_u$ $(1 \leq u \leq m)$;

(R_2) $A_1, \ldots, A_m \rightarrow B_1, \ldots, A_1, \ldots, A_m \rightarrow B_n, B_1, \ldots, B_n \rightarrow B \vdash_R A_1, \ldots, A_m \rightarrow B$;

(R_3) $A_1; \ldots; A_m \dot{\rightarrow} A_m + 1, \ldots, A_n \rightarrow A \vdash_R A_1; \ldots; A_{m-1} \dot{\rightarrow} A_m, \ldots, A_n \rightarrow A$ and conversely. For $m = 0$ (R_2) contains modus ponens as a special case:

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17. Cp. K. Mainzer, "Gültigkeit," in: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie,* Vol. III (Basel, 1973).

18. For this presentation, cp. K. Mainzer, "Sequenzkalkül," in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie.* <Also compare K. Mainzer, "Der Konstruktionsbegriff in der Mathematik," in *Philosophia Naturalis,* Vol. 12, number 4 (Meisenheim on the Glan, 1970), pp. 367-412 (in particular, p. 385f.)>

vii *'Metakalküle.'*

viii *ein beliebiger operativer Grundkalkül*

ix *Mitteilungsvariablen für Aussagen . . .*

x For example, $((A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A) \rightarrow A$ would be represented as follows $A \rightarrow B \dot{\rightarrow} A \dot{\rightarrow} A$.

$B_1, \ldots, B_n, , B_1, \ldots, B_n \rightarrow B \vdash_R B$
and for m = 1 (R_3) yields:
$A_1 \dot{\rightarrow} A_2, \ldots, A_n \rightarrow A \vdash_R A_1, \ldots, A_n \rightarrow A$
and $A_1, \ldots, A_n \rightarrow A \vdash_R A_1 \dot{\rightarrow} A_2, \ldots, A_n \rightarrow A$.

The latter pair of rules makes possible a procedure through which every assertion C of R can be transformed unequivocally into another assertion C', so that C' is without commas and $C \rightarrow C'$ or $C' \rightarrow C$, respectively, can be derived in R (that is, C and C' are logically equivalent): thus, step-by-step from $A_1 \ldots A_n \rightarrow A$, one first of all obtains $A_1 \dot{\rightarrow} A_2 \ldots A_n \rightarrow A$; then $A_1 \rightarrow A_2 \dot{\rightarrow} A_3 \ldots A_n \rightarrow A$, and so on, until $A_1 \overset{(n-1)}{\rightarrow} A_2 \overset{(n-2)}{\rightarrow} A_3 \ldots A_{n-1} \dot{\rightarrow} A_n \rightarrow A$, in which "(n-1)" stands for (n-1) dots, and so on.

The class of derivable assertions of *R* without commas corresponds to the class of derivable assertions in the intuitionistic, positive formal system of implication. Wajsberg's criterion of decidability yields a first indication of the performance capacity of *R*. According to the former, Peirce's Law $A \rightarrow B \dot{\rightarrow} A \dot{\rightarrow} A$ is not derivable, although interpreted classically, it is universally valid.

Since *R* has proven to be an intuitionistic formal system, an *intuitionistic semantics* is also employed as its basis.[19] In contrast with all previously proposed foundations for implication, such a semantics has the advantage that it is not dependent on an arbitrary selection of basic rules (R_1), (R_2), (R_3), but is operatively grounded. In the case of the basic formal system K°, we have begun with the (mathematically and logically) completely presuppositionless human power of schematically operating with symbolic building blocks. This power can be presented in arbitrarily selected formal systems *K*, which construct new combinations of configurations from a finite number of configurations of an alphabet of symbols through a finite number of rules of instruction. A new rule Rj is said to be correct (*zulässig*) in *K* if it yields no configurations other than do the previously given rules of K. A criterion of the correctness (*Zulässigkeit*) of Rj in *K* is provided by the proof of its replaceability (the possibility of its elimination) through the rules of *K* in derivations of configurations. If *universal correctness* has to be demonstrated, then no specific formal system *K* may be presupposed.

As an example, let us use a special case of (R_2): $A_1 \rightarrow A_2; A_2 \rightarrow A_3 \vdash A_1 \rightarrow A_3$. To any formal system *K* we add $A_1 \rightarrow A_2$ and $A_2 \rightarrow A_3$. What is to be shown is that $A_1 \rightarrow A_3$ is correct (*zulässig*) in this extended formal system K'. A formal derivation in *K*' of $A_1 \rightarrow A_3$ has the form:

.
.
m A_1
.
.
.
m→n A_3 $A_1 \rightarrow A_3$
.

The first column contains the line-number, the second column the conclusion, and the third column the rule that is applied to the line in question. But the line *n* can be replaced by the line m → n A_2 A_1 → A_2 and n → n+1 A_3 A_2 → A_3, through which arises a derivation in *K*, and the correctness of A_1 → A_3 is proven in *K* by the criterion of elimination. In this sense, the universal correctness of (R_1), (R_2), (R_3) can be shown.

However, we have thereby demonstrated that (R_1), (R_2), (R_3) are not arbitrarily chosen definitions but universal properties of schematic operation. The positive intuitionistic formal system of implication, when compared with the classical version of implication, is strikingly distinguished through this natural grounding in the universal properties of operating schematically. *R* can be conceived in terms of an axiomatization of universally correct rules of consequence ('effective implications'). The negation ¬A is then the special case A→F, whereby *F* is any assertion not derivable in the formal system to which *A* belongs.[20]

The operative introduction of the remaining logical constants (∧, v, V, ∃) simply is no longer constructively grounded in the same natural manner: Why the pair of rules A → (A v B), B → (A v B) for disjunction are chosen, for example, is only transparent if one possesses a meaningful prior understanding of logical disjunction. For the grounding of *R*, however, acquaintance with any procedures of construction secured through constitutive intuitions would prove to be sufficient.[21] Nevertheless, the principle of excluded middle ('*tertium non datur*') is not universally correct. Stated in a Kantian manner, there are thus not only negative and affirmative judgments; there are also those ranging over infinite domains of validity ('infinite judgments'), for which affirmation or negation is not decidable.[22]

2.3 Procedures for the Realization of Formal Judgments

After procedures of constitution in intuition have been provided for mathematical objects, discursive procedures of derivation in understanding were provided for judgment-forms. It is now a question of developing procedures for realizing formal judgments in intuition.

2.31 Realization Through Interpretations of Models. If one proceeds

19. Cp. P. Lorenzen: *Einführung in die operative Logik und Mathematik* (Berlin, 1955), §6.
20. Cp. note 18.
21. Cp. also the detailed comparison which H. Lenk, in his *"Kritik der logischen Konstanten,"* draws between the attempts to ground the logical constants through German idealism and Lorenzen's approach.
22. Cp. note 5.

from the existence of some structure or other ('worlds') as understood by classical mathematics, a realization proves to be a mere correlation ('interpretation') between the logical constants of a formal judgment, and objects or relations of a structural state of affairs. For example, let such a formal judgment be $\exists x \forall y f x y = x$, consisting of the function constant *f*, the predicate constant =, the individual variables *x* and *y* of a *formal language* T, then (for example) the state of affairs, "There is a real number *x*, such that for all real numbers *y* it is the case that x + y = y" would be a realization in the *structure* of the real numbers, which contains, among other things, addition (+) and equality (=) of numbers as functions or predicates, respectively.[23] From where are the functions, individuals, and predicates of this structure obtained? How are the colloquial quantifiers explained? They are given. Whoever inquires further abandons the paradise of mathematical innocence, at whose portal dwells almighty God, preparing punishments (*Rutenbundel . . . schneidet*)—a variation on an utterance by Luther—for the all-too-curious.

2.32 Realization Through Dialogical Strategies. Thus, there are certain questions not permitted by almighty God in the context of realization through interpretation. For instance after the existence of a solution to an equation has been derived in formal logic and has been shown to be consistent, are we not allowed to annoy our fellow men with the further question of how the number that is the answer can now actually be generated effectively? In posing such a question, it is the language-game of classical logic that we are required to pursue to its realization. Brouwer proposed another language-game (cp. 2.11). Are there still more language-games by which we are able to be guided in the realization of judgments? Are they arbitrary or did Kant choose a language-game, by establishing a system of categories distinguished by a constructive semantic, which alone permits *(zulässt)* grounded mathematical realizations?

Language-games concerning arithmetical assertions *(Behauptungen)* occur in the form of a thesis (attack) and antithesis (defense) between the partners in a dialogue (proponent and opponent). Arithmetical assertions (*Aussagen*) are composed of primary assertions and logical connectives. In this case, primary assertions are closed arithmetical assertions without quantifiers and connectives. For assertions which arise from the combination of two component assertions, A and B, the following possibilities of *defensive requirements* result from combinatorial considerations: In making an assertion of the conjunction $A \wedge B$, the proponent must defend both *A* as well as *B* when *A* (abb: A?) and *B* (abb: B?) are doubted by the opponent. In the case of the assertion of the dis-

23. Cp. K. Mainzer: "Formalisierung," in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie,* Vol. II, Basel, 1972.

junction A v B, the proponent must defend at least one of the two component assertions when they are in doubt (abb: ?). In the case of implication, the opponent doubts A → B under the presupposition of *A*. The proponent then has to show that *B* obtains. The intuitionistic negation of *A* is then the special case A → F, in which *F* is a non-defensible assertion. Existential and universal assertions arise through grounded generalizations of disjunction and conjunction: Whoever maintains the existence of an example (number) in ∃xA(x) must effectively indicate a self-chosen numerical example m with A(*m*) upon being questioned.[24] Whoever maintains the universal expression VxA(x) must be able to show that A(*m*) obtains for all numerical examples *m* of the opponent.

The possibilities of universal rules of play for regulating thesis and antithesis are indicated by the following *matrix of the rules of play:*[25]

A_o	D_o	A_p	D_p
∞	∞	∞	∞
.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.
k	l	m	n
.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.

24. In this formula, *m* represents the numeral of strokes, which is inductively defined through $\underline{1}$: = / and $\underline{m+1}$: = $\underline{m}$/. This notation is selected inasmuch as the defense of primary assertions (for example, / + // = ///) can be decided through derivation in the formal systems of strokes. However, the usual arabic manner of writing the natural numbers is also conceived, according to our operative viewpoint, merely as numerical encodings of [the natural numbers] /, //, /// . . . over the alphabet 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0. We are thus concerned with *diverse encodings of diverse symbolic alphabets of the same operative power.* Cp. also K. Mainzer: "Konstruktion IV," in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie.*

25. Cp. P. Lorenzen, *Konstruktive Logik, Ethik, Wissenschaftstheorie* (Mannheim, 1973), Chapter I.2, <in particular the constructive proof of consistency through weak affirmation (in connection with Gödel). Another interpretation of logic-games occurs in J. Hintikka (see note 10), p. 80f., whose significance I discuss in "Mathesis Universalis und gegenwärtige Kalkültheorien," in *Philosophisches Aspekte der Bildungsinformatik*, eds. M. Lansky *et. al.* (Paderborn, 1979).>



Key to the matrix: A_O: = the number of *a*ttacks of the opponent upon *one* assertion; D_O: = the number of *d*efenses of the opponent for *one* assertion; A_P: = the number of *a*ttacks of the proponent upon *one* assertion; D_P: = the number of *d*efenses of the proponent for *one* assertion; ∞ = defenses or attacks of *one* assertion which are repeated as often as one likes; *k, l, m. n* are natural numbers ('limits of repetition'), which indicate the highest number of planned defenses of *A* (attacks upon A) by the defender (attacker) of an assertion *A; k, l, m, n* are defined by the defender (attacker) before the first defense (the first attack). $\underline{1}$: = the attack always and only upon the last assertion of one's opponent (the defense always and only of the the last assertion attacked by one's opponent).

The rules of play according to (i) yield classical logic with the validity of $\neg A \vee A$, $\neg (\neg A \wedge A)$ and, according to (ii) yield intuitionistic logic without the validity of the *'tertium non datur'* $\neg A \vee A$, but with the validity of the principle of noncontradiction $\neg (\neg A \wedge A)$. Logic according to (ii) is constructive inasmuch as it presupposes no *'tertium non datur'* and requires a defense of the existential quantifier by an effective method.

With the above universal rules of play, and the rules for employing logical constants, composite arithmetical assertions are deconstructed into primary assertions through attack and counterattack. The proponent has *won* the dialogue (1) when he defends a primary assertion, or when the opponent cannot defend a primary assertion attacked by the proponent ('material dialogue'), and (2) when he has to defend a primary assertion to which the opponent had previously subscribed ('formal dialogue'). In the second case, the assertion is called *'logically true in the constructive sense.'*[26] In the first case, arithmetical formal systems decide whether the

26. Cp. note 17.

primary assertion is defensible or not. A *winning strategy* is a chosen course of play at whose end we find a rule for winning. A procedure of realization for formal judgments ranging over the constructively grounded (perhaps by operative formal systems) domain of objects of the natural numbers is then defined by dialogical winning strategies.

2.33 Realization Through Programs of Computing Machines. Realizations thus indicate procedures for showing the validity of complex judgments step-by-step, following the rules of employment of logical constants. In this sense, Kant had correlated his formal judgments with the respective schemata and thus arrived at the categories.

The rules of employment of the logical constants of constructive logic take account of—just as do Kant's schemata—the domain of validity whose structure (*Aufbau*) is first and foremost to be secured through constitutive procedures. In order to decide whether $\exists x\, A(x)$ is true in the theory of numbers, the classical certainty that a number x exists with the property A(x) does not suffice. Rather, an effective procedure must be furnished to show A(m) for an example m. Likewise, for the truth of $\forall x\, A(x)$, a procedure must be specified that effectively demonstrates the validity of A(m) for every natural number m. These procedures were winning strategies in the context of our dialogical interpretation.

Another definition is guided by procedures in the theory of computability, according to which assertions (judgments ranging over the domains of validity) can be mechanically tested.[27] A measure of the complexity of assertions (*Behauptungen*) is precisely provided by the composition and serial connection of machines which have to test the individual parts of assertions. Turing proposed the *prototype of a machine* with a tape divided into equally large segments (in general, linearly ordered), which could be marked by the machine with the letters of the definitive symbolic alphabet (such as, numerals). The operation of the machine is analyzed into elementary steps: "move one space to the right!" (abb.: "r"), "print the letter a_i!" (abb.: "a_i"), and so on. If such elementary steps are serially connected to one another in an appropriate way, then one obtains a table of instructions for performances[xi] ("*the program of the machine*"), which can mechanically simulate the formal derivations of configurations of the operative formal systems.[28]

In this sense, there are Turing machines which are able to compute the

27. <SCp. S.C. Kleene, *Introduction to Metamathematics,* Amsterdam, 1967, p. 501f.>; S.C. Kleene/R.E. Vesley, *The Foundations of Intuitonistic Mathematics* (Amsterdam, 1965), p. 94f.
28. Cp. K. Mainzer, "Mathematischer Konstruktivismus im Lichte Kantischer Philosophie," in *Philosophia Mathematica,* Vol. 9, no. 2, (Memphis, 1972).

xi *Handlungsanweisungsmatrix.*

functional values of a number-theoretic function in a finite number of steps for a submitted numerical input. Such functions are then called computable or constructive. The class of constructive functions determined by Turing machines can still be characterized by a series of mathematically equivalent procedures (such as *u*-recursion, semi-Thue systems, and similar procedures), which are all computable in the intuitive sense (1) in finitely many steps; and (2) they generate a functional value through the application of schematic rules to given numerals. Accordingly, Church formulated the thesis that all functions computable (or constructable) in the intuitive sense may be defined as *Turing-computable* (or Turing-constructable) *functions.*

According to Church's thesis, the effective procedures that are supposed to realize complex judgments can now be conceived as Turing-computable functions. With an appropriate encoding procedure,[29] a machine-number (Gödel-number) can be effectively and univocally correlated with every Turing machine and, therefore, with every constructive procedure in Church's sense too. For that purpose one need only encode the machine instructions (cp. above, such as "r", "a_j") by means of numbers so that one obtains a numerical matrix instead of the program of the machine. Through such an effective procedure of encoding (Gödel numbering), a natural number *e*—the number of the machine—can be correlated with such a numerical matrix in an effective and univocal way.

This [Gödel] number *e* will now realize (render valid) the formal judgments ranging over the domain of natural numbers in place of effective procedures. We now introduce theoretico-mechanical procedures of realization as we inductively define the two-place predicate "*e* realizes *A*" following the structure of the logical constants:

(1) *e* realizes the primary assertion *A* in case *A* is true and e = 0; (2) *e* realizes A ∧ B in case $e = 2^n \cdot 3^m$ and *A* is realized by *n* and *B* is realized by *m*; (3) *e* realizes A v B in case $e = 2^0 \cdot 3^n$ and *A* is realized by *n* or $e = 2^1 \cdot 3^m$ and *B* is realized by *m*; (4) *e* realizes A → B in case *e* is the Gödel number of a computable function *f*, so that for *A* realizing *n*, f (n) realizes the expression *B*; (5) *e* realizes ¬ A in case *e* realizes A → 1 = 0; (6) *e* realizes the closed formula Vx A(x) in case *e* is the Gödel number of a computable function *f* so that, for every *n*, f(n) realizes the formal expression $A(\bar{n})$ with the numeral *n* for the natural number n; (7) *e* realizes the self-contained formula ∃x A(x) in case $e = 2^n \cdot 3^m$ and m realizes the formal expression A (*n*) with the numeral *n* for the natural number *n*.

The question whether a primary assertion is true is decided by operative formal systems, or by Turing machines simulating them.[30] Thus, Turing

29. Cp. my article "Konstruktion IV," in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie.* <For more complex procedures as Turing-computable compare K. Mainzer, "Zu Freges Begründung analytischer Begriffe 2. Stufe," in: *Frege und die moderne Grundlagenforschung,* ed.: C. Thiel (Meisenheim on the Glan, 1975), pp. 90-110 (in particular, p. 99f.).>

30. Cp. note 24.

machines for the generation of numerals (/ + ///, //·//), and so on would be the constitutive procedures for number-theoretic domains of validity for the theoretico-mechanical realizations of formal judgments.

3. Objectivity Through Constructive Procedure

In section two, we presented various procedures of constitution for the generation of domains of validity, formal procedures of derivation for the formation of discursive judgments, and procedures for the realization of formal judgments. Now these definitions must be compared with one another (mathematical aspect) as well as with the Kantian proposals (philosophical aspect). In this way, Kant reveals a characteristic perspective on contemporary information theory and on the mastery of communications.

3.1 Comparison of Our Proposals for Definitions with Kant's Perspective

Various procedures which have a part in the formation of number-theoretic judgments were derived from various starting principles. Constitutive procedures (2.1) were exemplified by Brouwer's intuition of the number series (2.11), and by Lorenzen's operative formal systems for the generation of numerals and terms (2.12). An example of a procedure of derivation of formal judgments was furnished by the intuitionistic system of logic, which arose through the introduction of logical constants by operative rules (2.2). Examples of procedures of realization ranging over previously constituted domains of validity were provided by Lorenzen's dialogical strategies (2.32) and Kleene's theoretico-mechanical procedures of realization (2.33). The table on p. 174 offers a systematic summary of these basic principles and procedures which have a part in the formation of number-theoretic judgments.

Brouwer is closest to Kant in terminology. In Kant's sense, he explicitly appeals to the constitution of arithmetic as an "*a priori* determination of time," which is the succession of empty substrata in intuition. However, the degradation of the language of logic that occurs in Brouwer is not Kantian. Brouwer believes that he can do without logical judgments,[31] but according to Kant, constructions in intuition are objectifiable only when the results of the construction can be communicated in judgments (as categories) and rendered controllable. The constitution of arithmetic through "*a priori* determination of time" is also appealed to in the theory of mechanical computation. The steps in the computation of the functional values of a

31. Cp. as regards linguistic analysis in Brouwer, S. Körner, *Philosophie der Mathematik* (Munich, 1968), Chapter VIf.

number-theoretic function f are interpreted by a "step counting function" [xii] s_f and interpreted as a "clock period." [xiii][32]

What is mathematically interesting is the comparison of the theory of operative formal systems, of mechanical computation, and of dialogical strategies. In the context of procedures of constitution, every term that can be generated by a decidable operative formal system can also be generated by a Turing machine, and conversely. The procedure for realizing the (decidable) operative formal systems can be characterized in mechanico-theoretical terms. A *proof* would have to be conducted inductively following the structure of logical constants. For primary assertions the case is perfectly clear inasmuch as they could be generated through (decidable) operative formal systems as well as through Turing machines. Let us consider the case of implication as a further example: In order to prove the correctness of A → B, a proof of correctness β is presupposed for A, and then through β, an operative derivation β' of B is shown. A machine with the number e then realizes A → B, in case e is the Gödel number of a computable function f, so that for A realizing n, f(n) realizes the expression B; f(n) can then be demonstrated to be the encoding of the derivation β'. I provide a detailed proof by inducation elsewhere.[33]

To the proof that an assertion is universally correct under the operative interpretation (that is, that it may be added to an arbitrary formal system without new derivations of configurations becoming possible), or to the proof that an assertion is realized under the theoretico-mechanical interpretation there corresponds, in the dialogical interpretation, the demonstration of a winning strategy in a formal dialogue. The decisive advantage of the dialogical approach in comparison with the operative one is palpable:[34] In the formal dialogue, a winning strategy for A → B can be indicated without a winning strategy for A and B having to be known. According to the formal rule for winning (cp. 2.32), one need only eventually repeat an assertion of the opponent in one's own defense. In contrast, the proof of the correctness of A → B presupposes the correctness of the premise A.

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32. Cp. note 28.
33. K. Mainzer, *Strategie und Maschinen* (Mannheim, forthcoming). <For winning strategies in intuitionistic mathematics, also compare K. Mainzer, "Is the intuitionistic Bar-Induction a Constructive Principle?" in *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic,* Vol. XVIII, no. 4, 1977, p. 583-88.>
34. Cp. in this regard, K. Lorenz, "Die dialogische Rechtfertigung der effektiven Logik," in *Zum normativen Fundament der Wissenschaft,* eds. F. Kambartel, J. Mittelstrass (Frankfurt, 1973), p. 255f.

xii *'Schrittzahlfunktion.'*
xiii *'Rechenzeit.'*

3.2 Objectivity Through Computer Science and/or Rational Argumentation

We have juxtaposed the *classical tradition* of Plato, Leibniz, Bolzano, Frege, Hilbert, and others with possibilities of constructively grounded formations of judgments. In this tradition, mathematical states of affairs are given independently of the constitution of human knowledge as 'ideas' (Plato), 'worlds' (Leibniz), 'variable representations' (Bolzano), 'domain of objects' (Frege), 'structures' (Hilbert). Considered individually, their existence is not always effectively exhibitable in detail: rather, their existence is already secured according to the classical point of view when the systems of propositions describing them are free from contradiction (at least at the first level). However, when the structures are not exhibited by procedures of constitution, according to Kant, their existence is not secured—they are mere ideas ('possibilities of thought') such as set-theoretic topologies or algebraic structures.[35]

They are not constitutively composed. Accordingly, no grounding is provided by formal interpretations of formal judgments ranging over such domains of objects. For Kant, procedures of constitution, formation of formal judgments, and procedures of realization are a part of rationally grounded mathematical argumentation. Constitutive procedures, for example, secure the domain of objects of the natural numbers.

Today the special status accorded to natural numbers and number-theoretic formations of judgments by Kant, Brouwer, and others has also yielded results within the context of technological civilization. Information about economic states of affairs, political communality, and technology are number-theoretically encoded. Such information thereby becomes transmittable, storeable, and retrievable[36]—in short, available—for a technological civilization that would no longer be capable of living without this way of processing information. Information processing machines, whose logical prototype was outlined by Turing, relieve us of this intellectual "assembly line work" of the wearying step-by-step generation of configurations of symbols ('calculating') in line with well-defined rules.

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35. Cp. K. Mainzer: "Das Begründungsproblem des mathematischen Kontinuums in der neuzeitlichen Entwicklung der Grundlagenforschung," in *Philosophia Naturalis,* Vol. 16, number 1 (Meisenheim on Glan, 1976). <On the same topic: "Stetigkeit und Vollständigkeit in der Geometrie," in: *Wissenschaftstheorie und physikalische Begriffsbildung,* eds. A. Kamlah *et. al* (Braunschweig, 1978). Also on the same topic: "Symmetry and Invariance," in *Sixteenth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy and the World-Views of the Modern Sciences),* Düsseldorf, 1978)>.
36. On the system-theoretic significance of cybernetics also cp. P. Krausser, "Zu einer Systemtheorie rational selbstgesteuerter Handlungsprozesse," in *Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie,* ed. M. Riedel, Freiburg.

PROCEDURES FOR THE NUMBER-THEORETIC FORMATION OF JUDGMENTS

	Kant	Brouwer	theory of operative formal systems (Lorenzen I)	theory of mechanical computation (Kleene)	theory of dialogical strategies (Lorenzen II)	classical logic (Leibniz, Frege)
procedures of constitution	temporal constitution of intuition	intuition of the number series, choice sequences	operative formal systems for the generation of symbolic configurations (e.g. numerals, terms)	Turing machine for the generation of symbolic configurations (e.g. numerals, terms)	operative formal systems for the generation of symbolic configurations (e.g. numerals, terms)	structural definitions (set theoretic semantics)
procedures of derivation for formal judgments	discursive formation of judgments of the understanding	intuitionistic formation of judgments (no formal system)	intuitionistic system of logic	intuitionistic system of logic	intuitionistic system of logic	system of classical logic
procedures for the realization of formal judgments	schemata of the imagination	grounding a judgment as description of intuitive constitution	grounding a judgment through operative correctness	realization of a judgment through a Turing machine	grounding a judgment through a dialogical strategy	formal interpretations of judgments

xiv *Verfahren zur . . . Urteilsbildung.*

Let us pose, in conclusion, the question of whether we can thus technologically evade every instance of argumentation.[37] Kant, as is well-known, referred even this question to the domain of object relations. What about assertions about our fellow human beings, society, and so on? Here rational argumentation is also possible, according to Kant. The question, however, does not refer to objectivity through constructive procedures; rather, what is at issue is an objectivity through freedom.[38]

37. Cp. on this point the analysis of H. Lenk, "Technokratie —Ideologie—Philosophie," in *Philosophie im technologischen Zeitalter* (Stuttgart, 1971).

38. The connection of the concept of freedom with mathematical, rational knowledge is already given clearly in the framework of Kant's theoretical philosophy ('transcendental dialectic'). For further details cp. G. Frey, *Die Mathematisierung unserer Welt* (Stuttgart, 1967), and F. Kaulbach, *Immanuel Kant* (Berlin, 1969), Part B.

xv . . . *findet im Bild der Anschauung ihrer Niederschlag.* See p. 158, note 7.

FACTS AND SENTENCES*

Günther Patzig

Translated by J. Philip Miller

I

It is possible to understand Aristotle's influential, though potentially rather misleading formula *ὁμοίως οἱ λόγοι ἀληθεις ὡσπερ τὰ πράγματα* (*De Int.* 9, 19a33)—translated literally: "sentences are true just as things are"—as stating that true sentences *say* things to be just as they are. But another view is also possible: the view that, according to Aristotle, true sentences *are* just as things are. The difference between the two interpretations is that on the first view, the representational function of language is held to be symbolic, while on the second it is held to be depictive. These views have also confronted one another in recent discussions of the relation between language and reality. We wish first to recall briefly the fundamental points at issue here.[1]

II

In a case of depiction, the elements of the picture correspond to the elements of that which is represented. The arrangement of the elements in the picture corresponds to the arrangement of the elements of the object. Within certain limits, the elements of the picture are similar to the elements of the represented object (as in a still-life, for example). And likewise, the arrangement of the elements in the picture is similar to the arrangement of the elements of the object. Neither of these conditions can, in a simple manner, hold for the elements of a sentence. The words are not as a rule similar to the things designated by them, nor does their arrangement in the sentence

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*Translated from "Satz und Tatsache," in Günther Patzig, *Sprache und Logik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, 1970), pp. 39-76, an earlier version of which appeared in *Argumentationen: Festschrift für Josef König,* edited by Harold Delius and Günther Patzig and published by the same house.

1. On this issue, one should consult in particular K. Buehler's *Sprachtheorie* (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1934), pp. 179ff. Also E. Daitz's discussion in "The Picture Theory of Meaning," *Mind* 62 (1953), pp. 184-201; reprinted in *Essays in Conceptual Analysis,* ed. A. Flew (London: MacMillan, 1956), pp. 53-74.

correspond to the real, objective arrangement about which the sentence speaks.

The similarity found in a picture (*Bild*) motivates us to point to a segment of the picture and say "this is a bottle," or something of that sort. With a painted picture it may be just as appropriate to say "this represents a bottle" or "this is supposed to be a bottle." With reflections (*Spiegelbildern*), however, we usually say simply that we see ourselves, or someone else, in the mirror. We also see buildings being reflected in the water, and not the reflected representations of buildings on the surface of the water. The reason why we always speak of reflections in a manner resembling one possible way of speaking about genuine pictures is of course that with reflections, there is a complete correlation of the picture and the depicted.

The essential difference between depictive and symbolic representation is clearly seen in the fact that, to understand the latter, it is necessary to have *learned* something. A child will greet the picture of a duck in his picturebook with immediate enthusiasm. But in order to relate the word "duck" in his primer to the familiar animal, the child must have learned first to speak and then to read.

Symbolic representation and depictive representation often mesh with one another. This we can easily see from the examples of maps and musical notation. The outlines of the continents on a map of the world correspond to the outlines of the land masses on the earth's surface, in accordance with the scale and method of projection. The courses of rivers are similar to the curved lines which represent them on the map. Much is omitted from the map, and there are things on the map for which no similar object is to be found in nature. These latter are the very signs which we find listed in the "legend" on the map's margin. Sizes of towns are expressed not by the amount of space they occupy in the landscape, but rather by certain symbols and type-sizes, according to their populations. The arrangement of the signs does indeed correspond to the arrangement of the real things designated by them. Yet even this is only in accordance with certain conventions which must be learned. "Above" and "below" correspond to "north" and "south," and so on; and the distances between cities on the map is determined by the actual distances, though also by the map's scale. Thus in regard to the collaboration of depictive and symbolic representation, a map stands in the middle between a picture (an aerial photograph, for instance) and the purely linguistic description of a region (such as might be prefixed, say, to a work on the history of Greece). A map contains conventional signs about which a lexicon (the legend) gives information; but it also contains depictive elements. That is the reason we speak of "reading a map."

The same situation obtains in the case of musical notation. Here too there are purely conventional elements. The temporal values of the notes, the key,

the pauses, punctuation, and so on, are indicated by certain arbitrarily defined signs. Much is omitted: the timbre of the instruments on which the melody is to be played does not appear in the notation any more than the colors of the roofs of a town appear on a map. The pitch is nonetheless depicted, and the temporal sequence of tones is expressed by the left-to-right sequence of written notes. Just as spatially conjoined things are represented on a map by conjoined signs, so in musical notation tones which are sounded at the same time (in a chord) are aligned vertically. Both maps and sheet music project "symbolic fields" in which the various dimensions have different values: in musical notation, "above" and "below" mean "high" and "low;" on a map they mean "north" and "south." "Right" and "left" mean "east" and "west" on a map, "earlier" and "later" in musical notation.

These reflections make it clearer that depictive and symbolic representaticn do not exclude one another, that they can occur together. If we start from the pure depiction of a reflection, linguistic representation seems to lie at the far end of this progression: paintings, pictorial maps, musical notation. We might wish to ask: Does language represent in a purely symbolic manner, or does it too contain residues of depictive representation?

III

But a difficulty confronts us before we can even discuss this question sensibly. A picture might represent a landscape, a person, a historical scene or the like. A map might represent a part of the earth's surface or the weather conditions. But what does a sentence (*Satz*) represent? It will be replied that a sentence represents a fact, or a state of affairs.[1] If we wish to make use of Wittgenstein's distinction,[2] we can say that sentences represent states of affairs, and that a fact is what a *true* sentence represents. Facts are then a sub-class of states of affairs, just as true sentences are a sub-class of sentences in general. However, the plausible propositions that "sentences represent states of affairs (through symbolic representation)" and that "true

2. L. Wittgeinstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London: Kegan Paul, 1922), 2.06; or D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, trans., *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 2.06.

i. The English word "represent" has been used here and throughout this article to translate the German word *"darstellen."* This usage should not, however, be taken to imply that the author adheres to what is sometimes called the "representationalist" theory of meaning. In ordinary German, it is common to speak of facts being *"dargestellt"* by sentences; in many contexts this would mean only that the fact in question is stated by the sentence. "Represent" has been used in the present translation in order to preserve the author's implicit suggestion that there is at least a distant kinship between the "representation" found in sentences and that found in maps, pictures, and so on.

sentences represent facts" must be correctly interpreted. Because of their internal logic, these propositions are not comparable to propositions such as "portraits represent persons" or "scores represent musical compositions"; for while persons are, among other things, what portraits represent, they are also something more than what is represented.

The same is true of landscapes, weather conditions, musical compositions, and so on. Facts, on the other hand, are not first what they are and secondly, in addition,what is represented by true sentences. Anyone who wishes to speak of or allude to a fact must himself formulate a sentence which expresses this fact. Facts can never be apprehended except in the form of sentences. A fact is always "the fact that . . . "

Let us here recall Goethe's well-known remark that what makes a poet is "lively feeling for the situation and the ability to express it."[3] This remark should not be understood simply as pointing out two mutually independent requirements for the poet's calling, requirements about which it would be meaningful to say that someone has the one but unfortunately not the other. For a "lively feeling" is certainly not to be thought of as independent of the ability to express such feelings in words. And how would anyone acquire an ability for precise linguistic expression if he did not already have a full fund of feelings, sensations and experiences waiting to be expressed? Perhaps one could go so far as to say that the "lively feeling for the situation" comes to itself only when it has found adequate expression. Without the disclosive function of the expression peculiar to it, it is not what it is—namely, this definite feeling for this definite situation. And again, how should an ability for expression prove itself, if not through this function of helping a "lively feeling" come to its appropriate definiteness? These brief remarks must suffice to show that even in regard to the relationship between feeling and expression, that view is incorrect which takes as its model the pictorial representation of an object presupposed as such. We maintain that this model cannot be applied unreflectively to the relation between facts and sentences, and the digression on Goethe's remark has shown our claim to be less unusual than it might at first have appeared. Yet there is also something which is true of facts though not of feelings. Of feelings one must say that they become *definite* feelings only in the garb of linguistic expression. But one would not wish to dispute that, in general, there can also be feelings without linguistic formulation. On the other hand, it is obviously, or at least apparently, the case that there could be no facts or states of affairs at all if there were no language and thought, that is, no sentences to express or represent them. We said initially that a fact is just what a true sentence expresses or represents; and if this has plausibility, then we can say that every sentence formulates its fact, and that a fact is what a definite sentence *p* formulates. Without sentences, there could be no facts; facts are essentially language-dependent.

3. J. P. Eckermann, *Gespräche mit Goethe,* ed. F. Bergmann (Wiesbaden: Insel-Verlag, 1955), p. 145.

IV

We have now reached a point from which one decisive step would lead us into the speculative realm of a "coherence theory" of truth. If facts are language-immanent, then sentences and facts cannot be brought to confront one another, but only sentences and other sentences. Obviously, however, this was not what we had in mind when we took the plausible view that facts are just what true sentences express or represent. In taking this view, we seemed to be saying something quite straightforward, something that was in no way philosophically doctrinaire or paradoxical.

In fact, our original proposition seems to have a certain *triviality* about it. Is it not comparable in form to the trivial proposition that "paintings represent their subject-matter"? Or to the equally trivial propositions that "marksmen shoot at targets," "customers are people who make purchases in stores," and "people are nourished by food"? Thus we are faced with the unappealing alternative of having to interpret our proposition either as a paradox or as a bare triviality. In this situation, Nelson Goodman's pointed words can give us courage: "Any effort in philosophy to make the obscure obvious is likely to be unappealing, for the penalty of failure is confusion, while the reward of success is banality. An answer, once found, is dull, and the only remaining interest lies in a further effort to render equally dull what is still obscure enough to be intriguing."[4]

V

With this in mind, let us try a new approach. We wish to retain the view that true sentences represent or express facts. We also want to retain the view that different sentences express different facts, and that every true sentence expresses the very fact which it defines. But now let us listen to that other voice in us which declares facts to be language-independent to the highest degree. If facts are not independent of our speech and thought, how, we might ask, can we imagine anything that is?

Let us consider for example the fundamental fact that each of us must die at some time. This is regarded as a fundamental fact of human existence; it is said that one's existence is either authentic or inauthentic, depending on whether one faces up to this fact. Even for someone who never speaks of it and avoids thinking about it, this fact will announce itself one day and make itself heard. One might take account of this situation by saying the following: The fact that I am mortal can, to be sure, be apprehended only through a sentence, namely, the sentence "I am mortal." But once it has been apprehended and fixed in language, it is nonetheless understood as

4. N. Goodman, *The Structure of Appearance* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. XV.

something that could have subsisted quite well even without being expressed in language, as something that could have awaited its linguistic articulation, so to speak.[ii] And in this sense, there would be many facts which no one has thought of or expressed, but which someone could express or think.[5]

On the other hand, what are such facts apart from their being thought of by someone as the subject-matter of possible sentences? An artist can also say that he wants to go out in search of new subject-matter. But it would be absurd to imagine that he could encounter subject-matter in the way he encounters landscapes, boats, churches and old peasants. We cannot see subject-matter unless we are familiar with the intentions of artists.

VI

Can facts be seen? Yes and no. We do see that it's snowing outside, that my lamp is still burning, that the street-car is coming around the corner. But we see facts only in the sense that we can *say* we see that it's snowing, and so on. We cannot see them in the sense that we can see giraffes, shooting stars and baroque palaces. It makes no sense to say: "I've never seen a fact; would you please show me one?"

The expression "I see that *p* . . . " is not of the same form as the expression "I see an *x* over there." "I see that . . . " is to be understood as "I judge, on the basis of what I see, that . . . ." For example: I see falling snow flakes and determine, on the basis of this perception, that it's snowing. To be sure, when someone asks how I know that it's snowing or that my friend has become angry, it is quite correct for me to answer: "I see it." This "it" is related to the "it" which appears in the sentence "It is just as you say (or as the sentence says)." Here "I see it" means: I see just what one can see when it snows or when someone has become angry. We cannot see facts; but we can say we see them without saying anything false. We can "see" them only *cum grano salis.* We can only be the eye-witnesses of facts.

VII

Two mutually independent pieces of evidence seem to be leading us in opposite directions. On the one hand, the concept of fact presents us with something which is just what it is and as it is, precisely by being independent of our speech and thought. On the other hand, we can offer as a definition

5. At this point we are approaching Bolzano's "propositions in themselves." Cf. B. Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre* (1837), I, 19, second edition (Leipzig: F. Meiner Verlag, 1929f.), pp. 76f; or the selections in "Grundlegung der Logik. Ausgewaehlte Paragraphen aus der 'Wissenschaftslehre' Band I und II," ed. F. Kambartel (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1963), pp. 22f.

ii. This sentence was modified by the author for the present translation.

of the concept of fact only what occurred to us before: facts are just what true sentences represent or express. This internal duality in the concept of fact has often been noted.[6] And important authors have unwittingly given expression to it through involuntary fluctuations in their terminology. Good examples of this are quoted in the "Terminological Remarks" in R. Carnap's *Introduction to Semantics.*[7] The question which concerns us here is discussed briefly by Carnap in his outstanding book *Meaning and Necessity.*[8] He names C. J. Ducasse as a representative of the view that facts are identical with the true sentences which express them. Bennett and Baylis are cited as adherents of the opposite view, according to which facts simply cannot be sentences, for the reason that sentences are true or false, while facts cannot be true or false: "Facts themselves are neither true nor false, but just are."[9] Carnap considers the question as to what facts are to be, "to a certain extent," a terminological question to be settled by convention, since ordinary usage is too vague for any other solution. But in reading these contributions to the discussion, one gets the impression that each author has relied on only one of our two mutually opposed pieces of evidence. When Ducasse identified sentences and facts, his decision was prompted by the undeniably intimate connection between the two. Bennett and Baylis, on the other hand, let themselves be guided by the equally justified conviction that a fact is fundamentally different from the sentence which expresses it. It does not seem that this should compel us to appeal, with Carnap, to the freedom of definition. It might after all be possible for us to develop a view which would unite what is legitimate in each of the two opposed positions.

VIII

What is legitimate in each of the two views can be stated without difficulty. In regard to the intimate connection of facts and sentences, there is of course the banal truth that, in order to express or represent a fact, we must express a sentence in which the fact is expressed—just as when we want to cook soup, we need a pot to cook it in. But in addition to this, it is also true that a given fact can enter our sphere of awareness only in the form of a

6. The *Concise Oxford Dictionary* (1949 edition) defines "fact" as a "thing certainly known to have occurred or be true" (p. 404). But things which "occur" are essentially different in nature from things which "are true."
7. R. Carnap, *Introduction to Semantics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 235f.
8. R. Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity,* third edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 28.
9. C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, opinions, sentences and facts," *Journal of Philosophy* 37 (1940), pp. 701-711; A. Bennett and C. Baylis, *Formal Logic* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1939), especially p. 49.

sentence, and indeed, in the form of precisely that sentence which expresses or represents it. On the other hand, we must not forget the point which Bennett and Baylis rightly relied on: when a fact is apprehended in a given sentence, its language-independent, non-linguistic character is thereby also apprehended (unless of course the fact in question is a linguistic fact in the narrower sense).

Surely this situation gives us the right to speak of a unique relation which obtains between facts and sentences. Because of the uniqueness of this relation, we are tempted to fall back on other, more familiar relations for elucidation, and so avoid the difficulties involved in interpreting it correctly. An excellent example of this tendency is the theory developed by L. Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.* Wittgenstein interprets the relation between facts and sentences as a relation of two facts which are identical in structure. For on his view, sentences are also facts: they are "objects" combined in a certain manner.[10]

According to Wittgenstein, the basic error of previous theories of judgment is that they simply place sentences over against the facts which they represent. As they do so, the insight that sentences too are facts (namely linguistic facts) is lost. This subclass of all facts is distinctive in that all non-linguistic facts can be mapped onto it. The correspondence between language and reality is possible only because language itself is a part of reality. The relationship of a true sentence to the fact which it represents is that of identity in structure: "A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes and the sound-waves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world" (4.014). A sentence like "Karl loves Maria," as an articulated fact, depicts a non-linguistic fact articulated in a corresponding manner: just as the word "loves" stands between the names "Karl" and "Maria" in the sentence, so in the real fact which this model copies, as it were, the relation of love obtains between the persons named. Both the sentence and the represented fact are of the logical form "*aRb.*" A true sentence is a represented fact in the form of a sentence. The names in a proposition do not represent (*darstellen*) persons and objects; rather, they serve as the "representatives" (*vertreten*) for these ("In a proposition a name is the representative of an object": 3.22)—presumably in the way attorneys serve as representatives in court for disputing parties. Thus one could say that a trial in a civil court is a dispute between parties in the form of a legal dispute.

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10. *Tractatus* 3.14: "A propositional sign (*Satzzeichen*) is a fact." 2.141: "A picture is a fact." 3: "A logical picture of facts is a thought." 4: "A thought is a proposition (*Satz*) with a sense." A good commentary on this difficult work is that of E. Stenius, *Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960); chapters VI and VII in particular are devoted to the picture theory of sentences.

It must be noted here that Wittgenstein possibly would not have considered a sentence like "Karl loves Maria" to be a "completely analyzed" sentence (3.25), and would not have regarded "Karl" and "Maria" as names in his sense of "simple signs" (3.201). In that case, one could not expect this sentential sign to depict the relevant state of affairs adequately. This question has been discussed vigorously in the Wittgenstein literature, but no certain result has been attained. For our purposes, however, this does not matter: the principle behind Wittgenstein's view is preserved under both interpretations, and it is against this principle that the objections which we shall now formulate are directed. In Wittgenstein, the relation between facts and sentences is rendered available for analysis by making sentences themselves facts of a certain kind. The relation of a true sentence to the fact expressed by it can then be understood as the structural identity of two facts. The approach taken in this solution is at once so original and so simple as to make any further explanation of the fascination which it has long held unnecessary. Nonetheless it is not a legitimate solution; for the principle of linguistic representation is not depiction in Wittgenstein's sense. The depictive factor is still relatively significant with two-place relations—and this is no doubt the reason Wittgenstein gave preference to such examples in presenting his theory. But Wittgenstein's view fails when applied to one-place predicates, as in the sentence "Karl is blond." Wittgenstein's attempts to make his theory cover these expressions as well lead to the addition of assumptions so artificial as to lose all plausibility. And finally, sentences involving "because," "if—then," "all," and so on cannot be analyzed at all on the basis of a structural identity theory.

IX

In his book *Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (1940), Bertrand Russell has also attempted to explain the relation of facts and sentences on the model of another relation.[11] Here the relation between facts and sentences is interpreted as a special case of the causal relation. A sentence is true if it—or more precisely: its utterance—is the effect (influenced by linguistic training) of observing the very fact expressed in the sentence. One sees at once that here, instead of sentence and fact, two other things are placed in a causal relation, namely, the utterance of the sentence and the observation of the fact. Indeed this must be so, for only event-names can be used meaningfully in a sentence expressing a cause-effect relation. A sentence as such, however, is not an event, and neither is a fact. The fact that Brutus murdered Caesar is connected with the well-known historical event, but it is not identical with it. To see this, we need only mention that the murder, the

11. B. Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, fourth edition (London: Allen & Unwin, 1951), especially pp. 298ff.

event, can be dated in the year 44 B.C., but not the fact. The fact still exists today. A number of further problems are raised by the question as to the relation of an event to the fact that this event took place.[12]

X

Perhaps the following approach will take us further *salva singularitate,* that is, without our having to give up the aforementioned uniqueness of the relation between facts and sentences, as Wittgenstein and Russell do. We said above (see p. 180) that the proposition that "facts are just what true sentences represent" could be considered a bare triviality, comparable to propositions such as "targets are what marksmen shoot at," "subject-matter is just what a work of art represents," "food is just that by which people are nourished." On the other hand, one could say the following: Generally speaking, a target is indeed that at which someone shoots. But in any individual case, a target is always also some definite thing—a railway junction, a clay pigeon, a buck or an airplane. Nothing that is a target is wholly exhausted by being a target. Food and artistic subject-matter are similar of course: in the concrete case, nutriment is always a piece of fruit, a piece of bread, a bowl of rice or milk; concretely speaking, subject-matter is always a landscape, a person, a table with fruit. And can we not work out an analogous locution for the concept of fact? We could then say that, generally speaking, a fact is just what a true sentence expresses or represents. In any individual case, however, a fact could still be something else, and would indeed have to be something else. It is quite easy to say what else a fact could be in any individual case, especially now that we are familiar with Russell's remark on "percepts." If the sentence "it is snowing" is true, then what is represented in this sentence is a certain physical process studied in meteorology. If the sentence "Karl is angry" is true, then a certain mood of my friend Karl corresponds to it. And if we believe that

12. Characteristically, Russell wants to do away with this distinction: "Facts are to be conceived as occurrences" (*op. cit.,* p. 284). In another place (p. 153), he substitutes "percepts" for facts: "There are no facts 'that so-and-so.' There are percepts, from which, by analysis, we derive propositions 'that so-and-so.' But so long as this is realized, it will do no harm if percepts are called facts." Russell speaks here as though he were accomodating, on account of its harmlessness, an established usage by which percepts are called "facts." Actually, he himself establishes the identity of facts and percepts; and identifying them is by no means harmless, since his theory can emerge as an interpretation of the sentence-fact relation only after they have been identified. Needless to say, I do not mean that Russell consciously tries to influence the reader in favor of his theory on this point; rather, he makes the common mistake of interpreting the ordinary view in light of his theory, then citing this view in support of the theory.

Brutus murdered Caesar, then we are referring to an historical event. A family relationship between two persons is represented by the sentence "Maria and Martha are sisters," while the fact that subsists if the sentence "honeycombs are hexagonal" is true must be a certain structural form of honeycombs. We could then say, as we did for targets, food, subject-matter, and so on, that generally speaking, facts are just what true sentences express, but that facts in the concrete sense are processes, moods, events, relations or structural forms—anything whatever, including of course "percepts" and "occurrences," as in Russell. It would follow immediately then that facts generally speaking are language-dependent and cannot occur apart from sentences. On the other hand, facts in the concrete sense, facts as that which they are (processes, events, and so on), are altogether independent of language. In this way, we would have taken adequate account of each of our two conflicting pieces of evidence, while at the same time avoiding the illusion of paradox and triviality. The conflicting characterizations would now be seen to concern two different subjects.

Nonetheless the very ease with which everything gets qualified here as a fact (in the "concrete" sense) cannot but make us suspicious of such a straightforward solution to our problem. And in fact, the analogy on which we have relied, although with some reservations, does not stand up. For different pictures of the same object have *eo ipso* the same subject-matter. On the other hand, two different sentences which refer to one and the same event do not represent the same fact.[13] It is possible, at least, that two different pictures have precisely the same subject-matter (for example, two portraits of a single person by different artists), but it is not possible for two essentially different sentences to represent the same fact. Different sentences can, however, refer to one event or describe one object. In fact, we must consider the events and objects represented by sentences to be much more analogous than are facts to the "subject-matter" of a work of art. For a fact is closely bound up with the mode of representation—so much so that there is a dimension of possible disparity between the process or event, on the one hand, and the fact expressed by the pertinent sentence, on the other, that is unlike anything to be found in the other relations alluded to. Thus "fact" is not a general expression for events, processes, moods, structural forms, and so on, insofar as these are represented by true sentences—at least, not in the sense in which "target" is a general expression for railway junctions, airplanes, game animals, and so on, insofar as someone shoots at or could shoot at these; or in the sense in which "subject-matter" is a general expression for landscapes, persons, events, and scenes insofar as they are objects of artistic representation. The concept of "fact" clearly drops out of this group, for facts are dependent upon the way they

13. This statement will later on have to be qualified and made somewhat more precise.

are represented in sentences. A fact is not an event *insofar as* the latter is represented in a sentence, but rather *as* it is represented in this sentence.

XI

Thus we have failed in our attempt to clarify the concept of fact by means of an analogy with the expressions "subject-matter," "target," and so on. But perhaps our stumbling block will itself provide a foundation for further progress. We said that a fact is, for example, a process, an event, an "ὄν" in the broadest sense, as it is represented in a true sentence. And it would follow immediately from this that two sentences representing one and the same event, etc., in the same manner will represent the same fact. Now if we had a reliable criterion for the identity of facts, we could define the concept of fact by means of this criterion. This kind of definition was introduced in philosophy by Gottlob Frege. In his book *Foundations of Arithmetic,*[14] Frege defined the concept of cardinal number with recourse to an identity criterion: the cardinal number of the concept *F* is for Frege just what is identical when the concepts *F* and *G* are equinumerate.

Since this latter criterion can be formulated without making use of the concept of cardinal number (namely, by setting up a one-to-one correspondence between the exemplars of the concept *F* and the exemplars of the concept *G*), this procedure is not circular.[15] Here we shall assume what Frege discovered about the nature of the concept of cardinal number when he recognized that, in making an assertion of number like "Mars has two moons," we are making an assertion about the concept "moon of Mars." In such assertions the number appears as an object: we can say "the number of Jupiter's moons is four," and at this point there emerges the view that the expressions "the number of Jupiter's moons" and "four" or "Four" or "4" all designate the same object. Indeed, according to Frege, this is the sense of the equality sign in mathematics. One could just as well write:

$$\text{number of Jupiter's moons} = 4,$$

in the sense of an assertion of identity.

But for Frege, numbers are objects of a peculiar kind. We cannot see them, nor even form images of them. We may nonetheless speak of objects here, provided that we have access to a procedure for recognizing objects of

14. G. Frege, *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (1884), third edition (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1961), especially pp. 73-81; or J. L. Austin, trans., *The Foundations of Arithmetic* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968), pp. 73e-81e.

15. On this issue, cf. H. Scholz and H. Schweitzer, *Die sogenannten Definitionen durch Abstraktion* (Leipzig: Verlag F. Meiner, 1935).

this sort in various contexts. "If we are to use the symbol *a* to signify an object, we must have a criterion for deciding in all cases whether *b* is the same as *a*, even if it is not always in our power to apply this criterion."[16]

Now Frege finds this criterion in the "equinumerateness" of concepts. The cardinal number which belongs to the concepts *F* and *G* is the same whenever those concepts are equinumerate. The illusion of circularity vanishes when we realize that the equinumerateness of concepts can be established without our having to count the objects which fall under the respective concepts. We can set the number of the concept "plate on the table" equal to the number of the concept "knife on the table," as soon as it is shown that there is one and only one knife on every plate, and none elsewhere. We would not need to know *how many* plates or knives there are on the table. As we have said, cardinal number can then be defined as that which is the same whenever the same cardinal number belongs to two concepts.

By way of illustration, Frege produces a definition of the "direction" of a straight line which proceeds according to the same principle. The direction of a line *a* is that which is the same if and only if line *a* and line *b* have the same direction. Here, once again, we find a characteristic circularity of expression. But no methodological circularity need correspond to it, provided it is possible to ascertain that two lines are identical in direction without already having determined the direction itself. And just as we can establish that two concepts *F* and *G* are identical in number without our having to compare the results of two counting processes (namely by setting up a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of the classes defined by the concepts), so in the present case we can establish that two lines are directionally identical without being forced first to determine the direction of the two lines, and then to compare the results. Two straight lines have the same direction if and only if they are parallel to one another. It is established that two lines are parallel to one another if they lie in the same plane and do not intersect. Since parallelism can be understood as a special case of identity (namely, as identity in direction), the following proposition is valid:

> "*a* is parallel to *b*" if and only if "the direction of *a* = the direction of *b*."

From this it follows that the direction of a line *a* is that which is the same whenever the lines *a* and *b* are parallel. And since in the case where *a* and *b* are parallel, the extension of the concept "line parallel to *a*" is identical with the extension of the concept "line parallel to *b*" (this is so because all lines parallel to *a* must also be parallel to *b*), Frege can define the direction

16. Frege, *op. cit.*, p. 73; or Austin, *tr. cit.*, p. 73e.

of a line *a* as the extension of the concept "line parallel to *a*."

There is a formal analogy between the concepts line, direction and parallelism, on the one hand, and concept, number and equinumerateness, on the other. The number of a concept *F* is also precisely that which is the same whenever the concepts *F* and *G* are equinumerate with one another. Equinumerateness can be established without ascertaining the number, just as the parallelism of lines can be ascertained without knowing their direction. It is likewise true that when *F* and *G* are equinumerate, all concepts equinumerate with *F* must also be equinumerate with *G*. For this reason, Frege can define the number of the concept *F* as the extension of the concept "concept equinumerate with *F*." Thus, to replace Frege's rigorous terminology with Russell's more manageable formulations, the number two becomes the class of couples, three the class of trios, and so on.

These references to Frege's work should suffice to give us a preliminary familiarity with a course of argumentation by which we shall attempt, in the following section, to draw closer to the concept of fact. We wished to define a fact as that which is the same whenever two different sentences, both of them true, express or represent the same fact. Such a definition will make sense only if we find ourselves able at all times to determine whether two sentences express the same fact, without our having determined in advance which fact they represent.

XII

Here we give up a simplification which has been maintained up to this point. We have called attention previously to the necessity of making this further distinction.[17]

We have been stressing that every sentence expresses its fact; a fact has been considered to be an event, etc., as a sentence represents it. According to this view, two sentences which represent, for example, the same event, one of them more generally, the other more exactly, would necessarily represent different facts. As a result we are tempted at first to think that different sentences would necessarily have to express different facts. As a corrective, we shall now make the following qualification: although it still holds true that different facts are always represented by different sentences, the possibility is by no means excluded that two different sentences represent precisely the same fact.

It seems convenient to make these relations clear with a few primitive examples:

(1) Fido bit a man this morning.

(2) Fido bit the postman.

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17. Cf. pp 185f, above.

(3) Fido bit the postman in his trousers' leg.
(4) The postman was bitten by Fido in his trousers' leg.
(5) A man was bitten by Fido this morning.
(6) Unfortunately, Fido bit the postman.
(7) Fido bit the postman, and that is regrettable.[18]

Sentences (1) to (7), we would say, all refer to one and the same event; nonetheless, all of them are different from one another. What we must now investigate is whether each of them expresses or represents a different fact as well (assuming that all are true). It is obvious that (1) and (2) represent different facts, even though they refer to one and the same event. If we were asked why we consider (1) and (2) to represent different facts, we would answer: because (1) could be true even if (2) is false, and (2) could be true despite the falsity of (1). For, as far as (1) goes, Fido could have bitten some man other than the postman; and likewise, as far as (2) goes, he could have bitten the postman yesterday or this afternoon or at some other time. In addition to the core of information common to both sentences (the information that Fido bit a man), the sentences contain further pieces of information which can be true or false independently of one another. Accordingly, sentences (1) and (2) express different facts.

The relation between sentences (2) and (3) is somewhat different (and this would hold of (2) and (6) as well). But here too we can say that the two sentences represent different facts, since sentence (3) can be false even if sentence (2) is true. For Fido could have bitten the postman in the hand, as far as (2) goes. Sentence (3) adds a piece of information which goes beyond what is said in (2), and thereby takes its own particular truth-risk. It is correct of course that (3) cannot be true if (2) is false, and that (2) cannot be false if (3) is true. But that does not change the fact that it is possible for the two sentences to differ in truth-value, and this is enough to justify a difference between the facts represented by them.

It is precisely this possibility of the two sentences having different truth-

18. Perhaps some readers will be offended by the banality of the sentences which I take as examples. In German philosophical literature, as distinct from Anglo-Saxon, it is still customary for writers to call attention to the significance of their philosophical argumentation by the very examples which they choose for illustration. So whoever would prefer sentences about spiral nebulae, the Battle of Marathon or Hölderlin's hymn "Wie wenn am Feiertage," instead of these complaints about Fido, should hear Plato's view on this matter. In the *Sophist* (227A 10ff.), Plato says that one can make the principles of hunting clear by considering either the general or the vermin destroyer. Anyone who prefers to use generalship here is not, he says, refined, but merely pretentious. On false refinement in philosophy, see also Plato's *Parmenides* (130C ff.) and Kant's essay "Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie" (1796; *Akademieausgabe,* Vol. VIII, pp. 387-406).

values which drops out in the case of sentences (3) and (4). It is impossible for one sentence to be true and the other false. And if someone asks how we know this, we shall take refuge in an appeal to the semantic rules of the language in which these sentences are formulated. We shall point out that for the transformation of a sentence whose predicate is an active, transitive verb into a sentence with the corresponding passive form of the verb, subject and object of the initial sentence are made object and subject, respectively, of the resulting sentence. We could also say that "biting" and "being bitten" are related to one another "conversely," in the sense of modern relational logic. And for these relations it holds in general that $xRy = yRx$; that is, that whenever x has relation R to y, y necessarily has the converse relation R to x (Whitehead-Russell, *Principia Mathematica* I, 31.11). Thus, because there are semantic rules for the language and logical rules by means of which each of the two sentences (3) and (4) can be derived from the other, we can be certain that no case will arise in which these sentences have different truth-values. This would seem to be the justification for our intuitive conviction that sentences (3) and (4) represent one and the same fact, even though they are worded differently.

Something similar could be said of sentences (1) and (5), and likewise of sentences (6) and (7)—although in this latter case, we find no law of logic which enables us to see that "unfortunately, p" (where p is a sentential variable) and "p, and it is regrettable that p" are synonymous. Here we would have to appeal to a linguistic fact which might not be acknowledged by everyone: it could be denied that "unfortunately, p" always means in effect "p, and it is regrettable that p." A storekeeper might tell a customer that "unfortunately" he has completely sold out his large supply of winter coats, and thus cannot provide the customer with one. Here we might be uncertain whether "unfortunately" is only a polite phrase without meaning, or whether the merchant, while indeed regretting his inability to provide the customer with a coat, does not by any means regret already having disposed of his large supply.[19] This example is only to remind us that in cases such as the relation between sentences (6) and (7), an unequivocal

19. In this latter case we seem to be faced with the usual imprecision of everyday language: in a sentence of the form "p and q," the "unfortunately" is placed with p rather than with q. The merchant actually wanted to say, "My supply of winter coats is (happily) sold out, and therefore, unfortunately, I cannot provide you with one." The shift here is similar to that in the frequent use of "I do not hope to see you here again" in place of "I hope not to see you here any more." In both cases, the speaker wishes to make clear the most essential thing—his regret or his negative attitude toward the situation—at the very beginning of the sentence. One sees that this is the motive for the shift when one considers how strange the sentences sound when their parts are transposed: "I cannot sell you a coat, because unfortunately I have already sold out my supply," or "To see you here again is something for which I do not hope."

decision cannot, perhaps, always be made, since the expressions of ordinary language do not always have genuinely precise meanings. But this much can indeed be said: for someone who has decided to interpret "unfortunately, *p*" as "*p*, and it is regrettable that *p*," sentences (6) and (7) cannot differ in their truth-values any more than sentences (3) and (4). Sentences which in this sense must have the same truth-value designate or describe the same fact, provided they are true.

As a result of these considerations, we find it possible to say that two true sentences represent the same fact whenever the truth of each one of the two sentences can be inferred from the truth of the other sentence solely on the basis of logical laws and the semantic rules of the language in which the sentences are formulated.[iii]

Two sentences which stand to one another in the described relation are said to be "logically equivalent" or, according to Carnap, "*L*-equivalent."[20] Adopting this terminology, we can say: Two *L*-equivalent sentences represent the same fact (if they are true). And moreover: The fact which a sentence *p* represents is precisely that which is the same whenever sentences *p* and *q* are *L*-equivalent.

If we were to pursue the train of thought which we found in Frege's definitions of cardinal number and the direction of a straight line through to the end, we would have to formulate the corresponding definition as follows: The fact which a sentence *p* represents is identical with the extension of the concept "sentence *L*-equivalent to *p*." However, this definition would carry us away from the plausible view which we took as a guideline in our more informal considerations. If we say that the fact which a true sentence represents coincides with the class of sentences *L*-equivalent to this sentence, this result would in any case have little to do with what we ordinarily understand by "fact." Here the concept of the "proposition" as the meaning of a declarative sentence—a concept which is suspect because of internal problems regarding its Janus-faced, linguistic-extralinguistic status—appears as a rival to the concept of fact.[21] We are not obliged to follow Frege at this point, however; indeed, because the question we have posed is different, we are not even justified in taking over his solution, for the concept of "cardinal number" is a mathematical concept, as is the concept of linear direction. Frege correctly stresses that every definition in the realm of mathematics is legitimate if it allows the definiendum precisely those properties which are used in mathematical propositions about the object defined.

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20. Cf. R. Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity,* third edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 7-16.
21. For a "proposition" has been defined by several authors as a class of equivalent sentences.

iii. This sentence was modified by the author for the present translation.

We, however, were attempting to say with greater precision just what we actually mean when we speak of facts. And it seems certain that we did not have anything like *L*-equivalence-classes of true sentences obscurely in mind, even if it should be true that everything which can be said correctly of facts would also hold for *L*-equivalence-classes of true sentences, and vice versa. But after what has been said, it will not be difficult to find out what facts are, assuming that our considerations have been correct up to this point.

XIII

But first, we should test the view which R. Carnap sets forth in *Meaning and Necessity* immediately following his definition of the expression "*L*-equivalence" (an expression of which we ourselves have already made use). For this view, it seems to me, stands in the way of a more straightforward interpretation which otherwise would surely have suggested itself to Carnap. Carnap did, after all, have at his disposal the concepts which we have developed here. Carnap says[22] that the fact which must be present if the sentence "this piece of paper is blue" is true cannot simply be the fact that this piece of paper is blue. For in reality, he maintains, there is no color which is blue simply speaking. There are only certain shades of blue, say the shades blue_1, blue_2, . . . blue_n. A piece of paper must have one of these shades, say blue_5, if we are to be correct in calling it blue. But according to Carnap, not even this fact can be "completely specific," and a fact must be fully specific, fully definite; the paper's other properties would have to be stated as well. Among these properties would be included the relations which the object under discussion bears to all other objects in the universe. Thus we would be forced to acknowledge that there is but one fully specific fact, namely "the totality of the actual world" (*op. cit.*, p. 29). Carnap himself avoids this consequence of his specificity requirement. He restricts himself to an informal use of the term "fact," for purposes of preliminary clarification only. As everyone with some knowledge of the history of philosophy will note at once, Carnap is treading on classical paths of philosophic speculation here: one finds his argumentation directly reminiscent of the Leibnizian doctrine that every monad reflects the entire world; one also recalls Hegel's thesis that the True is the Whole. It is worthy of note that Frege too seems to approach such views on occasion, especially when he introduces "the True" as the referent of all true propositions, and defines judging as a distinguishing of parts within the truth-value, as an ever-differing analysis of the truth-value.[23]

None of these solutions is satisfactory if presented as an explication of the concept of fact which is familiar to us all. If in answer to the question

22. Carnap, *op. cit.*, p. 28f.

"what is a fact?" a philosopher explains that there is actually only a single fact, and that this fact is nothing other than the world, we shall be inclined to say that such facts were not what we meant. We saw that Carnap avoided such consequences, preferring to leave the concept of fact in obscurity. W. Stegmueller has this discussion in mind when he remarks, in his book *Das Wahrheitsproblem und die Idee der Semantik,* that there are still a number of unsolved problems regarding the concept of fact.[24]

XIV

If one asks what the sentence "Fido bit the postman" represents, it seems that one must answer—"simply and naively and foolishly perhaps," as Plato's Socrates would say[25]—that the fact which this sentence represents is just this: that Fido bit the postman, no more and no less. (With this answer, Carnap's problem of specificity has disappeared.) And if we are asked when the sentence "Fido bit the postman" is true, we will once again be able to answer only as follows: the sentence is true if and only if Fido bit the postman. The fact which a sentence *p* represents, expresses, or describes is precisely that which must be present if the sentence *p* is true. Thus the fact which a sentence represents is the totality of truth conditions for this sentence. The traditional correspondence theory of truth is in its intention quite correct; the mistake is merely the idea (an idea readily suggested by the theory, to be sure) that we could place ourselves between the sentence and the fact, so to speak, in order to compare the two with one another and establish their correspondence or non-correspondence, as the case might be.

Learning a language is essentially appropriation of the truth conditions of sentences, and then, along the way, appropriation also of the meanings of the words which appear in these sentences. The truth conditions of such primitive assertions as "this is red," "that is hot," and so on, are simplest to grasp. On the basis of these original correspondences between linguistic expressions and simple situations, the relations which sentences of complex structure bear to their truth conditions are built up gradually, by means of a series of differentiations. The logical rules which serve to introduce the logical particles "and," "or," "not," "if-then," "all," and "some"

23. G. Frege, "Sinn und Bedeutung," *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik,* N.F. 100 (1892), pp. 25-50, especially p. 36; reprinted in G. Frege, *Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung,* ed. G. Patzig, fourth edition (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975), pp. 40-65; or M. Black, trans., "On Sense and Reference," in *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege,* ed. M. Black and P. Geach, second edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1970), pp. 56-78.

24. W. Stegmüller, *Das Wahrheitsproblem und die Idee der Semantik* (Vienna: Springer, 1957), p. 141, note.

25. *Phaedo* 100D: ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως ἐυήθως.

define some of the truth conditions for all those sentences which are built up with their help. In many cases, even with sentences that are simple in structure, subtle reflections are needed in order to ascertain the truth conditions. When someone says, for example, that a book is "exciting," we expect that the speaker (a) has himself read the book with excitement, (b) believes that the person with whom he is communicating would also read it with excitement, and (c) thinks that a majority of readers would make a similar judgment. If one of these conditions is not met, this must be added explicitly. One could say for example, "It is an exciting book, but not perhaps for someone like you who has no interest in sports," or "It is an exciting book for people who have an understanding of economic relations." Mastery of the fine points relating to such stipulations makes up a considerable part of what could be called "competence in linguistic expression." One can speak here of the "rules of the game" which decide the truth conditions of sentences. In these rules, a thousand threads seem to establish the connection between language and reality. Sentences are not so much pictures of reality as predictions or promises about the outcome of possible actions, actions which could be designated "truth tests."

We arrive at the following result: There are facts, but only to the extent that there are truth conditions of sentences. If we wish to retain Wittgenstein's distinction between "states of affairs" and "facts," we can say that states of affairs are truth conditions of sentences, while facts are fulfilled truth conditions. There can be no such truth conditions of sentences without creatures capable of speech. But this qualification does not transform facts into merely linguistic entities. There can be no visible objects without creatures capable of sight, either. But just as it makes sense to speak of visible objects which no one sees and which no one has yet seen, so there can be facts which have not as yet been represented by someone in a sentence. This is indeed precisely the reason it is possible to discover new facts, and also to create new facts (as for example a *fait accompli*).

According to the preceding discussion, the sentence "x is a fact" is true if and only if there is a sentence p of a language L such that x is a fulfillment of the truth condition of p.

XV

We wish now to test this clarification of the concept of fact to see whether it satisfies the criterion which we developed in connection with our discussion of Frege.

From what has been said up to this point, it follows that:

(1) Two facts F_1 and F_2 are identical if F_1 is the fulfillment of the truth conditions for all and only those sentences whose truth conditions are also fulfilled by F_2.

(2) Two true sentences p and q are logically equivalent to each other

if all and only those facts which fulfill the truth conditions of p also fulfill the truth conditions of q. (The class of such facts will have one element only.)[iv]

(3) "Sentence p describes fact F" means: "The fact F fulfills the truth conditions of all and only those sentences which are logically equivalent to p."

From these three propositions, it follows that every sentence p describes at most one fact. Two different facts can never be described by one and the same sentence. And conversely, two sentences which describe the same fact are logically equivalent to one another.

This obviously suffices to persuade us that our clarification of the concept of fact satisfies the requirements of our criterion. If we view facts as the fulfilled truth conditions of sentences, then we can certainly say that a fact is that which is the same whenever two sentences p and q are true and logically equivalent to one another.

XVI

To this conclusion, I would now like to add a few informal remarks. It would seem useful for me to deal with certain immediate objections to the view presented, objections which might be summed up in the question: "Can we recognize in the fulfilled truth conditions of a sentence p the very fact represented or designated or described by sentence p?" Truth conditions, it could be objected, are somewhat intangible; they are not immediately real and sturdy, as we would expect facts to be. Such reservations I consider well-founded; nonetheless, I regard the proposed solution as a tenable one. My reasons are as follows:

We cannot by any means get rid of the internal duality in the concept of fact. The solution proposed here seems to me preferable to previous clarifications precisely because it emphasizes this essential feature of the concept of fact. The concept of fulfilled truth conditions also has this internal duality, of course. Perhaps some readers will feel that in our clarification of the concept of fact, the relation of facts to language becomes all too close and the independence of facts from our speech and thought turns out less clear than we would like.

This criticism loses its urgency, however, if we consider the concept of truth conditions as parallel to the concept of an organism's "survival conditions" (*Lebensbedingungen*). Admittedly, this parallel has its limits. If it did not, we would have been wrong in our initial thesis that the relation between facts and sentences is a quite unique one for which no other relation can be taken as a model. But the parallel does go far enough to enable us to clear up the difficulties to some extent by means of an analogy. The relation

iv. This sentence was modified by the author for the present translation.

of an organism to its survival conditions is not, to be sure, an exact model for the relation of true sentences to facts. But it does seem to come closer to this peculiar and unique relation than the models discussed heretofore. Talk of the survival conditions of certain organisms is familiar to everyone from biology and ecology. We know, for example, that the survival conditions which must be present in order for human beings to exist can be precisely stated. Since the specifics do not fall within our sphere of expertise, let it suffice to mention that the possibility of human existence is bound up with a certain chemical composition of the atmosphere, with a certain constant level of atmospheric pressure, with an average temperature between about -60° and +60° Celsius, with a certain gravitational force on the surface of the celestial body to be inhabited, and so on. Sources of nutrition, protection from radiation and many other things are also factors. These environmental conditions could no doubt exist even if there were no human beings. They certainly existed on the surface of the earth long before the era in which *homo sapiens* emerged as a distinct species. Specialists now date this emergence in the period from two million to one million years before the present era. The biological conditions for human existence are thus independent of human beings and their existence in the strong sense that they demonstrably preceded human existence in time. But it is also true of course that one can speak meaningfully of these survival conditions as conditions for human existence in particular only if one knows what human beings are. (The fact that human beings are necessary for meaningful speech in general can be left out of consideration here.) In the same way, biologists can state certain well-defined conditions which make it possible for fish to live in a river. These conditions must exist before fish can live in such surroundings. One can describe these conditions objectively, without mentioning fish at all; but one cannot speak of them as the survival conditions for fish without presupposing the existence of fish, or without at least presupposing such familiarity with the organism as justifies us in making such observations. Every organism selects from the whole of reality a partial region which we can define as its survival conditions. In order for the organism to exist, these conditions simply must be met (and that is of course the reason they are called its survival conditions). On the other hand, these conditions cannot be called "survival conditions" unless the kind of organism for which they are supposed to be such is stated in advance. Thus survival conditions are—to use a phrase of Aristotle's for our own purposes—"prior according to time and being" to the organism whose survival conditions they are. But they are "posterior according to thought and knowledge" to the organism which depends on them.

Within certain limits of analogy, the case is similar for fulfilled truth conditions or facts. I would almost like to recommend that, insofar as it is possible, the term "truth conditions" should be taken as "survival conditions" is taken. Just as an organism can live only in an area where its survival conditions are fulfilled, and dies off as soon as these conditions are

changed in an essential way, so a sentence can only be true so long as its truth conditions are fulfilled. The totality of these truth conditions is then the fact which it describes or expresses. The truth conditions for a sentence *p* can have existed (though they need not have) before the sentence had ever been expressed, before the relevant thought had ever been conceived. But they cannot be viewed as facts unless the sentence whose truth conditions they are is presented and formulated.

For any organism, even a hypothetical one, if we have an exact knowledge of the organism's biological peculiarities, then it must be possible to state its survival conditions in their entirety. Likewise, for every meaningful sentence, it is possible to state the truth conditions which must be fulfilled if the sentence is to be true. With Wittgenstein, we call the truth conditions of any meaningful declarative sentence a "state of affairs." On the other hand, we call fulfilled truth conditions the "fact" which the sentence represents or describes. Just as we could say that an organism defines or projects a totality of survival conditions, so we could say that a sentence *p*, if it is meaningful, projects or defines a totality of truth conditions. Such a sentence is true if the state of affairs which it projects is a fact. Another interesting parallel between truth conditions and survival conditions is the following: In neither case are human beings limited to observing whether or not the present environmental circumstances fulfill the truth conditions or the survival conditions of an organism. For we can change the circumstances, at least within a limited range, so that they become survival conditions for a given organism or truth conditions for a given sentence. Space travel technology offers a characteristic example of the former, of course, as does the maintenance of exotic fresh water fish in an aquarium. As an example of the second procedure, we can take any case where a promise is fulfilled or a plan is put into action.

But however suggestive the analogy between survival conditions and truth conditions may be, it is nonetheless limited in principle by the fact that the attribute of truth is not a real attribute of sentences in the way the attribute of being alive is a real characteristic of organisms. A true sentence does not differ from a false sentence as a living organism differs from a dead one. The change from "true" to "false" is not a temporal transition like that from life to death.

XVII

By showing up a similar structure in the concept of the survival conditions of organisms, we have weakened those objections which might be directed at our clarification on the grounds that it allows facts too little independence from language. I would now like to make a few remarks about another objection to the view I propose—an objection that is related to the one just discussed, though still different. Apart from the problem of the in-

dependence of facts from language, one would still like to be able to point to something sturdy, something concrete, something visible, so to speak, as the meaning (*Bedeutung*) of an individual sentence. For every complete sentence *p*, there must be something—a piece of reality, as it were—which is "the meaning" of *p*. By contrast, truth conditions and totalities of fulfilled truth conditions appear abstract and not very tangible. Now anyone who holds this view is, it seems to me, orienting himself unwittingly to the simplest kind of relation between linguistic signs and real existences: namely, that which a proper name bears to the object which it designates. When the name "Napoleon" is spoken, we see the man clearly before us; when we hear the name "Berlin," we associate a surveyable urban landscape within which some prominent details are present to us. On mentioning the South Pole, we can at least imagine a "conceptual point" about which fur-coated men are grouped with their dogs or caterpillar-tractors. And since images also come to us when we hear sentences like "Brutus murdered Caesar" or "Snow fell tonight," we think that the content of these images must be the meaning of the sentence in question. Yet our investigation showed how misleading it is to view sentences as pictures having facts as their subject-matter. Further, many by no means complicated sentences clearly arouse no images which we might be in danger of confusing with the fact expressed by the sentence. Consider the sentences "Karl has an intelligence quotient of 135," or "The negotiations in Vienna on arms limitation seem to have reached a deadlock," or even a scientific statement like "The radius vectors drawn from the sun to the planets describe equal areas in equal times." These sentences cannot be understood as though the concrete images were an adequate representation of the facts they express. The expectation that even sentences must have tangible pieces of reality as their objects is nurtured by the unjustified prejudice that whatever holds true for proper names must also hold true for sentences. Once we have made this situation clear to ourselves, the intangibility of the meanings of sentences, which had been felt as a defect, should not trouble us further.

HOW SUBSTANCE-CONCEPTS FUNCTION IN INDICATING AND COUNTING OBJECTS*

Hans-Ulrich Hoche

Translated by Gerhard Heyer

I

Essentially I have three theses for which I hope, in the following, to supply some arguments:

(1) Not only counting (as Herbart has already remarked and as is well known since Frege), but simply indicating objects already requires the contribution of concepts and thus of language.
(2) Not all kinds of concepts are equally suitable for indicating and counting objects.
(3) Those concepts which are suitable for this purpose in a definite sense coincide in large degree with the Aristotelian substance-concepts, viz. with the species and genera of individuals or 'First Substances' which are referred to as 'Second Substances' in Aristotle's *Categories.*[1]

Because of the third of these theses it seems justified to speak, for the sake of brevity, of 'substance-concepts' and their role in indicating and

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* Translated from "Über die Rolle von Substanzbegriffen beim Zeigen und Zählen von Gegenständen," *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* (Meisenheim: Anton Hain, 1975), Band 29, Heft 3, pp. 337-48.

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1. *Categories* (Oxford University Press), 2a 11ff.

counting objects. In the following I shall contrast such 'substance-concepts,' again using the Aristotelian terminology, with 'quality-concepts,' as well as with a kind of mixed concepts which I shall characterize as 'qualitatively or quantitatively hybrid substance-concepts.' Similarly, Strawson has distinguished between 'substance-names' and 'material-names.'[2] Corresponding to this, in his book *Individuals* there is the distinction between 'sortal universals' and 'characterizing universals.'[3] Quine talks instead of 'terms with divided reference' and 'mass terms.'[4] Whorf has the opposition of 'individual nouns' and 'mass nouns' within what he calls SAE (Standard Average European) Languages.[5] In all these cases, however, the difference between 'pure' and 'qualitatively or quantitatively hybrid' substance-concepts is not emphasized.

II

By using a terminology which refers back to Aristotle's doctrines on substance and categories, I do not want to commit myself to these doctrines. In particular, I do not want to assert that the concepts which mainly come into consideration in indicating and counting objects are something like 'genera' or 'species' of individuals. For this would mean bringing in questions the discussion of which would quite unnecessarily burden the treatment of the present topic.

Quite generally, I want to understand by a 'concept' precisely that whose linguistic signification can enter into any declarative or assertive sentence as a one-place predicate-expression (as a 'concept-word' in Frege's terminology or as a one-place 'predicator' in Carnap's sense).[6] Although this definition might give rise to equally extensive and interesting discussions, it should suffice for the present purpose, for which it is irrelevant whether, e.g., we interpret a concept, beyond that definition, with Frege as

2. P.F. Strawson, "Particular and General," in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 54 (1954),* pp. 233-260.
3. P.F. Strawson, *Individuals* (London: Methuen, 1959), pp. 168ff.
4. W.V.O. Quine, *Word and Object* (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1960), pp. 90ff. Vide in particular his remarks on this terminology p. 90 n. 1, and p. 91, n. 3.
5. B.L. Whorf, *Language, Thought, and Reality* [Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1972 (first published 1956)], pp. 140f.
6. Cf. Frege, "Funktion und Begriff" (1891), in G. Frege, *Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung. Fünf logische Studien,* ed. and intr. by G. Patzig (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, ^{2} 1966), pp. 17-39; or G. Frege, "Function and Concept," in *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege,* eds. P.T. Geach and M. Black (Oxford: Blackwell, ^{2} 1960), pp. 21-42; R. Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, ^{2} 1956), p. 6.

the 'reference' (or 'extension'), or with Carnap as the 'intension' (or 'sense') of the concept-expression, or whether, with Lorenzen, we take it to be what all 'synonymous' ('intensionally equivalent') concept-expressions have in common.[7]

Likewise, regarding the explanation of what I want to understand by the objects to be indicated and counted, too many details would only be confusing in the present context. Bearing in mind what has been said by Frege and particularly by Husserl,[8] one could, of course, define an 'object' (in the wider sense of the word) as precisely that whose linguistic signification can, as a subject-expression, enter into a true or false declarative or assertive sentence. But the objects we are concerned to indicate and count in the following are 'objects' in the narrower sense of the word, viz., 'individuals' or 'things.' I admit that it might be possible to define an 'individual' or 'thing' purely logically and formally as what can be designated by a subject-expression of lowest level, that is, by a subject-expression which did not result initially from a predicate-expression or a whole declarative sentence through logical transformation; but to make this definition sufficiently precise would be rather complicated and time-consuming.[9] So when, in the following considerations, I shall speak of indicating and counting objects, the reader should simply think of concrete, temporally and spatially determined, individual objects—of spatial things such as cities, houses, trees, animals, human beings, or books (as tokens!)—but not, for example, of facts, events, properties, contents of consciousness, numbers, etc.[10]

III

Let us begin with the problem of *indicating* individuals. What is in ques-

7. Cf. Frege, "Ausführungen über Sinn und Bedeutung," in G. Frege, *Nachgelassene Schriften,* eds. H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, F. Kaulbach (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969), pp. 128-136; R. Carnap, *op cit.* para. 4; P. Lorenzen, *Normative Logic and Ethics* (Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut, 1969), pp. 17f.; W. Kamlah and P. Lorenzen, *Logische Propädeutik oder Vorschule des vernünftigen Redens* (Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut, 1967), chapter III, para. 4.
8. Cf. *Husserliana III,* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), pp. 15, 48; or *Ideas (General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology)*, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 49, 80; critical on this sort of project is Quine, *Word and Object,* p. 242.
9. Cf. E. Husserl, *Husserliana XVII* (Formale und transzendentale Logik), (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), para. 82 f.; and on this point, H.U. Hoche, *Nichtempirische Erkenntnis—Analytische und synthetische Urteile a priori bei Kant und bei Husserl,* Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung Bd. 35 (Meisenheim: Verlag Anton Hain, 1964), pp. 84-86.
10. Cf. Strawson, *Individuals,* Part I.

tion here can be made comprehensible in the following way. If we understand by a concept (to summarize what was said above) anything whose linguistic signification is a one-place predicate (of any level), and if we understand by a thing or individual anything whose linguistic signification is a subject-term of lowest level, then we can say: whereas concepts can be defined (if, and as far as, it is necessary), individuals can be identified.

The identification of an individual can take very different forms and can be, at the one extreme, a wordless demonstrating or indicating; at the other extreme, a purely linguistic act in which not only gestures of pointing are dispensed with, but even context-dependent words or 'token-reflexives' like "this," "here," "now," "left of me," and so on, so that one may even be tempted to believe it is a kind of definition. We shall soon see, however, that identification and definition are two ways of determination which are to be separated sharply.

Following the Russellian terminology, I shall call any form of identification that can succeed in a purely linguistic manner—and thus can dispense with gestures of pointing—a 'definite description,' and I shall do so irrespective of whether or not 'token-reflexive' ('egocentric') expressions are being used. In all other cases—that is, in all cases in which the identifying person has to make use of gestures of pointing—I shall speak of an 'indicating' or a 'deictic act.'

On the basis of these terminological stipulations, we can say that one can identify an individual either by indicating (pointing it out or pointing to it, as the case may be), or else by describing it linguistically: for example, as the chairman of the present meeting of the faculty, or—much less dependent on the context—as the Dean of the Department of Philosophy, Pedagogy, and Psychology of the Ruhr-Universität Bochum during the winter-semester 1971/72.

Concerning the definite descriptions of individuals, we are now led to say that they are not entirely without the element of pointing, the deictic element; it is only banished from the actual situation of communication, viz. moved further, and sometimes very far, into the background. For every definite description by means of which the identification of an individual can really succeed[11] must contain, besides predicate-expressions, designations of individuals (including individual points in space-time); and although one could again describe those individuals, one is bound to end up in such a regression—in such a sequence of definite descriptions—sooner or later with individuals which one has to show to the partner of communication (unless they have been shown to him already on another occasion). The

11. Cf. Strawson's objections to 'pure individuating descriptions' like "the first dog to be born at sea," and 'quasi-pure individuating descriptions' like "the tallest man who ever lived," *Individuals,* pp. 26-28. Cf. also J.R. Searle, *Speech Acts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 86.

deictic element, which comes into play explicitly in pointing, is thus still implicitly contained in the linguistic description; and thereby also the most context-independent description of an individual—a classic example being the description of Homer as "the author of the 'Iliad' and the 'Odyssey' "—differs fundamentally from the definition of a concept.

We may express this fact as follows: However far-reaching the community of communication within which one can successfully describe, or otherwise identify, individuals, it is nevertheless always a real, factual, historical community of communication which differs fundamentally from the ideal community of communication of all rational men (even of all imaginable rational beings in general—one might think of the possible inhabitants of other planets), within which, with the prospect of success, one can define and communicate everything, the only exception being individually identified objects.

The fundamental difference between particular historical or factual 'communities of identification' and an all-embracing ideal 'community of definition,' which is hinted at in the foregoing, certainly raises a number of extraordinarily difficult problems, the discussion of which has no longer anything to do with my subject. What we are concerned with at present is the *indicating* of individuals or things, and what I mean to say by this should have become sufficiently clear in the course of the foregoing attempt to delimit it as against *describing* as well as *defining*.

IV

The *indicating* of individuals, very much like *counting,* and for a quite similar reason, cannot dispense with the contribution of concepts and, by the same token, with concept-words. Even seemingly inarticulate indicating is therefore, like counting, not an act entirely free from language.

With respect to *counting,* this insight—at least as a methodologically substantiated one[12]—goes back to Gottlob Frege. In his *Foundations of Arithmetic* (1884), Frege calls to mind that one cannot possibly count anything without, as he says, bringing into play a "word," a "terminology,"[13] and with that "the way in which we have chosen to regard it":[14] " . . . if I place a pile of playing cards in [someone's] hands with the words: 'Find the number of these,' this does not tell him whether I wish to know the number of cards, or of complete packs of cards, or even, say, of

12. Cf. in respect of this restriction the mention of Herbart in Husserl *Philosophie der Arithmetik, Husserliana XII* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 140, 161.

13. *The Foundations of Arithmetic/Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik,* German Text with English Translation by J.L. Austin (Oxford: Blackwell, ^{2} 1974), p. 59e.

14. *Foundations of Arithmetic* (FA), p. 29e.

honour cards at skat. To have given him the pile in his hands is not yet to have given him completely the object he is to investigate; I must add some further word—cards, or packs, or honours."[15]

In general, we can say that a task of counting is reasonably or meaningfully posed (viz. in such a way that it can be carried out) only if one of the two following conditions is fulfilled:

(1) We have been given information as to the following two questions: within which spatially and temporally delimited part of the world we are supposed to count, and under which general aspect, that is, by means of which concept, we are to do so. Having been told that much, we know that we are supposed to count precisely those things that fall under the specified concept within the specified spatio-temporal part of the world—e.g., everything and only that of which we can say that, on the one hand, it presently lies on this table and, on the other, is a book. This, however, is a twofold *conceptual* specification. Even though it is true that the expression "this table" stands for an individual, none the less the more comprehensive expression, "presently lies on this table," is as much a concept-word as the expression, "is a book." We can combine both these concept-expressions into one, viz. into the compound or 'molecular' concept-expression, "is a book which presently lies on this table"; or, in a half-formalized presentation, "x is a book and x presently lies on this table." Now we are to count all and only those things whose linguistic significations, when inserted into the blanks or 'argument-places' marked by the letter "x," complete this molecular concept-expression to form a true declarative sentence; and this simply amounts to saying: We are supposed to count all and only those things that may be subsumed under the concept, "book which presently lies on this table," or fall under this concept, or are instantiations of this concept.

(2) We have been given no spatially and temporally delimited part of the world; instead, the concept-expression which is to guide us in counting is derived from a relation-expression (polyadic predicate-expression) by means of partial saturation or completion. For example, the expression, "x is a personal student of Aristotle" is such a concept-expression; for of this expression we can say, if we like, that it resulted from the relation-expression, "x is a personal student of y" by inserting the individual-expression "Aristotle" into the blank or 'argument-place' marked by "y." In such a case the concept-expression contains as a constituent an individual-expression,[16] and the latter replaces in many cases—but not in all—the specification of a spatially and temporally delimited part of the world.

Generally speaking: The only things we can count are either instantiations

15. *FA,* pp. 28ef.
16. Strawson would talk of 'universals-cum-particulars,' *Individuals,* pp. 137, 189. Cf. also Quine, *Word and Object,* p. 106.

of a molecular concept whose expression includes a spatio-temporal specification, or else instantiations of a concept whose expression has been derived from a polyadic predicate-expression by inserting individual-expressions into the surplus blanks. Only concepts of one or the other of these kinds—let me comprehensively call them 'individually bound' concepts—have a determinable finite number; only they are concepts that render counting possible, or are 'counting-concepts,' as I shall say for short. Thus one cannot count either books or philosophical books or sons and daughters, but instead, e.g., the books which were available on Dec. 18, 1971 in the university-library of Bochum, or the dependant children who must be taken into account for Mr. Jones' income-tax for 1978.

That also in *indicating*, concepts explicitly or implicitly must come into play for this is due to a fact that can be justified even more simply: for this is due to the fact that gestures of pointing in themselves are always ambiguous.[17] If, in any particular case, it is not clear already from the details of the deictic situation, or from the preceding words, what exactly (that is, the instantiation of what concept) I intend to indicate, I must—at the latest on further inquiry—explicitly add the appropriate concept-word and say, for example, "I am talking of the minute-hand of my watch and not of its plexiglass-cover." So I conclude that indicating as well as counting, and by the same token also the construction of unambiguous subject-expressions for predication, can succeed only if, explicitly or implicitly, one makes use of a concept-word.

17. This remains true even if we were to emphasize (it is not even possible to say "complete" or "support") the gesture of pointing by uttering a demonstrative pronoun like "this." This fact has often been recognized, but as often been overlooked. For example, it is recognized in C.K. Ogden & I.A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning* (London: Routledge, 1923), Ch. IV; L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen* (Schriften I), (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1960), para. 28; or *Philosophical Investigations,* trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), para. 28; J.R. Searle, *Speech Acts,* p. 86. Using a striking expression from J.L. Austin, *Sense and Sensibilia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 68f., we could say: The demonstrative "this"—which, as it were, is nothing but a linguistic 'extension' of the gesture of pointing—is 'substantive-hungry.' However, the substantives which the demonstrative "this" requires do not include the pseudo concept-words "object" or "thing" (cf. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus logico-philosophicus,* 4.1272); this fact is not recognized in Kamlah-Lorenzen, *Logische Propädeutik,* pp. 114f. (but also cf. ch. I, para. 5). The 'substantive-hunger' of "this" (or the fact that the word "thing" cannot satisfy this hunger) appears to be overlooked also in Searle, *Speech Acts,* p. 117, and in G. Prauss, *Erscheinung bei Kant* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1971), pp. 41, 194-96, 230-34. In both cases it ought to be examined in detail whether, or to what extent, this is of consequence for the respective philosophical argumentation.

V

We must now pay particular attention to the fact that by no means are all concepts equally suitable for indicating and counting. Many concepts are of no use for either counting or indicating, while many others are good for indicating but not for counting. It will soon become apparent that all counting-concepts are also indicating-concepts, whereas the reverse is not true. Thus even more is required of counting-concepts than is required of indicating-concepts. For this reason, I shall concentrate on the discussion of the nature of counting-concepts, and treat the nature of indicating-concepts only marginally.

Frege himself has noticed that even an individually bound concept need not always be a counting-concept. He states the following condition for being a counting-concept: "Only a concept which isolates what falls under it in a definite manner, and which does not permit any arbitrary division of it into parts, can be a unit relative to a finite Number."[18] According to Frege, the concept "red," for example, does not satisfy this condition, even if one thinks of it as individually bound in a definite way. Hence the concept "red thing presently to be found in this or that china shop" is not a counting-concept for precisely the reason that we—aided, perhaps, by the proverbial bull—can reduce into parts whatever is subsumed under this concept "in a variety of ways, without the parts thereby ceasing to fall under the same concept."[19]

For the same reason, the concept of what is made of china is not a counting-concept, even if it is individually bound in this or that manner; for the fragments of a china plate consist of china, too.

If we interpret the concepts "red" and "made of china" as quality-concepts in the sense of the Aristotelian list of categories, that is, as concepts of the 'poión,' we can say now that not every quality-concept—and possibly, indeed presumably, none at all—is a counting-concept, even if, as here is always to be assumed, it is individually bound in any way whatsoever.

For quite a different reason than the quality-concepts we have considered so far, concepts like "tree" or "bush," and strictly speaking even concepts like "book," prove to be no counting concepts. (Later I shall characterize these concepts as qualitatively or quantitatively hybrid substance-concepts.) Let us put ourselves in the position of, say, a gardener's apprentice who has been ordered to list in two columns the number of trees and of bushes still found in a garden which is to be replanted. The apprentice will be able to carry this order out only in unusually favourable circumstances. For example, he only needs to come to an 'indecisively' grown horn-

18. *FA*, p. 66e.
19. *FA*, p. 66e.

beam to doubt straightaway whether this is a tree or rather a bush.

The cause of this is, as we can say with Frege, that in the case of concepts such as "tree" or "bush" we are not "able to decide definitely about every object whether it falls under that concept or not"; in other words, that "the limits to its application" are not "sharp."[20] A concept of this kind, however, is for Frege really "no concept at all;"[21] or, to put it better, concept-expressions like "is a tree" or "is a bush" are in a comparable sense 'without reference' (though not, according to Frege's well-known distinction, 'senseless') as, for example, the subject-expression "Hans im Glück" which appears in the fairy-tale of the same name.[22]

Against this position of Frege's, Wittgenstein seems to be right in raising the objection that concepts which can be delimited "for a particular purpose"—e.g., for the purpose of counting—are still good for many other purposes even before they have been delimited in any such way.[23] For example, the concept-word "book" ("is a book," "x is a book") is not only usable, but indeed indispensable, and yet it would be inevitable to delimit its application if one were to find out the precise number of books in a library on a certain day. For one could raise the question whether two or three sheets of paper, properly printed and bound, should already be called a "book," or whether, when taking stock, one ought to consider also a dummy-copy from the book-fair.

VI

Following these considerations, we can roughly divide those concepts which are not to be used for counting—that is, those which are no counting-concepts—into two classes, to the first of which belong quality-concepts of a kind like "red" or "made of china," and to the other concepts like "tree," "bush," and "book." For the first of these classes it is characteristic that also the parts (or at least many parts) of the objects falling under the respective concepts fall themselves under these very same concepts; for the second, however—while *this* is not true (the part of a tree is itself a tree only in highly exceptional cases, if at all, etc.)—it is characteristic that one cannot determine unambiguously for each and every object whether or not it may be subsumed under the respective concept. In other words: A concept of the first class (such as the concept "red") cannot

20. *FA*, p. 87e.
21. G. Frege, *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik,* begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet, Vol. I (Jena: H. Pohle, 1893), p. 9 n.3.
22. Cf. "Ausführungen über Sinn und Bedeutung," *Nachgelassene Schriften,* p. 133.
23. *Philosophische Untersuchungen,* or *Philosophical Investigations,* paras. 67-71.

be used for (spatially) delimiting each one of its individual instantiations piece by piece, and a concept of the second class (such as the concept "tree") cannot be used for (conceptually) delimiting the extension of its individual instantiations altogether. These are two quite distinct insufficiencies of delimitation, which nevertheless both lead to the same result: the concept is no counting-concept.[24]

If we now consider what these concepts, which, for two quite different reasons, are not counting-concepts, have in common, we can say (with Aristotle) that throughout they are not species and genera that can be regarded as pure substance-concepts, but partly (like the concepts "red" and "made of china") non-substantial quality-concepts, and partly (like the concepts "tree," "bush," and "book") qualitatively or quantitatively hybrid substance-concepts.

By the latter I mean the following: The concept-word "book," for example, does not designate a pure substance-concept because in applying it to individual objects, we do not only consider the instrumental character of these objects—the purpose they are to fulfill, their role in the practice of human life; in short, their practical function—but in addition refer to qualitative and quantitative characteristics which have nothing at all to do with the practical function of a written or printed text, and which do not belong to the concept of such a text (again speaking with Aristotle) "*kath'hautó*," and thus are not 'intrinsic' to it. For a similar reason, the concept-words "horn-beam" or "mountain-elder" designate pure substance-concepts (for they are oriented exclusively on similarities and differences of complicated biological functions and function-dependant organizations); however, the concept-words "tree" and "bush" do not. For the application of the latter concept-expressions is an attempt (for many purposes, of course, sufficient and useful) to divide into sub-concepts the biologically delimited, or at least delimitable, concept of a plant by means of qualitative and quantitative characteristics which do not belong to it *"kath'hautó,"* that is, "by virtue of its own nature."

Neither quality-concepts nor qualitatively or quantitatively hybrid substance-concepts are thus counting-concepts. Examining now these two kinds of concepts with regard to their use in *indicating,* we realize that whereas the quality-concepts cannot, the hybrid substance-concepts can well be used in indicating. That these two kinds of concepts, coinciding with regard to being no counting-concepts, none the less differ with regard to their suitability for indicating must not, however, surprise us.

24. Both insufficiencies of delimitation can happen to be represented by *one* concept. This is true also for the concept "red:" Not only are the parts of this or that red thing themselves red, but also the colour red merges continuously into the neighbouring colours of the colour-spectrum, which, as is well known, is the reason why a colour may be delimited in a variety of ways by various languages.

That the designations of quality-concepts are not really suitable for indicating and, by this token, for the construction of subject-expressions, should be clear after what has been said before: The concept "red," for example, does not delimit, as Frege put it, what falls under it in a definite manner, but permits of an arbitrary division of it into parts; and so, whenever I indicate "that red over there," it cannot be unequivocally certain what I am talking of unless another concept explicitly or implicitly comes into play. In contrast, demonstrative expressions are already of unrestricted use for the deictic act if they have been derived from significations for qualitatively or quantitatively hybrid substance-concepts, examples being the demonstrative expressions "this tree" or "this book." The reason for this is easily perceived: In distinction to counting, for indicating only the delimitation of the individual itself, and not the delimitation of the extension of the concept as well, is of consequence; since it has already become apparent through the gesture of pointing which instantiation of the concept "tree" or "book" is meant, and so it suffices if, as it were, the substantial part of the substantially-qualitatively-quantitatively mixed concept makes the individual delimitation of this instantiation succeed.

VII

I certainly do not have the intention of making a case for the Aristotelian list of categories. Therefore I do not think it reasonable to classify all possible concept-expressions (one-place predicate-expressions) according to this list, and to examine them with regard to their suitability for indicating and counting. By proceeding in such a way it might even become apparent that some of the concepts which Aristotle adduces as examples of substance-concepts are not indicating- and counting-concepts.[25]

Rather, one could agree to proceed in the opposite direction and redefine (or, in Carnap's terminology: 'explicate')[26] the traditional notion of a 'substance-concept' in such a way as to speak of a 'substance-concept' in all and only those cases in which the concept in question exactly delimits not only each individual falling under it from all others, but also the set of all individuals possibly falling under it as a whole (that is, the class of what

25. For example, I am thinking of "xýlon" in the sense of "piece of wood," *An. Post.* A 22, 82b37-83a23.

26. Cf. R. Carnap/W. Stegmüller, *Induktive Logik und Wahrscheinlichkeit* (Vienna: Springer, 1959), pp. 12-15; R. Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity,* p. 8.

falls under it, or its extension), and thus renders possible, in a definite sense, the counting as well as the indicating of individuals.[27i]

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27. For applications of the thoughts developed in this essay on 'ways of being given,' 'events,' and 'actions,' vide H.U. Hoche, *Handlung, Bewusstsein und Leib* (Freiburg/Munich: Alber, 1973), pp. 31, 289-99.

i. I would like to thank Mr. C. Evans and Mr. Andrew Fineron for their friendly assistance in preparing this translation. Above all, however, I would like to thank Prof. Hoche for his efforts in revising and improving earlier drafts.

THEODOR EBERT, MEINUNG UND WISSEN IN DER PHILOSOPHIE PLATONS

Berlin/New York: Walter De Gruyter, 1974, P. x, 234.

J.D.G. Evans

Theodor Ebert's book challenges many orthodoxies. His theme is the relation between knowledge and opinion in Plato; the light shed on this by the arguments in the *Charmides, Meno* and *Republic* 5-7 forms the main substance of his discussion. He overturns a quantity of doxographically hallowed theses, for example, that learning is recollection of facts previously known, that knowledge and opinion are distinct faculties with distinct objects, and that the Form of Good is the highest good. Deeply mistrustful of Aristotle's comments on Plato, he sees them as the origin of a tradition in Platonic interpretation which philosophers and scholars have been unable to escape.

Thus baldly described, the exercise may seem wilful. On the contrary, Ebert's book deserves wide and careful study. It is informed throughout by philological precision, philosophical insight, and a sense of both the history and the reality of the issues under discussion. Any future commentator on the *Charmides, Meno,* or *Republic* will make constant reference to Ebert's interpretations. English-speaking students of Plato will profit from his remarks on certain important tendencies in the German philosophical tradition. All will find it instructive to be reminded that Plato wrote *dialogues.* For it is a central maxim of Ebert's method that in reading Plato we need to notice closely who is speaking to whom, to appreciate the subtleties in the manner of their exchange, and thus to penetrate beneath the surface doctrines in the text to Plato's real intentions. He is as far removed as possible from the position of, for example, G. Ryle, who says of the *Republic:* "There can be no cut and thrust in an allocution even when this has been remodelled into the outward shape of a dialogue."[1] Ebert argues that the theories of which he wishes to disencumber Plato are to be attributed to Glaukon or Adeimantos rather than to Socrates, and that Plato's purpose in presenting them is to highlight *misinterpretations* of the true views of his mouthpiece.

The basis of such misinterpretation lies in the power of the perceptual awareness of objects as a model for knowledge. Ebert concludes his discus-

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1. *Plato's Progress* (Cambridge, 1966), p. 189.

sion of the failure in the *Charmides* to establish a coherent conception of self-knowledge thus:

> The aim of our interpretation was to demonstrate that Plato recognised the model-function of sensory perception as the source of unexamined conceptual misinterpretations of knowing. We have been able to show that the difficulties of the second half of the *Charmides* are grounded in a preconception of knowing which is conditioned by being directed to the phenomenon of knowledge of objects. That the construction of the difficulties comes about without knowledge of their principle seems excluded; the organising direction of the author, Plato, is too clearly evident in the course of the dialogue. On the contrary, in the portrayal of the preconception of knowing within the four sections investigated, one can recognise a definite presentation (p. 82).

In the preceding detailed analysis of the ways in which Critias reacts to and develops what he sees to be implicit in Socrates' questions, Ebert has frequently maintained that Critias construes claims and questions about knowledge of propositions as being about knowledge of objects; in failing to recognise this distinction, Critias betrays the hold which the model of sensory awareness has over his thinking about cognition in general.

The *Meno* bears a similar message. Socrates's purpose, Ebert says, in comparing learning to remembering resides in the phenomenological structure of the latter process. Sheer forgetting and sheer opinion share the feature of failure to grasp the nature of their own condition. In each case, between these conditions and their polar opposites of remembering and knowing there occurs an intervening stage, in which the subject is aware of being in the condition of which he was previously unaware (pp. 87-8).

This is all that Socrates intends by introducing the notion of remembering. The further details of the alleged theory of recollection, in particular the suggestion that present knowledge presupposes acts of acquaintance with other objects at other times, are inserted to indicate the perversity in Meno's understanding of the nature of knowledge. In the very presentation of his paradox of the impossibility of discovering what one does not know, Meno has in mind "the search for perceptible objects, whether it be that a definite object is to be discovered or rediscovered, or that one is seeking one or more objects with definite properties. In all cases I must already be acquainted with (*kennen*) the object or property sought. Here it is obviously absurd to want to seek something with which one is not at all acquainted. On the other hand, this objection is absurd where what is sought is not an object of sensory acquaintance but the content of some knowledge (*wissen*). He who seeks the solution of a riddle or of a mathematical problem, is certainly not already in possession of an idea of what the word is which solves

the riddle or of what the required number is'' (pp. 94-5). The solution to the problem which Socrates puts to the slave about the square area double to a given square illustrates this point. The object which will figure in the solution is the diagonal of the given square; and this the slave knows (*kennen*) from the start, even though he does not know (*wissen*) the solution. So, knowing the solution is not a question of knowing an object, and to grasp this point is sufficient to undermine Meno's paradox (pp. 99-100).

These analyses of Plato's motives in the dialectical exchanges between his characters can only be plausible if they are based on substantive philosophical distinctions. Plato certainly does not directly advertise his awareness of any such distinction between two kinds of knowing; nor does the Greek epistemological vocabulary which he uses reflect this awareness. Ebert approaches the question by a close analysis of the logical behaviour of the German cognitive verbs *erkennen, kennen, wissen* and *meinen.*

Erkennen—''recognise''—is the least important member of the quartet, although the tradition of Platonic interpretation has sometimes mistakenly treated Plato's epistemology as *Erkenntnistheorie.* It is an act, and so is to be distinguished from the other types of cognition which are dispositions (p. 42). But its grammar has one useful paradigmatic role: as a verb, it takes both objects in the accusative case and also that-clauses, but within this complex behaviour it is the former construction that has the dominant role. When we turn to dispositional knowledge, Ebert argues, these two grammatical roles are taken by *kennen* and *wissen* respectively. The first takes an accusative object and never a substantive clause. The reverse is typically true of the second; supposed exceptions to this—''I know (*wissen*) a house in which we can meet''—are only superficial, since such facts can be alternatively expressed by a that-clause, such as ''I know that we can meet in such-and-such a house'' (p. 45). The point of this example can be brought out thus: it is not a condition of its truth that one should *know,* be acquainted with (*kennen*), the house.

Ebert discovers additional features about the logic of knowing which follow from these surface aspects of the grammar of cognitive verbs. Firstly, while the (grammatical) objects of *wissen* are essentially relative in form—that is, of the form *R(a, b)*—this is not so with the objects of *kennen;* and it is consistent with this that *wissen*, unlike *kennen,* can be self-reflexive (pp. 45-6, 53). Secondly, error is to be construed as attaching to *wissen* rather than to *kennen.* In the case of objects of acquaintance, one either knows them or does not; and if not, one does not suppose that one knows them. Apparent exceptions arise where an object of someone's acquaintance is presented under a different name or description from that by which it is known to him. But in such cases the error involves a mistake about the *fact* that this description applies to the object. It is a mistake in *wissen,* and in fact can only occur where a person *is* acquainted with the object in question.

Finally, *meinen*—"opine"—has among its uses two which parallel the logic of *wissen;* one of these excludes knowing, while the other does not. In the first of these cases the person who opines will know that he opines, while in the second he will opine that he knows. These complexities, incorporating the reflexive character of the cognitive states and the relational nature of their grammatical objects, provide a real basis for the opposition between knowledge and opinion which Ebert seeks to unravel in Plato's thought.

All this is carefully argued. At the very least, Ebert's discussion will provide non-German-speaking philosophers with an insight into an epistemological vocabulary which suggests possibilities not obvious to English or even to French speakers. Moreover, he considers such features in modern analytic philosophy as Ryle's concern with dispositional cognition, and J.L. Austin's work on performative verbs. It is greatly to his credit that he allows Plato an awareness of the *kennen/wissen* distinction, unlike most other modern commentators, who have appealed to it to show up the innocence of a philosopher working in the pre-analytic age.[2]

On the other hand it must be insisted, against the relevance of these distinctions, that Plato's vocabulary does not reflect them. Ebert suggests that *gignoskein/epistasthai* corresponds to *kennen/wissen* (p. 58; less confidently, pp. 118-22). But texts such as *Protagoras* 352c and *Theaetetus* 202b-c tell against this decisively and make it dangerous for Ebert to rely on the presence of such a distinction at *Republic* 477b or *Charmides* 165c. More fundamentally, just as the contrast between Latin *duco-nubo* and English *wed* does not show that marriage was other than a symmetrical relation in the two cultures, so we must question whether the usages which indicate a difference in our cognitive relation to objects and to facts actually do bring out a real distinction so that Plato might have wanted to satirise a failure to observe it.

It is often argued, especially since the work of G. Frege, that this distinction is grounded in the linguistic difference between a sentence, construed as a combination of essentially disparate subject and predicate elements, and a list of names. The coining of "self-predication" to express the detection of a fundamental incompatibility between two aspects of a Platonic Form arises from this belief about what the elements in sentences mean. Although we may grant that "self-predication" as a comment on sentences expresses an absurdity, since no linguistic item can function as both subject and predicate, it does not follow that it points to an analogous absurdity in (a possible conception of) the nature of things. If this were to follow, we would have to grant some such fundamental distinction as Frege makes between concept and object. This is itself contestable; and despite the linguistic distinction between that-clauses and names or definite descriptions among

2. Ebert, p. 120 n. 30. For a recent example, see J. McDowell, *Plato: Theaetetus* (Oxford, 1973).

the grammatical objects of cognitive verbs, it is even more doubtful whether there is a basic epistemological distinction between knowledge of facts and of objects. For it remains to be shown that there can be knowledge of objects which does not consist in knowledge of facts, or vice versa.

A more fruitful point of entry to Plato's arguments is one which avoids these contentious areas of ontology and focuses on a potentially dangerous ambiguity in the grammatical object of cognition. When we speak of an "object of sight" or "object of opinion" (whatever the ontological nature of such objects), these expressions contain a potential ambiguity between "the object, which we see," and "the way in which we see the object." Objects in the latter sense, which are distinguished by the label "intentional,"[3] differ from ordinary objects in that the description which presents them cannot be handled in terms of our normal conventions for the existence and identity of objects. If an intentional object is interpreted as an ordinary object, as surface grammar encourages, paradoxes result. When I see or believe something, the object of this cognition may fail, under some other description, to be something which I see or believe. So intentional objects provide a link between grammatical and non-grammatical objects, and thus provide considerable potential for confusion in the notion of an object of cognition.

This is important for analysing *mistakes.* Shooting, in the sense of markmanship, is an object-related activity. In this use the verb "shoot at" takes as grammatical object "a target"; and it is an essential feature of shots that they be aimed at targets. But we also distinguish good from poor shooting, and the fact that the target is missed seems to indicate that the shooter, whatever his intentions, is not shooting at the target. Despite the grammatical point about the object of "shooting at," there are other descriptions by which the (non-grammatical) object can be presented—such as "third coconut from the right in the front row"; and we can now distinguish good from poor shooting according to the different expressions which can be substituted for "the target" in the function "*a* shoots at . . . . " So while the target is the intentional object of all shooting, be it

3. Interest in this phenomenon received a spur in modern times from the work of F. Brentano; see his *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte,* ed. O. Kraus (Leipzig, 1924) Vol. 1, pp. 124ff. For subsequent developments, see R.M. Chisholm, "Intentionality," in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* ed. P. Edwards (New York/London, 1967) Vol. 4, pp. 201-04. The whole issue is infested with controversy. For positions hostile to Brentano's, see W. Kneale, "Intentionality and Intensionality," *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 42 (1968), pp. 73-90; and R. Scruton, "Intensional and Intentional Objects," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* N.S. 71 (1970-71), pp. 187-207. My contention is simply that Brentano's concept points to an important source of ambiguity which infects some key arguments in Plato; for a clear instance, see *Republic* 524c.

good or poor, not all shooting is at that (extensional) object which is the target. This account enables us to preserve the distinction between good and poor shooting, and to insist that both are examples of the same essentially object-related activity.

A similar analysis can be applied in the case of descriptions. It is useful to speak of objects of description, not just in the grammatical sense that "*a* describes" must be followed by one or more words to complete a sentence, but also to bring out the uncontroversial fact that describing is an activity which, in some way, relates human cognitive subjects and things in the world. Here too there is a difficulty both in allowing and in disallowing that misdescriptions are descriptions. Clearly, a misdescription of Cambridge is not a description of *Cambridge,* and yet it must be just that if it is to be ranked a poor performance of something which could be done better. With both "describing" and "misdescribing," the grammatical object is "Cambridge." Let us suppose that Cambridge is a city of 100,000 inhabitants, bisected by a river, and so on. Then expressions mentioning numbers of inhabitants will also be grammatical objects of "describing"; but the misdescription, unlike the description, will not present to us an object which, under each of the expressions used in them, is Cambridge. So we distinguish the intentional object of all the descriptions, including the misdescriptions, which is Cambridge, from the *objects*—Cambridge, other cities, non-real cities—which the descriptions may present. That way, we can allow for the difference between descriptions and misdescriptions without making it so total that misdescriptions have to be understood as a different kind of exercise; they retain their status as failures.

These parallels provide useful insight into the case with knowledge and opinion. Plato's discussion of this in *Republic* 5-7 is the subject of Ebert's third and longest commentary. Plato distinguishes knowledge and opinion as respectively infallible and fallible (*Rep.* 477e4-8).[4] This seems to be an important point, and Ebert approves it. On the other hand, he regards the thesis that these cognitive states have different objects as incompatible with the contrast between infallibility and fallibility, and as a misinterpretation by Glaukon of Socrates's position. But consider the cases of shooting and describing. Let us suppose that a language contains two words—"shooting$_1$," meaning "shooting well," and "shooting$_2$," meaning the same as English "shooting," so that good and poor shooting are both cases of shooting$_2$. Then it follows that shooting$_1$ is infallible, while shooting$_2$ is fallible; shooting$_2$ parallels opinion in that sense, noted by Ebert (p. 37), in which it does not exclude the truth of what is opined. Alternatively, if we wish to concentrate on that sense of "opine" in which its object cannot be true (p. 39), we could coin "describing$_1$" to mean "describ-

4. This is actually asserted by *Glaukon,* but in this case that does not make it suspect for Ebert (p. 124).

ing truly" and "describing$_2$" to mean "misdescribing"; here it follows that while describing$_1$ is infallible, describing$_2$ is (worse than) fallible.

What about the objects of these renamed activities? It is clear from the characterisation of the objects of shooting and describing that while the intentional objects of shooting$_1$ and shooting$_2$, and of describing$_1$ and describing$_2$, are respectively the same, in each case the extensional objects are different. Plato supports the thesis that faculties are to be distinguished by their objects by appealing to the different sensory faculties (477cl-d5); and Ebert does not object to the thesis in this respect (p. 123). But it is plausible only as a thesis about *intentional* objects. We do indeed sense things differently with our different senses; but it is a paradox (although the history of metaphysics may blind us to this) to maintain that the things sensed by one of our senses are different from those sensed by another. This supports the suggestion that Plato was liable to confuse intentional objects with objects *tout court,* and so indicates how he may have felt able to infer that because knowledge and opinion (like shooting$_1$ and shooting$_2$) are contrasted as infallible and fallible, their objects must be different.

Ebert's analysis of the whole discussion of the philosopher's knowledge, ranging from the distinction between knowledge and opinion in *Rep.* 5 through the images of sun, line and cave in *Rep.* 6-7, leads him to reject "the interpretation of Plato directed on the original/copy relation, which seeks to extract a dualistic metaphysic from his dialogues precisely on the basis of this relation" (p. 181). He sees this as an aberration emanating from Aristotle, whom he criticises on other scores. Aristotle fails to understand the functional importance, as Plato intends it, of the original/copy relation as an illustration of the relation between direct and indirect cognition of the same things; he mistakenly construes it as an ontological theory about levels of reality (pp. 181-82). He is also in deep error about Plato's concept of the Form of Good. Aristotle's criticisms are directed against the Form as the highest good; that is, he construes it as *a* good, something superior to but still cognate with other good things (pp. 141-42). This quite misses the Platonic conception, which is that of an excluder-concept, indeterminate in content; the Form of Good has the function of revealing "ideative"—that is, limiting—concepts, so that "on account of the indeterminacy of content of this concept a grasp of Good is always only a grasp of the *function* of Good, not a grasp of a common characteristic of all that which is called 'good' " (p. 150). In the face of these Aristotelian misunderstandings, Ebert's Plato would respond as does J.E. Flecker's Aflatun:

O Aristu,
A white weak thin old fool are you.

Ebert is right, as was H. Cherniss, to remind us that Aristotle is a

philosophical critic of Plato, not his intellectual biographer. This does not mean that he lacks justification for pointing up those paradoxes which, on his reading of the dialogues, Plato built out of the insights of commonsense. Ebert can find much support in the text for his contention that knowledge and opinion are one faculty, not two, operating on the same set of objects; and also that Good is a specially important concept because it links all those concepts, particularly those operative in mathematics and science, that involve the notion of approximation to a limiting standard. Plato says things which support these contentions because they are highly plausible. It is when Plato goes beyond these plausible theses and brings in the Forms as objects of cognition that his account becomes controversial; and this is where Aristotle criticises him. Ebert disclaims any intention to comment on the Forms, yet he cannot altogether avoid them, and what he says causes some disquiet.

In *Rep.* 479, Plato seems most clearly to identify the contrast between Forms and particulars with that between the objects of knowledge and of opinion characterised as things which are and things which are and are not: indeed, in 476d, this identification is declared to be the aim of the ensuing argument. Ebert impugns the seriousness of this section because at 479b9-10, Glaukon generalises over *all* perceptible things, whereas the preceding induction has been concerned only with contraries; this distinction was familiar to Plato, as is clear from *Rep.* 523 (pp. 128-30). That Plato was indeed aware of it is precisely what explains the hesitation in *Parm.* 130c1-4 over whether there are Forms where non-contrary concepts are concerned. Ebert betrays, here, an assumption that the contrast between a Form and the entities participating in it is that between a universal kind and the individuals which fall under it. But much evidence supports the claim that the contrast is instead between an unambiguous paradigm case and other cases which are logically parasitic on it.

This emerges more clearly from his remarks about the Form of Good. "He who asks 'what is the good?' and thereby expects answers of the kind 'the good is pleasure,' or 'the good is knowledge,' is in no case asking about the Form of Good. He wants to know what *the truly good* is, not what *the good itself* is. He asks about one, namely the highest good, not about the unity of what we mean by 'good' " (pp. 139-40). This is highly contestable, as is Ebert's assertion that 'good' is used relatively to characterise facts ("good for so-and-so"), but non-relatively to characterise objects (p. 145). "It is not good to be a good thief" provides in its surface grammar a counter-case to this, since here the first occurrence of 'good,' used of a fact, indicates the relative character of what is signified by the second occurrence of 'good,' used of an object, and therefore the non-relative character of what is signified by the first occurrence of the word. I have argued elsewhere that the grammar of such a sentence provides a good clue to

Plato's conception of the difference between a Form and the particulars associated with it.[5]

It should be taken as no criticism of this challenging book that it stimulates disagreements. The accuracy and insight revealed in Ebert's work make one confident that he would have a reply to problems I have raised; and one looks forward to his further contributions to these studies. The book is well organised, the writing fluent, and the publisher's production is excellent. There are a few misprints in references, which should be corrected as follows: (p. 40, paragraph 2, line 3) 476d8-9; (p. 68, line 1) 166e4-167b5; (p. 185, line 7) 510e2-3; (p. 209, note 1) B9.

5 . *Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic* (Cambridge, 1977), p. 101.

GEROLD PRAUSS, *KANT UND DAS PROBLEM DER DINGE AN SICH**

A Review Article

W.H. Werkmeister

In his Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant said, with reference to "objects of experience," that, "though we cannot *know* these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to *think* them as things in themselves" (Bxxvi). With this statement, and with others of a similar nature, Kant referred to a result of his transcendental idealism which soon became the source of much misunderstanding and confusion in the realm of Kant interpretation.

In his comprehensive study, *Kant und das Ding an sich,*[1] Erich Adickes has pointed out that the thing in itself, and the appearance or phenomenon in our experience, are not two entirely different things; they are only one entity which, on the one hand, is given in our experience as an appearance, and which, on the other hand, has for itself an existence quite independent of that fact. Although this statement is in one sense correct (as we shall learn from Prauss), it is not correct in the sense in which Adickes intended it, for in that sense, it but re-enforces basic misconceptions. Let me illustrate this fact.

In commenting on the problem, H.A. Prichard wrote that "we know that things are, and not merely what they appear to be but are not."[2] It is not clear precisely what is meant here by "things." Are they empirical things which we know as phenomena, or are they things in themselves that in some sense are behind the phenomena? But the real confusion begins when references to "things-in-themselves"—hyphonated—enter the picture.

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* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1974; zweite verbesserte Auflage, 1977).

1. Erich Adickes, *Kant und das Ding an sich* (Berlin: Pan Verlag/Rolf Heise, 1924), pp. 20, 44.
2. H.A. Prichard, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge* (Oxford: University Press, 1909), p. 93.
3. Oscar W. Miller, *The Kantian Thing-in-itself or the Creative Mind* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. xix.

Oscar W. Miller's assertion that "the 'thing-in-itself' is, in essence, like, or similar to, the Moral Will"[3] need not be taken seriously. But confusion concerning the problem is increased by Alfred C. Ewing's explicit denial that "the thing-in-itself and its appearance are the same thing in different aspects, the former being the thing as it is and the latter the thing as it appears."[4] George Schrader, on the other hand, states as Kant's thesis that "the thing-in-itself is given in its appearance; [that] it *is* the object which appers."[5] He then finds "a fundamental inconsistency" in Kant's "conception of the thing-in-itself as the cause of appearances" and his "critical distinction between appearances and things themselves"—an inconsistency of which Kant himself "was apparently unaware." One wonders where Kant ever said that the thing-in-itself is the *cause* of an appearance. Other examples illustrative of the confusion surrounding Kant's references to "things in themselves" can readily be cited.[6] But enough has been given here to indicate that the problem has been variously interpreted, and that much misunderstanding prevails with respect to it.

In the midst of all the confusion, Gerald Prauss suggests that modern language-analytical methods be employed in the interpretation of the Kantian texts, and then proceeds to develop the results of such an analysis. It will be helpful in our understanding of Kant to examine Prauss's argument more closely.

I

It is Prauss's thesis that within the framework of Kant's philosophy the expression "thing in itself" can be understood in two distinctly different senses: in a transcendental sense, which Kant himself intended; and in an untenable transcendent-metaphysical sense which always creeps in—even in Kant's own formulations. The problem arises from the ambiguity of the phrase "thing in itself." Just what does it mean to speak of things in themselves within the framework of Kant's philosophy?

After an examination of Kant's three *Critiques,* the *Prolegomena,* the *Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals,* and of the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* Prauss finds that Kant uses the brief form "Ding an sich" (thing itself) only thirty-seven times, but the long form "Ding an sich selbst" (thing in itself) 258 times. Such statistics, we are told, can hardly be the result of mere chance (p. 13).

4. Alfred Ewing, *A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 194.
5. Schrader, George, "The Thing in Itself in Kantian Philosophy," in *Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays,* ed. Robert Paul Wolff (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967), p. 172f.
6. See, for example, A. Wernicke, *Die Theorie des Gegenstandes und die Lehre vom Ding-an-sich by Immanuel Kant* (Ergänzungsheft 97, 1969).

But what is still more important is the fact that both expressions, "thing itself" and "thing in itself," and their equivalents, are abbreviated forms of the expression "things viewed or contemplated in themselves"—"*res per se considerata*" or "*res per se spectata*" (p. 20). A typical example of such usage is found at the beginning of the first *Critique*: " . . . things when they are considered in themselves through reason" (A28/B44).[7] Only after this statement does Kant speak of "things in themselves." It is thus clear that, in the basic formulation, Kant separates "things" and "considered in themselves"; and it is obvious that the phrase "in themselves" belongs to "considered" rather than to "things." It is an *adverbial*, not a *predicative*, determination. It determines nothing other than a special mode of contemplation: "things—contemplated in themselves" (p. 23). And it is in this sense that, despite some lapses in formulation, Kant speaks of "things in themselves." He never uses the form "thing-in-itself"—hyphenated; and nowhere does he hypostatize such "things." His whole thesis is keyed to two aspects of reflection: upon things as phenomena, and upon the very same things "in themselves." As he puts it in the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason:* " . . . Our *Critique* [teaches] that the object is to be taken *in a twofold sense,* namely as appearance and as thing in itself" (Bxxvii). And in the body of the text he says: " . . . appearance, which always has two sides, the one by which the object is contemplated in itself, without regard to the mode of intuiting it . . . the other when the form of the intuition of this object is taken into consideration" (A38/B55).

II

It is unfortunately true that Kant himself has contributed to the confusion of his commentators, for his own formulations are at times ambiguous and unclear. What, for example, does he mean by "in itself?" It is perfectly clear what he means by viewing things as "appearances"—namely, viewing them as objects of our sensory intuition as interpreted by the concepts of the understanding. But when things are considered "in themselves," they are being considered "without regard to the constitution of our sensibility" (A28/B44). That is, to contemplate things "in themselves" means "not to regard them as appearances" (A256/B312).

But to set "things as appearances" in this way parallel with "things as things in themselves" is not only linguistically misleading, it is also factually false; for it implies that "in itself" is simply equivalent to "not as appearance," and thus has a negative meaning only. But, surely, to view the

7. References to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are to the translation by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: The Humanities Press, 1950, reprint). Smith translates "Ding an sich selbst" by "things in themselves," and "Dinge selbst" by "things themselves." In the Index, however, he gives us "things-in-themselves"—hyphenated—without explanation.

same things as both appearances and non-appearances, involves a contradiction which then leads to the hypostatization of these very things as "things-in-themselves."

But there is no contradiction in the basic meaning of viewing or considering things as appearances and also as in themselves. And when we adhere to the transcendental meaning of "things—considered in themselves," we do away with the metaphysical nonsense of "things-in-themselves" (p. 43).

Kant, unfortunately, uses the terms "appearance" and "thing in itself" on different occasions with different meanings, and rarely clarifies this difference. Consider, for example, the following passage from the *Critique of Pure Reason:*

> We commonly distinguish in appearances that which is essentially inherent in their intuition and holds for sense in all human beings, from that which belongs to their intuition accidentally only, and is valid not in relation to sensibility in general but only in relation to a particular standpoint or to a peculiarity of structure in this or that sense. The former kind of knowledge is then declared to represent the object in itself, the latter its appearance only. But this distinction is merely empirical. If, as generally happens, we stop short at this point, and do not proceed, as we ought, to treat the empirical intuition as itself mere appearance, in which nothing that belongs to a thing in itself can be found, our transcendental distinction is lost. We then believe that we know things in themselves, and this in spite of the fact that in the world of sense, however deeply we inquire into its objects, we have to do with nothing but appearances" (A45/B63).

An illustration of what Kant is here speaking of would be the rainbow as "appearance" and the raindrops as things in themselves, "in the merely physical sense" of intersubjective objects which constitute the world of physical reality.

In this empirical sense, the distinction between "appearance" and "thing itself" is perfectly clear—it is the difference between purely subjective and inter-subjective objects. But Kant uses the two terms also in a non-empirical sense, in which the empirical "thing" is itself an "appearance" or phenomenon; and Kant's transcendentalism requires precisely this. That is, it requires that we view as appearances in the transcendental sense what in the empirical sense are things in themselves, and that we then in turn view these appearances "not as appearances" but "as in themselves" (p. 54).

To be sure, Kant himself occasionally succumbs to the temptation to employ the mode of speaking appropriate to the empirical contemplation of things as "things in themselves" in his philosophical reflection upon these things also—even though it is evident that, in this perspective, things can be understood only as objects of possible experience. That is to say, the em-

pirical things which, for purposes of empirical cognition, can be rightly regarded as things in themselves are, for transcendental-philosophical reflection, but "appearances"; that is, they are "phenomena" (p. 57).

Kant himself has put it this way: "Appearances, insofar as they are thought as objects according to the unity of the categories, are called *phenomena*" (p. A248f.); and he clearly meant here by "appearances" the empirical appearances in sense perception, and by "phenomena" the transcendental-philosophical characterization of the very things which empirical cognition has as its objects. To put it differently: Although empirical cognition can and does regard its objects as things in themselves, these very same objects, along with all appearances, are but phenomena for transcendental reflection.

Transcendental reflection thus discloses a twofold subject-dependence of the same empirical objects. From the empirical point of view, the objects constitute an empirical reality with which our sciences are concerned, and which is not subject-dependent. From the transcendental point of view, however, these very same things are "phenomena" which, as conceptually determined appearances, depend, on the one hand, on our sensibility and, on the other hand, on the interpretative function of the understanding. Kant's theory of experience is thus, transcendentally, a two-level reflection (p. 62).

III

Before going into details concerning the two-level interpretation we must distinguish, with Kant, the realm of *external* experience from the realm of *internal* experience (p. 63). That is to say, we must distinguish *empirically-objective* cognition and its objects—"things" and "events"; in brief, "the physical"—and *empirically-subjective* cognition and its objects—"representations," "feelings," "sense impressions"; in brief, "the psychical." Kant's argument is that we achieve empirically objective cognition only when we interpret our empirically subjective sense impressions of "appearances" by means of the pure concepts of the understanding. Seen in this perspective, the empirical objects are subject-dependent in the transcendental sense.

To believe that empirical cognition comes about in some way other than through an interpretation of our sense impressions, and that empirical objects are something other than what is disclosed or disclosable in that interpretation, Kant regards as pure superstition. His "theory of interpretative cognition" is, and is meant to be, the very opposite of any copy-theory of knowledge. And it applies to the whole of nature no less than to individual empirical objects. Nature itself, therefore, and all that it includes, is in this sense "phenomenon." That is, it is subject-dependent—"appearance"—in the transcendental sense (p. 65).

Is it at all possible to view empirical objects other than as appearances? Is it at all possible to view them "in themselves?" The answer to this question depends upon how Kant's theory is ultimately to be understood.

IV

Prauss approaches this problem by way of an analysis of the conception of truth in Kant's theory. He points out that within the Kantian framework, the truth or falsity of empirical judgments can be explained only by allowing that, in empirical judgments, one and the same sensory intuition can be interpreted in different ways by subsuming it under different concepts. Although truth and falsity are disjunct, as mere possibilities they are grounded in the very nature of experience and, being so grounded, are conjunctive, since experience is amenable to false as well as to true interpretation. Although Kant himself never developed this line of thought, it is only on the basis of this principle that his theory of experience can be maintained (p. 71).

More specifically, Prauss points out, in analyzing experience into its constituents—intuitions and concepts—Kant has abandoned the traditional thesis that empirical cognition is either true or false, and that the empirical object is the object of true cognition. Within the framework of the Kantian theory we encounter things only as a consequence of a conceptual interpretation of sense impressions; and concepts and sensory intuitions are but indispensable elements in experience, not independent realities (p. 74).

As Kant himself put it: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible as to make our intuitions intelligible . . . The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise" (A51/B75). And as a matter of fact, in empirical cognition in general and in science in particular, sensory intuitions and concepts have always already been combined in an interpretation, and there is no intrinsic reason that such an interpretation should come to an end. Kant himself said: "Through observation and analysis of [empirical things as] appearances we penetrate to nature's inner recesses, and no one can say how far this knowledge may in time extend." And Kant adds: "But with all this knowledge, and even if the whole of nature were revealed to us, we should still never be able to answer those transcendental questions which go beyond nature" (A278/B334). Empirical knowledge, no matter how scientific it may be, simply is not philosophical-transcendental reflection—even when it is concerned with mental phenomena (p. 77). "Outer" and "inner" experiences alike involve objects that are empirically real (p. 81). But Kant's transcendental philosophy is a non-empirical theory of empirical cognition, as any epistemology must be; therein is grounded the two-level structure of Kant's philosophy.

The necessity for considering empirical things as "appearances" at the transcendental level arises from results obtained by analyzing the cognitive components of experience at the empirical level. Kant himself, however, never stated this crucial fact explicitly. Although he must have been aware of the two-level structure of this theory, he never referred to it specifically.

V

Concerning empirical objects as "appearances" in the transcendental sense, Kant wrote: "It follows from the concept of an appearance in general" that "something which in itself is not an appearance must correspond to it; for appearance can be nothing by itself, outside our mode of appearance" (A251). Therefore, "unless we are to move constantly in a circle, the word appearance must be recognized as already indicating a relation to something, the immediate representation of which is, indeed, sensible, but which, even apart from the constitution of our sensibility . . . must be something in itself, that is, an object independent of sensibility" (A252).

In the second edition of the *Critique,* Kant clarified his meaning as follows: "When we call certain objects appearances, [that is] entities of the senses (phenomena), and distinguish the mode of our intuiting them from the nature that belongs to them in themselves, it is already implied in our concept that we place the latter, considered in their own nature, although we do not so intuit them—or other possible things which are not objects of our senses but are thought as objects through the understanding only—in opposition to the former and call them entities of the understanding (noumena)" (B306). And it is in this sense that Kant also wrote: "If the concept of a noumenon be taken in a merely problematic sense, it is not only admissible but, as setting limits to sensibility, is likewise indispensable" (A256/B311).

Finally: "Though we cannot *know* these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in position at least to *think* them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearances without anything that appears" (Bxxvif).

But this "analytic" argument in defense of things in themselves—so Prauss points out—is "condemned to failure," for it involves a contradiction. Things which are "appearances" are here viewed as "not appearances" (p. 93). The concept of the appearance of things and the ground for this concept cannot be the same in principle, for they belong to different levels of cognition: the former is a matter of empirical fact; the latter is disclosed in transcendental reflection as a non-empirical insight into the structure of our cognition of empirical things.

Although the issue here raised is the very crux of Kant's transcendental theory of experience, Kant himself developed it only fragmentarily. Prauss argues that we must now complete Kant's work (p. 98).

VI

Reflection reveals that in all empirical cognition, two distinct elements are involved: a sensory intuition which is being interpreted, and the concepts of the understanding through which it is interpreted; both elements are grounded in the experiencing subject. Therefore, any object of experience, which is the determined content of a conceptually interpreted sensory intuition, is subject-dependent, and in this sense is to be regarded as appearance (phenomenon). But this view is inadequate, for the interpretation involved in the experience is not truly understood as long as it is conceived as being *merely* subjective.

Reflection shows that the intuition which is to be interpreted by means of concepts must itself already be so interpretable. In actual experience, intuition and concept are at once interrelated. They can be separated from each other only in transcendental reflection. And in that reflection both inner and outer experiences are equally the result of an interpretation. This means, however, that an essentially "dual articulation" is characteristic of the interpretation itself. The intuition which, by means of the concept, is interpreted as an external experience is not an intuition pure and simple but is always already, as it were, impregnated with the concept. That is to say, the concept can provide a specific interpretation of an intuition because that intuition is in itself interpretable in certain ways. The actual interpretation thus involves a dual articulation: the character of the intuition and the nature of the concept. Specifically interpretable intuitions are the necessary presupposition for the empirical alternatives of outer and inner experience (p. 101).

This does not alter the fact that there is a sharp distinction between intuition and concepts, and between sensibility and the understanding, and that intuition is in principle always sensory intuition. But it does mean that the subject's interpretation of something as outer experience and of something else as inner experience is already conditioned by an intuition which can be interpreted in certain ways only. Actual experience, be it inner or outer, is possible only where intuitions and concepts are thus interrelated.

As empirical cognition, outer experience is in principle always a matter of judgment. Although the act of a subject, a judgment nevertheless claims objective validity, implying a relation to an "objective reality" which gives it meaning and significance. But since even false judgments are in this sense meaningful, the question arises as to what precisely is the object to which judgments in general pertain. The so-called copy-theory of cognition quite obviously has no real answer to this question. What, then, is Kant's solution?

Since false as well as true empirical judgments are meaningful, the meaning of a judgment in general cannot coincide with either its truth or its falsity; nor does it depend on the presence or absence of an empirical object.

What this comes to is that the object to which a judgment—be it true or false—must relate in order to be meaningful must, in principle, be other than an empirical object. Kant calls it "the transcendental object = X," which "in all our cognitions is always one and the same = X" and is that which "alone can at all confer upon our empirical concepts a relation to an object—that is, to objective reality" (A109). "This transcendental object . . . is not in itself an object of cognition" but only "the concept of an object in general which is determinable [as an empirical object] through the manifold of the appearances" (A251). It can, therefore, also give meaning to false judgments, that is, to judgments which find no determination in and through appearances. Under no circumstances, however, is the "transcendental object," being but the projection of the concept of an object in general, to be taken for an independent object (p. 111). The unity which it "makes necessary can be nothing other than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations" (A105). It is only because of this "synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition" that we can say that we know an empirical object.

VII

Now, "just as for the cognition of an object distinct from me I require, besides the thought of an object in general . . . an intuition by which I determine that general concept, so for cognition of myself I require besides the consciousness, that is, besides the thought of myself, an intuition of the manifold in me, by which I determine this thought" (B158). That is to say, in interpreting this intuition through its concepts, the subject establishes the unity of itself as an empirical entity in precisely the same way in which it establishes the unity of any empirical external object. What Kant calls the "transcendental object" thus reveals as its very essence a dual aspect of inner and outer, and serves as the unifying principle in both cases. In no way, however, can this conceptual "object in general" be identified with a "thing in itself."

Consider for a moment what is involved in an actual case of empirical cognition.

Let us suppose that I have a sensory intuition which induces me to judge: I now see red. To begin with, this intuition is purely subjective, for only I now have it. It remains subjective even when I subsume it under the concept "red-appearing." But I realize at once also that the "red" of my sensory intuition is in some way extended in space. In a given case, "red-content" and (let us say) "oval form" belong together; and together they constitute what is objective within the subjectivity of this particular appearance. It is only with respect to such an object that it makes sense to say that it is "red" or that it is "oval"—even when the assertion is erroneous.

This example shows clearly, I believe, that the interpretable intuition as

determination of the transcendental object always has two distinct but interrelated aspects, the subjective and the objective, for the subjective intuitions of "red" and "oval" are inseparably interrelated in a way which is objectively rather than subjectively determined. And this is a matter of judgment (p. 120).

What is thus encountered at the first level of reflection is but a subjective interpretation of subjective intuitions by means of subjective concepts, and therefore can be understood only as subject-dependent (p. 123f). Nevertheless, the two aspects, the purely subjective and the given interrelation of content and form of the subjective experience, are different in principle. Neither one can take the place of the other. Their difference warrants the statement that, from the purely subjective point of view, the empirical objects must be regarded as appearances; but that, from the objective side, the empirical objects must be regarded as "not mere appearances." They must be regarded as things in their own right—as empirical things in themselves (p. 125).

Kant makes the point this way: "When we say that the senses represent objects *as they appear,* and the understanding objects *as they are,* the latter statement is to be taken, not in the transcendental, but in the merely empirical manner of the terms, namely as meaning that the objects must be represented as objects of experience" (A258/B313).

The point which Kant makes here is crucial. It means that insofar as empirical objects are concerned, two respects—the subjective and the objective—are essential. In their subjective respect, empirical objects must be viewed as appearances; in their objective respect they must be viewed as things in themselves. But there is the danger of disregarding the perspective of the transcendental reflection and hypostatizing quasi-empirical things-in-themselves as metaphysical entities behind the appearances (p. 132). In truth, the empirical things are to be understood simply as actual or possible concretizations of the purely conceptual projection of a transcendental object in general. As such concretizations they are objective and, in the sense already indicated, independent of the subject.

To put it differently: If to view empirical things as "appearances" means to see them as subject-dependent, then to view them as "in themselves" simply means to disregard their subject-dependence and to see that, although we are necessarily involved with them, we also are not all that is involved with them. The example of the "oval red" makes this clear. And it is now evident that the "in itself" is not an adjectival determination of "thing," but an adverbial determination of "viewing." To consider things "in themselves" simply means to view them "not as appearances." A transition from "things considered in themselves" or "not as appearances" to "things-in-themselves" or "non-appearances" is a blunder of most serious consequences. For it leads to a contradictory concept within the Kantian system (p. 141). But all empirical "things—considered in themselves" (as

Prauss puts it) remain legitimate objects of the empirical sciences. As Kant himself writes: "The natural appearances are objects which are given to us independently of our concepts, and the key to them lies not in us and our pure thinking, but outside us" (A480/B508).

VIII

There are sciences (for example, physics and chemistry) which deal exclusively with a world of things that is empirically objective. But there are also sciences (for example, psychology) which deal with subject-matter that is empirically subjective but that, nevertheless, conforms to Kant's conception of "appearances." Since, from the transcendental point of view, all appearances are subject-dependent, the empirically subjective must (along with the empirically objective) depend upon that non-empirical subject discerned in transcendental reflection—the transcendental subject.

To make the point quite clear: Empirical objects are of two types, the external or physical, and the internal or mental. Both types are empirically real, and both are objects of experience but are not experience itself; that is, they are not the experiencing as such. This remains the forming of objects (in the Kantian sense) and the positing of them over against the experiencing subject (p. 152). In other words, whatsoever is empirically real—the empirically subjective along with the empirically objective—must be seen "as appearance." But there is one important difference: The empirically objective always is an actualization of what the subject projects as other than itself; the empirically subjective, however, is the actualization of the subject itself as an empirical subject. It is self-actualization (p. 158f), and the experience is essentially an introspection for which only something like an empirically mental phenomenon can be an object (p. 164).

The experiencing itself, however—as experiencing—can never become an object. It is and remains the empirical manifestation of the non-empirical subject (p. 167). This means that the non-empirical subject which one recognizes in the empirical subject when one views the latter "in itself" is precisely the same subject which one sees when one views it "as appearance." That is to way, whether one views it "as appearance" or "as in itself," one always encounters the non-empirical subject within the empirical (p. 172).

But there now arises once more the danger of a confusion of levels, which Kant himself has done little to avert.

On one point we must be clear: In distinction from empirical cognition (such as we find in the sciences), transcendental philosophy is a non-empirical cognition of the empirical. It differs from metaphysics which, transcending the empirical, hypostatizes non-empirical entities. Kant's transcendentalism is directed neither against empirical cognition nor against non-empirical cognition as such, but against the non-differentiation of the

two—of which metaphysics is guilty (p. 178f).

What is troublesome is the fact that Kant himself did not always set forth clearly the transcendentally two-level meaning of the concept "appearance," and that he often confused the second level of transcendental reflection with the first level of empirical cognition. The fact that subjective appearances are always involved in our cognition of empirical objects does not in itself imply that these objects are nothing but appearances. On the contrary, known to us as the result of our interpretation of subjective appearances (sensory intuitions), the objects are always something other than appearances and are precisely the non-subjective objects of science as distinguished from the merely subjective elements of experience (p. 185). They are "appearances" in transcendental reflection only, not in empirical cognition. To view empirical objects solely as subjective appearances means to overlook what is decisive as the result of transcendental reflection, namely, that empirical objects exist over against the subject as concretisation of the transcendental object in general, and as the objective interpretation of the particulars of sensory intuition.

IX

We have seen that Kant's transcendental philosophy is a two-level interpretation of experience. In the confusion of these levels is rooted not only the basic difficulty involved in the conception of things in themselves, but also the problem of affection. That is to say, from Kantian texts readers get the impression that the Sage of Königsberg means at times "affection of the subject by empirical things," and at other times "affection by things in themselves." Both conceptions cannot be correct. How, then, is the problem to be resolved?

Erich Adickes has discussed the problem at length in *Kants Lehre von der doppelten Affektion.*[8] H. Herring dealt with it in *Das Problem der Affektion by Kant.*[9] And Moltke S. Gram has effectively shown that, whatever else may be suggested, the theory of double affection at least "fails both exegetically and philosophically."[10]

Prauss points out that within the Kantian system, the thesis of a double affection—affection by empirical things and by "things in themselves"—can be maintained only when one completely misunderstands the reference to "things in themselves" as a reference to "things-in-themselves" in the transcendent-metaphysical sense. As soon as this misunderstanding is removed, the problem simply dissolves.

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8. Tübingen, 1929.
9. Köln, 1953.
10. See "The Myth of Double Affection," in W. H. Werkmeister, *Reflections on Kant's Philosophy* (Gainesville: Florida University Press, 1975), pp. 29-63.

After all, if the expression "things in themselves" is taken in the transcendental sense of "empirical things considered as in themselves," it is at once clear that, aside from these things, nothing else affects us. After all, as Kant himself put it: "The transcendental idealist is . . . an empirical realist" (A371).[11] In the *Prolegomena* he was even more explicit: "I grant by all means that there are . . . things which . . . we know by the representations which their influence on our sensibility procurs us . . . . Can this be termed idealism? It is the very contrary."[12] Although Kant also says in this very same passage that these things are "quite unknown to us as to what they are in themselves," he adds at once that they are "not therefore less actual." A few lines further on, Kant adds that "the existence of the thing" is "not destroyed" by the fact that it "appears"; "it is only shown that we cannot possibly know [the thing] *by the senses* as it is in itself" (p. 37, italics added). And yet, a problem remains, for it is by no means clear how, from his transcendental point of view, Kant understands our being affected by empirical things.

Obviously this affection cannot be a causal determination, for Kant's category of causality pertains to the interrelations of things only. And the empirical sciences, being in principle confined to the realm of empirical things and events and their causal interconnections, provide no answer. As Prauss points out: The more firmly one holds to the belief that experiencing is the manifestation of an empirico-physical influence, the more decisively one must reject the idea that such experiencing can ever be explained in terms of empirico-physical interactions; for precisely the extent to which the empirical sciences—especially physics and physiology—are able to explain the context of causal interactions and effects, they contribute nothing to the explanation of experiencing as an event in awareness or consciousness. Aside from the fact that any reference to the mental already presupposes experiencing, it remains, empirically, completely unintelligible how, through the causal efficacy of physical reality, a mental reality can ever emerge as its effect. Nor does empirico-introspective psychology reveal how the mental can emerge out of the physical (p. 215f).

It is precisely because in their own realm of the empirical the various sciences cannot solve the problem of affection that Kant found it necessary to develop his transcendental philosophy as a non-empirical science of experience itself (p. 217f). In the *Prolegomena,* he put it as follows: "We are discussing, not the origin of experience, but that which lies in experience," and this "belongs to the critique of knowledge, particularly of the understanding" (p. 51). In this critique, which is a reflection upon experience rather than experience itself, the empirical realm as such has been

11. See also W. H. Werkmeister, "Kant's Refutation of Idealism," in *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* (Winter, 1977).
12. References are to the Carus translation as revised by Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co.), p. 36.

left behind, as it were, and subject and object become in general the non-empirical subject (that is, the transcendental subject) and the non-empirical object (that is, the transcendental object). Only the non-empirical subject characterized by sensory intuition and pure concepts of the understanding is under consideration at the first level of reflection. Not only is experiencing now understood as an interpretation of sensory intuitions through concepts, but what is being experienced, the object, is seen to be the outcome of that interpretation. This second level of reflection thus yields a non-empirical explanation of the empirical in general (p. 222). But does this solve the problem of empirical affection?

Actually, the problem is even more puzzling than it appeared to be at first, for how is it possible that an empirical object—through empirical affection of a non-empirical subject—gives occasion for an interpretation of sensory intuitions such that it itself is the objectified projection of that very interpretation? Obviously it makes no sense to say that an empirical object which, as such, is the conceptual projection of our interpretation of sense data affects us (p. 224).

This problem is dissolved the moment we realize that what transcendental reflection discloses as interpretation and result—the empirical subject as experiencing and the empirical object as experienced—is not conceived as involving a time interval such that one aspect comes before the other. Rather, experiencing as interpretation, and the experienced as the result of that interpretation, in all their details occur, in principle, always together. Actual experience exists as something which, at the moment of its occurrence, is already in itself complete. This being so, and seen from the transcendental point of view, the problem of affection simply disappears (pp. 225f).

Overall, there can be no doubt that Professor Prauss has contributed materially to a clarification of Kant's position and, in the process, has eliminated a good many misinterpretations that have beset Kant exegesis.

*CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO RAWLS' THEORY OF JUSTICE**

Otfried Höffe

Translated by Alice Eve Kennington

John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice.*
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. xv, 607.

B. Barry, *The Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Examination of the Principal Doctrines in 'A Theory of Justice.' (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. x, 168.*

Moral and political philosophy (*praktische Philosophie*), presently undergoing a rehabilitation in Germany, is not about to abandon the question of a just political order either to the controversy among political parties and political commentators or to the empirical social sciences. Even moral-political problems designated by such expressions as humanity, freedom, justice and (practical) reason should be subjected to methodical analysis in order that philosophy may exercise normative-critical jurisdiction, not only for the sciences but also for social institutions and processes. It is to this task of more than theoretical significance that John Rawls, professor of philosophy at Harvard University, and one of the leading proponents of Anglo-American ethics and political philosophy, has made a highly original contribution.[1] In order to rectify simplistic notions of analytic ethics, critical examination is necessary. For, in contrast to the usual German perspective, analytic ethics is founded neither on meta-ethical inquiry nor on utilitarian positions, nor does it proceed in a naively ahistorical way.

The attention attracted by Rawls' book is due even more to the thorough systematic analyses. Practical (or moral and political) philosophy in Ger-

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* Translated from the revised version of "A Theory of Justice (J. Rawls, B. Barry)," from the *Philosophische Rundschau,* 21 (1974-75), pp. 187-208, which appeared in *Theorie-Diskussion über John Rawls' Theorie der Gerechtigkeit,* edited by the author (Stuttgart: Suhrkamp, 1976).

1. *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971); German edition, *Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1975).

man is more strongly concerned with itself, with its historical and methodological self-understanding, than with a philosophically appropriate clarification of those questions with which the citizen who is acting and operating primarily outside the academic sphere sees himself confronted—with normative problems in the personal sphere, or from the areas of legal, social and educational policy.[2]

Precisely such questions are the ones Rawls takes up. Without losing himself in extended methodological discussions or in the differentiated interpretation of classical texts, and without displaying an anti-scientistic pathos, he formulates two principles of a humane society, attempts to legitimate them scientifically, and analyzes the implications and consequences of the principles down to the details of politics, economics and moral psychology.

The underlying concept of human society is justice, understood here not as the category of a moral doctrine, but rather as a category in a political ethics (in the sense of a normative theory of law and society). Rawls' study is not primarily concerned with a qualification of persons or actions; it concentrates on fundamental criteria of judgment for laws and social institutions.

Immediately after its appearance, the study received great, sometimes even enthusiastic approbation in the United States and in England.[3] The book was even accepted as one of the classics.[4] Indeed, it contains many carefully worked out arguments and can therefore stimulate many and various discussions. The fact that this long and thoughtful study could become a standard work so rapidly is a result of Anglo-American publication practice. Rawls had already worked out essential portions of his theory and had been publishing them since 1958,[5] and with these contributions he had aroused an intense critical discussion.[6]

Because of the number and diversity of the arguments, *A Theory of Justice* is not grasped quickly. For this reason, here are the main ideas set out in four theses:

2. Cf. the anthology *Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie,* edited by M. Riedel, Vol. I: *Geschichte—Probleme—Aufgaben* (Freiburg: Rombach and Co., 1972), reviewed by this author in the *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 80 (1973), pp. 216-218.

3. A few examples: "the most substantial and interesting contribution to the moral philosophy since the war" [Stuart Hampshire, New York Review of Books, (Feb. 23, 1972), p. 34]; "the most searching investigation of the notion of justice in modern times" [K. J. Arrow, *The Journal of Philosophy* 70 (1973), pp. 245-263, p. 245].

4. "A remarkable thorough treatise which well deserves to be called a philosophical classic" [J. Feinberg, "Duty and Obligation in the Non-Ideal World," in *The Journal of Philosophy* 70 (1973), pp. 263-275]. B. Barry's argument for a monograph devoted to Rawls' book: "A brief review is of little more value than would be a brief review of Hobbes' *Leviathan,*" [*The Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Examination of the Principal Doctrines in A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) p. ix].

1. The fundamental criterion of political institutions is justice in the sense of fairness.

2. The interpretation of justice as fairness stands in opposition to the normative ethic prevailing in the Anglo-American field of discussion, that of utilitarianism.

3. One can decide the conflict between the utilitarian and the fair interpretation of justice in a binding and scientifically valid way by means of an operational testing procedure—a rational, prudential choice made under ideal conditions.

4. It is the methodological goal of a rational ethics to establish a reflective equilibrium between rationally legitimated principles (of justice) and considered moral judgments.

1. Justice as Fairness

Rawls thinks of society as a system of cooperation that promotes the interests of each individual member. Such a "cooperative venture for mutual advantage" (p. 4) is characterized by an identity of interests—cooperation is supposed to create a better life for everyone—and at the same time it is characterized by conflict of interest, in that everyone wants as large a share as possible of the cooperatively produced "sum of utilities." The principles

5. "Justice as Fairness," in *The Philosophical Review* 57 (1958), pp. 164-194. (German in J. Rawls, *Gerechtigkeit als Fairness,* Freiburg: Alber, 1977); "The Sense of Justice," in *The Philosophical Review* 62 (1963), pp. 281-305. (German, *op. cit.*); "Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice," in *Nomos* VI, Justice (1963); "Distributive Justice," in *Philosophy, Politics and Society,* ed. by P. Laslett, W. G. Runciman, Vol. 3 (Oxford: Blackwells, 1967), pp. 58-82. "Distributive Justice: Some Addenda," in *Natural Law Forum* 13 (1968), pp. 51-71. (German *op. cit.*); "The Justification of Civil Disobedience," in *Civil Disobedience,* ed. by H. A. Bedau (New York: Pegasus, 1969), pp. 240-255. (German, *op. cit.*)

6. U. and R.P. Wolff, "Refutation of Rawls' 'Theorem on Justice,' " in *The Journal of Philosophy* 63 (1966), pp. 179-190; B. Barry, "On Social Justice," in *The Oxford Review* (1967), pp. 29-52; Ch. Perelman, *Justice* (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 39-51; N. Care, "Contractualism and Moral Criticism," in *The Review of Metaphysics* 23 (1969), pp. 85-101; Ch. Frankel, "Justice and Rationality," in *Philosophy, Science and Method,* ed. S. Morgenbesser *et al* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), pp. 400-414; R. L. Cunningham, "Justice: Efficiency or Fairness," in *The Personalist* 52 (1971), pp. 253-282; M. Lessnoff, "John Rawls' Theory of Justice," in *Political Studies* 19 (1971), pp. 65-80. See also the references in *Gerechtigkeit als Fairness, op. cit.* Since the publication of the monograph, the number of comments, some of them very critical, has jumped. See also the selective bibliography at the end of *Über John Rawls's Theorie der Gerechtigkeit,* ed. O. Höffe (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977), pp. 297-303.

for resolving conflict, assigning advantages and burdens (rights and duties), are identical with the principles of (distributive) justice. (The problems of commutative and legal justice are treated only in passing. In the following, the word justice will always mean distributive justice.)

Conforming to political tradition since Plato and Aristotle, justice claims the distinction of being the first virtue of social institutions. A viable society also must have the properties of stability, coordination and efficiency. It is not claimed that justice is the sufficient condition, but it is the necessary one to which absolute priority is due. No matter how efficient and stabilizing laws and institutions may be, if they are unjust, then, according to Rawls, they must certainly be changed.

To establish principles of justice claiming general validity, Rawls attempts to reformulate the classical theories of the social contract (Locke, Rousseau and Kant) with a higher degree of abstraction and, in contrast to the classical theories, to carry out their construction in detail.[7] The basic question in Rawls' contractual foundation for justice is: "Which principles would free and rational persons, acting only in their own interests, choose if they were to congregate in an original state of equality, to define their form of society and to decide on the fundamental terms that would regulate all further agreements." According to the basic thesis, principles of justice can be derived from rational self-interest as long as it operates only under certain "ideal conditions": "The aim is to replace moral judgments by those of rational prudence" (p. 94). Since the principles of justice are interpreted as the result of a free, equal and rational choice, the social institutions and processes which they define should not only be beneficial to everyone, but to everyone *equally*. Above all, no one should gain advantage or suffer disadvantage from natural endowment or social position. In this sense of identical benefit for everyone, justice means fairness.

The advantage that will obtain for everyone in a society determined by principles of justice is not found in a successful or happy life itself. In Kant, also, with whom Rawls feels himself most closely akin, the state does not have the duty to make its members happy; the state is restricted to the ends of justice, the guarantee of freedom through law. Similarly, Rawls does not expect the principles of justice to guarantee happiness. Primary social goods must be justly distributed. These are goods which, first—in contrast to primary natural goods like health, vigor, intelligence and imagination—can be considered to be socially conditioned (the exact demarcation would certainly still be open to discussion); and which, second, are things that every

7. Cf. O. Höffe, "Zur vertragstheoretischen Begründung politischer Gerechtigkeit: Hobbes, Kant und Rawls im Vergleich," in *Ethik und Politik, Grundmodelle und -probleme der praktischen Philosophie.* [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1979 (in press).]

rational man is presumed to want. The conceptions of ultimate goals pursued by people differ in large measure, and here the legal system should not interfere, but Rawls asserts nonetheless that general preconditions can be given which are advantages for the most varied goals: rights and liberties; opportunities and powers; income and wealth; self-respect (§15 and §63). This assumption by Rawls is, however, not completely convincing. Not all of the "goods" named by him are valid for every person, nor valid in the same way. This is most evident in the poverty movements of various epochs which voluntarily renounce income and wealth and realize their goal in life through quite different "goods."

The two principles that are supposed to regulate the distribution of primary goods are given the following provisional formulation (§11):

1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.

2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage; and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.

The final statement reads (§46):

First-Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle; and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

The first principle refers to civil and political rights, the second concerns material and non-material interests. With both principles, Rawls founds in essence a liberal and socially committed state ruled by law (*Rechtsstaat*)—a constitutional democracy bound up with a competitive economy.

The first, the principle of the greatest equal freedom, determines that fundamental and human rights (active and passive right to vote, freedom of speech and of assembly, freedom of conscience, of thought, right to life, to property . . .) are equal for all. In contrast to a plain, undifferentiated equalitarianism, the second principle shows that inequalities are not excluded in principle. Inequalities are, however, tolerated only in social and economic spheres, and there only if they do not reward natural advantages of a physical, psychological or intellectual nature with still higher social prestige and a greater share of economic goods.

Inequalities are legitimate according to the final formulation of the principles of justice only if they increase the benefit to those disadvantaged by nature and, because of the problem of justice between generations (§44), only insofar as is compatible with the principle of just savings [Difference Principle 2(a)]. At the same time, the inequalities must be bound to positions and offices which are available to all in the sense that they are not

assigned according to color, creed, age or sex, but only according to relevant factors such as talent, education, ability, and willingness to achieve [2 (b)].

These principles are not coordinates, which in formal terms would necessitate a third principle to cope with conflicts between the first two. Instead, the first principle is assigned absolute priority (First Priority Rule, the Priority of Liberty). Since liberty is acknowledged as the highest goal absolutely, it cannot be exchanged for other goods. The abrogation of fundamental rights for the sake of particular or collective economic advantage is unjust in every case. Demands for liberty can only be limited by competing demands for liberty by others. (Trans.: Rawls, p. 302: "Liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty.") In the other principle, the second part has priority over the first part.

2. Critique of Utilitarianism

In spite of a rehabilitation of practical philosophy, substantive statements about justice made with the help of philosophy are not common in the current German-language discussion. The claim to normative critical jurisdiction raised currently by philosophy lags considerably behind actual achievement, as a rule. If one wants to learn from Rawls how philosophy can actually attain its normative critical jurisdiction, it is necessary to read his book "against the grain"; and, in contrast to his declared intention to keep methodological discussion to a minimum (Foreword), we must draw attention precisely to problems of method.

At first, however, another preliminary remark: The significance of the two principles and of the contractual theory approach altogether is understood only if one recalls the context of the Anglo-American discussion.

Because it had a series of brilliant representatives (e.g. Bentham, J.S. Mill, and Sidgwick), utilitarian ethics was the predominant normative theory, and in the last few years it once again moved to the center of discussion (Urmson, J.J.C. Smart, Brandt, McClosky, Singer, Lyons).[8] Strictly speaking, philosophy had only utilitarianism and its hedonistic calculus, as well as a few intuitivistic interjections, available to it in determining principles of justice. Rawls himself took part at first in the analytically-refined attempt to counter weighty objections to utilitarianism by the introduction of such distinctions as that between action and rule utilitarianism. Although he believed he could legitimize institutions like promises (*Versprechen*) and

8. A documentation of this controversy may be found in the anthologies *Contemporary Utilitarianism,* ed. M. D. Bayles (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1968); *Studies in Utilitarianism,* ed. Th. K. Hearn (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971); *Einführung in die utilitaristische Ethik,* ed. O. Höffe (Munich: Beck, 1975); includes bibliography.

public punishments using rule utilitarianism,[9] he later draws attention to a fundamental limitation: no matter how utilitarianism is refined or modified, the principles derived by this approach stand, according to *A Theory of Justice,* in strict opposition to that which is customarily understood as justice.

Because of the historical importance of utilitarianism, Rawls subjects it to a differentiated criticism (§5, §27, §28, §30) before presenting his own constructive counterplan. This counterplan claims to provide the same assets as utilitarianism—clarity and systematic order—while at the same time containing a better interpretation of our moral convictions.

In utilitarianism, the highest goal of political action is the maximal well-being of all affected. Whether one construes this as the maximum total utility (Bentham, Sidgwick; among the economists, Edgeworth, Pigou) or the maximum per capita utility (J.S. Mill, Wicksell) is not decisive for Rawls' line of argument. For in either case, justice is demanded only when, and to the extent that, the welfare of all concerned is maximized. Justice has, therefore, become a function of collective (not personal) well-being. As a consequence, the niveau of collective satisfaction has priority over individual freedom. A slave or feudal society, even a police or military state, might be so adroitly organized, that although it entails extreme interference in the sphere of personal liberty and, moreover, extreme inequality in treatment, it nonetheless guarantees a maximum total or per capita utility. These would not only be permitted, they would be morally required. Quite rightly, Rawls is convinced of the opposite, that the idea of justice for each individual person requires an inviolability that may not be set aside even for the welfare of the whole society.

Utilitarianism may be interpreted as a collective egoism that has the tendency to degrade individuals or groups to means used by others. A society, however, which, on the level of fundamental principles of justice, does not treat the human being as an end, cannot be legitimated from a moral standpoint. Justice cannot be reduced to collective welfare, nor political ethics to utilitarianism. In his severe indictment against every form of slavery, bondage and caste system, Rawls holds certain fundamental and human rights to be valid without compromise.

Utilitarianism has itself never been capable of rationally legitimating its own criterion of a rational social order. Rawls cannot, therefore, appeal ultimately to implicit inconsistencies in his opposition to utilitarianism. He has to criticize the normative idea of society itself as posited by utilitarian maxims.

Utilitarianism, according to the intuitively persuasive pattern of argumentation, really offers only an efficient administration of social

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9. J. Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," in *The Philosophical Review* 64 (1955), pp. 3-32. (German in O. Höffe, *Einführung . . . . , op cit.*)

resources, though efficiency is not measured by single individuals, classes or strata, but by the collective as a whole. In utilitarianism, an individual model of rational decision is extrapolated on the level of the society. The utilitarian demands the satisfaction of that collective system of interests that would be constructed by an impartial observer confronting the given multiplicity of individual systems of interest. A violation of fundamental and human rights would be just only if it were to be accompanied by a preponderant economic or social benefit to the majority.

Naturally it may be objected that such a situation is historically very improbable. Since, where the minimum for existence is assured, the interest in personal freedom far exceeds the interest in goods, wares, and social position, limitation of personal freedom for a few can only be outweighed by the concomitant advantages of the majority.

But even if the two interpretations of society, the utilitarian and the fairness interpretations were, as a rule, to have the same result, there would still remain a difference in principle. For the utilitarian, the institutionalization of fundamental rights is a matter of historically variable individual preferences and their inclusion in a collective sum of benefits. What for the utilitarian is still an empirical analytical problem is, for Rawls, an absolutely valid normative precondition. It is exactly this notion, that the disadvantage of one person is outweighed by the advantage of another, which stands in fundamental contradiction to justice in the sense of fairness. In utilitarianism, everyone is treated as a part of the whole collective; from the fairness point of view, however, everyone is recognized as an individual. The two principles of justice "rule out even the tendency to regard men as means to another's welfare" (p. 183).

3. A Rational Constitutive Choice

Rawls does not want to decide the controversy between the utilitarian interpretation of justice and the interpretation of justice as fairness simply by means of intuitively plausible interjections; he also wants rational argumentation. He therefore develops a testing procedure useful not only in settling this controversy, but also in determining in general the correct principles of justice. In this, the contractual theory approach is introduced with systematic rigor, and reformulated on the plane of contemporary scientific disciplines.

Rawls defines his test as a rational prudential choice. He translates the idea of the social contract into the thought and language framework of contemporary rational decision theory and strategic game theory. The "translation" easily leads to misunderstandings. Admittedly, decision theory and game theory have still scarcely been subjected at all to philosophic discussion in Germany.[10] But relatively early, Habermas took up the theories and interpreted them in the framework of his critique of ideology as the second

and third steps in technological rationality.[11] With this, decision and game theories also fell under the verdict of a "positivistically split rationality," and were discredited for any philosophic discussion interested in the "good and righteous life." Rawls' theory would seem to miss its mark from the very start.[12]

For modern decision theory, rationality is opposed to states of arbitrary, emotional, or habitual determination. Based on an immanent clarification of the usual idea of rational prudential choice, a decision is considered to be rational if one strives, solely by means of a dispassionate process of informing and calculating, to maximize personal advantage, and moreover does so by choosing, from a given list of alternatively possible actions, those which promise the maximal value or utility in the light of one's own values and goals. In all of its variations and stages of development, rational decision is a logical operation based on empirical knowledge and subjective estimates in the mode of speculation about one's own success. (It remains open whether one would call the self-interest in each case egoist, altruistic, or socially indifferent). In the most simple theoretical case of rational decision, a single actor chooses the action of maximal utility to him from among various possibilities. The choice of principles of justice differs from this elementary situation not only in that *principles* of action, rather than the actions themselves, are to be chosen; the difference lies especially in that the principles are to be of maximal utility for several actors each making a choice affecting himself alone. For this reason, game theory seems to be of importance here.

Game theory, a branch of mathematical economics invented by J.V. Neumann and O. Morgenstern, has developed processes for rational analysis of decisions made by several decision makers. An extensive

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10. A detailed presentation of decision theory may be found in W. Stegmüller, *Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und analytischen Philosophie,* Vol. IV, I: *Personelle Wahrscheinlichkeit und Rationale Entscheidung* (Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer, 1973); a concise critique of the rational decision approach in H. Rombach, "Entscheidung," *Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe* I, (Munich: Kösel, 1973), pp. 361-373; see also O. Höffe, "Rationalität, Dezision oder praktische Vernunft" in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 80 (1973), pp. 340-368; and O. Höffe, *Strategien der Humanität. Zur Ethik öffentlicher Entscheidungsprozesse* (Freiburg and Munich: Alber, 1975), *Teil I: Kritik am Paradigma Nutzkalkulation.*
11. *Theorie und Praxis* (Neuwied/Berlin: Luchterhand, 3rd ed., 1969), p. 245ff.
12. In the United States, on the other hand, it is not unusual to use decision theory especially in the framework of moral philosophy. For example, R. B. Braithwaite, *Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1955); D. P. Gauthier, "Morality and Advantage," in *The Philosophical Review* 76 (1967), pp. 460-475.

methodology has been developed—a detailed and precise conceptual instrumentality for rational decision-making in complicated cases in which various decision-makers, each seeking to maximize his own advantage, influence each other and collide with each other in at least some interests. In addition, a number of problems have been formulated, and suggestions for solution are provided.

It is methodologically significant that Rawls wants to avail himself of decision theory and game theory, branches of research which are highly specialized and widely recognized in the sciences. This approach seems to place problems of distributive justice in the economic sphere of utilitarian calculation proper, the sphere of the maximizing of profit and the minimizing of loss. By assuming actors seeking to maximize their own advantage, an original feeling for, or interest in, justice is precluded. Feelings of justice have a founded status, but not a founding status. The principles of justice appear as the product of a calculation of interest, as the exact result of considerations of strategic rationality. That justice is viewed as a derivative of self-interest—that its principles may be reconstructed as a result of a calculation of personal utility—appears highly unbelievable. For justice consists, after all, in the negation of self-interest, and in the acknowledgement of a general interest, however more closely defined.

By defining the social contract as a rational prudential choice, Rawls makes a double assertion. First, it is a condition of rationality to exclude the different variants of egoism (§23), and to decide for principles of justice in the first place. Second, it is rational to choose justice in the sense of fairness (§26 ff.). In other words, it is of greater advantage to live in a society determined by fairness principles, than in any other society.

Since, in a rational choice, one chooses from a given list of alternative strategies the one that is the best for oneself, the social contract, as interpreted by decision theory, must assume that one has a list containing all relevant—if not all—alternatives. Rawls suggests five main approaches with a total of fifteen possibilities of choice: besides his own principles of justice, there are above all the two main types of utilitarianism, as well as intuitionist and egoistic conceptions in several variants (p. 124). Such a list certainly contains the predominant positions in the Anglo-American discussion of ethics. At the same time, one cannot *a priori* preclude additions or at least corrections. Rawls, therefore, cannot derive an absolute vote for the fairness principles from his rational choice. Consistent with the idea of strategic decision rationality, the principles of fairness are not the simply correct principles of justice. They are not absolutely valid, but only so in relation to the alternatives considered.

The result of the scientific testing procedure can only mean that the correct principles of justice conform more closely to the two principles of fairness than to the other proposals open to choice.

The rational game with which Rawls identifies the social contract is no or-

dinary game, neither in its function nor in its rules. In the first place, it concerns a meta-game, a second-order game, a constituting game, a game which is played not *according* to rules, but *for the sake* of rules. In the second place, even in a constituting game, there are "rules" that clarify the decision situation and make a solution possible. The rules or conditions defining the situation of the choice of constitution are summarized by Rawls in the concept of the "original situation" ("original position," "initial situation").

The original situation denotes neither a past historical time nor a desirable form of life. It is rather a theoretical construct, worked out by Rawls with the intention, first and foremost, of obtaining criteria for possible forms of life. The original situation is defined at the outset by certain conditions that make cooperation possible as well as necessary and thus make justice an urgent issue (§22). There must—such are the objective circumstances—be many individuals coexisting at the same time in a definite geographical territory, who have comparable physical and mental capabilities, and are so limited in their natural and social resources that forms of cooperation do not become superfluous. The subjective circumstances permit the individuals to have their own plans of life or conceptions of happiness, which result in differing ends and purposes and, above all, in conflicting claims on natural and social resources.

Further: principles of justice exercise an ordering function in society. Thus it is a part of their formal presuppositions that five conditions be fulfilled, among which a necessary, though not sufficient, condition is the criterion of universalizability currently so often espoused. The principles must: (1) be general in their form, and (2) be universally applied; they must (3) be publicly known, (4) regulate conflicting claims, and (5) be held as the final court of appeal in practical discourse (§23). Since the various egoistical approaches (everyone must serve my interests; everyone except me should act justly; everyone may pursue his own interest at will) do not even fulfill the formal conditions, they are eliminated as a rational option at this point.

In addition to the objective and subjective circumstances of justice, the formal presuppositions of the concept of right, and the assumption that the players will decide rationally in the above-defined sense (§25), Rawls sets two conditions above all for the constitutive choice: (1) since the rules for conflict solution will be spelled out by means of the constitutive game, the game itself must lie beyond all conflict, and hence the resolution must be unanimous; (2) Rawls assumes a "veil of ignorance" in the partners of the constitutive game (§24).

The constitutive game is, in the terminology of rational decision theory, a "decision under uncertainty." The players do, indeed, possess sociological information, but in such a way that the knowledge has no particular, only general, significance. A sociological knowledge of law is assumed, but without the complementary knowledge of the socio-cultural and individual

parameters, so that predictions about social and personal situations are impossible. The players know that the members of a society are highly different in their endowments, that they play various roles, and occupy unequal status positions. They do not know, however, their own place in the range of these possibilities; they are unable even to ascribe probability to the alternatives, in order to calculate at least their own natural and social chances. In brief, the players know neither their positions in society nor their natural gifts and abilities. They do not know whether they live as a king or a beggar, as Picasso, Einstein, or as a mentally handicapped person.

Rawls does not derive the conditions of the constitutive game from decision theory principles, and rightly so. An attempt to establish the rules of the constitutive game on a game theory basis would only lead to an infinite regress. In a linearly progressing chain of argument, a game that determines the rules of all games—a game which is in principle a first game—is logically not possible. If it makes sense at all to formulate the concept of a game of all games, then this would not be in the sense of the beginning of a series; it is possible only as a transcendental principle of the series, as a "transcendental game." Rawls, however, does not attempt to argue from rational principles *a priori.* Seen thus, the constitutive game has its point of departure in conditions that are themselves not rationally founded.[13] The conflict between utilitarianism and principles of fairness can be decided rationally only to a partial extent. A large measure of plausibility, however, accrues to the conditions originating in the pre-scientific sphere, for they make operational the attitude of impartiality expected of a universally valid test. By means of the requirement of unanimity, the possibilities of privilege and coalition formation are eliminated. In the original situation, domination is excluded from the outset. And because of the veil of ignorance, vitality, intelligence, social status and other natural or social contingencies that cause inequality among men—especially making them less or more, stronger or weaker—are excluded. Also, one's factual drives, needs, and inclinations, even one's conceptions of value and meaning, remain unknown. One knows only *that* one has needs and aims, and that one strives to maximize the general conditions required for satisfaction or realization.

Since everyone wants to maximize his own advantages, utilitarianism, which maximizes the advantage of the collective, is, following egoism, also excluded in the constitutive choice. What remains is the general fairness concept: the same advantages and disadvantages for everyone. With this Rawls's exact formulations of his principles of fairness are, however, still not legitimated; the final element in the rational, constituting choice, the

13. *Vide* O. Höffe, "Zur Rolle der Entscheidungstheorie bei der Rechtfertigung von Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien; Kritische Überlegungen im Anschluss an Rawls," in *Erkenntnis* 11 (1977), pp. 411-425; also in O. Höffe, *Ethik und Politik, op. cit.*

precise rule of decision, is still missing. Among the three forms of rational action—decision under (subjective) certainty, decision under risk (the results of the action alternatives are not certain but still probable), and the decision under uncertainty—the last form is the most complicated. Whereas for decision under certainty there exists one single rule of decision (maximize your utilities), and the same for decision under risk (maximize the expected utilities—the so-called Bayesian principle), there are various rational criteria for decision under uncertainty. The constitutive choice, because it is a decision under uncertainty, is not determined unequivocally.

The "most prominent" decision criteria for decision under uncertainty are the maximax rules (the rules of the maximal maximum: maximize the benefit of the most advantageous situation) and the maximin rules (the rules of the maximal minimum: minimize the disadvantage of the least favorable situation). When employed in constitutive choice, the maximin rule favors the bottom of the social and economic hierarchy, whereas the maximax rule encourages greater disadvantage at the bottom and greater advantages at the top of the hierarchy. Rawls argues for the risk-avoiding maximin rule in constitutive choice (pp. 152 ff.). As if one were playing against a diabolical nature, one should decide for an order of society in which one could expect great advantage even if one's place in society were to be set by a malevolent opponent, and one were obliged to live at the bottom of the social-economic hierarchy. Hence one opts for principles that guarantee even the worst-situated member of society the highest possible minimum of primary goods. The decision in favor of the maximin rule is, however, neither rationally derived nor very plausible. It is admittedly convincing that a society should guarantee everyone a social and economic "existence minimum"; that this minimum is, however, to be maximized would not be rationally plausible without the empirical assumption that the decision-makers had a pessimistic view of the world and were afraid of living at the bottom rather than at the top of the hierarchy.

Even assuming an initially equal decision situation, Rawls' principles of justice cannot be legitimated solely by rational decision. Their establishment requires additional empirical assumptions or else direct moral argument.

4. The Methodological Goal: Reflective Equilibrium

Since the conditions of the choice situation, especially the veil of ignorance, prejudice the choice of principles, and the conditions themselves are not derivable from rational choice, the constitutive choice appears at first to be ultimately arbitrary. Every attempt to establish ethics rationally confronts the same dilemma: the fundamental premises from which the attempt takes its point of departure arise from an act of arbitrary choice. In

spite of complete rationality in detail, pure rationalistic theories are irrational seen as a whole.

Rawls avoids this entirely fatal dilemma, and thus documents that he does not understand his theory in purely rational terms, in spite of the decision-theory framework of thought and language. Rawls writes, to be sure: "We should strive for a kind of moral geometry with all the rigor which this name connotes" (p. 121). But, insofar as he understands himself correctly, this requirement is valid only for the decision level, not for the meta-level. It refers to the manner in which the decision is made, not to the definition of the decision situation and its criteria. Rawls' analysis takes its point of departure from a normatively determined world of life—more precisely, from primary knowledge about it, from the every-day conceptions of justice. These everyday conceptions are not to be legitimated as such, nor radically expunged. They are also neither subjected to a transcendental reductive inquiry, nor ultimately established naturalistically, nor by a metaphysics of essence.

Rawls' methodological goal is called reflective equilibrium, a goal which escapes simple methodological operationalism. This concept has also been insufficiently elucidated by Rawls. Rawls is less a theoretician of ethical methods than he is a "practitioner" of ethics. Although he has not yet been able to explain his method adequately, the book does have a methodological scheme, one which, moreover, contains a significant broadening of the concept of analytic ethics. From everyday conceptions of justice, Rawls abstracts "weaker" principles with less content, which are assured of consent because of their higher degree of abstraction. Hence they are suitable as preliminary elements of definition in the original situation, and of the rational test procedure partly determined by them. From the premises relatively amenable to consensus, principles of justice are derived that are at first valid only on a trial basis.

Methodologically comparable in status to that of a scientific hypothesis, they are confronted with empirical reality—with the minimal consensus about justice to be found in society—and are revised according to the requirements of this reality. Accordingly, the premises, the original choice situation, are also altered. Still, the everyday conceptions of justice are not, in contrast to the observational data of the empirical sciences, a strictly valid case of falsification in scientific theory. This is no simple relationship, but rather a feedback relation, for the principles tell us to re-examine our convictions about justice and to eliminate the inconsistencies, contradictions, uncertainties, and distortions that usually crop up. The result of this feedback process is called "reflective equilibrium."

The rationally-derived principles and the considered everyday judgments about justice mutually modify and correct each other in a process of going back and forth between (a) the elements of the original choice situation, (b) the principles of justice derived from it, and (c) the considered judgments

on justice. In this way, sometimes it is the initial situation and the principles which are modified, and sometimes it is the considered judgments. This is to be continued until the rationally legitimated principles coincide with the modified judgments on justice, and one can say that the judgments stand up to a scientific analysis (pp. 20f.). In this way, the philosophic inquiry into justice becomes a revolving thought process. Its themes emerge again and again, though in a changed form (the original situation appears first in §4, then in §§22-26; the critique of utilitarianism first in §6, then in §§27, 28 and 30; the first formulation of the principles of justice in §11, the final one in §46); this is one of the reasons why the book is not easy to read.

The process of reciprocal guidance, by rationally legitimate principles and considered everyday judgments about justice, consists above all in weighing important contemporary or previously discussed conceptions (in Rawls, mainly the utilitarian and the fairness conceptions) and the arguments advanced for them; in confronting them with one's own, not yet well-ordered judgments; and—with a view towards alternative conceptions—in freeing the judgments from vagueness, incoherence, and so on, until they agree with one of the well-known suggestions or else establish a conception of their own.

Rawls' theory occupies a middle position between a purely inductive process of generalizing from experiences (one's own and other judgments about justice) and an abstract scheme of principles independent of experience. It is not, however, a compromise. A methodological element, that is found neither in induction nor in the abstract scheme, is introduced: by means of a feedback procedure, the original judgments are subjected to a process of learning and modification.

One cannot decide rationally in which learning and modifying processes one should take part, and in which direction they are to be conducted, or whether one, formally speaking, in case of contradiction between A and B, must change only A or only B or both. Reflective equilibrium is not a positive court of appeal; it is actually more a negative process. It tests alternative suggestions and eliminates all those which do not meet scientific requirements (such as consistency in the formation of concepts and closeness to everyday judgments).

For this reason, Rawls' study is a very personal book in spite of all its scientific objectivity. It shows not only which learning processes are worth being advocated, but also beyond that, in which direction Rawls' own learning processes have run.

Through the contractual approach, as well as through the reformulation in terms of decision theory, the principles of justice appear spelled out for once and for all as ahistorically valid, basic determinants of humane society in general. This understanding is to be corrected on the basis of the methodological goal, "reflective equilibrium." Since Rawls' theory relates to everyday judgments, and hence to a historically-formed consciousness

about justice—in the most favorable case, it relates to the most highly developed consciousness of justice—the articulated principles can lay no claim to invariable cultural validity.

In comparison with the existing judgments on justice, however, the theory is not simply affirmative. It is neither the mere legitimation of what one would advocate anyway, nor exclusively the systematic presentation of an unsystematic multitude of existing judgments. As opposed to the everyday conceptions from which the theory takes its point of departure, it is image and counter-image simultaneously. By being able to introduce modification and transformation of new judgments, it gains constructive and consciousness-modifying power.

Rawls himself gives an example: whoever, after mature consideration, is firmly convinced that religious intolerance and racial discrimination are unjust, but is still hesitant about the just distribution of riches, will find, by means of reflective equilibrium, not only legitimation of his firm convictions but also moral orientation. Accordingly, Rawls' theory is not a mere ratification of existing institutions or processes. Wherever social and political reality are in contradiction to reflective judgments about justice and their principles, a rationally-based criticism is possible.

Germany's present rehabilitation of moral and political philosophy still regards largely as only a prospect what Rawls realizes: a piece of normative critical authority. But one should not over-estimate the normative critical expectations. The authority of philosophy stems from its analytic (in a wider sense) competency, not from a competency in setting norms or in masterfully directing them.

The normative critical competency of philosophical ethics denoted by the expression "reflective equilibrium" assumes as an empirical fact that there is an elementary consensus about what justice means. In times of radical social protest, in epochs of moral crisis, or in times of upheavals, this assumption of a minimal consensus no longer holds. Wherever a substantial minimal consensus is not to be found, Rawls' method no longer applies. It also does not apply when such a consensus, though still extant, is being questioned, or where one is not satisfied with the reference to this fact, and inquires after the genesis and especially the binding force of the substance of consensus. To the question, "Why is that which one holds to be just, truly just?," Rawls' analysis can give no final answer.

According to Rawls, a scientific theory stands to everyday judgments about justice as linguistics stands to everyday speech. Just as one can correct his pre-scientific sense of grammaticalness to a certain extent by means of a scientific grammar, so one can improve his sense of justice through a philosophic theory (§3).

This analogy holds only provisionally. To maintain that: whereas that about which native speakers agree really *is* German or English colloquial speech, that which everyone considers to be just is not therefore really just,

is a kind of empirical reduction which is not valid. Although it would not make sense to express an ideological suspicion against grammatical rules being practiced, and to propose a "normative syntax" deviating greatly from the existing syntax, it could make sense to critically question judgments about justice, especially those which are collectively valid. There is practically no sense in a minority maintaining that we have to speak in quite a different way than we are accustomed in order to speak in a grammatically correct (not in a cultivated, brilliant, or exact) way. On the other hand, it can be reasonable when an infinitesimal minority—or even a single individual—maintains that one must think about essential points in justice in quite another, even radically dif- but not a criterion, for the principles of justice. They are points of departure and points of reference for a theory of justice, but not a final court of appeal. Even an existing general consensus is not a sufficient foundation for legitimacy.

5. Prudential Choice or Moral Choice?

The particular circumstances under which the rational constitutive choices are to take place, the definition elements of the original situation as well as the rules for making a decision, are neither derived rationally nor are they arbitrarily posited. They have been developed from given normative judgments, a process that is also methodologically indicated by the principle of reflective equilibrium. Does this then justify the fundamental configuration (*Grundfigur*) of Rawls' test procedure for principles of justice, the paradigm of "rational prudential choice," which uses elements from decision theory and game theory?

Through recourse to the thought and language framework of decision and game theory, as has been stated, Rawls appears to derive justice from the rational self-interest of competing individuals (see above, section 3). Upon closer examination, however, this impression proves to be an easily understandable misapprehension. In no way does Rawls consider justice to be a derivation of self-interest. His recourse to decision and game theory is also no mere concession to a new science that, beyond the academic controversies, enjoys the highest regard. Rawls wants, rather—without actually saying so—to restate on the precise level of contemporary scientific disciplines the concept of the state of nature which belongs to the theory of social contract. In classical contract theory, most clearly in Kant, the state of nature denotes neither an earlier historical stage nor a primitive level of cultural development; instead, it is a theoretical construct: the situation of men acting according to what they consider right and good, who might, in so doing, come into conflict with one another and have no authoritative judge for such cases. The state of nature is the opposite of the state of law (*Rechtszustand*); it corresponds to the starting point in decision and game

theory. Consistent with their subjective concept of rationality, the members of a political association are egoistic in a formal sense: they pursue their own interests no matter whether these are egoistic, altruistic, or socially indifferent in a material sense. In accordance with the modification introduced by game theory, this involves a majority of rational egoists who mutually assert their claims.

The principles of justice are not derived from this general decision and game theory approach. The choice takes place, rather, under special circumstances quite unusual for decision and game theory; these are summarized in the notion of the original situation, marking the transition from state of nature to state of law (not the original situation, but rather the rationality premise, is Rawls' equivalent for the classical concept of the state of nature). One of the elements of the original situation is the veil of ignorance through which the decision-makers lose sight of all individuality, even all particularity, resulting in a symmetrical relationship among all participants. The further condition, the rule of unanimity, prevents the dispersion of the symmetry of opportunity in the course of decision-making. Through the original situation, Rawls posits, as it were, an ideal decision situation, namely, one free of any domination; and beyond that, he posits a rational decision in which, through the symmetrical relationship of all participants, the conditions of "fair play" have been set from the beginning. The constitutive game does not establish the justice or fairness of a social order. In the form of initial conditions, they are already prior to the decision. The paradigm of "rational prudential decision" leads, therefore, in a false direction inasmuch as justice is not merely a derivative from individual calculation of utility. Justice, for Rawls, is also much more its *a priori* valid corrective. Since the parameters are not derived by individual calculation of utility—indeed, they lay fundamental restrictions on it—it is the standpoint of practical reason (that is, the moral point of view) as operationally defined in the parameters that has primacy.

Rawls' principles of justice are tautological in a certain sense. They are nothing more than explanations of attributes which from the outset had been incorporated into the definition of the original situation in its cognitive, emotional, and empirical conditions. The fairness character of the conclusions, the principles of justice, reproduce merely the fairness character of the premises, the starting conditions. Compared with rational self-interest, fairness is primary both logically and ethically. The social contract reconstructed by Rawls on decision theory lines is, first of all, a rational (moral) choice, and only secondly a utility calculation, and hence an economic choice.

If one speaks of rational prudential choice in a specific, and moreover modern, sense of the word "prudence," and if one does not mean the ancient φρόνησις or medieval *prudentia,* then one is assuming that there is a difference between the individual or particular and the general will, and that

prudence is associated with the individual or the particular, and practical reason with the general will. With the help of the veil of ignorance, however, Rawls has dimmed out all individuality and particularity, and through this artifice, has posited from the outset a general subject of rational choice. More precisely: since the difference between general and individual or particular will is retracted, a prudential choice in the specific sense of the word "prudence" is no longer available. In the initial situation, the rational subjects are unable to maximize their own benefit, because there is no subject or group here with its own individual or specific utility. Therefore, the relatively complicated instrumentality of game theory, the theory of rational choice which is made by competing and also interdependent decision makers, is also not necessary for the constitutive choice. The choice can be made by a single rational subject. No historically concrete, intersubjective process of consultation is required in Rawls' discursive situation.

One can read the original situation, especially its veil of ignorance, as a functional equivalent of the point of view of practical reason. Rawls offers a novel and highly surprising reconstruction of the "moral point of view," in respect to the ordering of arbitrary freedom of a majority of individuals (justice as the idea of law), not in respect to the maxims of action (justice as virtue). This reconstruction is, however, misleading. What Rawls succinctly brings out under the conditions of rational decision has, in real life, to be acknowledged as maxims by the various decision-makers under the factual conditions of natural, economic and social inequality. The fundamental task consists precisely in *not* pursuing one's own interest exclusively, but rather in acknowledging all groups and individuals as equal persons, even though they may appear unequal from natural, economic and social perspectives. Acknowledgement has to be made anew under the various socio-cultural conditions, and in the most different situations—in the usual cases as well as in the situation of a one-time, or revolving, constitutive choice (*Verfassungsgebung*). Non-violent, rule-abiding, and fair resolution of conflict arises from a basic attitude in which precedence as such is held, not by rational self-interest, but its negation, not by utility calculation, but an interest in communication guided by fairness. That which is primarily a positive and practical task, the conquest of natural interest in one's own advantage, has been reconstructed by Rawls as a negative cognitive problem by means of the condition of the veil of ignorance, that is, as a lack of information. In this way, the substantive problem of justice is distorted in a fundamental aspect.

Rawls' approach, using rational decision, is both illuminating and misleading at the same time. It is Rawls' merit that he, on the one hand, draws on a framework of thought and language understood and recognized in the circle of the sciences, and that, on the other hand, he so revises rational decision by the circumstances of the original situation that they fun-

damentally define a choice of (moral) reason rather than of (theoretical) rationality. The limitation of the analysis is found, however, in its inability to make sufficiently clear the radical transformation which happens in the situation of rational choice because of the additional assumptions. Not only at the beginning, but also still at the end of the inquiry, Rawls speaks of rational prudential choice (pp. 584 ff.; cf. G. p. 634). This obscures the difference between a utility calculation and a choice based on the interests of (moral) reason, and it sets up a false horizon of expectation, as if it indeed lay in one's rational self-interest to decide justly and fairly.

6. The Structure of the Derivation—A Liberal Fallacy (Barry)?

Among the various statements on Rawls, Barry's *The Liberal Theory of Justice* (supra, footnote 4) occupies a special position. This author, known primarily for his *Political Argument* (1965) and *Sociologists, Economists and Democracy* (1970), is so persuaded of the importance of Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* that he considers a short review as inappropriate as would be a short review of the *Leviathan* (Barry, p. IX). His own book on Rawls was not written, however, because he was convinced that the theory is correct and needed to be explicated and defended. Barry considers Rawls' argumentation in many cases to be implausible and less than thorough: "The general drift of the book is . . . that Rawls' 'theory of justice' does not work and that many of his individual arguments are unsound." (Barry, *ibid.*)

Barry places Rawls' theory first of all in its intellectual context, and gives an account of fundamental characteristics of the theory, in order to examine the claim that two principles of justice have been formulated logically and deduced stringently. The study closes with a critical discussion of the political and economic institutions believed by Rawls to be compatible with his principles of justice, that is, with a discussion of the competitive economy and the system of representative government based on universal suffrage. By examining the derivation in terms of clarity, consistency and plausibility, Barry commits Rawls in advance to a kind of moral geometry (Rawls, p. 121). It is significant that the other and methodologically more comprehensive interest in reflective equilibrium recedes into the background.

Barry not only analyzes the individual steps of the derivation (derivation of the primary good, priority of freedom, equality of opportunity, and the maximin rule); he also examines the nature, or better, basic structure, of the derivation as a whole. According to Barry, there is a logical gap between the premises and the conclusions. It does not follow from Rawls' assumption about primary goods—goods of which every individual wants to have as much as possible—that it is rational in the original situation to choose generally applicable principles of distribution which would guarantee the

greatest possible amount of primary goods to each person. Even though it might be of advantage to every individual to have a car (or wealth, power, freedom of belief), one does not find the best social order where the greatest possible number of cars (or greatest amount of wealth, power or freedom of belief) is distributed.

Rawls is guilty of faulty reasoning, according to Barry, that reverses the standard liberal fallacy and, in this reversal, simply exhibits a new variety of liberal fallacy. Barry formulates the fallacy as follows: "It is an illicit move to go from 'I would prefer more of X to less of X, all else remaining the same' to 'I should like society to be arranged so that I get as much as possible of X' " (Barry, p. 118 f.). The objection to this argument is that an individual good is not simply *ipso facto* a collective good as well. The individual consumption of primary goods is important not solely to the consumer but also to third persons. In choosing principles of distribution, therefore, individual benefit (mobility with the automobile) should not be maximized for its own sake; rather, it should be weighed against collective disadvantage (such as environmental pollution, danger to others).

Barry wants, quite properly, to take into account not only individual consequences, but also collective side-effects. As soon as one thinks of the dysfunctionality of autonomous economic growth, one sees the cogency of Barry's argument that the choice of a social order is not sufficiently determined by individual *ceteris paribus* preferences (Barry, p. 121). In spite of this, Barry's argument against Rawls is not sound. To remain with his own example, it is certainly correct that one cannot conclude with necessity from the individual interest in automobiles that these same individuals will have an interest in a society with as many automobiles as possible. But what are the reasons for this? An automobile contributes, among other things, to mobility; it also serves the play instinct, the quest for recognition, and so on. If there are too many cars, the streets are jammed, and the noise and fumes become unbearable, then the automobile becomes dysfunctional as regards mobility and the play instinct. For when the streets are jammed, the train is faster, and if a great many people have an automobile, especially a large, fast and expensive one, then only *not* owning one can be a status symbol. In brief, a society with many automobiles does not guarantee the ends for which people want to have a car: great mobility, occupation for the play instinct, visible out-doing of the crowd, and the like.

In Rawls' concept of primary social goods, however, the goods are not as concrete as automobiles. Rawls understands primary social goods as socially conditioned assumptions which are, as a rule, necessary to realize any plan of life: rights and freedoms, income and prosperity. Moreover, the individual primary goods are not to be maximized for themselves; rather, the *entire system* of basic freedoms is to be as extensive as possible—that is, the social and economic inequalities are to be, *as a whole*, as beneficial as possible to those least favored. The potential dysfunctionality of an automobile

society does not compromise the concept of social primary goods, but rather Barry's interpretation of the automobile as a social primary good, or the reduction of a system of primary goods to one of its elements.

There is a more fundamental counter-argument: the principles of justice do not refer at all to production (there should be as many automobiles, as much prosperity, power . . . as possible), only to distribution: no matter how many automobiles, how much prosperity and power exist, whatever amount is available is to be distributed according to such principles as provide each with as great a benefit as possible. Rawls does not at all infer collective goods from individual goods; he concludes from the interest in primary goods, and from moral equality of all human beings, that a fair distribution of primary goods is required.

CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON RECENT KANT LITERATURE IN ENGLISH*

Michael Benedikt

Translated by F. P. Van De Pitte

N. Rotenstreich, *Experience and Its Systematization* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965).
R. P. Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963).
G. Bird, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962, 2nd printing 1965).
Jonathan Bennett, *Kant's Analytic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966).
P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Methuen & Co., 1966).

This article deals with the more recent attempts in English toward an acquisition of Kant's thought. For this purpose we[1] have selected several

* Translated from "Kritische Erwägungen zur jüngeren englischsprachigen Kantliteratur," *Philosophische Rundschau*, XVII, No. 1–2 (1970), pp. 1–27.

Author's note:

Since the publication of this review, some ten years of revision have passed. But in spite of more sophisticated terminologies (of pragmatism, Marxism, language analysis, and existential hermeneutics; in spite of relativity, of theories of meaning as well as speech acts), the primary themes are still relevant: reference versus truth, constitution versus construction, reduction of apperception to instrumental reason from the perspective of the "causality of freedom." However, the main problem has not even been grasped: the distinction between theory of knowledge and transcendental argument demands from the latter not only material a priori as an abstraction of the "substrate of appearance," but also a sound elaboration of the connections between individuals and the "action schemes" like property, division of labor, exchange. That these practical elements of action are also relevant for the constitution of an object for science is the clandestine assumption of this untimely review.

1. That is, in cooperation with E. L. Mowatt of Oxford and Vienna, and E. Landrichter of Vienna. The final initiative came from Kurt R. Fischer of Lancaster, Pa., U.S.A.

outstanding works of the current period so that the contrast with our usual conceptions could be sketched in terms of them. This must be done, of course, without going into a very tedious and troublesome analysis of the history of Kant's reception in England and America.[2] To begin with, we will consider N. Rotenstreich's basically systematic book, *Experience and Its Systematization.*[3] In a sense, this work falls somewhat outside our framework, since the interpretation of Kant which it provides is more indebted to the German tradition than to the Anglo-American. Then we will look at R. P. Wolff's *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity,*[4] which shall be examined only in those areas where it departs from being a mere commentary. After that, G. Bird's *Kant's Theory of Knowledge,* as well as the bold study of J. Bennett, with its audacious and condescendingly jovial style: *Kant's Analytic*[5] (his work on the *Dialectic* is to follow shortly).[i] Last but not least, we will consider the most highly original interpretation of Kant by the well-known author of *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics,*[6] P. F. Strawson's *The Bounds of Sense.*[7]

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2. See the survey of J. Passmore, richly endowed with references: *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1957). For the period prior to that, see R. Wellek, *Immanuel Kant in England, 1793-1838* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1931). For a more recent position, see especially G. Shaw, *Das Problem des Dinges an sich in der englischen Kantinterpretation, Kantstudien,* Supplementary Vol. No. 97 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1969).
3. See also the review by R. Malter in *Kantstudien,* LVIII, No. 3 (1967), p. 391.
4. See also R. P. Wolff, "Kant's Debt to Hume via Beattie," *Journal of the History of Ideas,* XXI (1960), pp. 117ff. To this should be added L. W. Beck, "Once More unto the Breach. Kant's Answer to Hume, Again," *Ratio,* IX, No. 1 (1967), pp. 33-37.
5. The present review was completed, except for a few additions, in January 1968. The systematic investigation of D. P. Dryer, *Kant's Solution for Verification in Metaphysics* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966) could to some extent have served as background for the present considerations; but it arrived too late to be taken into account. With respect to these works, see also the reviews in *Kantstudien,* LIX, No. 3 (1968), p. 384f. (Strawson, Bennett, Dryer). Equally to be taken into consideration are the following most recent works: S. J. Al-Azm (Beirut), *Kant's Theory of Time* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1967); M. S. Gram, *Kant, Ontology and the A Priori* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1968); Thomas K. Swing, *Kant's Transcendental Logic* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1969). A consideration of works in English on Kant's practical philosophy, and his teleology and aesthetics, would involve a discussion, on the one hand, with such as H. J. Paton, A. C. Ewing and R. M. Hare, and on the other, with C. L. Stevenson, L. W. Beck, J. Hospers and Kurt Baier, M. S. Gram, J. R. Silber, S. Axinn, M. J. Gregor and J. E. Atwell, and so on, as well as with G. Schrader and I. Stadler, among many others. But in the present context all this must be set aside.

i. This work actually did not appear until somewhat later: *Kant's Dialectic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

In the preceding works, hardly any reference is to be observed to the various German attempts to come to terms with Kant: neither the phenomenological nor the various neo-Kantian, nor even the efforts of the Idealists. (The work of Rotenstreich may be noted as an exception, and perhaps that of R. P. Wolff.) Thus it may be tempting to compare such an apparently epigonous reception of Kant with those of his direct disciples. Rotenstreich's obvious predilection for Maimonides argues well for this impression; and Bennett seems to stand in the shadow of the *Aenesidemus*[7a]—although the latter occasionally falls within the penumbra of Herder's *Metakritik,* in his spiritualistic sensualism and in his monadological and individualistic tendencies. Some rather essential features of R. P. Wolff's statements remind one of Reinhold: Such to some extent is the misunderstanding, and the rejection, of the schematism (as transition from the general to the specific, objective deduction). Then there is the reference to an original intellectual activity in the style of Descartes; or again, his specific point of departure for a renewed foundation for, and acknowledgment of, objectivity through the transition from content of thought to objects (or objectivity—this remains unclear) by means of synthetic concepts of functions and rules. Finally, there is the fundamental valence of synthetic necessity, and its reduction to the concept of mental activity itself—a completely familiar method of procedure to one who is a former student of the Jesuits of Vienna. Certainly the embedding of "cognitive activities" in innate rules or faculties of the mind deviates greatly from the properly understood intentions of Kant, as well as from the principles of consciousness and their *positions,* as Reinhold occasionally expresses them.[7b]

In these considerations, however, we find revealed one of the customary and characteristic misconceptions to be encountered in many Anglo-Saxon

6. P. F. Strawson, *Individuals, An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (London: Methuen, 1959).

7. Regarding this work, see also the controversy in *Philosophical Review,* LXXVII (1968), p. 340: "Strawson on Kant" (by Bennett); and p. 332: "Bennett on Kant's Analytic" (by Strawson).

7a. <See Gottlob Ernst Schulze, *Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von dem Herrn Professor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Fundamentalphilosophie . . . ,* 1792. This work was reprinted by the *Kantgesellschaft,* Berlin, 1911. >

7b. <Reinhold's pretended progress from Kant to Fichte within two shifts is famous enough: First, concerning the content, he abolishes the thing in itself. Second, he demands a formal principle from which to deduce the two primary stems of cognition, sense and reason. Later, he not only proceeds to the traditional unity of thinker, thought, and what is thought—in terms of intuition, concept, Idea—but also shows a method of derivative positions concerning the manifold, its combination, and objective unification.>

interpretations of Kant. It concerns the relation between subjective and objective deduction, and the basic limitation which this places in general upon theoretical posited constructs.

Following Kant, the idealist endeavors of the early Fichte and Schelling were intended to press further the metaphysical deduction of the categories, which Kant had only inadequately provided (according to Schelling, this is equally the metaphysical deduction—and not merely the exposition—of space and time as the forms of intuition), toward the original unity of the metaphysical deduction with the subjective deduction, and as well of the origin of the categories and the Ideas. This was in fact done with growing disregard for the objective deduction, especially in its limitation through the task of deriving empirical judgments and concepts (demonstrative and descriptive elements of our semantic conventions). For English-language Kant interpretation, however, precisely the latter aspect has come ever more into the foreground.[8] The idealist systematic was originally brought into play for the purpose of mastering the "terror of the objective world"[9]—not least, however, because the requirement of the objective deduction, and more precisely, that of *empirical* concepts, was set aside. It was no longer possible, therefore, to account for scientific and social progress and its characteristic "lawfulness" or tendency to regularity (which in the longer

8. Concerning the relation between subjective, objective and metaphysical deduction—the theme of the monumental work of Vleeschauwer—but under the presupposition of the positive task of a teleological deduction of empirical concepts, see the *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 139f., as well as the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, B 670f. A full understanding of these four principle aspects of the Deduction could only be provided in a sketch of the derivational relation of the categories and Ideas and their different schematization of the ideal and real aspects of space and time as the forms of intuition. An interesting overview of the procedure employed in the transcendental-subjective and objective deductions has already been provided by G. Jánoska in his dispute with the brilliant misunderstanding of Kant by M. Aebi. See Jánoska's article "Der transzendentale Gegenstand," *Kantstudien,* XLVI, No. 3 (1955), p. 193f. Now, however, there is the work of D. Henrich, "The Proof-Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction (Part I)," which is especially valuable for English-language investigations. See *Review of Metaphysics,* XXII (1969), pp. 640-659.

9. See, first of all, Schelling's *Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kritizismus,* Letter No. 10: *Schellings Werke,* ed. M. Schröter (Munich: Beck/Oldenbourg, 1927f.) following the earlier edition of K.F.A. Schelling (1856ff.), Vol. I, p. 337. Then see Hegel's *Theologische Jugendschriften,* ed. H. Nohl (Tübingen: Mohr, 1907), p. 231; or (for the context leading up to the quoted phrase) *Early Theological Writings,* trans. by T. M. Knox (University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 167. The quoted phrase occurs in an uncompleted sentence which, together with the note following, Knox omits from his translation.

run is historically operative); and thus the idealist systematic could no longer perceive the terror of its own inherent alienation. In precisely the same manner, a philosophical movement must become groundless when it is no longer able to trace back the concept of experience—or in more recent terms, the concept of either the common, ordinary use or the hermeneutic use of language—to its fundamental reality in the general and concrete *Logos* of the rational agreement of idea and ideal.

G. Bird presents perhaps the most orthodox interpretation, indicating a kind of English "back to Kant" tendency—if we set aside the more rigid commentators.[10] In many respects this work calls to mind Kant's most faithful, though ultimately unrecognized, disciple, J. S. Beck.[11]

But the work of P. F. Strawson shows us that such an impression is of little consequence. By his subtle and arbitrary manner of interpretation, Strawson sets in relief those aspects of Kant's masterpiece which are relevant to his own "descriptive metaphysics"—a position which is influenced

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10. N. Kemp Smith, *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,* 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1929). A. C. Ewing, *A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,* 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950). H. J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience,* 2 vols. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1936). W. H. Walsh, *Reason and Experience* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947), H. J. Paton, *The Categorical Imperative* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). T. D. Weldon, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,* 2nd ed. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1958). S. Körner, *Kant* (London: Harmondsworth, 1955). L. W. Beck, *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), and many others.

See also the more recently published American collections of essays: *Kant, Disputed Questions,* ed. M. S. Gram (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967). Also, especially, *Kant, A Collection of Critical Essays,* ed. R. P. Wolff (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1967); and the most recent collection of essays, *The First Critique: Reflections on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,* ed. T. Penelhum and J. J. MacIntosh (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1969). See also the papers in *The Monist:* A) General Topic: "Kant Today, Part I," LI, No. 3 (1967); B) General Topic: "Kant Today, Part II," LI. No. 4 (1967). The first part comprises contributions concerning the *Critique of Pure Reason* up to the end of the Transcendental Analytic. The second deals with the Dialectic, as well as questions on the foundation and application of moral philosophy and with Psychology and Anthropology. The collection, *Kant Studies Today,* ed. L. W. Beck (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1969) offers a series of interesting articles including contributions by Sellars, Murphy, Gram, Milmed, Garver and others. Also, see the compilation, "Bibliography: Selection of articles in English," 1968 (I), *Kantstudien,* LX, No. 3 (1969), pp. 389-93, and the selected bibliography covering the period "1945 to the Present" in the work cited above, *Kant, A Collection of Critical Essays,* ed. R. P. Wolff, pp. 412-15.

by Moore, Ryle, Austin, and Quine; even more by Frege[12] and Wittgenstein; and not least by Leibniz and Aristotle. But this interpretive art is such that it might remind one of the many procedural techniques that have come to be recognized as objectionable—of the "thoughtful dialogue between thinkers"[13] in Heidegger's sense—if his point of departure and results were not so utterly different.[14] Certainly, in the digression on the Analogies of Experience,[15] which are so seldom dealt with adequately by German scholars, Strawson leaves room for a comparison with the work of Heidegger. Strawson attempts to resolve the issues in this context by means of the concept of an objective world and its "unified spatio-temporal framework" borrowed from the third Analogy. That is, in the question which reminds one very much of Quinton's investigation,[16] "Why only one objective world?"[17] Here, especially in the reference to a variation in the definition of

11. We would rather not deal here with the works of his namesake, Lewis White Beck of the University of Rochester, who (along with Herbert Lamm of the University of Chicago) is one of the most prominent American interpreters of Kant. But these works would surely also prove highly interesting for the clarification of the understanding of Kant. To this end, Beck has provided both historical reflections on the development of Kant's reception into England and the United States, and also a defensive questioning with regard to analytical philosophy. (What has it learned from Kant; how much could it learn?) See L. W. Beck, "Die Kantkritik von C. I. Lewis und der Analytischen Schule," *Kantstudien,* XLV (1953-54), pp. 3-20. In addition to his many articles, translations, commentaries and introductions, see also the historical work: *Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (Belknap), 1969].
12. Relevant to this, also, is the Introduction to *Philosophical Logic,* ed. P. F. Strawson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967) in the excellent, informative series: *Oxford Readings in Philosophy.*
13. M. Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,* trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. xxv.
14. That is, not so much concerning the relation between the experiential concept and the concept of the world, but rather the interpretation of the relation between logical and phenomenological reflection in Kant's work.
15. Since the study of Laas, which was too heavily influenced by Schopenhauer and Physicalism (based on the psychology of perception prevailing a hundred years ago), there has been no historical and systematic investigation of the Analogies of Experience in the German language. As the principle element in a work shortly to be published, Carl Meier (of Franklin and Marshall, Lancaster, Pa.) deals with the Analogies of Experience from a peculiar middle position that is between those of Bennett and Strawson. Among other things, I am indebted to him for a series of valuable references to American literature on Kant.
16. A. M. Quinton, "Spaces and Times," *Philosophy,* XXXVII (1962).
17. P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense,* pp. 150f.

temporality, one might very well find an affinity with Heidegger's transcendental concept of the world.[18]

But we should not be deceived that Strawson, who as we shall see is limited by his empirical "principle of significance,"[19] is by no means ready to set forth the concept of an actual world. Such a concept of the world would have to be set off as distinct from the merely theoretically considered physical world of space-time, to which we belong as the beings who distinguish themselves from it, and of course as physical entities. And it would have to be displayed in such fashion that its very reality would consist precisely in a reference to "things" and their specific worldliness. This worldliness is set apart, equally, from both the pragmatic world and from either the theoretical, objective world or the scientific, technical world, by means of the "*nasty ditch (garstigen Graben)* of affectation" (Lessing, Schelling), or even the "annihilating Nothingness of ontological difference" (Heidegger).

From this perspective, we must realize how characteristically different the understanding of Kant is in the greater part of the German publications of recent years, and even among the latest to appear.[20] The same may be said

18. It should be noted, however, that the phenomenological exposition of such a concept of the world, first from the theoretical perspective of a fundamental ontology, could only be initiated through an investigation of the synthetic unity of the schema of the Idea, which for Kant is reflected analogically in the temporal schematism of the theoretical, and thus determinant, power of judgment as intuitive comprehension of time (*Zeitinbegriff*)—*together with* the problematic of the schematism of spatiality, which is mentioned (B 195) but not developed. Both in his interpretations of Kant and in the work *"Vom Wesen des Grundes"* (recently republished in *Wegmarken,* Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1967), Heidegger has sketched the difference between the theoretical and the practical sense of a fundamentally philosophical concept of the world. But in neither case has this concept actually been derived, either speculatively (as history of Being) or through transcendental reflection on meaning.

19. P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense,* esp. pp. 16-18, 33-35, 171-72, and 265f.

20. Only a few items may be selected out of the extensive reservoir of publications: G. Martin, *Immanuel Kant,* 3rd ed. (Cologne: Cologne University Press, 1960). H. Heimsoeth, *Transzendentale Dialektik,* Parts 1-3 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1966-69). M. Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1962); and *Kants These über das Sein* (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1963). E. Fink, *Alles und Nichts* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1959). R. Zocher, *Kants Grundlehre* (Erlangen: Universitätsbund, 1959). F. Kaulbach, *Der philosophische Begriff der Bewegung* (Cologne and Graz: Böhlau, 1965); and *Philosophie der Beschreibung* (Cologne and Graz: Böhlau, 1968). Friedrich Delekat, *Immanuel Kant,* 2nd ed. (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1966). P. Plaaß, *Kants Theorie der Naturwissenschaft* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965). O. Marquard, *Skeptische Methode im Blick auf Kant* (Freiburg and Munich: Alber, 1958). P. K. Schneider, *Die*

with respect to French[21] and Italian works.[21a] A comparison of efforts in English[22] with the performance of the most significant German authorities on Kant in the middle years of the present century, such as Cassirer, Heimsoeth, and Martin (all of whom currently have works available in English translation),[23] or Kaulbach, Kopper, Zocher, Delekat, Henrich, and several others,[24] and a comparison with the works of Daval, Vuillemin, Lachièze-Rey and Maréchal, shows very little in the line of parallels or affinities, apart from the ordinary standard definitions. Naturally, then, a confrontation would be all the more exciting if conducted along the lines of individual basic positions within the framework of "ethno-national differences."[25]

Wissenschaftsbegründende Funktion der Transzendentalphilosophie (Freiburg and Munich: Alber, 1965). J. Ebbinghaus, *Die Formeln des Kategorischen Imperativs und die Ableitung inhaltlich bestimmter Pflichten* (Turin: Ediz. di Filosofia, 1960). This work is also available as an article in *Filosofia,* X (1959), pp. 733-753. H. Delius, *Untersuchungen zur Problematik der sogenannten Synthetischen Sätze a priori* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963). O. Blaha, *Die Ontologie Kants* (Salzburg and Munich: Pustet, 1967). B. Liebrucks, *Sprache und Bewußtsein, IV* (Frankfurt/Main: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, 1968). Among articles, the works of G. Jánoska and W. Stegmuller, in *Ratio,* IX (1967), and X (1968), were found to be especially notable. The frequent articles by D. Henrich of the *Philosophische Rundschau,* begun in 1954 and now appearing in the *Review of Metaphysics* (note 8, above), deserve special consideration and evaluation.

21. See the detailed work of R. Heinz, *Französische Kantinterpreten im 20. Jahrhundert* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1966).

21a. V. Mathieu, *La Filosofia trascendentale e l'Opus postumum di Kant* (Turin: Ediz. di Filosofia, 1958). See also, for example, the works of A. Massolo, G. Lumio, and P. Chiodi. Unfortunately, the work of A. Rigobello, *I limiti del trascendentale in Kant* (Milan: Silva, 1963), published under the supervision of H. Kuhn, arrived too late to be dealt with. Among other things, it provides a good overview of the history of Italian literature on Kant. The work is now available in German: *Die Grenzen des Transzendentalen bei Kant* (Munich and Salzburg: Pustet, 1968).

22. See above, note 10.

23. E. Cassirer, "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics," (*Kantstudien,* 1929); H. Heimsoeth, "Metaphysical Motives in the Development of Critical Idealism," *(Kantstudien,* 1924); both of which are to be found in *Kant, Disputed Questions* (see note 10, above). G. Martin, *Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of Science* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1955).

24. Here we must refrain from an explicit reference to the enterprise of Popper.

25. See on this topic Schelling, "Über den Nationalen Gegensatz in der Philosophie," *Schellings Sämmtliche Werke,* 14 vols. (Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta'scher Verlag, 1856-61), X: 192. Note as well his discussion of Coleridge's line: "I am rich and quite satisfied and require nothing." Schelling comments that, among the English, one "dispenses with comfort, upon which (e.g., metaphysics) the German people have so long placed such a high value" (*ibid.*, XI: 277-78).

But we shall be able to refer only in a cursory way to this matter in what follows.

Since an excellent review of the fundamentally systematic work of Rotenstreich (Professor in Jerusalem) is already available,[26] I may express myself rather briefly concerning it.

The title would lead one to suppose that Kant's great leap will progress toward a solution which is distinct both from that of Aristotle and that of Hegel. This leap is beyond the gradual concretion of the thing-in-itself as disjunctively posited "supersensible substrate," by way of the mediation from its "*determinability* through the intellectual faculty as judgment of nature" to its "practical self-determination in reason,"[27] and of course in the differentiation and unity of Reason and Understanding and their respectively distinct legislations based on "the same ground of experience."[28] Yet, despite the very extensive analyses in several main divisions of his work,[29] Rotenstreich is unsuccessful in coping with the manifold functions of the power of judgment.[30] He can neither derive them logically from the Kantian definition and (incomplete) deduction of judgment, nor demonstrate the *mediation* of theoretical and practical reason under different modifications (aesthetic-technical; historical-philosophical, as the history of culture and civilization; and theological, as rational theology and that of revelation).

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26. U. Arnold, "Besprechung Rotenstreich," *Erasmus,* XVIII, Nos. 15-16 (Wiesbaden 1966).
27. *Critique of Judgment,* 2nd Introduction, pp. lv-lvi; and *Critique of Practical Reason,* pp. 187ff. Both references are to the original editions. This pagination is given in the margin of the standard edition: *Kants Gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin: Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1902-; later volumes published by George Reimer and Walter de Gruyter), V. Hereafter this work is referred to as *Schriften.* See also, *Critique of Judgment,* trans., with an Introduction by J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1951), p. 33. Hereafter this work is referred to as *Bernard trans. Critique of Practical Reason, trans., with an Introduction by L. W. Beck (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956), p. 108.*
28. *Critique of Judgment,* p. xviii; *Bernard trans.,* p. 11.
29. Formal, transcendental and speculative logic; Deduction and Schematism; Scholastic metaphysics, first philosophy, Critical metaphysics; Necessity and limits of the Dialectic, teleological power of judgment, and Practical Reason.
30. See M. Benedikt, "Ist die 'absolute Position' als Erfahrung konkretisierbar?" in *Wiener Jahrbuch für Philosophie, 1968, pp. 105-144, esp. p. 138f.*
31. Perhaps with two exceptions: First, the too brief restriction of the power of judgment with respect to the problems of subsumption and reflection between empirical and *a priori concepts* on the one hand, and *a priori* and *a posteriori elements* on the other hand. Secondly, the deterioration of the standard of investigation in the area between the establishment of the foundations and the actual application of practical legislation.

Although the aporetic individual analysis has succeeded excellently in nearly every part,[31] one must regret the lack of a clarification and determination of the concept of objective experience that would be sufficient to provide both a transcendental theory of constitution and a description. Unfortunately, this concept continues to be characterized by amphiboly even in the *Opus postumum.*[32] It would have been better if Rotenstreich had not felt it necessary in the first two logical chapters to shift so quickly back and forth, first to Kant's disciples and Hegel and then to Plato and Aristotle, in order to survey the fundamental dimension of the space of Reason (*Vernunftraum*) concerning experience. Starting from the analytic and synthetic difference encountered in reflection on the concept, one can indeed still represent the determination of this reflection on an autochthonous basis under the aspect of differentiation in synthetic and analytic subsumption (as possibilities of the operation of the Understanding). This requires, of course, an analytic subsumption of Reason under the Understanding, as a condition for the difference between the objectively synthetic, and the subjectively analytic, use of the Understanding. In the result of this process, one would be able to examine the extent to which an original synthetic act of the schematism of a space of reason (*Vernunftraum*)[33] yields, for the very first time, a boundary to a *practical* operation of the Understanding. This synthetic act serves as an element of the discursive procedure in which limitability is established through the finite self-giving of representations *as sensible* (and thus immediately abstract). In the practical operation which thus occurs, the "intellectual capacity" subsumes itself *under* reason, thus giving this relation its potential and actual experiential determination. This is in contrast with the experiential determination of the conceptual use of a space of reason of theoretical interest, which is restricted through outer and inner sensibility.

32. In the *Opus postumum* Kant designates experience as the product of the hybrid Transcendental Philosophy in the balance of its ideal-assymptotic and real-constitutive aspects. (We prefer to ignore the theory of senility here). See, however, the work of J. Kopper, "Kants Lehre vom Übergang als die Vollendung des Selbstbewußtseins der Transzendentalphilosophie," *Kantstudien,* LV (1964).

33. The concept of a space of reason has again come into vogue. See Kant's use of this concept, especially in "What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thought?" *Schriften,* VIII, pp. 133-147. This work is also translated in *Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy,* trans. and ed. L. W. Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949).

34. See *Critique of Pure Reason,* A 107, B 116, 118, 119, 120, 182, 194, among others. Also, see *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* Chapter IV, end: "General Observation on Phenomenology," Library of Liberal Arts edition, trans. James Ellington (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1970), pp. 125, 127. Hereafter this work is referred to as *Ellington Trans.*

It is quite remarkable, therefore, that Rotenstreich fails to perceive the dependence of the metaphysical deduction of the categories upon the transcendental and metaphysical exposition of the forms of pure intuition (as finitely posited concepts of reasons).[34] Nor does he take notice of determinations of the assignment of the particular categories to the reflections of intuitions and their abstract material of perceptions, both in their separation and in their experiential unity.[35] But these are precisely the loose ends which could be taken up into a more extensive elaboration of the original and objective unity of the combined transcendental-subjective and metaphysical deduction of the categories. For only from this perspective is it possible to pursue further the distinction between intellectual intuition and intuitive understanding. If this distinction is neither discernible, nor even constitutively verifiable, nonetheless it *is* conceivable—and the components distinguished are essential prerequisites for the experience of any entity whatever. Thus, the question that must be pursued is how this distinction can be maintained both with respect to the object of experience, and in terms of the absolute unity of Reason. In the same manner, Rotenstreich's comparison of Kant and Aristotle also remains unfounded. The comparison lies between the sensible restriction and realization of the categories by Kant (indeed, even the Ideas *within* the already fixed space of reason as temporal schemata) and Aristotle's concretion of the primary constituents of Reason (*Noesis, Logos, Idea*) *as* concepts of nature (via the mediation of *ousia* and *to ti en einai*). But such a comparison remains groundless apart from the characteristic ontological schematism of Aristotle (form is the schema of the idea)[36] and unless the noetic difference of this schematism from that of Kant were effectively maintained through the Analytic, the Dialectic, and the *Critique of Judgment.* For it is here that Kant has developed the operation of sensible restrictions in the different forms of mediation of a referential presentation.[37]

Therefore, because the distinction between theoretical and speculative philosophy is left out of consideration from the very beginning, Rotenstreich is also unable to restrict the concept of the latter to the practical. Nonetheless, he offers within relatively narrow limits a broad and

35. Critique of Pure Reason, §11, B 109f.
36. See Aristotle's *Metaphysics,* 1029 a 3,4; but also 1002 a 21, and elsewhere.
37. Setting aside a few allusions, not least among them Heidegger's, one may say that, since Schelling's and Hegel's exaltation in the speculative arbitrariness of absolute Mind, there has as yet been no tendency whatever to come to terms with the comparison between the <productive> schematism of the second science presented by Aristotle (form is schema of the idea) and the verbally harmonious exposition (not deduction) of the judgment of taste with respect to the sublime in §29 of the *Critique of Judgment* (pp. 110 & 116), and the following observations (*Bernard trans.*, pp. 106, 108f.).

significant perspective on the complete program of Kant. And of all the works in English here presented, this work is the most indebted to the tradition which derives its reception of Kant from the (hitherto mostly futile) attempts to overcome the problems of unification provided by the subjective and metaphysical deduction of reflected and demonstrated concepts.

The book on Kant by Robert P. Wolff (student of C. I. Lewis, and Professor at Columbia University) is intended to be a more extensive and critically comparative commentary on the Analytic of the *Critique of Pure Reason.*

In an unusually precise manner, he is successful in bringing us closer to an easier and continuous understanding of the central portions of the two threads of the deduction, especially as it is presented in Edition A. (One is at times, even if not explicitly, reminded of Vleeschauwer's subtle, archeological exposure of particular strata). With respect to method, he attempts to achieve a middle path between the orthodox interpretation of Paton and the patch-work procedure of Kemp Smith. This middle path is one of critical hermeneutics, which follows up the lead provided by the question of the meaning of synthesis and thus arrives at the area of broader interest: the often neglected completion of the objective deduction in the Analytic of Principles.

A minor consideration that is lacking here is a still necessary derivation of the difference between intuition and concept,[37a] a derivation which was indicated by Kant. One surely cannot allow it to rest simply on the specific differences in virtue of which the *representation* is qualified as "given" or "generated." But apart from that, what we most miss here is an attempt to resolve the question: How can the relation of general and individual concepts be brought to potential and actual objective knowledge by means of the logical synthesis of subject and predicate concepts? Such a project could only be carried out through a derivation of all the procedures and means by which an object can be given—even though these sometimes lead to the cognition of an object and sometimes do not. But since Kant, it is possible to pursue the matter in two distinct ways: first, by means of a simple definition of judgment ("an act by which given representations first become cognitions of an object");[38] and secondly, through establishing a mediation between the fundamental synthetic principle concerning the conditions of both objectivity and action in experience (*Critique of Pure Reason,* A 111), on the one hand, and the supreme principle, on the other. But, of course, the supreme principle has a double function to fulfill, and it is especially this latter point which seems to me not to be clarified by Wolff—that is, how is the supreme principle not merely the principle of all synthetic judgments,

37a. See in this regard the works of G. Jánoska and D. Henrich cited above, note 8.

38. Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* Preface (*Ellington trans.,* p. 13n.).

but also simultaneously the supreme principle of the Postulates of empirical thought? Thus, two distinct functions are required here: the "transition" from the subjective transcendental deduction to the determination of the object (and not just the objectivity) of the objective deduction; and at the same time, the disclosure and concretion of the difference between perceptual content and object of apperception. But these two aspects and their interrelation actually constitute a *single* result of the theory of the schematism.

In the theoretical philosophy of Kant, even if we limit ourselves to that part (*Akroasis*) which makes the description of objects possible, a great deal is already going on. There is a general derivation of the production (reflected in the power of judgment) of the potential synthesis of the various types of cognitive determinations, of the forms of expression of thought, or of semantic production. Therefore, we must really not expect that it also provides a theory concerning the differences between type, symbol, image, metaphor, and schema. However, the elimination of the problem of the schematism through the Analytic of Principles is itself too little to satisfy us. For, indeed, we would be unable, by means of any act of reason whatever, to undertake the particular synthetic determination of subsumption, restriction, and realization of empirical intuition in and under concepts—if the following essential conditions were not satisfied: (1) The transition from the transcendental principle to the potential empirical judgment (as unity of teleological procedure and conceptual reflection, of the "phenomenon of the phenomenon")[39] must be schematic to begin with; (2) and reciprocally the transition from the subjective unity of possible objectivity for the determination of the form of objects (Nature) to the *natura materialiter spectata* can itself only be possible through the transcendental act of the schematism of the regulative Idea—above all, of the intuitive comprehension of time (*Zeitinbegriff*) in its relation to permanence as such, as well as to the permanence of the empirically real in time.[40]

39. This concept [*Erscheinung der Erscheinung*] is employed in the *Opus postumum,* especially in Fascicle X, for the theoretical realization of the constituted object of experience, and has been called to our attention by Lehmann, Daval, Mathieu, Barth, and now Kaulbach. But in this concept, the problem of the deduction of empirical concepts is broached as well. (Regarding these two problems, see the procedure of the Deduction in Edition A of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* which is still obscure with regard to subjectivity. It is therefore mentioned in the program of revisions: B xxxviii). With the help of the "Deduction of Ideas" (B 367, 376, 386f., 390, 393, 697 and elsewhere), this problem becomes the explicit theme of the *Critique of Judgment.* It enters into the various attempts at deduction of the *Opus postumum* in objectively theoretical and formally practical shifting. For the problem of the Deduction of Ideas, see especially H. Heimsoeth, *Transzendentale Dialektik,* cited above.

40. That is, as fulfillment of the synthesis of the Second and Third theoretical Postulate.

In the same manner, it remains unclear to what extent not only the Second Analogy, but even more the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments, is just the precise repetition and theoretical restriction of the *principium grande* of Leibniz. It is suggested, however, that *this* revised principle can only be relevant in a position with reference to the significance of the Analogies as a whole—a position which Kant does not express explicitly.[41] For ultimately, one will find that the general principle of the Analogies (at least in Edition B) is too meager to provide sufficient support for the derivation of the difference and unity of such rules as those of substance, function, and structure in their objective reference.

The attempt to seek out such a position, the most difficult in the Kantian Analytic—the relation between modal and relational reflection—does not succeed. Rather, it appears that Wolff himself has occasionally fallen victim in his critical hermeneutic to the fluctuation between Humean skepticism and pre-Critical dogmatism. In any case, the battle through which the "synthetic activity" retreats to the level of faculty psychology in Tetens' sense renders this interpretation plausible.

Actually, Graham Bird had already made it his particular concern to find access, if not indeed the solution, to this problem in the book mentioned earlier. In taking up this problem, he presupposes the validity of the problematic disjunction between phenomenon and thing-in-itself and guards against any hasty synthesis or suppression of this distinction.

Consequently, by means of a procedure employing both historical-critical commentary and systematic assimilation, Bird seeks to extricate from Kant's theoretical philosophy the most difficult passages bearing on the "ontological difference" and its mediation as the "third" in terms of the "object of experience." He presents this draft to his English readers (and especially those oriented on Prichard's *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*)[42] in an up-to-date fashion, employing the modern idiom. But he leads beyond these considerations to the problem of transcendental (cosmological) and moral freedom, and its lawfulness under the condition of the constitution of the person-concept, as presupposition of this difference (between cosmological and moral reflection).[43]

Meanwhile, it remains rather questionable how the abstract framework of the logical categories, which is the result of the (incomplete) metaphysical

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41. Not even in the context where he specifically occupies himself with this synthesis (apart, of course, from the ontological discipline), that is, in the outline of the prize essay, "On the Progress of Metaphysics" (1793, never completed); and in the polemical work, *Der Streit der Fakultäten.* Whereas in the *Opus postumum,* there is hardly an outline of a deduction to be found that would relate the problem of the synthesis of modal and relational reflection in the theoretical determination of an object—by way of deduction—to the whole space of reason.

42. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1909.

deduction, is nonetheless able to function in relation both to the problematically applied noumena and to the forms of the phenomena—reflectable and reflected according to their form and content. It is by means of these forms and their (*posited*) immediacy that the complementarity is displayed, which consists of the "no longer" of a presence, which has always been possible beforehand, of the thing as phenomenon, and the "not yet" of possible theoretical objectivity.[44]

However, Bird is in a position to shed light rather extensively on the position of the objective deduction—central for theoretical knowledge—in such fashion that several things are clarified. On the one hand, the unity of the transcendental synthesis relates to the function of the *natura formaliter spectata.* On the other hand, this same unity is considered under the presupposition of reflection on this spontaneity, and the separation which this implies between outer sense and the *merely* subjective function of the form of inner sense. From this perspective it determines, by means of the transcendental form of time, both the contents of outer sense and their coordination. In the process, he is also able to illuminate the difference between ontological concepts of an object and concepts of a person, and the implications of this difference regarding existence within a causal nexus.

Bird, however, has been unable to make the subjective Deduction itself intelligible as the potential context for the general derivation of both concepts of reason and of the understanding. Moreover, later in his article on "Logik und Psychologie in der transzendentalen Deduktion,"[45] he has also, similar to R.P. Wolff and contrary to the instructions of Kant, reduced the cardinal problem of the theoretical concept of transcendental method through psychological reduction to absurdity.[46] This problem involves the original distinction of understanding and reason and its theoretico-empirical restriction, in positing the latter on the one hand *in* understanding (as apperception) and on the other hand *beneath* understanding (as intuition in general), and the agreement of the two.

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43. Here the discussions of Strawson's concept of the person (p. 181), concerning the relation between noumenal self-determination of spontaneity and inner sense (in contrast with the form of outer sense emphasized by Strawson) are especially interesting. On the relation between subjectivity and personality, see also: H. E. Matthews, "Strawson on Transcendental Idealism," *The Philosophical Quarterly,* XIX, No. 76 (1969), pp. 204-20.
44. This reflection seems to me not merely to be of great importance in relation to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant (see *Die Frage nach dem Ding,* cited above, pp. 110f., and also pp. 100f.) in that he has presented in quite distinct fashion both the "imaginative" concept of the world and that of the privation of the objectified phenomenon exemplified in Kant. It is also important with respect to the problem of affection not solved by Heidegger.
45. G. Bird, "Logik und Psychologie in der transzendentalen Deduktion," *Kant-studien,* LVI (1966), pp. 373ff.
46. *Ibid.,* pp. 382f.

We come now to a critical point in our investigation, to the great problem already grasped by Aristotle: How the "object-constituting" relevance of reason in the "soul" and its separability or "transcendence"—which indeed is also specified in its actual and thematic "executions" of *phronesis,* of *techne,* and of *episteme,* presupposing *sophia* and *nous*—relates itself to the *ordinary* human modes of self-comprehension in social interactions (*doxa* and *pistis* in all their derivatives), in juridical and in "laudatory" speech, and in the political discourse essential to general well-being. In connection with the events of Plato's *Dialogues,* Aristotle presents this "state of affairs" in his *Rhetoric, Poetics, Topics,* and even in the *Prior Analytics,* as a relation between hearer and speaker (and observer).

It is significant that the English "common sense"[47] demonstrates a tendency to assume explicitly this rhetorical determination of man. But far more, there is also a tendency to establish it, even in the interpretation of Kant, as nothing less than the surrogate of the attempt to trace objectivity back to the activity of transcendental subjectivity (to be derived within theoretical self-limitation). Such a substitution would eliminate the unity of the subjective-transcendental and metaphysical deduction.[48] Speech, as the peculiar production of subjective pre-conditions, whether they be transcendental-theoretical or practically oriented "modes of life" ("*Lebendigkeit*"),[49] is itself, therefore, already "synthetic" in its use. For that reason, the analysis or reflection on the employment of concepts by means of differentiation between mere subjective speaker-identification (in its

47. "Common sense," as an intersubjective disposition of the mind (*Critique of Judgment,* §§21 & 22), is for Kant the medium of metaphorical speech, to which the prescriptive-evaluative determination is related symbolically (§59) and to which the descriptive-theoretical determination is related analogically. Certainly, consideration is not yet given here to theoretical self-limitation in the transcendental philosophical or analytical reflection *on* these forms of speech; Kant has sketched this self-limitation in his theory of the relation between representation (*Vorstellung*) and referential presentation (*Darstellung*), although that was inadequately developed. In contrast, however, the analytic philosophy dissolved this self-limitation in the context of the distinction between neustic and phrastic modes of speech, as these are distinguished by R. M. Hare and Stenius, the one from the practical and the other from the theoretical forms of speech presentation.

48. Note here Strawson's skepticism with respect to the underived relevance of the personal pronouns of the first person in the metaphysical and transcendental-subjective deduction. However, this position, taken up in *The Bounds of Sense,* is in contrast to his own differentiation of the hearer-speaker identification in *Individuals* (pp. 15f., and 87f.).

49. This term is used by Kant in the *Prolegomena* and in the Fourth Antinomy of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as well as more extensively in his *Lectures on Metaphysics* (although here in an uncritical manner, plain and imprecise) as subjective condition of transcendental reflection, that is, in the sense of life as experience.

private-privative self-escalations) and objective hearer-identification (in its public truth, in terms of describable object-relatedness) appears as a semantic "making" ("*facere*"). Thus the entire analysis takes on the appearance of a mere semantic fabrication.[50]

A good step forward toward the reduction of the *a priori* synthesis to an *a posteriori* analysis is attempted by J. Bennett in his work, *Kant's Analytic.* The book examines the "mind" (*"Gemüt"*) in part psychologically, and in part through linguistic analysis.

Employing certain axioms of linguistic analysis, Bennett seizes upon what is for him the central argument of the Transcendental Deduction (A106-107, 110-111, 115-117; B 121-126, 129-139). This is done by means of a conventional thesis concerning the demands of a <Lockian-> bourgeois individual consciousness which, for us, is nearly Marxist in character. In this setting, he identifies the relation between the analytic and synthetic positing of the transcendental ego with the so-called "ownership-doctrine of mental states." The point of the deduction would thus be that, on the one hand, subjects (or the subject in us) are (is) proprietor(s) of intellectual or affective (*gemütlicher*) states. But on the other hand, one must comprehend these as characteristics of the experience of the immediately reflected self-differentiation of the species, and its reified results as objective features of the environment, which is operatively mastered through systems of 'signs.' As the dog takes on definite traits, so does the master.

Here we omit the investigations of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Except for the identity-thesis of the content of apprehension, as related to both the spatio-temporal form of intuition and to empirical consciousness, they are quite uninteresting,[51] since the problem of the transcendental movement of the imagination in apprehension[52] is left unbroached.[53]

Things become more interesting after Bennett has completed a briefly summarized classification of the axioms mentioned above, which he had worked out in his book, *Rationality*[54]—by departing from Moore's

50. See M. Benedikt, "Ist die 'absolute Position' als Erfahrung konkretisierbar?" (cited above), p. 140, esp. note 155.
51. One would give preference here to the efforts of Dingler as well as to the most recent investigations of Kambartel.
52. *Critique of Pure Reason,* A 98f., A 120n., B 127f., B 152ff., B 155n.
53. Bennett's reference to the derivations of the forms of intuition in relation to a theory of principles of Geometry would have to be confronted with those of Frege, Couturat, Martin and Daval. One would also have to consider Strawson's theses and analyses concerning Kant's assumptions with respect to a determination (whether intuitionistic or decisionistic) of the axiomatics of both normal and non-Euclidean systems and their possibility.
54. *Rationality: An Essay towards an Analysis* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964). This work is now available in German as Volume 2 of the Suhrkamp series, *Theorie* (1967).

linguistic analysis and making some compromises with Austin's classification of objective modes of speech. Only at this point do we see how Bennett gets into the main aspects of the transition from subjective to objective deduction, as though he were entering upon the contemporary text of one of his co-lecturers.[55]

The first two of his three fundamental linguistic axioms are not related to any *definite* knowledge of an object that would be analytically and epistemologically relevant. The three together read as follows: (1) "Any creature which makes judgments at all makes judgments of such and such a kind" (the symptom function); (2) "Any *language* has means for expressing judgments of such and such a kind" (the signal function); (3) "Any *concept-exercising language* has means for expressing judgments of such and such a kind." (Thus we find represented the well-known modes of language, as symptom, signal, and symbol functions). Bennett then continues: "Kant conflates these three, but their distinctness must be enforced."[56] This is a radical misunderstanding. Or does it perhaps contain a kernel of truth, after all?

In his *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant indeed does not expressly distinguish between these three reflective moments of "language." There he is concerned with quite different matters, that is, with the theoretical constitution of the object in its distinctness from the pragmatic determination of the things or means produced by us.[57] But he does distinguish the three reflective moments implicitly, both in the *Anthropology* and in some of his *Reflections.* Certainly concept use (the semantic "*facere*") as a function of the "recognition" of the *empirical* difference and unity of concepts, such as those of universality and of the past, is set apart by Kant from the determinations of "apprehension" of the designation of sensible representations through image representation (*agere*). That is, it is distinguished either in terms of invention or in terms of the presence of the mere appearance of the object insofar as this is verifiable through copy or counterpart representations <*Ab- oder Gegenbildvorstellungen*> (semantic *fingere*).[58]

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55. *Kant's Analytic,* especially the comments in the Preface, p. viii.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 86. Italics added in points 2 and 3.
57. *Critique of Pure Reason,* B ix, 67, 125, 166, 374, *inter alia.* This is so, even though the determination of the practically operative elements, *antecedent to* the concretion in technically practical rules, definitely produces a specifiable sense of discrimination from the rules (Analogies) which make the description possible.
58. Kant has attempted to exhibit the different fundamental semantic functions of our judgmental capacity in his *Opus postumum* by distinguishing between *fingere, agere, facere,* and *operari.* See the *Opus postumum: Schriften,* XXI: 36, 76, 90, 226, 560; and XXII: 48, 50, 62, 130, 287, 472, 475, 477, *inter alia.* See also, however, the earlier reference in the *Critique of Judgment,* §43: *Schriften,* V: 303; *Bernard trans.*, p. 145.

However, the actual attainment of knowledge is not at all, as Bennett believes, to be resolved in the distinguishing and combining (*facere*) of concepts such as those of universality and the past. (Herder also holds this position and—as far as I can see—in contemporary times, Gehlen). Rather, it is only the distinction of the pure and empirical constituents of reflection, with respect to our theoretically reflected "mind" ("*Gemüt*") in the very operation (*operari*) of these modes of concept-use—by means of a theoretically and generally conceived schema (and its pure image) of the intuitive comprehension of time (*Zeitinbegriff*)—which allows us to distinguish between the temporally past determination of objectivity and the free and prospective action of the present, which is however socially and pragmatically (or object-) oriented. (This is *at one with* a "*Typik*" of past determinations of freedom.)

In one place, Bennett appears to sense this radical difference. However, in contrast to linear inner temporality, he persists in the analytically unconventional, rough phrase "temporality as such."[58a] The magic criterion, "concept-exercising," falls, however, far below the distinction Kant set forth in one of his *Reflections.*[58b] It is only this insight which frees us from the need either (1) to make explicit the meaning of the reflexivity of the speech act; (2) to fixate it as a transcendental or semantic "self-reflexivity of experience"; (3) even speculatively to exalt it by a "self-escalation (*Selbstaufstufung*) of spirit"; or (4) to posit explicitly that form of reflection itself as *"nihil negativum"* and to set it "heterothetically"[59] in practically conditioned and logically unconditioned negation, in order to further the concrete object-determination also of the practical complementarity of

58a. *Kant's Analytic,* p. 66.

58b. "The senses provide the matter (*i.e.,* the semantic 'resistance') for all our representations. It is from this matter that the formative faculty first forms its representations, independently of the presence of objects: the power of imagination, *imaginatio* (inclusive of the empirical or a priori *fingere* and its distinction from the 'resistance'); second, the capacity for comparison: wit and the power of differentiation, *judicium discretum* (thus the determination of 'concept-exercising' is already present here); third, the capacity to combine representations, not immediately with their objects, but through the mediation of a representative, *i.e.,* to designate (which includes the distinction between semantic action and practical action and the specific capacity of each for being designated." (Parenthetical material is added). *Reflexionen Kants zur kritischen Philosophie,* 2 vols., ed. Benno Erdmann (Leipzig: Fues's Verlag, 1882-84), I, *Reflexion Kants zur Anthropologie,* p. 118. Also in *Kants handschriftlichen Nachlaß,* II, part 1, No. 339 (*Schriften,* XV, part 1, p. 134). See also M. Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (cited above), pp. 136-37.

59. Concerning the concept 'heterothetic,' basically a revision of the Aristotelian *endechesthai kai allos echein,* see J. Mader, *Die Logische Struktur des personalen Denkens* (Vienna: Herder, 1965).

what is private and public.[59a] This, and not some "ownership-doctrine," is the potential, pure, or empirical meaning[60] of the unity of the metaphysical and transcendental deduction, which would certainly also have to be given application in "axioms of the rhetorical use of language."[61]

Basically, this is at least a partial aspect of the problem of the "faculty of judgment" in its manifold ostensive, empirical and pure determinations. Indeed, Kant begins the restriction and realization of the faculty of judgment, on the theoretical level, explicitly with the schematism of concepts, not of ideas—which Bennett once more completely misunderstands. Only on the basis of a schematized concept can Kant, on the one hand, consolidate the *substantia phaenomenon* through general causality, in its distinguishability from arbitrary and regulatively necessary succession, into the general structural determination of reciprocal action, and, on the other, after the restriction of this temporal position on temporality, still distinguish another disposition of succession, the "representation" of which determines the sequence of events, that is, the antecedents in accordance with practical requirements ("practical" as understood by Kant). Only in the limitation of this mode of temporality is the question to be raised concerning such matters as the "sense" of "living entity," or concerning the specific liveliness of human acts and speech, which Bennett has already applied under the previously distanced criteria, (1) and (2).

To be sure, if the sensualization of concepts exercised in our *theoretical* use of speech were the only means of spatio-temporal description, and there were not in addition the symbolic and metaphoric, imagery, *Typik,* and so on, then perhaps Bennett could be right. And it is certainly also true that Kant is not sufficiently master of a semantic idiom to arrest and confine the undetermined past in the understanding in such fashion as to satisfy the

59a. <The intent here is to call into question the predominance of the idealistic interpretation of the "criterion of significance">.

60. With respect to this matter, see also the undisciplined investigations of objective and personal otherness by M. Theunissen, *Der Andere* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1965), as well as the investigations by J. Habermas and others, *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften,* ed. J. Habermas (*Philosophische Rundschau,* Supplementary Vol. No. 5, Tübingen: Mohr, 1967). See also the two most recent collections of essays by Habermas: *Erkenntnis und Interesse* and *Technik und Wissenschaft als "Ideologie"* (both, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1968). Certainly Habermas seems (in the coordinating context of his "concern with emancipation") to define inadequateiy the concept of mediation with respect to modal and relational determination when he employs again the early Hegelian concept 'being-with-oneself-in-another' (*Im-Andern-bei-sich-Sein*) for the purpose of providing a basis, on the one hand for the interests of instruments and knowledge, and on the other for those of practical communication.

61. See F. Fischer, *Proflexion und Reflexion* (Ratingen bei Düsseldorf: Henn, 1965), p. 107.

analyst; but, that does not mean that his transcendental conception of synthesis would not be translatable into such an idiom. However, the scope of the semantic *"facere"* in Bennett's version seems <to a Kantian> to be too narrow to set forth the distinction of the *operatio* in the determination of living things, as well as that of the significance of private and public forms of social relations in a theory of history and the specific experiential world which such a theory requires. Moreover, these must be distinguished equally from the interests of knowledge pertaining to the scientific reproduction of empirical, structural lawfulness, and from those of regulative rationality. Thus, we see Bennett in his confinement limited to the confusion of theoretical restriction and general experience, while he also attempts to draw the critical restriction of the meaning of experience into his conceptual sphere by means of ownership restrictions.

For that reason as well, we shall not go into the particulars of the many abuses of Kant—such as "awkward," "radically wrong," and "neurotic"—but rather we shall turn our attention to P. F. Strawson, who is perhaps the most important mind in English philosophy <at least regarding the post-Wittgensteinian era>.

In order to do full justice to Strawson's interpretation and misunderstanding of Kant, it would be necessary (if indeed it were possible) to write an entire book with at least as much in the line of terseness, straw-dry humor, and far-flashing perspectives as he occasionally provides.

Our consideration within the scope of this brief review, however, is intended to be less an evaluation of the differences than, tentatively, a critical distinguishing of our traditional [Continental], and still to be fulfilled, exegesis of Kant from the most recent interpretations in English.

The title of Strawson's book is already exciting. "*The Bounds of Sense*" might mean "the boundaries (or limitations?)[62] of sense perception (or of meaning!)."[63]

The interpretation and revision goes through almost all divisions of the Doctrine of Elements in the *Critique of Pure Reason.* Left out of consideration, however, are such things as the chapter on the Schematism, and the

62. In my opinion, Strawson seems to have distinguished inadequately on the basis of principles the logical and transcendental aspect of the category of limitation. (See also K. Reich, *Die Vollständigkeit der Kantischen Urteilstafel,* Berlin: R. Schoetz, 1932). Since Fichte and the early Schelling, the working out of this very difference became decisive for the further development of German Idealism. [See L. Krüger, "Wollte Kant die Vollständigkeit seiner Urteilstafel beweisen?" in *Kantstudien,* LIX, No. 3 (1968), pp. 333f.; and also note 37a, above.]

63. Although Strawson does not explicitly take up the point, the title appears—often verbatim— in Kant's own work. It first occurs, in an early and rather "uncritical" form, in his letter to Lambert of 2 September 1770 as the basic requirement of a *phaenomenologia generalis,* which turns up again in a

aspect of noumenal causality in its relationship to empirical sequences, that is, the "cosmological" dialectic of freedom in the Third Antinomy and the two components of the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic: "The Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason,"[64] and "The Final Purpose of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason." These latter two sections are particularly essential for the delimitation of procedure in the theory of science and the philosophy of history. Individual points from these slighted divisions are, of course, occasionally mentioned in other contexts.

Strawson deals in a particularly thorough manner with those elements in the Aesthetic and Analytic which are gathered up once more by Kant in the Second Postulate (especially in Edition B). These hang together nicely with the "admirable principle of significance"[65] and thus with the necessary relatedness of concepts to their verification in empirical intuition. Strawson finds the Second Postulate to be "explained in a strategically unfavorable place," and we shall see why. Then he deals with the objective deduction, particularly as it is presented in Edition B, but he consults in addition certain important passages in Edition A (pp. 115ff.). Among these, one regrets

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restricted form in the modal reflection of the *Metaphysical Foundations.* In a letter to Marcus Herz, 21 February 1772, Kant mentions the projected plan for his future principle work as "The Limits of Sensibility and Reason." Then the phrase occurs again with more precision as the differentiation between practical and theoretical reason in the Preface to Edition B of the first *Critique* (p. xxv). The concept <'bounds of sense'> had already been defined sharply once before—at least in terms of the subject matter <or meaning>—in the famous "objective turn" of the deduction in the Introduction to the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.*

64. Here would be the place, in the sense of a "Treatise on Critical Reason," to do justice to the demands of Popper. In my opinion, this is lacking in the work of Albert.

65. See note 19, above.

65a. In the context of the Analytic of Principles in general and especially of the Second and Third Analogies, the preparatory work for the schematism of space is still lacking despite Kant's suggestion at B 195f. (According to Kant's "General Observation" on Chapter IV of the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* the concept of space as such is "a necessary concept of reason, and therefore nothing more than a mere idea": *Schriften* IV: 559; *Ellington trans.,* p. 125). Now the relation between object of experience and the spatiality of our intuition is of special interest to Strawson. His interpretation of the Refutation of Idealism and of the "General Note on the System of Principles" are examples of great interpretive ability. (This Refutation is in opposition to the transcendental idealist arguments on space—which here take on at times a phenomenal idealist character—found in the Fourth Paralogism of A 366f.) Also here, however, the problem of the *thematized theoretical objectivity* of space appears not to be grasped fully. On this matter, see the republished work of C. B. Garnett, *The Kantian Philosophy of Space,* 2nd ed. (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1966).

the omission of that to which there is recourse under the heading of recognition: the sharper distinction of the concepts of thing, noumenon, objectivity, object, and nature. This latter would require a schematism of spatial dimension, which is here only *intimated* by Strawson.[65a]

In the Dialectic, the chapter on the Paralogisms and aspects of "The Ideal of Pure Reason," are evaluated with reserved recognition. In spite of the intention to set limits to sensibility, the lumping together of the Third and Fourth Antinomies with the "Ideal" seems to me to lack justification. After all, one must keep in view the practical and teleological verification of the two other *Critiques.* At this point, Strawson's interpretation turns against him, since in the Deduction he has failed to distinguish sufficiently between the synthetic and analytic *sense,* and the empirical and transcendental *use,* of concepts in such functions of reason as subsumption, abstraction, regulation and reflection.[66]

The discussion which relates to the establishment of the foundations of geometry is extremely careful. The analysis of the operative mathematical synthesis of the homogeneous (arbitrary *compositio* as the construction of concepts in "intuition") should be confronted with the investigations of G. Martin or the more recent work of Kambartel.

The Analogies of Experience are developed without the function, which Kant adumbrated and Schelling[66a] spelled out more clearly, of the relational synthetic categories, as the more original functions of unity of the quantitative and qualitative forms of abstraction (and their distinction reflected once more in modal reflection). Thus, they stand without their necessary reference to the principle of the Axioms and Anticipations, which Kant first began to correlate in the *Metaphysical Foundations* and the *Opus postumum.* These Analogies are transformed, therefore, by means of a peculiar reversal—employing the assistance of the objective deduction as revised through the analysis of experience—into a framework that will support the descriptive metaphysics which actually undermines the Kantian systematic. This constitutes a reversal because the spatio-temporally restricted position of the self in relation to otherness (that is, the I-object relationship reflected in transcendental apperception) of a subject limiting itself both theoretically and in terms of sensibility provides only the abstract generality of an anonymous (no ownership), empirical (ownership), and transcendental (phenomenal) idealist instance; it provides no supplementary objective possibilities whatever for establishing the foundation required in the identification of an object. The *result* of the synthesis that we have all along brought before us, whenever we have identified it descriptively,

66. This "jungle" is by-passed by Strawson especially on p. 93. See note 62, above.

66a. This occurs in both the second and third epochs of his "System of Transcendental Idealism" as well as in the transition from the first to the second Practical Principle.

would therefore be equated rather with our propositional use of language (which is in any case already synthetic) than with its transcendental deduction, which Strawson considers so dubious.

Together with this fundamental revision, radical procedures are employed once more with respect to all the results and consequences which either lead *to* or follow *from* that "doubtful position." These include the moments of space and time as the pure forms of intuition—which are isolable from the spatio-temporal framework—as sense-specifiable elements of an ideal intuition in general; affectation—whether simple or reduplicated, insofar as it is not physiological or empirical; the theory of synthesis; and nature as constitutional product of our construct <semantic fabrication>.

At this point, questions of three kinds present themselves to the interpreter of Kant:

(1) With what does Strawson replace the subjective and metaphysical deduction? (The former, Kant has submitted to freedom—as always; the latter, without ever completely fulfilling it, he considers inalienable, even if, on the basis of his double concept of metaphysics, the metaphysical deduction also takes on a new reference to empirical reality *after* the *Critique*).[67]

(2) How can Strawson do justice to the following principal demand of Kant: "If the model of the natural sciences can serve for Nature_1 as distinct from Nature_2 in the sense of Newtonian mechanics [or in a more extensive concretion and empirical representation of the objectivity, which is (temporally) posited as generally past], and causality from freedom is inexplicable in terms of Nature_{1+2}, how is their distributive unification to be thought?"[68]

(3) What position in his system would Kant assign to Strawson's revi-

67. Basically, the distinction of a double concept of metaphysics is the object of the "metaphysical deduction." The merely conceivable transcendent concept—an *asyntheton* prior to the disjunctively limiting distinction between universal and individual concept—is ruled out of bounds. But this concept receives its ultimate definition, in which it is however still dependent on mere theoretical reflection, in the note on the Introduction to *Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone,* where the problem of the supreme principle of *all* experience is dealt with.

68. This question was asked in the context of a Kant-Marx Symposium on the "Second Introduction" to the *Critique of Judgment* (in Zwettl, Autumn 1967), mainly by J. Zeleny of Prague. [See also his article, "Kant und Marx als Kritiker der Vernunft," *Kantstudien,* LVI (1966), p. 330f.] Concerning the discussions at Zwettl, see E. Heintel, "Die beiden Labyrinthe der Philosophie," *Überlieferung und Aufgabe, VI* (Vienna: Oldenbourg, 1968), p. 677.

sion[69] for the purpose of setting up a "descriptive metaphysics," and how would this revolution modify the structure itself?

In order to do justice to all three of these not insignificant questions, it would be necessary to refer back to what was previously Strawson's major work, *Individuals,* with the aid of his *Introduction to Logical Theory.* But this could only be done within a broader framework. Therefore, the following must serve as response to these "crucial questions":

(1) Strawson views the unity of the metaphysical and transcendental-subjective deduction as the unity of "an imaginary subject of transcendental psychology" (p. 97), in which we no longer "have faith" (p. 117), because "it is too late in the day" to impute the history of a timeless thought process to a "supersensible subject" that "has no history" (p. 249). In the place of this unity, Strawson implicitly[70] brings into play the primarily rhetorical and hermeneutic relationship of the speaker-hearer context with its various levels of significance. These include the apophantic-theoretical on the one hand, and "practical" or (?) pragmatic (that of

69. Here we must first of all deal with the distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics: In Oxford circles there has been a bit of intensive puzzling over the derivation and significance of the term 'revisionary metaphysics'—as reciprocal pole and as standing in a means-end relation to "descriptive metaphysics." Now the term itself originates from the "Empirical Psychology" section of Kant's *Lectures on Metaphysics.* Comparable to the second and fourth forms of the Paralogism, it is—in the context of an anticipated sharp criticism of all merely subjective or "absolute" interpretations of "transcendental idealism"—posited as a mere reflectional determination of the discipline required in assimilating the metaphysical past, and not a concept of subjectivity that would involve ontology and the theory of constitution. Also, however, Strawson seems not to have completely succeeded in his interpretation of the restriction of the critical requirement of the self-limitation of the theoretical knowledge of constitution within the primary space of reason. This task is attempted through his mixture of theoretical, scientific and philosophical use of language, which is perhaps language-critically justified, and its respectively different limitations. But because the task is not properly fulfilled, he has also not succeeded in distinguishing the particular moments of transcendental idealism. Strawson's unaccomplished determination of apperception, as the form of the self-limitation of theoretical knowledge in general, might occasionally mislead him in such fashion that he confuses transcendental idealism with the "logical egoism" of mere "speaker identification" expounded by Kant in the introductory paragraphs of the *Anthropology.* Concerning the significance of "descriptive metaphysics" for what Strawson assumes (*Individuals,* p. 9) to be the mutual interest of Aristotle and Kant, see Kant's reference to the "labor" of the deduction of the categories by the Stagirite in "Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie" (*Schriften,* VIII: 393f.).

70. See note 48, as well as note 11.

behavioural psychology) on the other.[70a] This hermeneutic relationship in its *theoretical* use of language (and the consequent restriction of common usage, which he does not completely and expressly separate) makes it possible for Strawson, almost contrary to expectations, to set forth the "descriptive metaphysics." This is provided, together with its "analytic" constitution of an objective world, under the condition of the empirically verifiable conception of a spatio-temporal "framework." Consequently, when we identify objects (in apprehension, reproduction, and recognition), we *represent* them, on the one hand, necessarily under the condition of the presupposed unity of the framework of spatio-temporal coordination within the diversity of our experiences in a continuous subjective context (story-identification). On the other hand, we already continuously *present* them *referentially* as distinguishable moments of the unified and thematized experience of the one object-world (history-identification).[71] In this world, therefore, as physical beings, we too are objects of physical identifiability in a determinate, representative perspective for ourselves and others.

(2) Here, we certainly encounter a difficulty for Strawson, since he has neglected to provide the necessary distinctions. He has not established a specific mode of existence for the human body as a living thing, which would distinguish it (from its corporeity as the determination of a body among bodies) by means of logical predicability based on the more fundamental concept of "person." It is under the "condition" of this concept that the world which surrounds the body is already, at any given time, to be conceived from the spatio-temporal perspective. Neither has such a mode of existence been established for "common human nature." Nor, finally, has it been established for the class of non-human living things in order to provide a fundamental distinction from that "Nature or the world-whole itself" (p. 230), of which (or of which world whole?) human reason is itself a part. ("Human reason itself is part of Nature," p. 230.)

So even if we are willing to concede beforehand that the theoretical determination of the limits of sensibility requires both the concept of objectivity and Critical principles, which are limiting concepts—that is, they do not yet involve the positing of a "point outside the bounds of sense" (p. 12)—the reference to Nature as a totality, and to the subsumption of our reason under it, is a syllogism derived without reflection on the difference between the regulative and reflective powers of judgment as directed toward a point or a sphere, which revolves or remains precisely beyond the limits of sensibility. In this critical chapter (Part IV) concerning the metaphysics of transcendental idealism, therefore, Strawson has also posited the alternative: We must choose either Nature as a whole, to which our reason belongs, or the illusion of transcendental idealism, "an extra wheel,

70a. See *Individuals,* Part I, Chapter 3, pp. 87ff. The distinctions between theoretically practical (according to the object) and speculatively practical (ac-

zealously but idly turning" (p. 257).

It is precisely transcendental idealism, however, which is capable of leading us out of a concept of nature (whether that of Leibniz, Spinoza, or even the Greeks, with divine immanence or limits, or distinctive speculative transcendence) to a conception of the freedom of the human life-world (*Lebenswelt*). Moreover, this can be accomplished without thereby having to give up the concept of the pre-scientific, scientific, or specifically human nature, whatever the case may be, with respect to such things as the relation to God, or the speculative concept of Nature as a sublime or lost, but nevertheless repeatable, past.

Undoubtedly Kant may be seen to have made too little effort to present

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cording to the form) are employed by Kant in several contexts: The most important occurrences are in his *Lectures on Metaphysics* and on *Logic,* and especially in his *Lectures on Ethics,* which are so highly regarded also in England. [*Lectures on Ethics,* trans. L. Infield (New York: Century Co., 1930); this work is also available in a Harper Torchbook edition, with an Introduction by L. W. Beck (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).] However, one may easily overlook here the fact that Kant has placed both of these determinations still at the (subjective) transcendental level, before the distinction of the speculative and *empirically* practical—the primary synthesis of which, in conformity with the modal and relational position, first conditions the original requirement of critical reason.

71. The problem of the difference between representation (*Vorstellung*) and referential presentation (*Darstellung*) is not yet resolved, because the philosophical concept of referential presentation—first set by Leibniz within a still secret dialectic between empirical and speculatively grounded representation—although expounded by Kant, achieved no clear-cut definition.

Thus, this concept of difference could be worked around into a speculatively exalted concept of representation by Hegel; or by Frege, and in part by Husserl, it could be transformed into a logical concept of presentation in *Mathesis.* Nevertheless, Frege's three *Logical Investigations* remain of directional significance, both with respect to the sense of logical and of "mathematical" presentation—especially for the discussion of Wittgenstein's distinction between sense and reference (*Sinn und Bedeutung*). Strawson has also taken this into account. Since Russell—as D. Pears recently shows in his important book—that very difference has become one of the fundamental problems of English analytic philosophy. Thus Strawson has placed the first part of Frege's so-called *Logical Investigations,* "Thought" (*Der Gedanke*), at the beginning of his previously mentioned collection, *Philosophical Logic.* The translator should, therefore, be especially careful—and Quinton is after all an excellent translator—when the term 'representation,' which for Frege is such a *Critical* concept, is rendered in a pre-Critical and empirical (in the sense of Hume, or even of Locke) fashion by the term 'idea.' Frege was at least, in these later works, enough of a Kantian to defend himself against such confusion. After all, he had been instructed by Kant's clarification of concepts to avoid this kind of "careless disorder" (B 376f.).

the *concrete* freedom—viewed by Strawson as another aspect of the hermeneutic relation—which characterizes the forms of speech in the context of private and public being-together as an explicit innovation: a point of departure for "practical Anthropology."[72] This discipline must be distinguished from "Anthroponomy" and "Pragmatic Anthropology" as the foundation of a philosophy of history which is a product of the confrontation between natural history and the history of salvation. But in order to read Kant in this way, we must choose to ignore several places in his works to which Strawson here pays no attention (p. 151).[ii] The most important of these are the *Critique of Judgment,* the work on religion, and above all the work on *Perpetual Peace* in the formulation of the maxim of publicity (and its unattained semantic presuppositions).

However, it remains to be considered that "transcendental idealism" is for Kant a methodological concept rather than an ontological characteristic of the essence of man. It is intended that this concept be transformed from a theory of knowledge about nature into the possibility of the experience of this nature itself. But this is to be accomplished only under the condition of the concepts of freedom and under their limitations. (See the First and Second Introductions to the *Critique of Judgment.*) Undoubtedly Kant has very often left his reader in the dark with respect to whether and how far the result of the transcendental synthesis, together with its complementary enactment, is itself to be understood as constituting a new *ontologia generalis* or our knowledge of the world in general—be it of the mathematical framework of knowledge as physics (here again as physics in general), or merely of the currently known physics of Newton.

Yet there is something about which he did not leave us in doubt: It is not the nature of theoretical experience nor even of its past, now (aesthetically) sublime speculative presupposition that can be known, but the *anhypotheton* of both as the medium of our rational law, which is defined through freedom in terms of the maxims of other men. Although it cannot be known theoretically, it can be brought forth [permanently] by way of

72. See O. Marquard, "Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffes 'Anthropologie' seit dem Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts," *Collegium Philosophicum. Studien, Joachim Ritter zum 60. Geburtstag von E.-W. Böckenförde, et. al.* (Basel and Stuttgart: Schwabe, 1965). It certainly seems to me that Marquard has not distinguished sufficiently, in the case of Kant, between Practical Anthropology on the one hand, and Pragmatic Anthropology and Anthroponomy on the other.

ii. "He <Kant> nowhere depends upon, or even refers to, the factor on which Wittgenstein, for example, insists so strongly: the *social* character of our concepts, the links between thought and speech, speech and communication, communication and social communities" (*The Bounds of Sense,* p. 151).

practical acknowledgement. Here Kant certainly no longer asks himself precisely how this generated world stands in relation to the theoretically restricted world of experience [Nature]. And it is upon the theoretical perspective of this question that Strawson directs the entire weight of his analytical skill.

In fact, the dimensionality of our practical-public relationship requires a structure of temporality with the prevalence of consequences prior to their determination through antecedents. This is to be accomplished not through the concept of motivation, its "transcendental" reflection, or absolute grounding—nor through the "self-escalation" ("*Selbstaufstufung*") of a mind. [Somewhat in the sense of the second motivation of the "Being-with [conscious of]-oneself-in-another" ("*Im-andern-bei-sich-seins*") in the "system" of Schelling.] For here, the extensional dimension of the otherness of the other is constantly alienated. The explicit and detailed answer remains for the most part a debt which Strawson owes us. His question is impossible to ignore.

(3) The position which Strawson has taken up is precisely the "soft spot" between the Transcendental Philosophy and the *Metaphysical Foundations.* One who would overlook this would in no sense have taken account of his motivating interest. The *Foundations,* especially the "Phenomenology," is subject to a great liability: Its principles bring clarity, of course, to the distinction between general critical ontology and a theory of principles for natural science by explicitly introducing the objective doctrine of judgment, or the objective-transcendental deduction. The distinction between physics and "psychology," however, replaces at this point the foundation of a descriptive ontology, to which also belongs the objectifiable relation between outer *and* inner sense in its theoretical *a priority.* However, this *a priority* is no longer merely concerned with general alteration, but with specifically empirical movement [mechanics].

Kant realized this toward the end of his life and began to work once more on the deduction. On the one hand, this was done in a restricted sense without regarding the problem of the derivation of the teleological relation of reciprocity and of the practical relation of causality. On the other hand, the task was expanded to include also the theoretical deduction of empirically material concepts required by the distinction between that which is moveable in its own right, and that which is self-moving (that is, living).

In the case of Strawson, on the contrary, we note a lack of distinction—still possible or even necessary in that middleground—between a generally theoretical, and a specifically scientific, theory of principles (as distinct from pre-scientific or technical model-constructing theories), if its foundation is supposed to rest in a theoretical reflection on the rhetorical hearer-speaker relation. In this context, therefore, in virtue of his rejection of the merely "historical" interpretation of Kant as the philosopher of Newtonian mechanics and the Euclidian axioms, I believe that Strawson has neg-

lected the principle problem of *Mathesis*[71] as reflection and limitation of theoretical knowledge. Thus he has overlooked the extent to which not only the reflection of identification on representation and imagination, but even the determination of "sensibility," are caught up in the differentiation between *Mathesis* and theoretical knowledge. The essential distinction requires reference both to their *presuppositions* and to the matter of *knowledge* within *Mathesis itself.* For this reason, an explicit position, together with its critical analysis and consequent (if already immanent) synthesis, is required before one is able to assume sensibility as an unmediated, or as in *Individuals,* a psychologically mediated, factor.[74]

Thus it happens that, despite the mastery of the alienation prompted by the transcendental approach and its "nightmares" (p. 249)—by means of a descriptively objective ontology and its intersubjective foundation—one may once again be inadvertently seized by the terror (or anxiety, pp. 249 and 264) of the objective world as a factor beyond the limits of sensibility. Then once again it would be impossible to distinguish the transition to reflection on the publicity of social language from the state of emergency of self-therapeutics.

To summarize, it is interesting to see how the empirically rhetorical idiom in the interpretation of Kant is displaced by, and in favor of, a concept of synthetic activity and its complementary world of experience. This movement extends from the skeptical position of Rotenstreich—with respect to an architectonic systematic concerning the dominant theoretically posited concept of experience itself—all the way to the approach of Strawson's hermeneutic theory of language. This is, however, by reduction or almost abandonment of the great Kantian conception of mediation and its deduction (which he himself did not fully execute) in favor of a question concerning *another* empirically conditioned "objective world."

One thing remains certain. We are obviously unable to dispense with the original unity of the functions of truth (metaphysical deduction) and of action (transcendental-subjective deduction) in both theoretical and practical philosophy. But in the same manner and to the very same extent, we are also

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73. See M. Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding* (cited above), pp. 49ff.

74. This critical observation, however, should not be understood to lessen the significance of Strawson's logical investigations or of his epistemological exercises in Kantian philosophy. We note especially his efforts to get at the difference between "Logos" and "Idea"—theoretically reflected and limited by sensibility—on the basis of an attempted mediation of receptivity and spontaneity, exemplified chiefly by hearing in regard to inner sense, and by sight with respect to outer sense. But the question remains, whether the revolution in perspective which is characterized by the transition from the presentation of the types of synthesis in the operation of thought within the one space of reason *into* the analytic reflection on language does not inadequately deal with the previously sketched, inalienable aspects of Kant's thought.

unable to do without the derivation of the empirical concepts—for example, within the framework of a principle of significance—and the determination of objectivity, either by a descriptive metaphysics or by reference to the relation, in practice, between private and public forms of speech and conduct and their intersubjective foundation. This we now can learn from the English—even if it comes to us under the title of metaphysics.[75]

However, it remains to be seen to what extent a concretion of that unity of metaphysical and subjective-transcendental deduction can escape the "nightmares" of a mere self-escalation; or whether an absolute history of reason—with its lack of discrimination of content and object in objective mind—can be achieved without reverting to a new terror of the objective world. From Kant's point of view, this is the task of a philosophy of action; it is in this discipline also that the significance and limits of theoretical knowledge must find a foundation, through the transformation of the concept of nature into one of world-reference.

75. See note 25.

RECENT ANGLO-AMERICAN LITERATURE ON KANT*

Klaus Hartman

Translated by Terry Pinkard

J. Bennett. *Kant's Dialectic,* Cambridge University Press, 1974. pp. XI, 291.

J. Bennett. *Kant's Analytic,* Cambridge University Press, 1966. pp. XVI, 251.

J. Hintikka. *Logic, Language Games and Information,* Oxford University Press, 1973. pp. X, 294.

N. Rescher. *The Primacy of Practice,* Blackwell, 1973. pp. XV, 156.

In the last few years analytic philosophy has led an impressive critical discussion with Kant, particularly the Kant of the *Critique of Pure Reason.* As the chorus of reviewers has made it clear, the analytic treatment of Kant (as representatives of this, we can mention Strawson's *The Bounds of Sense* and Bennett's *Kant's Analytic*) has, in Germany, mostly been rejected. It has been reproached for exhibiting a naiveté in trying to extract a true content from the historical Kant; it has also been reproached for a lack of attention to the fine points of Kantian theory, a lack which could have been remedied by a better knowledge of the continental European secondary literature. In the following review of recent Anglo-American receptions of Kant, this latter reproach cannot be dismissed, but it may be advisable to bring a kind of benevolent neutrality to a non-hermeneutical analytical procedure which concerns itself with possession of the truth. We will abstain from imputing to an author a stand in opposition to Kant, or even in line with certain of his subsequent critics (Eberhard, Reinhold, Aenesidemus-Schulze and others have been mentioned in this connection), as if the

*Translated from "Neuere englischsprachige Kantliteratur," *Philosophische Rundschau* (22/3-4). 1976.

analytical procedure were to appear as obsolete from the outset[i]. Instead, we shall first ask what an analytical analysis of Kant signifies.

The analytical interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* means, first of all, that inaccuracies and incoherences in Kant can be brought to light, much as is done in other contemporary interpretations. However, analytic philosophy is very precise in tracing arguments; it is a supervision, a *control* of arguments. In this case, one expects that mostly logical corrections should be admitted. The analytic interpretation offers, furthermore, a reconstruction of the Kantian theory into another idiom, a reinterpretation. Even though such a reinterpretation is often a mere reformulation, it will, for the most part, be a reduction—a reconstruction of what is analytically acceptable in Kant, together with a criticism of what is analytically unacceptable. It is clear, therefore, that such a critique of Kant is in part a function of the philosophy which is brought to it. The important question would be in which points that analytic reconstruction and critique of Kant need not be accepted, and where, therefore, analytic philosophy's claim to absoluteness is to be rejected.

Let us first turn to J. Bennett, whose book (*Kant's Dialectic,* hereafter KD) supplements his previous work, *Kant's Analytic* (hereafter KA) in such a way that it becomes a commentary on the *Critique of Pure Reason.* KD presents itself as an independent work, but establishes its connection to KA through a cursory presentation of the basics of the Kantian position, and also draws on modern classics such as Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, and the English empiricists. We will refer back to KA partly in order to appraise both works, KA and KD, as a total commentary.

1. Concerning the question of the relation of *intuition* and *concept,* Bennett sees in Kant a break with the tradition of Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, in which a continuum of intuitions and concepts is asserted. Objects are collections of impressions with the unwanted consequence that no differentiation can be made between the objective entity and impressions, and (in Berkeley) that non-given objects also do not exist. Kant, on the other hand, takes the understanding to be a 'data-processing' faculty: concepts are abilities to bring intuitions under judgments (KD 17). In that way, concepts are explained through judgments, functions of the understanding, in which Bennett sees here a parallel to the analytic notion of a "concept-exercising language" (cf. KA 54, 85 ff., 8). The meaning (*Bedeutung*) of a concept is explained through its use in judgments.

Kant thus presages the modern standpoint. In judgments, an intuition is objectively determined. To speak of an object means, now, that a concept is a rule for the intuition about which the judgment is made. A judgment says

i. This is the author's reconsidered meaning. In the German text the sentence reads, "Wir unterlassen es daher, einen Autor mit einer Kant oder den Kant-nachfolgern gegnerischen Position zu belegen—hier sind schon Eberhard, Reinhold, Aenesidemus-Schulze und andere herangezogen worden—, so daß die Überholtheit von vornherein feststünde" (The Editor).

conceptually what the intuition 'says' ostensively. With the use of concepts, the object is no longer a collection of impressions; rather, the latter verify the objectivity of the concept. Non-given objects would be objectivity claims made in judgments, which can be vouchsafed through the having of intuitions. Bennett interprets the referentiality of concepts to intuitions as "concept-empiricism" (KA 27) with which a "knowledge empiricism" and a "meaning empiricism" go hand in hand.

If the role of forms of intuition appears to be so very repressed in KD, it must be noted that in KA Bennett also gives the *transcendental aesthetic* its due weight. It is treated for the most part from the standpoint of whether or not the spatial forms of ordering of appearances are compelling requirements for the givenness of particulars. In this connection, Bennett talks of an "outer sense theory" (KA 15ff.). He models himself on Strawson's interpretation of spatiality as such a requirement, following him also—for the purpose of analysis—in the preference of a sound world, arriving, however, at somewhat divergent conditions for external givenness. Bennett holds time to be something contingent, which cannot be imagined as absent (KA 49). Here he concedes to Kant that one must speak of a single time, while the corresponding thesis about space is not convincing. Some other objections are the same as those made by other Kant scholars, such as the skepticism about Kant's dependence on Euclidean space, which Bennett acknowledges as space for the givenness of objects "at a glance" (KA 31).[1]

Appearances or phenomena are physical objects (in a broad sense including states of affairs and events), but for Bennett assertions about phenomena are not supported merely by assertions about sensuous states of consciousness; rather, the former are equivalent to the latter (KA 22). Bennett employs the expression "phenomenal" for both states and appearances. The Kantian theory is *idealism* because it asserts the primacy of sensuous states (KA 23); it is *transcendental* because it presents a thesis about meanings (*ibid.*). That means that appearances are something to be conceptually determined as objective, and are not to be taken as non-signified sensuous states. Thus, it follows that for the objectification of these states, a meaning-function, the understanding, must be invoked in addition to the spatial forms of intuition. Bennett is not successful in determining the respective shares, as it were, of both instances of objectification. One does not really know (nor incidentally does Kant himself)[2] whether spatialized sensuosity is also an object, or is an object only when it is conceptually determined.

The counterpart of the referentiality of concepts to intuitions, that is, to "concept empiricism," must also be, for Bennett, a doctrine of the use of

1. Compare Bennett's critique of Strawson's interpretation of space and geometry in Kant in *Philosophical Review,* July 1968, "Strawson on Kant," pp. 346-349.
2. Compare CPR A51, A62 and A79. A defective determinateness is also evidenced by Strawson's 'particulars.'

concepts—a doctrine of categories—even though it seems difficult to single out certain concepts as categories. Because of the lacunas of the metaphysical deduction, the Kantian doctrine of categories appears in jeopardy (KA 79 ff.), but Bennett nonetheless accepts four categories, viz., reality, negation, totality and plurality; on the other hand, corresponding to a proposal by Quine on the question of 'singular terms,' he holds unity to be reducible to arguments of general propositions (KA 89ff.). A series of further Kantian categories (limitation, modal categories) are explained as misguided: limitation because it means virtually the same as negation (KA 78); and modal categories, because a "concept-exercising language" could do without them (KA 91). Nevertheless, the categories of relation must be given their own argument, since they have no true counterpart in the table of judgments (KA 95). This occurs in the analytic of principles, the critique of which would yield a relative justification of these categories.

What is obviously displayed here is a skepticism vis à vis categories; Bennett's critique of the formal character of Kant's categories as against material, *a posteriori* knowledge (KA 88) also points in the same direction. In Bennett, the problem of the *a priori* thus takes the form that Kant's supposed synthetic *a priori* judgments are a question of non-self-evident, unobvious analytic judgments (KA 42).[3] Along with Quine, Bennett affirms that the distinction of the analytic and the synthetic is not a sharp one (KA 9, 49); it is a question of conceptual relations of implication, which can and must be argued for.

2. The Kantian doctrine of *transcendental apperception* is in KD only briefly touched on (KD 31 ff., 34). What Bennett thinks about it must be gleaned from KA. Bennett extracts from Kant's thoughts on transcendental apperception and the transcendental deduction of the concepts of the understanding something amenable to his analytic position. He sees in the transcendental deduction the adoption of the standpoint of the first person singular, from which an argument for the ascription of sensory states (which on their own are interpretable as objects) to consciousness is to be made (KA 103 ff.). In reference to its history, consciousness ought to be self-consciousness. Bennett sees that Kant wants to demonstrate three things, viz., the unity of contemporaneous properties of a thing, the unity of stages in the history of a thing, and the unity of states of consciousness (KA 114). At the center of his interests, however, is self-consciousness, which in the given case is a reference to its own history. What is at stake is the ability to have the thought "This is how it is with me now" (KA 105), a thought which presupposes "That is how it was with me then."

Bennett's position defines itself in the idea that the unity of consciousness is an "awareness" of itself, and thus is self-consciousness without first creating unity. Self-consciousness is original without needing an activity, an identification; if it did, then criteria of identity would be applied to the consciousness which has to employ these criteria (KA 109; cf. BS 102, 108, 165, 168, 170). To be sure, the ownership of a sensation (such as a headache)

must be original; the "ownership of mental states" (KA 103) must be immediate. However, for Kant it is a question of how an otherwise dispersed consciousness can be one, and thereby be self-consciousness. The Kantian problem is (in any case in the important §16 of the B-edition of *Critique of Pure Reason*—hereafter, CPR—which, unfortunately, is not interpreted in detail by Bennett) the achieving of synthesis on the part of consciousness, on the basis of which it would be a whole when it has a diversity before it, whether this diversity be conceived of in the present, or as temporally run-through (the A-edition seems to interpret all present plurality as temporally run-through). In the case of the present, Bennett sees "counting rules" [in distinction from "identification rules" (KA 120)] applied to consciousness, something which has yet to be proven to be useful (KA 121). He takes Kant's claim about self-identification to be a wrong way of putting the problem, a way which leads to the presupposition of a transcendental act (KA 110). But if a present sensation is already a case of self-consciousness, is not the thesis of a self-consciousness and a subjective identity on the basis of a reference to its own past already deprived of its compelling character—whereas Bennett also wants to demonstrate self-consciousness and subjective identity through recourse to the history of consciousness?

The interpretation of the Kantian thesis of self-consciousness as a constitution by acts appears in Bennett to be too quickly disposed of as bad philosophy. Is it not a problem, how to be able, from the perspective of the first person singular, to conceive of the deployment of universal concepts or categories through which the object would be one object and consciousness would be united and thereby self-consciousness? One can not make do with an empirical activity, for the identity of consciousness and the identity of objects must be guaranteed in whatever content, and thus be universal.[4] Kant (and also Husserl) posit that which is required in synthesis as a transcendental act. The task is to conceive universal self-constitution together with the constitution of objects. For Bennett, this means that an act must first posit the unity which is a presupposition for the act on the part of consciousness.[5] The inseparable connection of the act of synthesis

3. On this, compare Strawson's considerations in *Philosophical Review,* July 1968, "Bennett on Kant," pp. 333-335. The contingency of time, which Bennett acknowledges, is the occasion for such considerations.
4. The transcendental character of apperception is for Bennett bound up with its universality: universal criteria for the identity of the subject and for that of the object are required (KA 113), criteria which normatively govern the capacity for empirical synthesis, even when the competence for empirical synthesis needs to contain no explicit application of categories.
5. KA 111: "Yet what has driven Kant to posit a transcendental synthesis at all is just the fact that intuitions can be given only in the unity of consciousness and therefore only after the performance of the synthesis. It looks as though, rather than declining to date the synthesizing act, Kant must date it both before and after the first time at which the items to be synthesized are given."

and its result can be interpreted as the paradox of a *hysteron proteron* which points, however, only to the illicitness of a 'representation' of this act; and it is to be granted that a dialectical way of reading §16B—as Fichte and Hegel developed it—is the more rigorous reading. Kant comes close to this way of understanding when he interprets the unity of transcendental apperception as a universal concept (cf. CPR B133f., 134 note).

In Bennett's interpretation, transcendental apperception cannot be the principle for the givenness and experience of objects; transcendental apperception is merely the doctrine of the ownership of states of consciousness insofar as these are not present sensations. Such ownership of states of consciousness that turns out to pose—in contrast to particular present sensations—the problem of 'self-ascription,' for whose solution a synthesis or a capacity is to be provided, should, it is true, permit of mediation through an object, in that sensory states are reinterpretable into characteristics of objects.[6] But for Bennett, the argument does not 'click' and produces no junction of subjective and objective unity; the objective unity is only dubiously associated with the subjective unity. Transcendental apperception is really only a structure of unification of consciousness with itself; objective and categorial relevance cannot be shown, although Bennett, as we have already seen, accepts the Kantian theorem of objectification through concepts. This occurred, however, within the confines of a clarification of what the use of concepts is. As one now sees, Bennett cannot accept the Kantian argument for this thesis. The interdependence between a determinate (categorized) or a determinable objective unity and a subjective unity remains somehow undetermined. Apparently, for Bennett, the additional argumentation of the "analytic of principles" and the "Refutation of Idealism" is required here.

Strawson has called attention to Bennett's underestimation of the transcendental deduction, if he in fact has not seen in it a sufficient instance to secure its objectivity. The question is: Is the transcendental deduction only a kind of premise for such a demonstration, or is it already a *proof* of objectivity? In this point, Bennett has conceded to Strawson that he erred.[7]

Strawson (in BS) achieves a sympathetic estimation of the Kantian theorem of transcendental apperception, no doubt from the standpoint of analytic philosophy. He thinks that we could very well imagine an experience only of sense-data (BS 98f., 109), but agrees with the Kantian argument when he thinks that two things belong to experience: "Thus and so is

6. KA 103f.: "No-one would think it sensible to ask whether there could be instances of redness which did not consist in something's being red."

7. cf. *Philosophical Review,* July 1968, "Strawson on Kant," p. 342: "What Strawson primarily seeks to salvage from the Transcendental Deduction (TD) is an argument from (1) 'A self-conscious being must apply concepts' to (2) 'A self-conscious being must apply objectivity concepts.' There is such an argument in TD, and Strawson has satisfied me that I have erred in seeing TD's value as wholly residing in Kant's arguments for (1)."

how things objectively are" and "this is how things are experienced as being" (BS 107); so, conceptually grasped objectivity serves as the security for, and contrast to, subjectivity. Subjectivity—the 'it seems to me'—demands on its part the possibility of recognition of various particulars, and through that, the possibility of an identical subject (BS 100ff.). Only the possibility of acknowledging experience as mine prevents the dissolution of the experienced in experience. R. Rorty[8] has given a systematization and correction to the Strawsonian analysis which clearly brings to light what is acceptable for analytic philosophy (cf. in particular *loc. cit,* 233ff.).

3. Another section of KD referring back to the Analytic, the one dedicated to the concept of *substance,* rounds off the picture of the Kantian theory and prepares the way for the *Dialectic,* in particular, the Paralogisms. Bennett gives a historical reflection on the concept of substance in Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza, and interprets Kant's concept of reality in light of Leibniz as an application of the separation of the thing-in-itself and appearance, whereas his "concept empiricism" neither demands nor allows it (KD 52).[9] Bennett moves into the Strawsonian critique of *transcendental idealism,* which here appears as "imposition theory" (KD 54 ff.). Bennett decides that we do not 'make' objects, but can only experience that which our consciousness permits to enter. The theory ought, then, to be a "selection theory" instead of an "imposition theory" (*ibid.*). It is clear that with respect to this point Bennett, in a way analogous to that in which N. Hartmann develops his thesis of the parallel identity of the categories of knowledge and being, falls short of Kant's transcendental plan.

Of interest is Bennett's analysis of substance as permanent. He picks up notions from KA on the first analogy, in which the alteration of a substance is made problematic, and thus suggests taking again into account the earlier book.

Bennett's treatment of "Analytic of Principles" must, as has been already indicated, concern the problem of how determinate objectivity, which is not yet given by transcendental apperception, can be set forth; or, to be more precise, how objectivities cast in categories of relation are *implicata* of the unity of the subject. Taking his clue, like Kant, from Schematism, he considers the problem of the application of the categories. He comes to a criticism which claims, in line with S. Körner (KA 145) and the usual criticisms of the circularity of an application in a contem-

8. In his essay, "Strawson's Objectivity Argument," *Review of Metaphysics* 24 (1970), pp. 207-244.

9. Here there is an approximation to Prauss' interpretation of the thing in itself in Kant. G. Prauss, *Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1974).

poraneous constitutive understanding of the categories, that a "referential rule" is not possible, for it would claim that "you may apply the concept *C* to a thing just so long as the thing is . . . " (in which case the thing must already be conceptualized). Thus one cannot explain the use of concepts any more precisely (KA 147). Likewise, temporalization in a schema to make the application of categories intelligible is to be rejected ["It is no solution to say that the naked concept *C* does not apply to the *Bs* but that the specially adapted concept *CB* does apply to them" (KA 151)]. One would have to show that categories make possible the application of other concepts (KA 145, 151).

But KA does not stop here, out of indignation, as it were; it follows Kant's train of thought further to the First and Second Analogies, and to the Refutation of Idealism (leaving out the parts on the Highest Principle, the Amphiboly of Reflection, Phenomena and Noumena, and with only a meagre commentary on the Axioms of Intuition and the Anticipations of Perception; the Third Analogy remains without a commentary). It is noteworthy that in connection with the First Analogy, Bennett can extract nothing from the Kantian thesis that time is unperceivable and thus requires an extrapolation—substance as enduring—to demonstrate the objectivity of my representations. He rejects the sempiternity of substance as following from the schematism (KA 184), and develops its possible meaning and its eventual necessity out of Kant's understanding of change, which can only occur in a substance.

Bennett holds it to be false to presuppose enduring substances (in the sense of everlasting); it is adequate to presuppose substances of moderate durability which remain fixed during a change (KA 198). The question, however, is more fundamentally that of the necessity of substance as something objective: to what extent must the given be divided into properties and substances? Bennett asks himself, through an appeal to a fiction (a porcelain pig which is suddenly no longer there), if something which was held to be a substance could then be degraded to a mere property—this is to be Kant's view. The consideration is connected with the question of whether or not the reduction of the substantial to the adjectival is permitted. Bennett is inclined towards such a reduction, but suggests that the concept of substance can be more efficient (KA 198). In that way, the determination of objectivity as substance is decisively weakened.[10]

What would then be the substantival something to which all change would adjectivally refer—indeed, to which substances also must be adjectivally referred? In cases of the supposed change (*Wechsels*) also of substances, Bennett opts for conceiving these substances as being adjectivally referred to regions of space (KA 199). In KD, he moves away from this

10. cf. Strawson's criticism of Bennett in *Philosophical Review,* July 1968, "Bennett on Kant," pp. 338 ff.

view (KD 63 f.); he now suggests that the Kantian (and, incidentally, the Fregean) view involves a logical objection against absolute change, or against the change of substances. Or: one must recast a whole philosophy in order to allow such change. The interpretation of the concept of substance as a coercion of thought comes close to a transcendental interpretation even if it is, in this form, non-Kantian. Incidentally, transcendental argument does not ask for everlastingness, but only for a scheme under which something is entertained in thought as fixed in relation to a change. In Kant there is found, by way of contrast, the notion of a preservation of mass and of an existence for all time (CPR A242 f.). If one wants to make an argument for a 'mass-term' substance, then it could not be a transcendental argument.

The Refutation of Idealism, which Bennett seems to see as logically preceding the First Analogy (KA 203), should be the proof, or the rudiments of a proof, of an objective region which self-consciousness demands. The argument is amended—it demands something enduring not only for that which is changing in me, but also for that which is enduring in me (KA 205)—but is taken seriously. The thesis is that a concept of something objective makes it easier to assess divergent memories of the past (KA 208). It is, moreover, brought into connection with Wittgenstein's problem of a private language (KA 211 f.): someone who is limited to inner experience can construe no past out of his present data; his past becomes identical with his memories; the distinction of past and present does not function (KA 209). Unfortunately, Husserl's much more detailed investigations on inner time-consciousness remain ignored.

Bennett's analysis of the Second Analogy, which must be carried over from KA insofar as it is presupposed in KD for the treatment of the Third Antinomy, is based on a critique of a non-empirical causal necessity due to laws prescribed by the understanding (KA 157f.). The critique begins with the analysis of a *process* (of the boat which in Kant goes down the river and in Bennett puts out to sea from the harbor). For Kant, my representations adhere to a necessary succession, and from that it should follow that the process is completely regulated by causal laws—a consequence which, however, does not hold: " '*X* and *Y* could not have occurred in the order *Y-X*' entails; 'given that *X* and *Y* happened nonsynchronously, they had to happen in that order *X-Y*', but it does not entail: 'Given that *X* happened, *Y* had to follow' " (KA 221).[11] Causality can thus not be viewed as a demonstrated objective determination; it belongs in the realm of hypothesis-building in Popper's sense; Kant, so it seems, confused hypothesis and constitutivity (KA 159).

11. cf. H.E. Allison, "Transcendental Idealism and Descriptive Metaphysics" in *Kant-Studien* 60 (1969), pp. 216-230 and "Kant's Non-Sequitur. An Examination of the Lovejoy-Strawson Critique of the Second Analogy" in *Kant-Studien* 62 (1971), pp. 367-377.

The *static* case—in Kant, the case of the house, where the process of my representations does not correspond to an objective sequence—serves as the contrast to objective process. Where the reversal of the succession is possible, there is no question of a causal process. Nevertheless, Bennett thinks that this is not sufficient to clarify matters. One must take into account the body which makes movements and, in that way, conditions a succession of givens. Kant, it seems, assimilates the two cases, or contrasts them from the viewpoint that a series of representations in me can and must be compared with objectivity. Had Kant noticed that, in the example of the house, bodily movements explain the arbitrariness of the succession, the difference between the two cases would have been clarified; in his treatment of the problem, one gets the impression that in the ego-perspective one runs through a succession of representations not knowing whether it is a matter of a subjective succession in the survey of an object, or the experience of an objective process. One would, on this account, need a phenomenology of kinaesthesia. We may note that Kant does not want to give the experiencing subject a criterion, which is empirically at issue; all he wants is to offer principles for alternative conditions of the possibility of experiences.[12]

There remains, as Bennett sees it, an argument between the lines, the so-called "ordering argument." It is a weak answer to the question: How can I know that subjective data have happened in such and such an order (KA 223), for which objective items are taken to be required? Still, this argument is more specific than the general argument in favor of realism in the Refutation, since it demands an objective foundation for each datum ("objective backing for each recollection of that kind"), and objectivity is required not only as a universal background (KA 224). What is objective (determinate, however unjustifiably) serves thus for a rectification of memories. There are exceptions: I can order correctly items of the immediate past which yet belong to the present without recourse to any objectivity; this holds also for continuous sequences. Similarly, one is supposed to be able to secure a subjective succession when one remembers a point in time which one remembered earlier (KA 228). (On such matters Husserl had more precise things to say). However, it is, so Bennett thinks, more probable that recourse to objectivity takes place: I cleaned my shoes while the sun rose and walked as it was setting . . . " (*ibid.*). It is clear that objectivity, or even truly determinate (substantial, causal) objectivity, is not to be secured in Bennett's reconstruction. What Bennett does not see, or cannot acknowledge, is that a constitution of objectivity is already presupposed if objective items are to be able to rectify the subjective course of representations. He does not see that according to his interpretation of Kant's theory, one would have a circle, viz., that already objectified sequences (Locke's

12. cf. Klaus Hartmann, "The Analogies and After," *Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress,* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972), pp. 47ff.

course of the sun, which helps to rectify my subjective time between sleeping and waking) are drawn upon, the constitution of which must itself be achieved in the first place. The transcendental conception is more radical: the posit of a determinate (although not necessarily causal) objectivity must already be vested in the possibility of experience in general. With Bennett's aforementioned two-sided understanding of Kant's phenomenalism, the transcendental problem is certainly not to be grasped, for then objectivity and determinate objectivity are only probable options. With his minimal understanding of Kant's argumentation, Strawson can come to grips with Kant better than does Bennett.

II

In his treatment of the "Dialectic" in Kant's CPR, Bennett focuses his attention not so much on the Kantian notion of a 'critique' of pure reason, which he rejects (KD 267 ff.), as on the specific problems which are tested in the second half of the CPR. Moreover, he sees this part as an application of the Analytic and the Aesthetic (KD 2, 6). The three main themes of the Dialectic, as selected by Kant, figure above all as themes which were prominent for the then contemporary German academic philosophy (KD 258); this comes as no surprise, since Bennett cannot be expected to appreciate the problems of a *metaphysica specialis.* Understandably, he also rejects Kant's rationalization of these themes in accordance with the three types of judgment (categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive). The themes are, however, still taken to be important themes of philosophy. As we noted earlier, the author, in his analysis, draws more fully on modern classics than he did in KA.

1. Following the order of the CPR, Bennett turns first to the Paralogisms (KD 66-113), which he discusses in the detailed A-version [no comment being offered on the Fourth Paralogism (KD 71f.)].

The Kantian theory of the subject in the Paralogisms seems to Bennett to be grounded on a Cartesian basis. This does not contradict the fact that Kant ties self-consciousness to a necessary condition, viz., access to objectivity. According to Bennett, this objectivity is a domain of objects as something other over against me, discounting one's own body or other subjects. Bennett gives a classification of possible ways of understanding Kant on this point, and contrasts his interpretation of Kant with Strawson's thesis that a reference to the body (Strawson, BS 164) and to other subjects (Strawson, BS 168) is necessary for the identity of a subject (KD 67f.).

Kant's critique of the soul as substance is taken up sympathetically; it points out the peculiarities of a concept of self which, if taken uncritically, can lead to false inferences (KD 69). Bennett sees the First Paralogism as the assertion that I can conceive of myself only in substantial terms. Kant's talk of me as "absolute subject" in the second premise is, however, misleading.

"Subject" is understood on the one hand as a 'topic' (of all my possible judgments), on the other hand as the 'maker' or 'bearer' (of all my possible judgments, KD 75). The two are different, for although all my judgments are mine—inhere in me—not all of my judgments need have me as a topic. Moreover, predicates of my judgments are not the same as inherences in me. The paralogism is conclusive only due to this error. By itself, the notion of inherence would lead to the Cartesian position of a thinking substance; the more subtle notion, which Kant adumbrates, is that of the conceivability of myself only as substantival (KD 74, 77). Then the inference to myself as a substance is still possible (KD 74), but an extension to a substance ontology is not indicated (KD 78). One question which presents itself naturally is whether Kant, in his amalgamation of subject as subject of predicates and as subject of inherences, did not want precisely to present an error of thought by the rationalists. Bennett treats the Paralogisms as if Kant is making mistakes, not attacking the mistakes of others.

The interpretation of the relations of the various Paralogisms is interesting but cannot be presented here in more detail. The Second Paralogism proves to be intertwined with the first one, if one believes that, with the thesis of the substantival conceivability of myself, the representation of the ego as an aggregate ought to be warded off. This, however, is the content of the Second Paralogism (KD 78). The further analysis, as the reviewer understands it, suffers from the inclusion of empirical examples of criteria for the question of the persistence of the ego as substance (cf. the section "My death"); and, in the treatment of the Second Paralogism, from unbearable fictions or "puzzle cases" ("mental disunity," "mental fission"). Finally, in the treatment of the Third Paralogism, there is again an interesting alternative, viz., the interpretation of personality as "reidentification at different times" and the doctrine of a substrate. The first alternative is destroyed in the fiction of quasi-recollections enabling me to remember the states of consciousness of another; the second leads to the point that the concept of a substrate is equivocal insofar as it does double duty for the thing in itself and the bearer of properties (KD 107). Again, one could ask whether Kant did not want to present 'paralogisms,' whereas Bennett is looking for a doctrine in the Paralogisms.

2. The Antinomies offer Bennett a rich field for making critical objections. The treatment of the First Antinomy, and in particular of its temporal half, is a good example. Kant's argument in the Thesis that "the infinity of a series" consists in the fact that "it can never be completed through successive synthesis" and thus "an infinite world-series which has passed away" would be impossible, is confronted by Bennett with a logical-mathematical clarification, viz., that there are open, discrete series with one and two open ends (KD 118). Kant claims, practically, that an infinite series must have two termini, the second terminus appearing to be shifted to the future of a successive synthesis, which—if the series in the opposite direc-

tion is infinite—cannot on its own part be terminated. Bennett calls this step by Kant a "futurizing move" (KD 123). The completeness (the being passed away) of an infinite series to the present point (infinity with one open end) appears therefore as impossible. This way of obtaining surreptitiously the double open-endedness of a series is, however, not legitimate.

One must agree with the argumentation as a logical-mathematical critique, but it must also be asked whether the epistemological motive of successive synthesis (open to the future) as 'surveying' (Strawson BS 177, 119) the whole series is not legitimate. It would seem that the thesis (and also the antithesis) must exclude an epistemological way of viewing the matter, since it is supposed to be a question of something in the mode of being-in-itself. The past series would not be non-infinite on account of its epistemological lack of closure. The epistemological way of viewing the matter would be valid only for Kant's own solution.

Kant's proposal for the solution of the conflict of thesis and antithesis seems to Bennett to be a 'weakening move' (KD 134), viz., of an indefinite regress with restriction to appearances and possible appearances. For this—that is, for the concept of a non-finite in contrast to an infinite—Bennett sees no logico-mathematical necessity.

Bennett opposes this Kantian proposal through a reference to the mathematical doctrine of infinity of Cantor and Frege (KD 129 ff.). For an infinite n, it can be said that " 'n + 1' is greater than n" and " 'n · m' is greater than n" are false. Aleph zero is the number which expresses this state of affairs. It is not a natural number and thus cannot be reached through a progression in natural numbers; it does not lie in the series of numbers. Within the series of numbers, there are infinitely many natural numbers, but each of them is finite and thus in an infinitely large world, no infinite distance from something to something else as a point of reference need be given. Consequently, it would also be false to say that past events stretch back infinitely far and thus have occurred an infinitely long time ago. The concept of an infinite distance is to be rejected.

With a shift of emphasis, Bennett rejects the idea that the infinite is to be taken as a whole, viz., as a whole of the elements of a series, or as a whole which is determined through limits. Kant's indefinite regress amounts to a solution vis-à-vis a conflict between two different requirements of wholeness: wholeness as given through limits, and wholeness as given through a lack of limits. (It is added in the third antinomy that wholeness is afforded by a sufficiently determined principle). 'Wholeness' is thus equivocal; it signifies determinateness within limits (also, if the measurement of the elements of the series is not achieved, through successive synthesis, cf. CPR A426 note), and totality of the elements precisely without limits. The avoidance of a totality in indefinite regress—which, according to Bennett, reads: "Every finite set of *F's* excludes some *F's*" (KD 137)—does not mean, however, that there may not be something infinite involved. The

Kantian solution, as well as the Thesis disclosing the necessary finitude of the world, are to be rejected.

The problem of the Antithesis (KD 143 ff.) is whether there can be an extra-mundane space and an extra-mundane time. Kant bases himself once again on an epistemological view and holds that outside of the world as a whole, no object of intuition is encountered (CPR A428f.). Bennett seeks to show that, even in a relational theory of space, it is possible to hold that beyond a conceived borderline of the universe, causal objects are possible, and that this is only *de facto* not the case. In contrast, for Kant the world must be as large as space, and there can be no extra-mundane space. The world cannot stand in relation to space, for the relational theory of space excludes a determinate place for the world. Bennett thinks, however, that one can leave determinateness open. Then Kant's argument, viz., that extra-mundane space cannot be given, can be discarded; Kant himself had asserted that an empty space cannot be given in experience. The consideration remains that with the acceptance of an extra-mundane space, the world would not stand in relation to space as an object; space and objects are not on the same plane ontologically. But such a query does not show, so Bennett thinks, that the thesis of an extra-mundane space would be false. It could be that whatever is the case simply cannot be expressed in a relational judgment. The Antithesis is thus rejected as far as its spatial part is concerned.

The temporal part of the Antithesis is appraised differently. Bennett thinks that speaking of an empty time is meaningless; but against Kant he wants to allow that there could be a beginning in time, viz., a beginning with time (KD 160).

It would be stimulating to compare Bennett's logico-mathematical treatment of the Antinomies with the Hegelian treatment, which is non-metaphysical or categorial. The Hegelian treatment does not capitulate before the problem of determinateness of the infinite (as a whole on the basis of limits and as a whole on the basis of a lack of limits); instead, it allows infinity to be grasped in an interplay of discreteness and continuity, resolved in a concept of 'quantum' (*Logik,* I, Lasson, 213-236). It is significant that Hegel already possesses the concept of infinity to which Bennett lays claim, viz., that of something infinitely small or large, "which can be neither increased nor decreased" (*Logik* I, 242). Hegel could handle the problem of infinity categorially, something Bennett cannot do. The Hegelian answer is, it is true, only an answer to the problem of determinateness, and not a comment on the question of whether or not metaphysics can make claims about space and time.

The Second Antinomy, that of divisibility, can be treated here only briefly. Bennett's analysis turns on the question of divisibility as logical and as real. Allowing logical divisibility, corresponding to the divisibility of space, does not admit physical divisibility (that something is "splittable"). Logical

divisibility need not imply physical divisibility, as the Antithesis demands, if one differentiates between substance as a count-term and substance as a mass-term (KD 175); accordingly, the Thesis fails, too. Bennett also thinks that space need not be infinitely divisible (KD 182ff.). Likewise for time.

The problem of infinity in the Third Antinomy is different from that of the First and Second Antinomies in that it treats a dynamical problem. The question of existential posits through causality is brought up once in the Thesis, according to which the chain of natural causes cannot progress into infinity, and once in the Antithesis, in which this very claim is made. The difficulty in the Thesis lies in the demand for a sufficiently determined cause. Bennett cites Schopenhauer, who thought that a state A can be conceived as a sufficient cause for a state B if we presuppose "the completeness of the necessary determinations through whose togetherness state B follows without exception." The demand for a sufficient cause has nothing to do with the question of "how state A itself arrived at actuality" (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* I, Insel, Grisebach, p. 644). Bennett speaks of a conflation of reasons for believing (KD 185). Justification demands a justified basis, but explanation demands no explained basis (*ibid.*). There is a confusion between understanding and explanation; the Antithesis is right (KD 188). And still, in the Kantian solution, the Thesis is brought into play insofar as it asserts a sufficiently determinate beginning of a causal chain—except that this beginning is now conceived as something in the given case and not as a first cosmological beginning, so that the Antithesis likewise can hold its own: the compatibility of Thesis and Antithesis becomes a problem of the doctrine of freedom. Bennett criticizes this move, holding that cosmology is irrelevant for questions concerning the doctrine of freedom. One may, however, be more sympathetic: if one accepts a categorial title for a sufficient beginning, then a cosmological beginning may suffice as a beginning out of freedom.

3. The idea of the Kantian *theory of freedom,* the claim that freedom is a noumenal cause, is subjected to a shrewd analysis. Bennett finds that Kant wavers between a parallelistic interpretation—according to which each human action is to be related as an appearance to a thing-in-itself—to freedom as its ground: one could speak of a 'linear' theory. Kant may intend an 'angular' theory, however, according to which a noumenal cause has a noumenal consequence which is itself represented in an appearance (KD 192, 202). Reason could thus perhaps have a noumenal effect on the will, expressed in an appearance belonging to it; freedom would step into actuality via a detour. Both schemata are not, however, compatible. Besides, so Bennett reproves, the Thesis says that not everything is caused through the causality of nature, but it does not say that something is caused by an extra causality of a peculiar kind (KD 193). To that extent, it is not really reconcilable with the Antithesis.

Bennett divides Kant's doctrine of freedom into a doctrine of the ac-

countability of actions and a theory of action. The *theory* of *accountability* (whose contrastive elucidation by Hume's and Schlick's deterministic theories, and Strawson's position, will here be passed over) falls into a difficulty because, according to Bennett, Kant unclearly wants both determinism and freedom, or both linear and angular theory. By way of contrast, the *theory* of *action* can be interpreted more easily as a reconciliation of determinism and freedom. Bennett rests his case on a reinterpretation according to which it is essential to show that contrary to the deterministic scheme, a "self-prediction" must not necessarily be true. He sympathizes with Ryle's thesis, which holds that "self-prediction" is the particular case where the performance (viz., the "self-prediction") makes the difference, constituting a new causal element so that "self-prediction" does not collapse into deterministic prediction. Not all actions can be replaced by self-prediction. Ignorance and the irreconcilability of "making the prediction" and "prediction" (incompatibility of the being of *F* and the consciousness of *F*) are always present. It is thus a question of "ordinary empirical deliberating" (KD 221). Bennett affirms, therefore, the noumenal aspect of freedom in Kant—not as a moment of practical reason which would be a cause, but as a margin of irrationality for predictions.

In Bennett's thesis, one cannot see how normative matters have a place, much as one may, conversely, criticize Kant for conceding a causality to reason at the same time that he has no place for irrational decision. Above all, one must raise objections against the rationalization Bennett gives for actions in the framework of a deterministic outline. The analytic setting of the problem, according to which a pertinent "self-prediction" makes action redundant and places freedom in the incompleteness of "self-prediction," is to be rejected. A decision can occur in the light of knowledge, but it is a positing, something of one's own, that cannot be interpreted away through ponderings on redundancy. One cannot avoid the ontological question (What is the constitution of a being which is free?) and, in the given case, the metaphysical question (How is an occurrence of a positing to be understood?). That the Kantian metaphysical explanation is not satisfactory, and an ontological one is virtually absent, is to be conceded. It is obvious, incidentally, that Bennett rejects the non-temporality of freedom in Kant.

4. Bennett treats the Fourth Antinomy together with a piece on the proof of the existence of God in a chapter on God (KD 228-257). First, he treats the ontological proof of the existence of God and discusses the problem of existence as a predicate. One argument for the denial of existence as a predicate is that otherwise, the instantiation of a concept would always bring a plus in determination with it, so that it would be the instantiation of a concept richer than the initial concept, and thus would be a paradox (KD 230). Bennett thinks he can reject this argument—perhaps a fully determinate concept would vouchsafe its existence—but nevertheless, affirms

Kant's basic conception, which he thinks belongs to a position shared by Frege: 'there are' = judgments are to be separated off from other judgments. This position, Bennett argues, is not proven. The case is, rather, that in Kant, it is only illustrated and in Frege, it serves as a working hypothesis.

Bennett believes that this position is not endangered by the proposal (by N. Malcolm) that the inference is sound if 'existence' is replaced by 'necessary existence.' The argumentation is that 'necessary' means 'true by definition,' and then 'necessary existence' may be parsed as 'existent by definition.' In that way, however, the problem is again back where it was in Kant: 'existent' may not appear as definiens (KD 236). It seems, thus, that the ontological proof can be rejected, in conformity with Kant, subterfuges notwithstanding; indeed, the logical defect of the Anselmian (and Malcolmian) concept of God is supposed to have been demonstrated. For Bennett, God's existence is, as he explains in a wholly un-English avowal, in this sense (that of Anselm and Malcolm) contradictory or nonsensical (KD 237).

The Kantian interpretation of the *cosmological proof* is different from the Thomistic one in that contingency is not interpreted as 'not existing at some time' but as 'conditioned.' Accordingly, it is the Fourth Antinomy, and its concern for the unconditioned underlying the conditioned, which is pertinent here. The trouble is, though, that it discusses the problem in cosmological terms—even though Kant goes beyond the cosmological sphere in the solution of the antinomy (CPR A560f.)—whereas the chapter on the proof of God means something unconditioned which is not in the world (KD 243). In the cosmological proof, Kant's speculation in respect to infinity is re-enacted in the dynamic sense. In one sense, the question is how to give an account of a series completed from behind; this, Bennett hopes, is not Kant's considered view (KD 244). In another sense, which he also sees to be represented by Kant, it is a question of how to account for the whole series (KD 245). The problem is again that of causes and reasons, which Bennett retains for a concluding discussion in the final chapter. In the present context, he is satisfied that for Kant, the cosmological proof infers from the contingent to the cause, but that this principle has meaning only in the world of the senses (CPR A609), and is meaningless outside of this world (KD 246).

The cosmological argument, in a second step, calls for the determination of the necessary being claimed in the course of causal reasoning. Kant treats here the *ens realissimum,* which Bennett subjects to an analysis (KD 249 ff., cf. KD 228 ff.). He rejects the concept in view of his notion of a completely determined concept (KD 248). There are said to be indefinitely more of these concepts than that of the *ens realissimum* (KD 249 on CPR A 573). The reviewer is not able to follow Bennett here: a completely determined concept is not tantamount to that of the *ens realissimum*, the sum-total of all positive properties, which the representative of the ontological and

cosmological arguments has in mind (cf. CPR A574 ff.). Once the *ens realissimum* has been introduced as an account of the necessary being, then the justification of its necessity is a matter of its concept only. In that way, Kant thinks, the cosmological argument is founded on the ontological argument. Bennett has a lengthy passage to the effect that the cosmological argument does not presuppose the ontological argument, but serves only as additional confirmation (KD 251 f.). Even so, the cosmological argument has been shoved onto the logical track and can be attacked from there, viz., that there is no necessary existent (KD 253). It is difficult to see in Bennett's variant any great difference to Kant's critique of the proof.

Finally, Bennett discusses the *physico-theological proof* (KD 255-257). This argues from parts to the whole, asserting on the basis of a teleology in the world a teleology of the world (KD 225). Bennett expresses doubt about Kant's thesis that the argument must lead back to the cosmological one so that a proper 'enchainment' of the physico-theological, cosmological, and ontological proof would arise (dominoes effect, KD 257).

5. A last chapter is dedicated to *reason.* Bennett sums up and criticizes the affinity of reason to the syllogism, the unclarified relations concerning understanding and reason in the syllogisms of reason, and the task of reason, viz., to achieve what is the inverse of the syllogism, an ascending series to conditions and principles. Bennett notes the great generality of the concept of condition—for Kant, the surrounding stretch of the world would have to figure as a condition of that world (KD 264)—but then outlines Kant's view, according to which conditions are what make something possible. Surroundings being disregarded as conditions in this sense, what remains are conditions comprising causes, earlier times in relation to a later one, and physical facts. The problem is whether a search for conditions can terminate, or whether it will only regress to ever further homogeneous conditions of conditions. In an earlier passage, dealing with the Third Antinomy, Bennett had expressed the opinion that he did not understand Kant in his call for an unconditioned: Kant's insistence must be due, so it seems, to a misunderstanding conflating two issues, viz., that a justification requires a justification, but that an explanation does not require an *explanans* which itself must be explained in order for it to do any explaining (KD 185). Here in the later passage, Bennett does not hold to the separation of reasons, or grounds, and explanation. He places next to one another "grounding or explanation or theoretical setting" (KD 266).

The situation is throughout different with respect to the so-called *mathematical* and the *dynamical* antinomies. In the mathematical ones, the fundamental expression of a type of infinity would suffice if such type did not, after all, involve for Kant a metaphysical concept of space and time; Bennett's objection that Kant errs in the concept of infinity (KD 137) is, even so, logico-mathematically significant. For the dynamical antinomies, however, the problem is expressly set within an *existence-positing*

metaphysics, and the regress to conditions and principles is not to be checked by the assertion of any given type of infinity. What Kant is seeking is an 'explanatory' *principle,* that is, a principle which provides the ground for the understanding of a series of existents or events and is at the same time an *actual ground,* a cause. Kant's speculative intention is not to be captured with the means of analytical philosophy, which would only decompose it into its inspirational components. Its admissibility cannot be judged analytically. Rather, one might turn to the Hegelian procedure which judges the matter ontologically. In Hegel's categorial analysis, the issue is how a bad infinite can, if viewed from the vantage point of the true infinite, be accommodated in ontological theory. Hegel shows in the *Logic* what can count as a *principle* (as opposed to an element) of a series, thus clarifying the logicality of the relations between ground and series. Nevertheless, the Kantian problem, as was already indicated, remains for existence-positing metaphysics. With its speculative standpoint, Hegelian rationality offers a doctrine of categories instead of an existence-positing metaphysics and allows for a solution, but it is not that for which Kant asks, if such a solution is possible.

Bennett occupies himself further with Kant's idea that reason strives for highest principles, but falls prey to the illusion that these principles are to be taken as objective instead of *regulative* (KD 268). He criticizes this idea in several respects. He thinks that regulative principles transcend experience only quantitatively, not qualitatively (KD 272), and that as so understood only bear on the antinomies of cosmology, not on the paralogisms or on theology. Bennett's suspicion that the antinomies show the real inspiration for the *Dialectic* belongs here; this suspicion in turn explains why the problematic of the unconditioned is inappropriate for psychology and theology.

By contrast, we feel that in all three areas of *metaphysica specialis,* the principles are qualitatively different from appearances, the significant difference being that the problematic of the series broaches the question of infinity also in a quantitative sense. Our reflections on principles and conditions show that the principles of the real which are sought are qualitatively (ontologically) different from conditions. Of interest is Bennett's observation that the idea of regulative principles tends to favor the Theses of the Antinomies, whereas Kant's sympathies in at least the first two antinomies lean to the Antitheses, while reason deludes itself in the Theses. According to Kant's manifest theory dialectical illusion generates, however, the antinomical clash as such and not just one side of it (KD 280). A lot of material for respectable observations is buried here. Bennett does not arrive at the suggestive thesis that Kant's idea of the regulative is indicative of the speculative moment in his thought, a moment which he could not critically ground and which thus has the appearance of a natural endowment of reason. This turn, so we might suppose, reflects his non-arrival at Hegel's position.

A concluding appraisal of Bennett's two books on Kant can be brief. The main advantage of his analysis is what we earlier called the 'control of arguments.' Analytical philosophy can point out many complications and unclarities in Kant, and force theoretical alternatives to be decided one way or the other with a view to the consistency of the whole theory. But there are also non-necessary material premises falsifying another theory on confrontation: thus the installation of language for concept; the opposition of empirical fact and logic as alternatives to one another, designed to ward off Kant's synthetic *a priori* in favor of non-trivial analytic judgments; and finally, the lack of appreciation for categorial problems. Analytic philosophy's tools of thought thus fail where in Kant the issue is one of principles, of transcendental and speculative thought. Kant's transcendental thought is missed if one reduces the Transcendental Deduction to the production of a coherent history of consciousness, for which purpose an objective reference point would be useful, particularly if it turns out, even on an analytic view—in Strawson's and above all in Rorty's reconstructions—that the transcendental deduction achieves a proof of a relationship of mutual presupposition between objectivity and subjectivity. Kant's transcendental deduction is also missed if one underplays the categoriality of theory in the Analytic of Principles with a conventionalism in matters of substance or with the "ordering argument," or if one ignores the speculative element in the Dialectic, which Kant reduces to regulative notions. Quite generally, Bennett fails to reflect on how logical, epistemological and ontological types of clarification relate to each other. The Bennett interpretation wavers between the thesis of what Kant would have needed to say if he had thought analytically, and the thesis that he sometimes had an inkling of that kind of thought. What is neither-nor is either ignored or sharply attacked.

On that, a word or two more. One knows of many modern Anglo-American examples of cool, and sometimes arrogant, judging and writing. In contrast to Strawson's book on Kant, Bennett's two books constitute no exception. There is hardly a page in which Kant is not burdened with charges like "abominable," "repellent," "dismal," "preposterous," "feeble," or "silly." Also, Bennett's inclination to irony vis-à-vis philosophy follows well-worn tracks. Thus in KA the problem of substance is labored in the example of a porcelain pig. When, in the course of the investigation, the piggy-bank seems to have changed into a mere pig, shall we say that it has suffered an existence-change? The analytical joy in fictions and 'puzzle cases' coincides with an inclination to tomfoolery. Is there hope for another fashion sometime soon?

III

J. Hintikka's book, *Logic, Language Games and Information* (LL) leads

us into a quite different world of thought. Its individual essays—in part going back to the "John Locke Lectures," Oxford, 1964, and mostly published in the years 1964-1971 in early versions—cover such different themes as a quantificational theory of model sets as representations of possible worlds, the relation of quantificational logic to the picture theory of thought and to language, and many more. All we can briefly consider here is Hintikka's occupation with Kant proper; this is not to deny that everything in the book can be conceived as relating to Kant, if we may believe the subtitle, *Kantian Themes in the Philosophy of Logic.*

There are in essence two (mutually connected) problems which, in Hintikka's reading of Kant, play a central role: first, Kant's notion of a *construction* of concepts, which forms the basis for his theory of the synthetic character of mathematics and geometry; and then, more generally, Kant's understanding of the *analytic* and the *synthetic.*

Let us take the first point. Hintikka must give a reading of the Kantian doctrine of the synthetic character of mathematics and geometry from his own quantificational logic, and thus object to the reading according to which Kant requires intuition, for this makes construction possible, as something not strictly logical (LL 208, by way of criticism of Russell). For Hintikka, "intuition" in Kant means the *representative of an individual* (LL 208), and the question of the possibility of construction means: how can something intuitional, an individual, be introduced *a priori*? In terms of quantificational logic, this means that through the existential quantifier, an individual can be universally introduced (rule of existential instantiation 145). Hintikka contrasts Kant's (already systematically adapted) position with the quantificational reading (LL 118 f.).

It is to be remembered that Hintikka relates quantificational logic to language games and game-theoretical considerations, and especially to games of *seeking* and *finding,* which are presented in contrast to Quine's behavioristic interpretation of the games of 'assent' and 'dissent' (LL 183 ff.). With that, he also wants to establish a counterpart to the Kantian idea, viz., that intuition as the presenting of an individual is connected with a faculty or an activity (sensibility), a counterpart which would be closer to quantificational logic (LL 121). (It is clear that the theme of the continuum, to which Kant wants to do justice, recedes in importance).

Hintikka's reading of Kantian 'construction' is made more explicit in the course of the book by being set forth within the context of the second complex of problems mentioned above, the *elucidation* of 'analytic' and 'synthetic.' The preferred understanding of 'analytic' is based on a relation of meanings to one another within a true sentence (conceptual truth, Type I, LL 125-133), or on the inherence of a conclusion (as a sub-sentence) in one of its premisses (Type II, LL 133-136). Hintikka presents two further concepts of analyticity: Type III means that an argument may introduce no new individuals (LL 136-146); Type IV claims that the informational content of

the conclusion of an argument must not exceed that of the premisses (LL 146-148). It follows that Kant's concept of analyticity corresponds to Type III, according to which an analytical argument cannot infer from the existence of one individual to another (LL 148). By contrast, an argument which *a priori* permitted that would be synthetic *a priori* (on the level of Type III).

This classification of the Kantian understanding of analyticity is underpinned by Hintikka with comments on an understanding of analyticity corresponding to Type IV, under which logical truths are *tautologies.* He sees the difficulty of such a thesis to be that the informational content of such truths would have to be contested. A corresponding difficulty affects mathematics. Thus a theory is needed to combine analyticity with a gain in information, and thus make possible a useful understanding of deduction. A synthetic moment corresponding to Type IV of analyticity is demanded.

To this end, Hintikka introduces the concepts of *degree* and *depth.* They mean that, in a deductive argument, individuals and quantifiers appear which were not contained in the initial theorem. This implies that in deductive inferences of quantificational logic, propositions appear which are as such synthetic (in the sense of a variant *e* of Type III, LL 180). Putting things in another way, one may say that in logic (first order logic, quantificational logic) there are different tautologies: *surface tautologies* and *depth tautologies,* the latter of which involve the introduction of individuals in deductive connections.

According to Hintikka, the Kantian interpretation of mathematics and geometry, which he sees as interpretable in quantificational logic, fits in with this picture (LL 182). He also offers an impressive, historically supported analysis of the Kantian notion of analysis and synthesis (LL 199-221): the point is not merely that the two feature opposite senses of direction, but also that Kant was familiar with the classical geometrical procedure and its steps of *πρότασις, ἐκθέσις, κατασκευή* and *ἀπόγειξις.* The figurative presentation (*ἐκθέσις*) requires a construction (drawing of auxiliary lines), for example, the introduction of further geometrical objects, to make the proof possible. Kantian 'construction' would be a universalization of the *κατασκευή,* which then makes the proof—on its side analytical—possible (LL 214).

With his scheme of degree and depth (the precise workings of which must be ignored here) Hintikka is in a position to interpret the Kantian example of "7 + 5 = 12" as an example for the synthetic character of mathematics (LL 195f.). The synthetic character of equality corresponds to a rigorous sense of syntheticity (a coinage to correspond to analyticity) of Type III *d* (LL 149; a geometrical example is interpreted in LL 196).

Hintikka's reading sketched above is of great subtlety and seems, in fact, to present a logical, rational solution of the Kantian problem in the *transcendental aesthetic* (although the differentiation of mathematics and

geometry, or, according to Lorenzen, of the formal-synthetic and the material-synthetic, still poses problems).[13] However this may be, Hintikka's is a significant attempt to clear up and understand Kant's synthetic *a priori* logically (by way of proposing degrees and dimensions of depth of theorems), if not to justify it. One can see, for example, that in a selective context Hintikka can give a more rigorous reading of what Bennett, allying himself with Quine and Strawson, means when he calls synthetic *a priori* truths "non-obvious analytic truths" (KA 42). It cannot be further outlined here how Hintikka's analysis treats a decision for a definitive solution of the problem of analyticity (Type III together with Type IV). Is Kant's synthetic *a priori* accepted for mathematics and geometry? The text of the book gives only a diagnosis of different understandings of analyticity and syntheticity, and makes no decision in favor of one type or one terminology.

What Hintikka does not attempt, but what could involve another non-strictly logical understanding of intuition in Kant—oriented around the notion of a continuum and a matrix for multiplicity—is an interpretation of the *categorial* synthetic *a prioi* of the *transcendental analytic.* It would be stimulating if we were to say something about that. Since a solution in terms of quantificational logic will not be available here, Hintikka's reading of the synthetic *a priori* in Kant is only partial. Perhaps we may infer that for him, the Kantian conception—as spanning the Aesthetic and the Analytic—is not homogeneous.

Hintikka's ideas on *concept* and *actuality* (LL 233-237) should be noted. *A priori* surface information appears as information about actuality, but it is nonetheless also conceptual information (LL 233); no new observations are needed here, only a depth analysis of the concepts and of the compossibility of possible individuals. Hintikka accepts the idea that, in the *a priori* realm, proofs further our knowledge both of actuality *and* of our conceptual system (LL 234). The categorial character of *a priori* concepts which makes that possible (if we prescind from mathematical concepts, which in Kant have a peculiar tie to actuality mediated through sensibility), can of course not surface here. Yet Hintikka still addresses this dimension when he talks of the thing in itself. The thing in itself—or, more correctly, things in themselves—are concealed, but only to the extent that one cannot know, in terms of proof theory, when we have reached the requisite depth, a depth which would be tantamount to the knowledge, that is, a complete analysis, of the compatibilities of conceptually apprehended individuals (LL 237).

Finally, the reviewer may note that he is not totally clear how far Hintikka's basic ideas (on model sets and constituents, on the relation of model sets to possible worlds, and on the role of quantificational logic as an instru-

13. cf. W. Kamlah, P. Lorenzen, *Logische Propädeutik* (Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut, 1967), pp. 218ff., 225ff.

ment of knowledge) are cogent in themselves and as presuppositions for the attractive readings of part of Kant's transcendental theory in the *Critique of Pure Reason.* For this, more specialized investigations and discussions would be required, exceeding what can be offered here and what the reviewer is, at present, in a position to provide.

IV

In his book, *The Primacy of Practice* (PP), Nicholas Rescher attempts an amalgamation of Kantian ideas on practical reason, and on the regulative function of reason with pragmatic ideas. Practical reason is to be accorded a primacy.

Rescher's fundamental thesis is that all factual knowledge needs a criterion for its validation, but that this criterion itself cannot be a truth, since then the criterion which secures truth would, in a circular fashion, presuppose that which it is supposed to validate (PP 2). Alternatively, therefore, the truth-criterion is to be taken as *methodological* ((PP 3) Along with this, since it does not underlie the question of truth but figures as an instrumentality, it must be examined as to whether or not it works. The assessment of truth in the domain of factual knowledge is accordingly dependent on the justification of a method, and thus dependent on a justification through practical reason. The alternative character of truth-assertions and method is compatible with that of theoretical and practical reason. And insofar as all assertions of fact require a criterion for their justification, practical reason lies at the basis of theoretical reason and takes precedence over it (PP 21).

With the instrumental justification of a method, there follows a difference in kinds of evidence: the evidence that hitherto a method has led to successful results and achieved success more effectively than another (both cases of evidence in historical experience); and the evidence that success is to be imputed to the method (PP 15f.). This latter type of evidence is not a knowledge of facts; it can only be justified through the warranted postulate that post-hoc evidence in suitable contexts justifies propter-hocness (PP 17).

Evidence of the former kind, on the other hand, since it is designed to help erect a criterion of truth in the first place, is only plausible; it can be undermined through failure of the truth-criterion—or the method—supported by it. Still, the circle of presupposing truth for truth is avoided. Again, viewed in this way, practical reason underpins theoretical reason in its factual knowledge.

Unfortunately, Rescher is led astray when he takes the practical moment, keyed to methods rather than truth-assertions and designated as instrumental, to be practical also in the sense of a *pragmatic* approach (PP 6) which, with its aim of avoiding pain or disappointment, is geared to human

emotions (PP 21: ". . . The ultimate metacritical standard for weighing a criterion of truth acceptance [in the factual area] is not cognitive after all but affective . . ."). The author professes a Darwinian pragmatism (PP 27). The mistake is that the discovery of truth need not serve practical ends, so that the methodological (and in this sense 'practical') step need not be 'practical' in the sense of 'useful for us.' Nor does acknowledgement of cognitive purposes mean that the evidential problem of the criterion becomes circular; one can differentiate between the justification of method and of truth. The unclarity is mirrored correspondingly in an unclear use of "instrumental" and "pragmatic." The author reserves a non-pragmatic, only instrumental, standard for truth in ethics to the extent that it sanctions values which do not collapse into values of welfare; but, regarding the question of non-useful discoveries of truth, he cannot bring himself to provide the necessary clarity. He makes do with an equivocation.

The above mentioned mistake apart, the distinction between a (practical) method for the validation of truth and assertions of factual truth permits a new interpretation of the *problem of induction* (PP 28f.). The problem is that in an induction, a generalization is proposed which transcends the given evidence. We have thus a thesis and a method, viz., the injunction to transcend the given. The method stands in need of confirmation under the maxim that it is rational to affirm something as long as it is not falsified. One need not establish the thesis (the empirical generalization)—for example, through an assertion about the regularity of nature—rather, one must legitimate an "operational program of action" (PP 35). The justification of induction is thus practical and not material; it is not 'correct,' but it must work (PP 37). In fine, Rescher's view is that we first 'validate' the method, then generalize past givens, and finally apply deductively the generalization to future items (PP 39). The issue is not one of moving from the past to the future, but one of legitimating a practice which leads to generalization; we must validate a practice, not a material thesis (viz., the generalization as true). These are warranted non-pragmatically through methods, and methods are warranted universally, as general methods, through results or successes (PP 40). Practical reason lies at the basis of induction, but this is as methodological pragmatism, not as the pragmatic assertion of specific material theses (PP 40). This idea, however, is again mistakenly tied to Darwinism (PP 42-44). Nonetheless, Rescher's sharpening of the distinction of thesis and method (PP 45), which instances a new elucidation of induction, strikes one as noteworthy.

In the chapter which follows, dedicated to *natural laws,* Rescher differentiates between accidental generalizations and law-like generalizations (PP 47), and asks how the deficit in merely accidental generalizations is compensated once a law is asserted. According to Rescher, what is important for a law is that we consider counterfactual cases: if such and such were so, then it would be subject to the law; confronted with a counterfactual hypothesis,

we would retain the law (PP 50f.). For Rescher, induction is insufficient to secure a law (PP 55), since it encompasses hypothetical (and not only non-observed) cases. Laws possess "nomic necessity" and "fact-transcending hypotheticality" (PP 60). What, then, makes a law into a law?

The answer is: imputation (PP 56). All depends on the systematic context in which the law appears. The relevant considerations here are pragmatic (PP 59). Nonetheless, induction must be well-founded. It is, similarly to what was said earlier, not the grounding of generalization as a material thesis, but the grounding of procedure, of imputation, which is at issue (cf. PP 61). Law-likeness cannot be an observed law (Hume), but neither is it an unavoidable production of the human mind or consciousness (Kant): it is warranted decision (PP 63). This means to accept a Kantian idea but deflates it from a transcendental-constitutive notion to the notion of successful imputation (cf. PP 65). (This is also because this view draws on particular natural laws, not, as Kant did, on a universal law-likeness of a causal kind. In Rescher, the categorial level of the Kantian theory is side-stepped).

The said imputation is 'regulative,' thus lacking sufficient evidence and yet connected rationally with a conceptual framework (PP 67). Ultimately it is methodological, and occurs in the interest of a theoretical rationalization of our experience (PP 67). Rescher speaks of a 'constitutive' thesis which is accepted on regulative grounds.

The notion of regulative imputation leads to a chapter in which Rescher treats the problem of *noumenal causality.* He sees the problem from the perspective of the principle of sufficient reason (PP 70 ff.), which claims no proper causality but, in an appeal from the conditioned to the unconditioned, is imputed as a ground. In terms of it, appearances are referred to an object without which they would not be objective. By way of a postulate (PP 79 ff.), thought is taken to refer to a transcendental object. Such thought does not lead to knowledge of this object but serves as an underpinning of the knowledge of appearances.

The difficulty is that now the objectivity of knowledge, in the genuine transcendental understanding expressed in the Analytic of Concepts of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason,* takes on a regulative, in fact hypothetical, character (cf. PP 87). Thus, the cogency of Kant's transcendental philosophy is pragmatically relativized and weakened. Incidentally, the reader has to do without a discussion of difficult pieces of Kant's theory such as the Third Antinomy and the two-world doctrine of the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.*

We will pass over a chapter on a topic more or less out of context with the rest of the book, viz., non-contradiction in nature. The idea is that contradictions in nature (where imputed) need not militate against the principle of non-contradiction if one adopts the view that there are different branches of time in two-dimensional time. (This is in answer to the Everett-Wheeler thesis.) Let us, rather, move over to a *critique of analytic philosophy* (PP.

107 ff.). Rescher's idea here is that in analytic philosophy, conceptual connections are torn apart in the interest of conceptual clarity. "Puzzle cases" are invoked (PP. 108), and the question is what a concept means without some other content which goes along with it. [For example: What does 'consciousness' mean without a body of one's own? Can one have consciousness in another body? And so on. The issue is that of "normality-violating hypotheses" (PP. 114).] The method of argumentation is familiar enough (also in Bennett). Rescher comes out in favor of unadulterated conceptual interconnections, understood as grounded on the factuality of our world ("fact-coordinative concepts").

The difficulty is that, on this view, synthetic truths can only be empirical. The Kantian (categorial) synthesis is replaced by an empirical synthesis embedded in a world view (PP. 119), much as Rescher would have us believe that he thus bows to something approaching a theory of synthetic *a priori* truth (PP. 120). We cannot see, however, that an argument for this weaker thesis is given. The weaker thesis is one for our world, the correlative being a thesis for all possible worlds (cf. PP. 120); this, again, is not Kant's thesis. What Rescher must oppose, without any close inspection of transcendental argument, is the idea of *a priori* knowledge of a world which is ours insofar as it features space and time. Quite different suggestions emerge if Hegel's philosophy, or hermeneutics, is taken as a point of departure. Hegel's categorial system can argue *a priori* for the interdependence of certain categories; N. Hartmann, too, has come up with *a priori* claims in this context. None of this receives attention.

In view of its serious defects, little need be said about Rescher's treatment of ethics (chapters VII and VIII). The idea is, on the one hand, to model ethics on pragmatic notions and, on the other, to leave room for non-welfare (or, as it were, non-Darwinian) values. The values which go beyond general welfare are somehow higher, but again not really intelligible. They are to be presented in an 'instrumental' analysis, distinguished from a pragmatic analysis in the manner sketched above (PP. 132). Rescher's detailed treatment, however, is unsuccessful. 'Instrumental analysis' is at one time a generic concept, making pragmatic analysis a special case; at another time, however, it is a coordinated supplement to pragmatic analysis (cf. PP. 3, 6, 135, 146, 151, 152). What is generally valid in ethics reduces to Darwinian welfare values, while the other values are culturally relative. Ethics has to do with survival in the sense of a survival *sui generis*, with additional ideas of value. It is striking that the author takes no notice of the proposals (relating to the exquisiteness versus fundamentality in values, to an ethic of value versus an ethic of success), made by M. Scheler and N. Hartmann fifty or sixty years ago. The pragmatic way of viewing these matters does not seem to contribute anything useful. In addition, the reader marvels over the optimism. Would someone not rather be of the opinion that ethics might serve precisely as an impediment to survival where it

recommends biologically disadvantageous restraints? Let us note in conclusion that in his chapter on ethics, Rescher loses sight of the idea of the regulative (mentioned PP 142 in the general sense that the differentiation of facts and values demands a postulate). The attempted linkage between ethics and the basic inspiration of the book seems unsuccessful.

One is tempted to regard the three or four reviewed works (together with Strawson's book on Kant) as authoritative new contributions, whether instructive or erroneous, of English and American philosophers (pace Hintikka) in search of an assessment of Kantian transcental philosophy. However, reflection on the legitimacy of the Kantian position indebted to the English and American way of doing philosophy finds its expression in other places as well (to mention only the essays by Bubner, again Hintikka, Körner, Rorty, Eva Schaper, Stroud, Wilkerson and others; at times, their more general approach to the possibility of transcendental argument is intriguing). The works selected here do not, as a rule, go that far. What they do is to present significant analyses, interpretations and reflections, of Kant in three representative forms of modern philosophizing: the analytic, the symbolic-logical, and the pragmatic. Will further efforts concerning the transcendental inspiration—not to mention an extension of the program to Hegel—finally lead to a convergent assimilation?

ANNOUNCEMENTS

In the case of articles and reviews not originally written for *CGP* which are carried in translation, the Editors assume no responsibility for the accuracy of the bibliographical references. Notwithstanding, whenever, in the course of reworking the notes for an English language readership, an error is discovered, an endeavor is made, with the cooperation of the author, to correct it.

CGP is prepared to announce, in future volumes, the titles of books originating in German, translations of which into English are in preparation, have (within a period of two years) appeared, or are scheduled to appear. The information for such announcements, including the date by which a particular work is anticipated, or on which it appeared or is scheduled to appear, and the name of the publisher, will be welcomed by the Coordinator from persons directly involved.

In the interest of establishing contact with our purchasers, subscribers and readers, the Editors of *CGP* invite the reactions, critical and otherwise, to the first two volumes. The purpose stated in the Preface in view, suggestions are particularly welcome at this time with regard to modes and movements within philosophy currently appearing in German which in the opinion of the reader are deserving of more attention in our contents selection process than they have been accorded up to this time.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Hans Blumenberg, *Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt* (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkahmp, 1977).

Theodor Ebert, *Meinung und Wissen in der Philosophie Platons* (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1974).

Konrad Gaiser, *Die Ungeschriebene Lehre Platons* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1963).

Dieter Henrich, *Identität und Objektivität* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1976).

Kurt Hübner, *Kritik der wissenschaftlichen Vernunft* (Munich: Alber, 1978).

Malte Hossenfelder, *Kant's Konstitutionstheorie und die Transzendentale Deduktion* (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1978).

Friedrich Kaulbach, *Ethik und Metaethik* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974).

H. Lübbe (Ed.), *Wozu Philosophie?—Stellungnahmen eines Arbeitskreises* (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1978).

Niklas Luhmann, *Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1968).

Jürgen Mittelstraß, *Neuzeit und Aufklärung* (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1970).

Jürgen Mittelstraß und Manfred Riedel (Editors), *Vernünftiges Denken* (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1978).

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L. Bruno Puntel, *Darstellung, Methode und Struktur* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1973).

J. Ritter, *Metaphysik und Politik; Studien zur Aristotles und Hegel* (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1969).

Robert Spaemann, *Kritik der politischen Utopie* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1978).

Michael Theunissen, *Sein und Schein* (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1978).

Ernst Tugendhat, *Vorlesung zur Einführung in sprachanalytische Philosophie* (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1976).

USAGES WITHIN *CGP*

A Manual of Style, twelfth Edition (Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 1969) is *CGP's* authority in matters of form. The following special usages will be of interest to the reader.

1) In the case of translations, footnotes listed under small roman numerals are by the translator or, where specifically indicated, by the coordinator or person responsible for the editing.

2) *Pointed Brackets:* If an author introduces a term, short phrase, or brief explanation into a translation which does not appear in the published German edition, this material is placed within pointed brackets: "<. . . >".

3) *Single Quotations*: Most of the many admissable usages of single quotes are adequately covered in *A Manual of Style.* The admission of the third of the usages here considered, as a concession to a fairly common practice within current philosophical literature, principally occasions this special consideration. Single quotes may be used (1) as scope indicators around a phrase, in its initial occurrence, employed to translate a foreign term for which there is no appropriate single term in English, (ii) to indicate a special or restricted sense for a term, (iii) to indicate the *mention,* as distinguished from the *use* of a term, the latter being indicated by double quotes.

The first and second usages can be especially useful in translation. The third usage, or a surrogate, will sometimes be found essential to conveying the meaning of a German text. Seeing that both the second and third usages pertain to single terms, however, they tend to be incompatible. The problem may be resolved in either of two ways: (i) The first resolution grows out of the following supplementary instruction: In the case of the first and second usages, the affected phrase or term, *upon its first occurrence within the text,* shall be followed by the foreign word being translated, in parentheses, or, if such is needed, by a translator's note. The resolution: In the case of the second usage, the translator may elect to place the foreign term translated (to be in parentheses) following the term enclosed in single quotes, *not merely the first time in which it occurs, but each time it occurs.* The foreign word in brackets will then serve as a flag to indicate the usage of single quotes which is in force. (ii) A translator may indicate mention by placing a term in italics, rather than by the use of single quotes, explaining this choice in a translator's note. This resolution will have appeal where the second usage occurs with some frequency and where competing usages of italics can be avoided.

4) *Scope Indicators:* Parenthetical page references within the text of a review originating in English may follow a phrase, a sentence, or a group of sentences (the latter usually constituting a paragraph) being quoted or paraphrased. Where the reference pertains only to the phrase or sentence it immediately follows, this is indicated by the placement of the formal punctuation mark—usually a comma or a period—following the parenthesis.

Whitehead's simple declaration, "Objectification is abstraction" (p. 62), reflects his philosophy of science more adequately than it does his metaphysical orientation. [Not: " . . . abstraction," (p. 62)"]

Hegel writes: "What philosophy begins with must be either mediated or immediate, and it is easy to show that it can neither be the one nor the other; thus either way of beginning is refuted" (p. 67). [Not: " . . . refuted." (p. 67)]

Where the page reference serves to document more than one sentence, it stands free of punctuation. In this case the paragraphing or some other stylistic device serves to co-determine the scope.

PLANNED FOR SUBSEQUENT VOLUMES
(The Translations of the Titles are Tentative)

Hans Michael Baumgartner, "Theses for the Founding of a Transcendental Historiography," in: Hans Michael Baumgartner and Jörn Rüsen, *Seminar: Geschichte und Theorie* (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1976).

Hans Blumenberg, "Self-preservation and 'Inertia': Toward the Constitution of Modern Rationality," in: Ebeling (Ed.), *Subjektivität und Selbsterhaltung* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976).

Gernot Böhme, "Is Goethe's Theory of Colors Science?" In: *Studia Leibnitiana* IX (1977).

Friedrich Kambartel, "Ethics and Mathematics," in: Manfred Riedel (Ed.), *Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie*, Band I: *Geschichte, Probleme, Aufgaben* (Freiburg: Rombach, 1972).

O. Marquard, "Happiness in Unhappiness," in: *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 1978/1.

Reinhart Maurer, "The Relation of Technology and Justice and its Metaphysical Basis in Plato's Republic," in: *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, 82. Jahrgang (1975).

Gerold Prauss, "Frege's Contribution to the Theory of Knowledge," in: *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 1976.

E. Scheibe, "Can Theories be Explained?" In: *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 1976.

Josef Simon, "Teleological Reflection and Causal Determination," in: *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* 30 (1976).

Ernst Tugendhat, "Charles H. Kahn: The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek," in: *The Verb 'Be' and its Synonyms*, ed. by W.M. Verhaar, Part 6 (Dordrecht: Riedel, 1973).

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